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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines representations of the courtroom trial in Hollywood cinema 
produced between 1934 and 1966. The primary method is close textual analysis, 
which has been neglected in previous work on trial sequences in cinema. However, 
I argue that a rigorous engagement with both the conventions of the courtroom trial 
form and individual films’ use of these conventions requires close attention to the 
text. 
The introductory chapter identifies the dominant conventions, meanings and 
ideology underpinning Hollywood representations of the courtroom trial by looking 
at the treatment of space, character, procedure and drama in a number of films 
produced between 1957 and 1962 that serve as a representative sample of the 
conventions of trial representation in Hollywood cinema. I conclude that the 
narrative scenario of the courtroom trial tends to dictate a set of formal strategies 
that respect and affirm the American adversarial trial system. However, I also use 
this chapter to begin mapping out the ways in which individual films are able to 
nuance their representation of the courtroom trial despite its multitude of fixed 
components. 
My subsequent chapters examine how different genres and modes inflect the 
dominant representations of the courtroom trial as I look in detail at trial sequences 
in, respectively, the social problem film, the woman’s melodrama and film noir. 
This method involves firstly engaging with existing criticism on each genre and 
considering how previous definitions and identified conventions, meanings and 
representational strategies might be said to affect that particular genre’s 
representations of the courtroom trial.  
My second chapter examines representations of the courtroom trial in the social 
problem film, which I argue cleaves relatively closely to the representational model 
outlined in my introductory chapter. However, through close readings of two case 
studies, Dust Be My Destiny and Pinky, I also demonstrate the differences in how 
both films handle the didacticism and resolution that the trial form offers the social 
problem film, and identify competing voices in the text that complicate what could 
be viewed as a solely affirmative depiction of the court system. My third chapter 
examines representations of the courtroom trial in woman’s melodrama, employing 
as primary case studies Peyton Place and Madame X. My analyses of these films 
demonstrate how the female-centred melodrama can, to different degrees, challenge 
the patriarchal structures of the court by emphasising the female protagonist’s 
viewpoint. My final chapter looks at courtroom trial representations in film noir. I 
provide close readings of trial sequences in Stranger on the Third Floor and The 
Lady from Shanghai. Here I argue that noir’s use of the courtroom trial exemplifies 
the genre’s oft-situated difference from conventional forms in Hollywood cinema 
of the period. Noir trials consistently challenge notions of the adversarial trial 
system as the correct one for seeking justice.   
12 
 
Introduction 
 
For a long time, the cultural picture of the courtroom trial has been rooted in 
its filmic representation. The editors of Cahiers du Cinèma refer to the trial as ‘a 
classic feature of Hollywood cinema’ as early as 1969.1  Carol Clover locates an 
increasing presence of the trial sequence in early talking pictures, noting that 
MGM’s first dramatic talkie was a trial film (The Trial of Mary Dugan [Dir: Bayard 
Veiller, 1929]).2 This is understandable given that dialogue might be considered 
inherent to the trial form (not only talkie, but oft-considered “talky”), but Clover 
traces its origins back even further, to early silent cinema (Falsely Accused! [Dir: 
G.W. Bitzer, 1908]). Thus as Hollywood cinema entered the 1930s, the filmic trial 
was already an established convention, one that proliferated in the following 
decades. A particularly malleable form, the courtroom trial appears in Hollywood 
musicals (Gentlemen Prefer Blondes [Dir: Howard Hawks, 1953]), comedies (I’m 
no Angel [Dir: Wesley Ruggles, 1933], The Awful Truth [Dir: Leo McCarey, 1937], 
Adam’s Rib [Dir: George Cukor, 1949]), Westerns (Broken Lance [Dir: Edward 
Dmytryk, 1954], Valerie [Dir: Gerd Oswald, 1957]) and fantasies (Miracle on 34th 
Street [Dir: George Seaton, 1947]). 
Yet despite this longstanding awareness of the trial as a well-worn 
convention, there has been very little examination of it within film studies. This is 
perhaps because of its exemplification of convention. The trial is a necessarily 
limited form, its patterns of representation and development bound to a particular 
                                                          
1 Editors of Cahiers du Cinèma, ‘John Ford’s Young Mr Lincoln’ in Philip Rosen (ed.), Narrative, 
Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986) p. 471. 
2 Previous talking pictures had been produced by the studio, but they had all been entertainments 
in generic frameworks (the musical, fantasy) that rendered the use of spoken dialogue spectacular. 
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setting and procedure that we associate with the “real life” courtroom.3 These 
imposed limitations may seem off-putting for critics; how interesting can a trial 
scene possibly be? But looking at the trial affords the critic several opportunities: to 
identify and interrogate the conventions of a form we recognise as conventional but 
tend to neglect; to consider how these conventions have been utilised, subverted 
and problematised across a range of Hollywood films, genres and styles; and to 
examine the subsequent meanings produced, particularly as they pertain to 
Hollywood’s constructions of American law and justice. 
This thesis examines the representation of the courtroom trial in Hollywood 
cinema between the dates 1934 and 1966. I employ textual analysis of a number of 
trial scenes spanning several genres, including the trial film (or courtroom drama), 
the social problem film, the women’s melodrama and film noir. This methodology 
addresses what I maintain has been a persistent failing of previous criticism on 
trials in cinema sufficiently to consider in detail the textual aspects of trial 
depiction. This lack strikes me as particularly significant given the aforementioned 
degree of fixedness of many of its formal elements. This fixedness makes the trial 
scene the ideal convention for examining what differences in meaning are wrought 
by the specific choices made in each film. Even the slightest term of difference 
proffers a new meaning to what is considered a standardized, immutable 
convention. It is this perceived fixedness that also permits the thesis to act as a 
critical intervention in the areas of both mise-en-scène and genre criticism within 
film studies, the details of which I will return to shortly.  
                                                          
3 Audiences tend to overlook the degree to which the conventions of trial representation have 
been largely intertextually constructed; we assume the plausibility of a trial scene on the basis of 
its adherence to the conventions set into place by other films. 
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I have employed my date range for a number of reasons that will overlap as 
I explain them. Beginning with 1934 allows me to consider uses of the trial scene 
from the point at which the Production Code Administration censorship guidelines 
began to be stringently enforced. These guidelines imposed a limitation upon 
representations of the trial during this early period. The initial rule regarding the 
law (‘Law, natural or human, shall not be ridiculed, nor shall sympathy be created 
for its violation’4) is followed by an explication that namechecks the court: 
The courts of the land should not be presented as unjust. This does not mean 
that a single court may not be presented as unjust, much less that a single 
court official must not be presented this way. But the court system of the 
country must not suffer as a result of this presentation.5  
 
The ambiguities that result from the language used here has meant that rendering 
the exact boundaries of this guideline were difficult, and it is beyond the remit of 
this project to consider the exact role played by censorship in the trial 
representations that were screened. Nevertheless, Francis M. Nevins views the 
period from 1930 to mid-1934 as ‘juricinema’s first golden age’,6 identifying a 
distinct pattern of trial representation, pivoted around the figure of the shyster 
lawyer, that he argues was ended by the strict enforcement of the Production Code. 
This suggests that the Production Code imposed certain limits on how the trial 
scene could be represented in film, and I am interested in exploring what was 
possible within those limits, within specific generic contexts. My case studies will 
consider the degrees to which individual films and film genres were able to critique 
                                                          
4 The Motion Picture Production Code of 1930; quoted in Jack Vizzard, See No Evil: Life Inside a 
Hollywood Censor (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), p. 367. 
5 Ibid., p. 377. 
6 Francis M. Nevins, ‘When Celluloid Lawyers Started to Speak: Exploring Juriscinema’s First Golden 
Age’ in Michael Freeman (ed.) Law and Popular Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 
109-131. 
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the law and the adversarial trial system during this period, moving from a 
consideration of the broadly respectful approach identified in my first chapter to the 
varying types of challenge and critique evidenced in the later chapters. Finally, for 
reasons that I will elucidate in my conclusion, I argue that the chosen date range 
contains the greatest concentration of courtroom trial scenes (as we shall see, of a 
certain type) in the history of Hollywood cinema.  
Due in part to my use of textual analysis as a primary methodology, I have 
attempted to employ as case studies trial scenes that share a number of essential 
features. All of the trials analysed take place in United States courtrooms that 
operate within the nation’s adversarial system. Of the six major case studies I 
analyse in my final three chapters, five depict criminal cases and one a civil case. 
All of the five main criminal cases are murder trials.7 Beyond the trial films 
considered in my first chapter, all of my major case studies place a lead character in 
the defendant role, thus rendering all of the central identification figures outsiders 
to the courtroom proceeding. The case studies in my social problem and melodrama 
chapters, with the exception of the first of two trials depicted in Dust Be My Destiny 
(Dir: Lewis Seiler, 1939), consist of climactic narrative courtroom trials. All case 
studies appear within dramatic rather than comedic contexts and each trial is treated 
as a serious event within the diegesis.  
These choices of corpus have been made in part because they reflect the 
dominant narrative contexts within which significant trial scenes appear in films of 
                                                          
7 This imbalance is a reflection of the dominant narrative contexts within which the trial is 
employed across Hollywood cinema of this period; as Greenfield et al. note of filmic trial depiction 
‘Crime dominates. Within crime, murder dominates’. [See Steve Greenfield, Guy Osborn, and Peter 
Robson, Film and the Law: The Cinema of Justice (2nd edn; Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, 2010), p. 25.] 
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this period. The embedding of a trial narrative within a broader generic and 
narrative framework often involves placing characters unfamiliar with the processes 
of the court into the trial scenario, a contrast from the legal professional-centred 
case studies of my first chapter that prioritises a point of view divergent from the 
legal viewpoint. I have decided not to deal with comic courtroom scenes (despite 
the many pleasures and rewards of the comedic trials of this era) because I again 
wish to set certain tonal parameters around the contexts in which my case studies 
appear. Ensuring that each trial is treated “seriously” by the film identifies a 
parameter to my study while also allowing me to demonstrate the range of 
possibilities permitted within this limitation. For example, I believe that the parodic 
and exaggerated inflections of trial representation one would immediately think 
could be displayed through recourse to the comedic courtroom are also exhibited in 
the trial scenes that I analyse in my noir chapter. 
My reasoning for looking at inflections of the trial convention through the 
prism of genre also warrants explanation. The issue of genre is one that I deal with 
across the thesis, considering at different points various definitions and debates 
surrounding the term and its application. I wish to establish here that my own use of 
the term genre is one that emphasises hybridity and overlap. I work from the 
assumption that all Hollywood films are hybridized forms with claims to multiple 
genres. This approach is relatively neglected by much academic work on film 
genre, which, as Deleyto notes ‘is still centrally concerned with whether a film 
belongs to a genre or not’,8 and which is inclined to view genre hybridity as a 
phenomenon specific to post-classical Hollywood. This inclination is challenged by 
                                                          
8 Celestino Deleyto, ‘Film Genres at the Crossroads: What Genres and Films Do to Each Other’ in 
Barry Keith Grant (Ed.) Film Genre Reader IV (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012), p. 220. 
17 
 
Janet Staiger, who argues against the notion of classifying classical Hollywood 
genres as pure, viewing the majority of mainstream Hollywood films as instead 
‘inbred’ products that contain multiple generic registers.9 Staiger argues that, rather 
than continuing with the impulse to categorise and classify, ‘the most valuable 
critical contribution that can be made’ to film genre is ‘to analyse the social, 
cultural, and political implications of pattern mixing’.10  
I believe I provide such a contribution through this research. Although 
Staiger differentiates the ‘inbred’ mode of genre mixing within mainstream 
Hollywood cinema from her concept of the ‘internal hybrid’ (in which mainstream 
genres are utilised by marginalised and independent filmmakers), the notion of the 
internal hybrid using genre mixing to ‘dialogue with or criticise the dominant’ 
applies to the uses of the trial form I analyse here.11 In my case studies, dominant 
patterns of trial representation, consolidated by the mid-1930s, inscribed into 
viewer expectations of the trial sequence, and entailing a specific ideological 
position, mix with the generic structures of the social problem film, woman’s 
melodrama or the film noir. It is in examining the features and results of these 
mixtures that this thesis explores existing film genre theory. I have chosen to 
analyse a number of case studies incorporating four generic frameworks that are 
broadly distinct, and which bring out different key areas of discussion, but which 
also tend to hybridization and can be viewed as modalities as much as genres, a 
selection which coheres with my approach to genre. These are the trial film, the 
social problem film, the woman’s melodrama and film noir. Each brings out 
                                                          
9 Janet Staiger, ‘Hybrid or Inbred: The Purity Hypothesis and Hollywood Genre History’ in Barry 
Keith Grant (Ed.) Film Genre Reader IV (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2012), p. 215. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 
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different areas for discussion in terms of their particular relationship to the broader 
conventions of trial representation, and each produces, in its interaction with the 
trial form, a new pattern of textual features that is, overall, more stable and 
consistent than the results of attempts to classify “pure” examples of the given 
genre.  
The perceived rigidity of the trial form also permits this thesis to act as an 
intervention in mise-en-scène criticism. Adrian Martin has recently discussed the 
concept of ‘social mise-en-scène’, a way of looking at film style that he considers 
an ‘overlooked path’ in film studies.12 I believe that Martin’s conceptualisation of 
examining narrative scenarios in terms of how they relate to wider codes and 
conventions of social life can be tested through application to the structuring 
elements of the trial scenario. Martin argues that:   
These situations […] are at once inherently cinematic and inescapably 
social. They are cinematic because games can be played with them […] And 
[they] are social because we know and recognise them in the world beyond 
cinema; they form a sort of omnipresent theatre of everyday life. Whether as 
material for cinema or the stuff of the quotidian world, certain, specific rules 
are involved, and sometimes explicitly invoked: habits, rituals, prohibitions 
great and small, punishments if infringement of the code is too great.13  
 
The concept of ‘social mise-en-scène’ encapsulates how I believe I attend to the 
trial scene in cinema, through paying attention to the boundedness of its status as a 
public space with rigidly ordered codes of being and communicating, and 
examining how films navigate these codes. Once again the perceived rigidity of the 
trial form, with its rules, rituals and necessarily formulaic development, can be 
considered as an opportunity to explore how this familiarity and fixedness is played 
                                                          
12 Adrian Martin, Mise En Scène and Film Style: from classical Hollywood to new media art, 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke,  Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 131. 
13 Ibid., p. 129. 
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with, modified, subverted, challenged, or transformed, at the levels of both choices 
made in individual films and the aforementioned ‘pattern mixing’ of the trial form 
with a range of Hollywood genres.  
 I begin the thesis with a review of literature that covers the field of existing 
criticism on representations of the trial in Hollywood cinema. The majority of this 
material comes from the field of ‘law and film’ criticism and is predominantly 
written by legal scholars. I position myself within this literature, identifying what I 
see as the gaps in the field’s primary methodologies, and the need for and features 
of my critical intervention. This material also introduces terminology and 
arguments that will be applied to my own case studies.  
 My first two chapters consider two groups of films that share what I argue is 
a broadly affirmative depiction of American law and justice, one that is identified 
through their representations of the courtroom trial. The first chapter looks at the 
films of American trial cinema’s so-called golden age of 1957-62: Twelve Angry 
Men (Dir: Sidney Lumet, 1957), Witness for the Prosecution (Dir: Billy Wilder, 
1957), Anatomy of a Murder (Dir: Otto Preminger, 1959), Compulsion (Dir: 
Richard Fleischer, 1959), The Young Philadelphians (Dir: Vincent Sherman, 1959), 
Inherit the Wind (Dir: Stanley Kramer, 1960), Judgment at Nuremberg (Dir: 
Stanley Kramer, 1961) and To Kill a Mockingbird (Dir: Robert Mulligan, 1962). 
These films as a group continue to typify for audiences both how the Hollywood 
trial scene looks and what it means. For this reason, I use them to survey the 
dominant narrative and stylistic conventions of trial depiction in Hollywood 
cinema. This survey is structured around a number of the fixed elements of the 
courtroom trial form - its setting, its characters, and its procedural development - 
considering how formal and dramatic patterns emerge from and interact with these 
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standardized foundations. I illustrate these patterns with detailed examples from the 
films, ones that balance an awareness of their exemplification of convention with 
the specificity of their use within a film’s particular contexts. I identify in the 
golden age trial film grouping a set of strategies that are broadly respectful and 
reflect the films’ belief in a normative model of American law and justice.  
In my second chapter, I consider the representation of the trial in two social 
problem films, Dust Be My Destiny and Pinky (Dir: Elisa Kazan, 1949). Building 
on existing literature on the social problem film, I suggest that the trial scene in 
these films functions as part of the genre’s recurrent project of presenting 
possibilities for social amelioration through recourse to the United States’ dominant 
structures and institutions. Working from a liberal humanist perspective, both films 
depict the plight of a marginalised individual who experiences social prejudice. The 
climactic trial scenes function in part to resolve the social problem of prejudice by 
demonstrating the impartiality and rightness of the court system. Nevertheless, 
despite the broad affirmation of the court, other competing voices emerge from the 
text during these trial scenes that gesture towards the more overt challenges to the 
legal point of view that are foregrounded in the subsequent case studies. Pinky 
especially is revealed to contain an ambivalence towards the courtroom resolution 
that signals a less affirmative and more complex response to the American court. 
My third chapter deals with the trial scene in the women’s melodrama, once 
again analysing in detail the climactic trial scenes of two films: Peyton Place (Dir: 
Mark Robson, 1957) and Madame X (Dir: David Lowell Rich, 1966). These films 
emphasise the gendering of the court’s dominant structures of discourse, presenting 
a clash between the female point of view (one that is aligned with the emotional life 
of the female protagonist defendant) and the masculinist legal point of view. In 
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contrast to Pinky, which also places its female protagonist in the defendant role in a 
climactic trial (and elsewhere draws upon the conventions of the women’s 
melodrama), these films feature female defendants who have committed the crime 
for which they are on trial, but who refuse to disclose key information, rooted in 
their emotional lives, to the patriarchal courtroom. Whereas Peyton Place 
negotiates these conflicting points of view and eventually authorises the court’s 
gendering by giving a climactic speech to an authoritative male figure, Madame X 
aligns itself fully with the female point of view, affirming the form of justice 
embodied by its female protagonist, and maintains its challenge to the masculinised 
constructions of law. I demonstrate that both of these films present their challenge 
to the court’s underlying structures through ruptures to the conventions of trial 
representation outlined in my first chapter, by including formal elements deemed 
excessive within the trial setting and by emphasising a close alignment with the 
melodrama’s gendered point of view structures.  
Finally, my fourth chapter looks at the courtroom trial in film noir, a genre 
that frequently presents the most overt and sustained critique of the courtroom 
convention. I map out how we can formulate the interaction of courtroom 
convention and the strategies of noir by considering the field of noir criticism, 
specifically work which attends to noir’s difference from “conventional” forms in 
Hollywood cinema, before looking briefly at the oblique trial scenes of Scarlet 
Street (Dir: Fritz Lang, 1945) and Phantom Lady (Dir: Robert Siodmak, 1944). 
These two films paradoxically present and obscure their critical trial scenes by 
focusing on the subjective experience of key characters and representing the 
courtroom in a non-naturalistic manner. I then analyse in detail the trial material of 
two noirs, Stranger on the Third Floor (Dir: Boris Ingster, 1940) and The Lady 
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from Shanghai (Dir: Orson Welles, 1947), which employ noir strategies to parody 
and subvert the conventions of courtroom depiction and in the process critique the 
American models of law and justice. Once again, these films enact their critique of 
the courts through ruptures of the patterns of representation outlined in my first 
chapter.  
Throughout my second, third and fourth chapters, I identify patterns of 
inflection of the courtroom conventions outlined in the first chapter that persist 
across examples of the genre under discussion. This is integrated alongside detailed 
textual analysis of the trial scenes, which are discussed not solely in relation to their 
broader generic frameworks and the conventions of trial representation, but also 
through a consideration of their place and significance within the network of 
relationships constructed across the film. My aim has been to strike a balance 
between demonstrating how these films exemplify the given genre or mode’s 
patterns of trial representation (and the corresponding meanings of those patterns), 
and examining their own specific choices, evaluating the particular meanings and 
effects produced.  
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Review of the Literature 
 
 I intend here to examine the existing scholarship on representations of the 
trial in Hollywood cinema. As this is a relatively neglected area of study, I am able 
to look in detail at the work of those who have focused on the trial, comparing their 
approaches to my own and considering the relevance of their key findings and 
arguments to my project. Because many of the scholars I include have more than 
one publication on legal cinema, I have chosen for the benefits of rigour and clarity 
to focus specifically on works that contain substantial material on the trial, although 
it will become clear that this often entails overlap with broader issues of law and 
film. Partly for this reason, I begin by looking at an overview of the ‘law and film’ 
field of criticism by Greenfield, et al. that also considers representations of the trial, 
before taking a broadly chronological approach to other works on the trial in 
cinema that I have found relevant and (for various reasons) illuminating. 
A majority of the scholarship on trial representation in film comes from the 
field of ‘law and film’ writing. This field emerged as scholars in the disciplines of 
law and criminology began to grapple with the plenitude of legal representations in 
cinema, inevitably becoming drawn towards depictions of the trial.14 The grounding 
of most of these scholars outside of film studies has resulted in works on the trial in 
film that function primarily as filmographies or surveys, discussing films largely in 
relation to the accuracy of their legal representation. This applies to, for example, 
The Drama of the Courtroom (Laster, with Breckweg and King, 2000) and Reel 
                                                          
14 The study of filmic representations within other academic disciplines is not isolated to the 
example of law and film. Medicine and film, for example, is another cross-disciplinary field that 
considers the representations of medical officials (doctors, surgeons) in film. See, for example, 
Michael Shortland, Medicine and Film: a checklist, survey and research resource (Oxford: Wellcome 
Unit for the History of Medicine, 1989) and Brian Glasser, Medicinema: Doctors in Films (Oxford: 
Radcliffe Publishing, 2010). 
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Justice (Bergman and Asimov, 2006), two of the few books devoted to the trial 
scene in cinema. Thus, despite the proliferation of material on the trial in film over 
the past two decades, a bulk of it is at cross-purposes to my own methodology and 
intention.  
Greenfield, Osborn and Robson provide an overview of this field and 
acknowledge the failure of much of law and film scholarship to sufficiently engage 
with film theory and criticism. They note that much early research was interested 
mainly in the ‘accuracy and realism’ of film’s representations of law, viewing them 
in relation to the real-life law that constituted the primary scholarly interest.15 The 
authors of Film and the Law suggest that this imbalance has resulted in a neglect of 
film studies’ aims and methodologies in examining trial representation:  
From the earliest days when lawyers appeared in films, concern has 
been expressed by the legal profession […] as to the kinds of images 
being portrayed. How the images have altered and how different 
groups have been featured forms a major part of the scholarship to 
date. Rather less attention has, hitherto, been paid to analysing how 
these images are constructed.16  
 
Greenfield, Osborn and Robson aim to identify the elements of the law film genre, 
although they acknowledge the problems inherent to generic classification.17 This 
desire to locate through dominant patterns of trial representation a discrete genre, be 
it the law film, trial film or courtroom drama, is a preoccupation of the field that 
reappears across the literature I review here. Moving from a consideration of the 
appeal of the legal proceeding for filmmakers (in which they note the inherently 
                                                          
15 Steve Greenfield, Guy Osborn and Peter Robson, Film and the Law: The Cinema of Justice (2nd 
edn: Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2010), p. 4. 
16 Ibid., p. 8. 
17 Ibid., p. 51. 
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dramatic nature of such proceedings, the courtroom’s ‘architectural and symbolic 
qualities’, and its adversarial format as key elements),18 Greenfield et al. present 
what they deem ‘an analysis of the notion of ‘courtroom drama’’,19 considering 
how this notion, which they identify as a focus of earlier attempts to classify the 
law film, has been problematically theorised. Referring to Thomas J. Harris’ 
Courtroom’s Finest Hour in American Cinema (to which I will return shortly), they 
point out that a number of the ‘‘classic’ elements’ of the courtroom drama Harris 
identifies in his example of generic typicality (Anatomy of a Murder), fail to appear 
in the other courtroom films cited in his study. They then quote from Reel Justice, 
in which the authors similarly list a number of conventions they identify in the 
courtroom drama:  
1) ‘the drama of one-on-one confrontations’ 
2) ‘the built-in suspense factor of wondering what judgment the jury (or in 
some cases the judge) will decide’ 
3) ‘eternally fascinating themes such as murder, treachery and sex’  
4) ‘controversial legal and moral issues […] presented in a sugar-coated 
way. They can present the clash between good and evil such as the 
movie lawyer fighting for Morality and Justice’.20   
The quotes invoked by Greenfield et al. are emblematic of the law and film 
approach to identifying the courtroom drama’s conventions; they bear a sketchiness 
that views the courtroom convention in terms of its broadest constitutive narrative 
                                                          
18 Ibid., p. 34. 
19 Ibid., p. 33. 
20 Bergman, Paul and Asimov, Michael, Reel Justice – the courtroom goes to the movies, ( Kansas: 
Andres and McMeel, 1996) p. xvi, quoted in Steve Greenfield, Guy Osborn and Peter Robson, Film 
and the Law: The Cinema of Justice (2nd edn: Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2010), 
p. 43. 
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and thematic elements, at the expense of considering, for instance, recurrent 
stylistic strategies and the procedural elements of the trial itself. Greenfield et al. 
counter the configurations of the courtroom proffered by previous theorists with a 
simple yet pivotal point, one that can help us to understand how a working 
foundation for identifying the specific terrain of the trial form can be formulated: 
there are good reasons why the courtroom drama has been 
categorised and recognised as a distinct type: the setting, the 
pageantry, the uniform, etc. Thus the physical environment is a 
limited and known quantity and cannot be altered, trials cannot take 
place elsewhere […] law governs the type of building rather than the 
other way around and the style is also fixed. We know the rules of 
engagement and these must follow their course. The participants 
cannot shift to any degree from the pre-determined path […] The 
whole point of trials is that they are formulaic.21    
 
Greenfield et al. subsequently note that this is ‘the beauty of the courtroom scene – 
it is fixed; it has to be, otherwise the law does not work’.22 To acknowledge these 
essentially limiting qualities is to move closer to what I see as a logical method of 
approaching the trial form, which is to look at the elements that are truly ‘fixed’ and 
begin to distinguish the different ways of inflecting these elements through 
variables of form and content. 
 However, this is not a methodology that the authors of Film and the Law 
adopt, despite their useful recognition of the flaws in previous conceptualisations of 
courtroom convention. The authors’ concern with film theory and in particular 
genre theory is a step in the right direction, but their treatment of the latter reveals 
where their methodology diverges from my own. Their attempts to identify the law 
film as a genre includes the proposal that the law film reaches far beyond the 
                                                          
21 Greenfield, Osborn and Robson, Film and the Law, pp. 62-63 
22 Ibid., p. 63. 
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courtroom convention.23 I am in agreement with this; however, their argument 
extends to the suggestion that some courtroom scenes are irrelevant to the 
discussion of film and the law, providing no insight into cinematic constructions of 
law and justice.24 I would maintain, instead, that all films that venture into the 
courtroom will yield from analysis of its trial content some insight into that film’s 
conception of law and justice, the ideological positions entailed therein, and 
(extracting oneself from the narrower goals of the legal studies approach) the 
specificities of the individual film’s formal and ideological strategies. 
The concern the authors of Film and the Law have with defining the 
courtroom drama often seems unproductive, frequently lapsing into unsubstantiated 
claims (Witness for the Prosecution is ‘perhaps the best example of a courtroom 
drama’) and presenting contradictory methods for classification.25 For example, 
moving from their own initial brief formulation of the ‘trial movie’ as one where 
‘the action resolves in the courtroom and the trial is the crucial feature of the 
film’,26 they proceed to posit that certain films that would seem to fit this paradigm 
(including Kramer vs. Kramer [1979, Dir. Robert Benson]) must be refused the trial 
movie label because they are ‘only concerned with the courtroom for a limited part 
of the film’.27 Here, several issues with their classification emerges. Firstly, very 
few films, courtroom or otherwise, are set entirely during the trial – even famed 
examples of the trial film genre, To Kill a Mockingbird and Compulsion, spend 
                                                          
23 Ibid., p. 51. 
24 The exclusion or marginalisation of major groups of texts in the search for a discrete genre (be it 
the law film, trial film, legal cinema, or courtroom drama) is another failing of the ‘law and film’ 
approach, exemplified by a third book-length study, authored by Ross D. Levi, The Celluloid 
Courtroom A History of Legal Cinema (Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Publishers, 
2005). Levi’s exclusion of films that ‘make […] no real impact on the viewer regarding our legal 
system’ (p. xv) relies upon the problematic notion that such ‘impact’ can be (or has been) classified.  
25 Ibid., p. 45. 
26 Ibid., p. 53. 
27 Ibid., p. 45. 
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relatively little time in the courtroom in their singular trial scenes. Likewise, many 
films that would not fit this model ‘resolve’ in the courtroom and thus posit the trial 
as the crucial, or at least climactic, feature. This is true, for example, of two of my 
case studies, Dust be My Destiny and Peyton Place. Greenfield et al. maintain that 
they prove that ‘there are visual, oral and plot conventions shared by a sufficiently 
large number of films to allow one to delineate what can be expected in a 
‘courtroom film’ or ‘trial movie’’,28 but they remain content largely to identify 
these conventions, essentially mimicking the same problematic structures of 
classification they identify elsewhere in the field – they look only at the images and 
not at their construction.  
 Thus, Film and the Law, despite its useful elements, tends to reflect the 
issues with law and film work on trials in film, which limit themselves to defining 
legal cinema, the courtroom drama or the trial film as genres. The majority of this 
work is written by legal scholars for articles in journals such as the Journal of Law 
and Society and Law and Humanities. The desire to focus on films that are most 
clearly tied to legal themes and/or contain overarching trial narratives is 
understandable when considering the massive corpus of films produced in 
Hollywood that include courtroom sequences. However, this work is also prone to 
making generalizations on the basis of a limited corpus of ‘legal films’, or inversely 
by applying their hypotheses to too broad a corpus (doubtless exacerbated by 
restraints on word count). Much law and film work tends not only to neglect factors 
such as genre, censorship and theories of narrative, which may begin to combat 
these generalizations, but also avoids any extended application of close textual 
                                                          
28 Ibid., p. 62. 
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analysis to courtroom sequences.29 Omit Kamir, who attempts to overview the law 
and film field and its varied aims and methodologies, has suggested that the field 
does not consider cinematic techniques to a satisfactory degree, citing work by 
Carol Clover that I will discuss shortly, as an ‘outstanding exception’.30 
Nevertheless, a significant amount can be gleaned from this body of work and I 
wish to demonstrate this by looking at other scholars in the field who have written 
on the trial. Their work exemplifies both the usefulness of some of the field’s 
material and the gaps that I can address in my own study.  
One scholar who typifies law studies-based approaches to the cinematic 
courtroom sequence is David Ray Papke, who has written many articles on media 
representations of the American legal system that are often focused on the 
influences such representations have on cultural perceptions of law. This includes 
work on representations of such figures as judge (‘From Flat to Round: Changing 
Portrayals of the Judge in American Popular Culture,’ 2007) and jury (’12 Angry 
Men is Not an Archetype,’ 2007). Here I discuss two of his contributions to the 
field that deal specifically with the trial. 
In ‘Conventional Wisdom: The Courtroom Trial in American Popular 
Culture’, Papke looks at the trial in American cinema, literature and television, 
stressing the intertextuality that has produced ‘a standardized cultural picture of the 
courtroom trial’.3132 Papke explores the ramifications of this ‘standardization,’ in 
                                                          
29 For example, I have located only one instance of shot analysis in the entirety of The Celluloid 
Courtroom. 
30 Omit Kamir, ‘Why ‘Law-and-Film’ and What Does it Actually Mean? A Perspective’ Continuum: 
Journal of Media & Cultural Studies 19:2 (June 2005), p. 261.  
31 David Ray Papke, ‘Conventional Wisdom: The Courtroom Trial in American Popular Culture’ 
Marquette Law Review 82:3 (Spring 1999), p. 471. 
32 Machura and Ulbrich (2001) share with Papke an acknowledgement of the intertextual 
construction of a standardized ‘movie’ trial. They argue that ‘the cinematic portrayal of legal 
procedures reflects not so much the real world of law but rather their depiction in previous 
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particular its effect of ‘naturalizing the text,’ arguing that ‘Americans are at ease 
with literary and cinematic courtroom trials, and they can use them to clarify their 
values, reinforce their moral standards, and even shape their identities’.33 Papke 
states his aim to ‘denaturalize’ the trial convention, which for him ‘reinforces the 
ideas that courts work as institutions and that law in general can be trusted both in 
its articulation and application’.34 It is evident that Papke’s ideological reading of 
the courtroom trial convention is concerned primarily with the wider cultural 
repercussions of this convention rather than the elements that have gone into its 
construction.  
Papke structures his discussion around elements of film narrative (setting, 
character and plot), evading close analysis in his methodology. He tends to 
generalise when outlining the features of the courtroom trial convention due to an 
unacknowledged focus solely on the courtroom drama genre. These generalisations 
include his insistence that ‘defendants and litigants […] play a surprisingly limited 
role’ in courtroom narratives because ‘the attorneys tend to be the most developed 
characters’.35 This statement is not true with regards to my corpus, which is 
constituted of narratives in which protagonists appear as defendants or other legal 
non-professionals in the courtroom. Although Papke’s notions of standardization 
and naturalisation are relevant to the depiction of the courtroom trial in Hollywood 
cinema more broadly (as my examples show, there are certain narrative, 
iconographic and formal conventions in depicting the courtroom space and trial 
development that are remarkably consistent, due in part to the fixedness inherent to 
                                                          
movies.’ [see, Machura, Stefan and Ulbrich, Stefan, ‘Law in Film: Globalizing the Hollywood 
Courtroom Drama’ Journal of Law and Society 28:1 (2001), p. 129.] 
33 David Ray Papke, ‘Conventional Wisdom’, p. 478. 
34 Ibid., p. 488. 
35 Ibid., p. 483. 
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the form) he fails to consider the ways in which the concerns and styles of different 
genres and modes can inflect or interact with this standardized picture. 
There is more to be gleaned from a subsequent article by Papke which 
acknowledges its focused discussion on a small group of films that remain at the 
forefront of the cultural picture of the courtroom trial. Here, Papke responds to 
work from Thomas J. Harris and Nevins that saw this group as constituting 
respectively ‘the finest hour of the courtroom cinema in America’,36 and the legal 
film’s ‘golden age’.37 Papke interrogates the shared ideology underlying these 
“golden age” images of U.S. law, although he notes the slight disparities between 
his predecessors’ corpuses and his own.38 Papke’s own corpus consists of nine 
films released during the period covering 1957-1962: 12 Angry Men, Witness for 
the Prosecution, I Want to Live! (1958, Dir: Robert Wise), Anatomy of a Murder, 
The Young Philadelphians, Compulsion, Inherit the Wind, Judgment at Nuremberg 
and To Kill a Mockingbird. While he asserts that the films are ‘hardly identical’,39 
Papke argues that they ‘have a shared legal content. The films tell us similar stories 
about law, lawyers, and legal institutions’.40 These stories include in each instance 
substantial uses of the trial form. Papke refigures Nevins’ notion of a “golden age” 
to point to the films’ shared ideological position: 
the films under consideration are “golden” in terms of not only the 
quality of their screenwriting, directing, and acting but also their 
                                                          
36 Harris, Thomas J, Courtroom’s Finest Hour in American Cinema (New York and London : The 
Scarecrow Press, Inc Methuen, 1987), p. xiii quoted in Papke, David Ray. ‘Law, Cinema and 
Ideology: Hollywood Legal Films of the 1950s’ UCLA Law Review 1473 (2001), p. 1474. 
37 Nevins, Francis M. ‘Law, Lawyers and Justice in Popular Film and Fiction’ Human Education (May, 
1984), p. 4 quoted in Papke, ‘Law, Cinema and Ideology’, p. 1474. 
38 For example, remarking upon the absence of two of his texts, To Kill a Mockingbird and The 
Young Philadelphians, from Harris’ eight case studies. 
39 Ibid., p. 1475. 
40 Ibid., p. 1476. 
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presentations of lawyers, trials, and law in general. The films 
endorse the rule of law; they inspire belief in that rule of law.41  
 
Papke details how they ‘endorse’ and ‘inspire belief’ in ways that are useful to my 
own research. Several of Papke’s points will feature in my following chapter, as he 
detects patterns of characterisation in depictions of lawyers and judges and 
treatments of the courtroom space across these films that point to the creation of ‘an 
idealized courtroom and courtroom proceeding’.42 For example, Papke’s assertion 
of the importance of a ‘political “centering”’ of the legal professional characters to 
the golden age trial film’s affirmation of the U.S. legal system can be compared 
with the symmetry he notes that the courtroom space is imbued with in the films.43  
The ‘Americanism’ embedded in the films’ mode of trial representation is 
justifiably emphasised by Papke,44 who argues that law ‘and a belief in law are cast 
as something noble and particularly American’.45 Here Papke is at his most 
convincing, especially when he makes the case for Judgment at Nuremberg as a 
quintessentially American courtroom film, noting that, despite the European 
inflection provided by the setting, ‘what we have is a bastardised American 
proceeding trying four Nazi judges for violating an American sense of the rule of 
law’.46  This makes his subsequent attempt to historicise this golden age as part of 
Hollywood’s assertion of its Americanism in response to the anti-communist 
movement particularly effective.4748  
                                                          
41 Ibid., p. 1483. 
42 Ibid., p. 1478. 
43 Ibid., p. 1476. 
44 Ibid., p. 1487. 
45 Ibid., p. 1482. 
46 Ibid., p. 1485. 
47 Ibid., p. 1490. 
48 This includes the provision of specific contextual evidence (such as President Eisenhower’s 
proposal of a national Law Day and the American Bar Association’s presentation of ‘Gavel Awards’ 
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Papke also considers the ‘provocative juxtaposition of law and justice’ as a 
major thematic preoccupation of the films,49 albeit one that is invariably absorbed 
into the overarching ideological project: ‘The legal process – even in the 
Hollywood film –does not always get things right; it does not always deliver justice 
[…] But still, all the films speak to the possibility of justice under a rule of law […] 
The films assure us that our aspirations for honest lawyers, reliable courtrooms, and 
good laws are appropriate and prudent’.50 I would argue that this gesture to the 
juxtaposition rather than conflation of law and justice warrants more extrapolation 
that it is given; how does To Kill a Mockingbird, for example, still speak to the 
‘possibility of justice under a rule of law’ when the jury’s racial prejudices ensure 
that the African-American defendant is found guilty despite the evidence to the 
contrary? This is a tension at the heart of the trial form to which other scholars are 
more attuned, and which I will return to in my discussions of more recent and more 
developed studies of the trial in cinema. 
Papke faces the same obstacles as others producing article-length studies on 
trial representation, which means that the level of detail provided is often 
inadequate. For example, Papke briefly notes that the ‘stories of the litigants and the 
lawyers all become bigger than accounts of individual crimes and controversies; all 
take on larger symbolic meaning’.51 This is true, but it is also worth examining in 
each instance what these ‘larger symbolic meanings’ are and how they relate to the 
                                                          
to media texts ‘that fostered public awareness of the law and of America’s system of justice’, both 
1958). This historicising of particular groups of trial texts occurs elsewhere within the field to 
varying degrees of engagement, including in work by Rosenberg (1994) and Rafter (2001) to be 
considered later in this literature review. It is generally agreed upon that a convergence of social 
and cultural factors influenced the golden age of the trial film in the late-1950s.  
49 Ibid., p. 1481. 
50 Ibid., p. 1486. 
51 Ibid., p. 1481. 
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broader intentions and generic frameworks of the films. There is also a tendency, 
through Papke’s corpus selection, to generalise or misinterpret. For example, 
Papke’s inclusion of I Want to Live!, a film usually (and I would posit 
understandably) absent from the “golden age” corpus, warrants further explanation 
than it is granted. I would not be alone in maintaining that this film both emphasises 
the failure of the judicial system and is aligned with the female experience,52 two 
factors that render it anomalous within Papke’s corpus and, in the instance of the 
former, entirely contradicts his argument.  
Similarly, Papke exemplifies the reductive readings of Anatomy of a Murder 
made by legal scholars. Papke argues that the lawyer protagonist of the film, played 
by James Stewart, finishes the film ‘the way Atticus Finch […] was from the start: 
smart, stable, devoted to the profession, and blessed with the kind of moral 
authority that is most possible when one has deserving clients’.5354 This perspective 
diverges from interpretations of the character made by film scholars Foster Hirsch 
and Nick Pinkerton, who locate a far greater ethical ambivalence embedded in the 
character’s performativity in the courtroom and the film’s use of Stewart’s persona. 
Anatomy of a Murder has inadvertently become a litmus test for the differing 
perspectives offered by film studies and by lawyers, criminologists or historians 
writing on the ‘law film’, with Shivas (1962), Perkins (1972), Zborowski (2008) 
and Bruzzi (2010) reading through the film far more ambiguity, ambivalence and 
                                                          
52 See Nicole Rafter, ‘American Criminal Trial Films: An Overview of Their Development, 1930-2000’ 
Journal of Law and Society 28:1 (March 2001), p. 17 
53 Papke, ‘Hollywood Legal Films of the 1950s’, p. 1476. 
54 His perspective is shared by another scholar with a legal background, Nicole Rafter (whose work I 
will return to later in this review of literature), who states that ‘Stewart’s portrait of a homespun 
attorney, simple yet crafty, reinforces the archetype of the heroic, all-American lawyer’ (see Nicole 
Rafter, ‘American Criminal Trial Films: An Overview of Their Development, 1930-2000’ Journal of 
Law and Society 28:1 (March 2001), p. 17.) 
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complexity with respect to its depiction of law and legal process than those working 
outside of film studies. The insights offered by film scholars through a much closer 
engagement with the text and a disinclination to group Anatomy of a Murder 
amongst the other 1950s legal films,55 demonstrate what is all too often overlooked 
by legal scholars. Such oversights demonstrate what close analysis and a greater 
engagement with cinematic conventions (including those of genre and star persona) 
can combat. I will return to Papke’s corpus and his overarching argument in my 
next chapter. Although I agree that a set of strategies can be broadly detected across 
this group of films that works to affirm and uphold a law-based ideology, I also 
believe that looking at some of these films in more detail will reveal devices and 
meanings specific to the project of each film while simultaneously sharpening our 
understanding of this broader, shared ideology.   
Norman Rosenberg more effectively negotiates some of the pitfalls of 
generalization and misinterpretation that muddy Papke’s arguments. His article 
‘Hollywood on Trials’ builds on work in both film and law studies, discussing a 
number of classical Hollywood films in relation to two main issues: firstly, classical 
Hollywood’s recurrent use of the structures of law, in particular the courtroom trial, 
as a means of providing narrative resolution and closure; and secondly, the legal 
theory-oriented question of ‘the ways in which films about law represent 
problematics of “legal translation”’.56 He does this through a comparison of 
traditional trial films and what he terms ‘law noir’,57 contrasting two ‘conventional’ 
trial films, Twelve Angry Men and The Young Philadelphians, with the law noirs 
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Stranger on the Third Floor, Fury (1936, Dir: Fritz Lang), They Won’t Believe Me 
(1947, Dir: Irving Pichel) and Boomerang (1947, Dir: Elia Kazan). 
‘Hollywood on Trials’ constitutes one of the first attempts to examine the 
trial sequence with recourse to the frameworks of genre and classical narration. The 
distinction made between the traditional trial film and the law noir allows 
Rosenberg to detect divergent narrative strategies and ideological positions 
embedded in the use of different generic frameworks. Rosenberg finds that the 
traditional trial films ‘highlight a court trial as a means for providing relatively 
assured and authoritative “closure to a narrative”’ and ‘represent a courtroom as a 
special, public forum in which potentially troubling cultural questions about the 
specialized discourses of legal professionals can be laid to rest’.58 He argues that 
the level of narrative resolution required from classical Hollywood narratives is 
often provided by trial sequences, which through ‘appealing to the ideal of a clear, 
authoritative law’ work to ‘resolve a film’s […] narrative ambiguities’.59   
The ‘law noirs’, in contrast, are shown to ‘raise doubts about the ability of 
the trial process to achieve satisfactory closure and about the adequacy of legal 
language itself’.60  Rosenberg calls upon theories of translation within law studies 
that argue that, during courtroom trials, ‘the real life concerns of “outsiders” are 
represented in the specialized forms required by the legal discourses of 
“insiders”’.61 The translation metaphor views the law as a foreign language to those 
outside of the legal profession and suggests that their ‘stories will ‘inevitably’ be 
transformed through the lawyer’s representation’, which may ‘serve to silence, 
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rather than give voice to, people who find themselves involved with law’.62 The 
issues Rosenberg raises here pertaining to the ‘language’ of law, its insider/outsider 
distinctions, and what this means for expressivity and the ability to tell one’s own 
story in the courtroom, are then discussed in relation to the courtroom trial in the 
films he designates as ‘law noir’. 
Hence Rosenberg reads Stranger on the Third Floor as a critical 
interrogation of the reliability of the trial system, effectively considering both its 
thematic and formal elements (noting, for example, that ‘the film visualizes the trial 
system as systematically unbalanced’ through the use of devices including canted 
angles).63 He draws out the broadly similar critiques of legal discourse at work in 
the other three ‘law noirs’ but, in paying attention to each individually, and by 
employing textual analysis, Rosenberg is able to discuss the specificities of each. 
For example, he argues that the final ‘law noir’ he discusses, Boomerang, imbues 
its trial scene (albeit reservedly) with more trust in the legal system through its legal 
professional protagonist, thus paving the way for the later, more straightforwardly 
affirmative representations.  
Rosenberg’s discussion of legal translation is also highly useful to my 
approach, the insider/outsider distinction he draws reflecting to some degree the 
analogous position of genres with regards to trial depiction: How do ‘outsider’ 
genres infiltrate or subvert the trial form from the ‘inside’? How do characters 
whose generic terrain exists outside of the courtroom cope within it? One of the few 
problems with Rosenberg’s methodology, which will become apparent when he 
returns to the ‘law noir’ in a more recent piece considered in my noir chapter, is his 
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insufficient engagement with debates surrounding the constitutive elements of noir. 
Rosenberg relegates his definition of film noir to a footnote, describing it as ‘a body 
of Hollywood films […] that featured narratives about crime and a dark […] critical 
view of American life and institutions’.64 A greater engagement with the substantial 
literature of film noir could have bolstered Rosenberg’s argument further. My own 
readings of trial scenes in noir will be more attentive to debates in noir criticism. 
Rosenberg also refrains from dealing with further issues of generic hybridity and 
overlap. All of his noir case studies sit uneasily with the noir classification, drawing 
upon the conventions of the social problem film (Boomerang, Fury) and even the 
horror genre (Stranger on the Third Floor). The issues he raises can also be applied 
to other genres, modes or styles within Hollywood cinema that are neglected, or 
only alluded to, in his discussion. For example, Rosenberg argues that the narrative 
developments of the courtroom sequences in Fury, during which emotion ‘carries 
the day,’ are in part indebted to ‘female-centred melodramas’.65  However, neither 
he nor any other law and film scholars that I have located examine what is evidently 
being suggested here as an inflection of the courtroom trial sequence that is specific 
to melodrama. Nevertheless, the issues Rosenberg raises through the law noir, of 
translation and an awareness of the extent to which the climactic courtroom 
sequence can elude as well as provide narrative resolution and closure, can be 
applied to my own corpus of films covering a number of genres.  
 Rosenberg’s influence can be seen on Nicole Rafter, who utilises the notion 
of ‘law noir’ in her examination of the historical development of the ‘American 
criminal trial film’ (which, in another indication of the field’s classificatory 
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confusion, she designates as a subgroup of a larger trial film genre). Rafter detects 
three distinct phases in the evolution of the criminal trial film: ‘an experimental 
period that began in the 1930s and bore fruit in the 1940s and 1950s with law noirs; 
a brief heroic period […] and a period of depletion, 1970 till the end of the century 
and beyond, during which trial movies tried but often failed to meet the challenge 
posed by a new set of cinematic and political circumstances’.66 My chosen time-
range broadly covers her first two phases, and Rafter’s conceptualisations of these 
distinct phases are indebted to earlier work on trial representation, including those 
discussed above. 
Before looking at the specifics of each phase, Rafter begins with a broader 
configuration of what she views as the foundational elements of the criminal trial 
film. She argues that the major theme of this subgroup is ‘the difficulty of achieving 
justice’,67  locating in the criminal trial film ‘a tension between two sorts of law: 
immutable natural law or justice on the one hand and fallible man-made law on the 
other’ and concluding that the films ‘proceed to play with the discrepancy between 
the actual and ideal’.68 She then posits the inclusion of opposed ‘justice’ and 
‘injustice’ characters as pivotal to this theme and the films’ pattern of development. 
The two character types work to divergent ends with regards to the gap between 
natural and man-made law; the justice figure attempts to align the two 
configurations, whereas the injustice figure is responsible for the presence and 
persistence of the gap.69 Rafter argues that in ‘most criminal trial movies produced 
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before 1980, the film’s resolution occurs when man-made law becomes identical to 
the underlying pattern’.70  
Although Rafter offers a striking and potentially productive 
conceptualisation of the trial film’s constitutive elements, it is immediately 
undermined by the list of films she proceeds to note that feature no justice figure at 
all. Similarly, her contention that ‘the closing of the gap between law and justice 
usually occurs in the trial scene, where the triumph of the good lawyer over the 
nasty one signals resolution of the film’s basic dilemma’ damages her initially 
promising point by gesturing to a convention that even a cursory glance of trial 
scenes would be able to counter or complicate.71 Rafter’s admitted ‘generalizations’ 
are thus rendered even more problematic,72 although some of her basic points 
remain relevant to this thesis. This includes her notion that many criminal trial films 
‘conclude with a good father or father-figure (who may also be a judge) settling the 
case and restoring order’, which can be related to my own understanding of how 
trial scenes reflect, and occasionally comment upon, a patriarchal structuring of the 
court of law. The concept of the justice and injustice figure (while problematically 
theorised by Rafter) also offers a useful way of distinguishing between the 
character types of my case studies and of identifying individual films’ treatments of 
law and justice.  
Rafter’s first two phases are, as I have noted, indebted to previous 
definitions of trial cinema but largely fail to expand on them productively. Her 
input on the ‘heroic-lawyer’ phase is more useful, particularly when she considers 
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how the films are also ‘traditional’ formally, arguing that ‘their camera work is less 
dramatic than that of law noirs and less radical – one might almost say more 
respectful’.73 This notion of a respectful form in representing the trial is useful to 
me, as is her reference to ‘standard devices’,74 which I will return to in following 
chapter. However, Rafter’s designation of the period prior to the ‘heroic-lawyer’ 
phase as one of ‘experimentation’ (with nods to Young Mr. Lincoln [Dir: John Ford, 
1939] – ‘the most heroic of all heroic-lawyer movies’ – and The Ox-Bow Incident 
[Dir: William A. Wellman, 1943] as predecessors of the heroic lawyer tradition) is 
more problematic.75 I find this ‘experimental’ descriptor misleading and reflective 
of several issues within the field, some of which I have mentioned previously. It 
demonstrates a lack of awareness of the dominant structural devices of classical 
storytelling, particularly genre and intertextuality. Regarding the latter, I argue that 
the failure of scholars to consider the intertextual web informing trial depiction, 
with the exceptions of Machura and Ulbrich (2001), leads them too readily to 
search for ‘phases’ and ‘lines of development’ in trial depiction. I maintain that, 
ignoring undeniable periods of socio-cultural influence on trial representation 
(including, of course, the ‘heroic-lawyer’ strand of the 1950s), and the post-
classical models that exist outside of the time period with which I am concerned, it 
is more productive to think of the trial scene as a form limited by its rigidity and 
disinclined towards drastic developments or phases over the course of the classical 
era. Rafter’s survey of the ‘experimental period’ is marked more by gaps and 
absences than useful content, and in focusing upon Rosenberg’s ‘law noir’ 
conceptualisation she mistakenly (if implicitly) establishes the noir model as the 
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dominant one of the period. The exclusion of, for example, trial representation in 
the social problem film and the melodrama, two modes which were commonly 
more commercially popular than noir, demonstrates a lack of engagement with 
other contexts. This lack of contextual engagement is possibly what leads Rafter to 
the conclusion that Madame X ‘may be the worst trial film ever made’;76 inattentive 
to the specificities of melodrama, Rafter marginalises what I consider a highly 
effective and significant use of the trial form. 
Carol J. Clover (1998) also examines the courtroom trial in American 
cinema. The inclusion of her piece as a chapter in Nick Browne’s Refiguring 
American Film Genres demonstrates both the central project of identifying the trial 
film, which Clover argues is ‘a category widely acknowledged though never treated 
as a genre’,77 and the grounding of Clover’s discussion in film studies. She 
accordingly grants greater focus to filmic techniques than most legal scholars 
working on the topic, and pays particular attention to the depiction of the jury and 
the representational strategies employed in order to position the trial film’s viewer 
as a jury surrogate.  
Clover initially takes a historical approach to the trial film genre, tracing the 
depiction of trials on film back to the earliest days of silent narrative cinema and 
explaining their inherent audience appeal by drawing out the parallels between film 
narrative and trial narrative as well as trial juries and film audiences. Clover’s 
illuminating analysis of courtroom sequences in films such as Compulsion is 
applied in order to demonstrate her hypothesis that the trial film genre can be 
                                                          
76 Ibid., p. 18. 
77 Carol J. Clover, ‘”God Bless Juries!” in Nick Browne (Ed.), Refiguring American Film Genres 
(London: University of California Press, 1998), p. 257.  
43 
 
identified primarily in terms of its consistent treatment of the jury, arguing that 
‘what we expect in a courtroom drama is a form that presents itself as a trial and us 
as its jury’.78 She argues this is achieved partly by reserving a ‘blank space’ in the 
text (through an evasive or even non- depiction of the diegetic jury) for the viewer 
to fill.79 She tellingly describes exceptions to this rule as ‘generically offbeat’.80 
Clover’s central hypothesis is an intriguing one that she is able to apply to 
various trial narrative scenarios. For example, she suggests that even in the films 
where the viewer already knows the truth regarding the case on trial, the film’s 
strategies still ask us to enact this process of judgment, only in this instance on the 
final sentence passed. Clover proposes that the majority of trial films present a 
‘double-trial structure’ that embeds in its ‘official’ case other possibilities of 
evaluation and judgment that pertain to the wider legal system. She argues that:  
The double-trial structure is fundamental to trial narratives. […] In 
the overwhelming majority of trial movies, the unofficial trial turns 
on an aspect of the legal system. Is the system fair across various 
social differences – class, race, gender? Can it be corrupted? Does 
money buy people off? Are lawyers human? Should the death 
penalty exist? Can the system really get at the truth? Can it 
distinguish between technical justice and real justice? Does it 
convict people? Does it too often acquit the guilty?81  
  
Clover brings this configuration of the double-trial structure back to her central 
argument, asserting that even this unofficial trial ‘almost never questions […] the 
institution of the jury’.82 She relates her conceptualisation of the trial film to an 
overarching ideology, concluding that the ‘American courtroom drama could no 
more critique the jury than a game of Cowboys and Indians could critique 
                                                          
78 Ibid., p. 265. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., p. 266. 
81 Ibid., p. 264. 
82 Ibid., p. 265. 
44 
 
racism’.83 I can examine the latter claim by considering the ways in which my case 
studies treat the jury, considering whether they consistently keep the jury system 
central to affirmative notions of legality and justice as Clover asserts, and how any 
‘generically offbeat’ treatments of the jury (of which there are several within my 
case studies) construct separate meanings. The notion of the ‘double-trial’ embeds 
within all significant cinematic trials the possibility of critique and commentary on 
the legal system. If the vast amount of filmic trials contain this shadow second trial 
(and I would agree with Clover that they do) then one fruitful manner of 
distinguishing between models of trial representation is to consider how forcefully 
they engage with this ‘unofficial’ trial, what facets of the system they place on trial, 
and what judgments are reached. Although the focus of other scholars on 
identifying and classifying the law/trial/courtroom genres has limiting 
consequences for the broader range of trial scenes to be found in the Hollywood 
cinema, Clover’s approach is sufficiently inclusive to be applicable to the spectrum 
of cinematic trials, especially through this notion of the ‘double-trial’ structure. 
 Stella Bruzzi (2010) provides a recent contribution to the field that is 
particularly useful and illuminating with regards to my project. Bruzzi’s decision to 
focus on director Fritz Lang, and specifically his depiction of the trial system in 
Fury (1936), allows for another acknowledgement of contrasts ‘to the normative 
Hollywood impulse to believe unquestioningly in American justice’ as typified in 
traditional trial films.84 Bruzzi asserts that in ‘the majority of Hollywood courtroom 
dramas, the courts [….] are the ‘great levellers’; they embody and uphold the rights 
of the individual. They do not, as they frequently do in Lang, thwart and contradict 
                                                          
83 Ibid., p. 272. 
84 Stella Bruzzi, ‘Imperfect Justice: Fritz Lang’s Fury (1936) and Cinema’s Use of the Trial Form’ Law 
and Humanities 4:1 (2010), p. 2 
45 
 
ideas of personal and social justice’.85 Bruzzi analyses Fury in order ‘to 
demonstrate that, even within the context of mainstream films funded by the major 
Hollywood studios, it was still possible to engage in a serious critique of the same 
legal systems that many other films sought resolutely to uphold’.86 Thus, like 
Rosenberg, Bruzzi’s choice of corpus counterbalances the reductive tendency 
within law and film scholarship to focus on the ‘traditional trial film’.   
 Prior to her extended discussion of Fury, Bruzzi addresses many of the 
issues I have encountered in my navigation of the field of law and film scholarship, 
mostly related to the fact that ‘the field of legal cinema has largely been discussed, 
developed, and refined outside of film studies’.87 This field’s limited corpus is 
acknowledged by Bruzzi, who argues that Lang’s ‘peripheral’ status in law studies 
demonstrates the differences between law and film scholarship, as does the fact 
‘that the films most readily discussed in existing law and film books – The Verdict, 
Philadelphia, A Civil Action, The Firm or The Pelican Brief – are not generally 
viewed from within film studies as being very good films’.88 Likewise, Bruzzi 
acknowledges that much law and film scholarship aims both to produce a typology 
of legal cinema and employs methods that view legal cinema ‘in direct relation to 
the law outside cinema, the ‘real’ law as opposed to the ‘reel’ law, if you like’.89 
Bruzzi seeks to readdress these imbalances through her own reading of Lang’s 
Fury.  
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 Bruzzi also pays close attention to the fit between trial sequences and the 
dominant models of narrative in classical Hollywood cinema, providing a more 
incisive expansion of the arguments made by Rosenberg. Bruzzi argues that: 
the trial’s formal linearity (that it is defined by causality and bound by the 
classical unities of time, character and space) offered a narrative form that 
embodied a sense of certainty. A neat consequence of the trial having to 
reach a conclusion (whether satisfactory or not) is that it embodies closure.90  
 
The ‘inherent cohesiveness’ of the trial form is relevant for Bruzzi because it both 
offers an ideal space for ‘confrontations between oppositional socio-political and 
ideological forces’ to be enacted and provides ‘an acceptable rendition of classical 
Hollywood’s attachment to narrative closure’.91 Having acknowledged these 
qualities of the cinematic trial, Bruzzi then demonstrates how they are complicated 
in the trial sequence of Fury through Lang’s complex engagement with questions of 
justice and morality and a deliberately unconvincing sense of narrative closure. She 
concludes that Lang’s legal films ‘do not point to an ideological position as, say, 
does Twelve Angry Men; instead they offer analyses of the workings and 
shortcomings of justice’.92 Bruzzi’s work overall demonstrates an acute 
understanding of both the standard, ‘traditional’ uses of the trial form in cinema and 
the divergent uses produced by filmmakers such as Lang.  
 E. Deidre Pribram provides the most recent innovative contribution to the 
field under discussion here. Considering the debates over generic status within the 
field from a new perspective, Pribram introduces the notion of the justice genres, an 
umbrella term encompassing the various genres that ‘devote attention to the legal 
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system’ and which ‘share common ground in their attempts to constantly define and 
redefine what justice or injustice might mean in ever-changing cultural and 
mediated circumstances’.93 Trial films are included within this schema, but Pribram 
rightly emphasises that the majority of ‘legal genres are mixed or hybrid forms’.94 
Pribram’s more inclusive and expansive consideration of genre is also nuanced by 
her emphasis on the role of rendered emotion in identifying generic structures and 
their cultural repercussions. Thus, Pribram sets out to argue that ‘one of the ways 
generically aligned narratives diverge is through what usually is referred to as 
‘tone,’ but which I reframe here as the narrative structures of feeling or emotional 
codes various texts evoke’.95 This involves balancing considerations of the 
interrelated structures of depicted emotion and audience affect in relation to the 
justice genres. Considering these ‘narrative structures of feeling’ in relation to the 
justice genres at the heart of her study, Pribram argues that:  
the judicial system and the justice genres share in common the frequent 
perception that each operates in a realm grounded in reason, managing to 
excise the limitations of emotions. However, those who understand both 
juridicial processes and law-and-order genres as culturally constituted 
recognize, increasingly, their indispensable engagement with emotions.96   
 
Pribram’s introduction of these concepts pivoted around the centrality of emotion to 
genre classification and the justice genres in particular is highly useful in 
considering how I can approach my case studies. The notion of a tension between 
reason and emotion can be easily extended to the narrative space of the courtroom, 
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and is especially productive when considering the particularly emotional depictions 
and affects at play in, for instance, women’s melodrama.  
Pribram later focuses on the trial film, analysing some of the key concepts 
introduced by Rafter and Clover. She applies Rafter’s claim that the tension 
between ‘natural’ and ‘man-made’(described by Pribram as ‘positive’) law is 
central to the criminal trial film, to Clover’s notion of the ‘double-trial structure’, 
positing that ‘the double-trial structure, and in particular its focus on larger 
concerns of justice, is grounded in the struggle between positive law and natural 
law, in which natural law is almost invariably embodied by a single individual 
working against the system’.97 Pribram argues that these trial narratives’ 
affirmations of law are predicated upon the presence of this character, a stand-in for 
natural law, ‘who is unscathed by and somehow remains immune to the power 
struggles, corruption, bureaucracy, and political intrigues that otherwise plague the 
social institutions of justice, as they are represented in popular media’.98  
Pribram’s conception of this figure accounts for many of the legal heroes of 
the traditional trial narratives (including Juror No. 8 in 12 Angry Men and Atticus 
Finch in To Kill a Mockingbird) and develops a convincing explanation for how 
such narratives are able to affirm law while remaining focused on its flaws, 
including the difficulty in achieving justice noted by Rafter. Although once again 
the rooting of Pribram’s conceptualisation in more traditional trial narratives means 
it must be carefully applied to my own case studies, the facets of the tensions 
between reason and emotion and positive and natural law that she discusses provide 
fruitful ways of considering how my case studies construct meaning. Similarly, her 
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ensuing discussion of the ‘paradigm paradox’ in contemporary trial narratives,99 
which predicates the triumph of justice upon an overt manipulation of positive 
law,100 is a structure that does not apply to trial representations under the classical 
Hollywood paradigm (specifically due to the impossibility of having positive law 
broken to positive effect under the enforcement of the Production Code), but 
nevertheless can contribute to an understanding of my texts. I intend to locate 
instances of obfuscation and contradiction in the depiction of the breaking of 
positive law, and of strains between positive law and the text’s own 
conceptualisations of justice, throughout my case studies.   
Conclusions 
The field of criticism on trial representation in American cinema of the 
classical period has informed my own understanding and approach in a variety of 
ways. I have noted that a majority of the material on trial representation in cinema 
has emerged from disciplines other than film studies, and that subsequently much of 
the ‘law and film’ work overlapping with my project deals in differing aims and 
methodologies to my own. Chief amongst these is the neglect of a sophisticated, 
rigorous level of textual analysis, which has resulted in considerable generalization 
and misapplication of findings. The focus on locating discrete genres such as the 
‘law film’ or ‘trial film’ has led to an understandable but often unproductive focus 
on a small body of films and has also marginalised issues of intersecting or 
hybridized generic forms. This I will counter by looking in depth at case studies 
from a selection of genres and modes, some of which have gone unstudied in 
relation to trial depiction. The most illuminating criticism from the perspective of 
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my intended methodology has been that which considers trial scenes through a 
combined attention to genre and textual analysis (including Rosenberg, Clover and 
Bruzzi). However, all works considered have provided material which will inform 
my subsequent readings of a number of trial scenes, including terminology and 
argumentation (encompassing issues of ‘legal translation’, divergent concepts of 
law and justice, notions of ‘natural’ and ‘positive’ law and the ‘double-trial’ 
structure, amongst others) that I will utilise in my following chapters.  
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1. Standard Trial Procedure: The Conventions of the Courtroom Trial 
Sequence in Hollywood Cinema, 1934-1966 
 
 I have considered how previous attempts to identify the conventions of trial 
depiction have been undermined by broad generalisations. I proposed that a more 
rigorous consideration of these conventions could use the very fixedness of so 
many of its components – its setting, its participants, its procedural elements – as its 
foundation, and examine how stylistic and narrative conventions emerge from these 
components. I have divided this chapter into three sections; each investigates the 
patterns of representational strategy I have detected in relation to one component of 
the courtroom trial. The first of these examines how the space of the courtroom is 
typically represented through aspects of mise-en-scène. The second considers 
dominant representations of the character types we expect to be present during the 
courtroom trial. The third looks at how the elements of trial procedure are 
structured and presented in order to make for engaging drama. Of course, these 
three areas necessarily intersect and overlap with each other, and this will become 
apparent over the course of the chapter.  
In presenting these conventions, I employ examples from several films that 
together constitute what has been figured as the golden age of the trial film. These 
films include Witness for the Prosecution (referred to hereafter as Witness), 12 
Angry Men, Anatomy of a Murder (referred to hereafter as Anatomy), Compulsion, 
The Young Philadelphians (referred to hereafter as Philadelphians), Inherit the 
Wind (referred to hereafter as Inherit), Judgment at Nuremberg (referred to 
hereafter as Judgment), and To Kill a Mockingbird (referred to hereafter as 
Mockingbird). Although I am aware that this choice of corpus may appear to 
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contradict my critique of much law and film scholarship’s restriction to analysing 
this same set of films, I have chosen them for several reasons. They have proved 
crucial in cementing the dominant cultural image of the courtroom trial by 
consolidating the conventions of the prior decades of trial depiction in Hollywood 
film into, in each case, a substantial trial narrative. When the courtroom trial is 
considered in relation to Hollywood cinema, particularly of the classical era, it is 
these films that come most readily to mind. The work on these films featured in my 
review of literature tended to argue that they all reflect what Bruzzi describes as 
‘the normative Hollywood impulse to believe unquestioningly in American 
justice’,101 thus making them to some degree representative of broader dominant 
constructions of law and justice in Hollywood cinema. I will use these films to 
survey what I argue are the dominant conventions of trial representation across 
Hollywood cinema of the chosen period, and to offer the most famous and 
representative iterations of a broader respectful approach to the trial sequence. This 
approach is, I argue, aligned with the ‘normative Hollywood impulse’ and 
identifiable across a much wider body of films than this representative grouping. In 
order to demonstrate the prevalence of the conventions I identify, I have included 
an appendix that displays how many of the seven major golden age trial films 
(Witness, Compulsion, Anatomy, Philadelphians, Inherit, Judgment, Mockingbird) 
contain each of the major conventions outlined. When examples of a given 
convention are not provided in this chapter, please refer to the appendix.   
However, one further reason for examining the golden age grouping is that 
these films are also, as law and film scholars have noted, ‘hardly identical’,102 and it 
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is through their differences as much as their similarities that we can begin to see the 
flexibility allowed in representing the courtroom trial, even when limited to a 
consideration of a group deemed traditional. Examining these “golden” trial films at 
this stage will identify the conventions shared to some degree by all courtroom 
sequences, while also allowing us to consider where the specific emphases of the 
courtroom drama or trial film may depart from depictions in films we do not treat 
within these terms. This corpus selection allows me to establish a dominant 
representation of the courtroom trial with which to compare my later case studies, 
but will also demonstrate individual uses of the trial form, particularly in my third 
section. 
Before moving on to the main body of this chapter, I wish briefly to 
extrapolate some of the major similarities and differences identifiable across the 
golden age legal films.103 All but two of the films take place in American 
courtrooms. One key shared narrative element is that all of the films considered 
depict criminal trials, and five feature murder trials (12 Angry Men, Witness, 
Anatomy, Compulsion and Philadelphians). This is telling as it relates to the similar 
overall tone with which the courtroom narrative is being approached. The content 
of the trials means that all of the films deal with serious subject matter, and in the 
particular cases of films such as Mockingbird and Judgment, subject matter that is 
unimpeachably serious. However, others, such as Witness incorporate more humour 
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into their trial material while asserting the essential gravity of the narrative 
scenario. Similarly, although wider social, cultural and political resonances are 
unavoidable, one way of mapping out the golden age films is to consider the extent 
of their engagement with these issues in their trial scenes (with Clover’s notion of 
the double-trial structure in mind).  
The courtroom trial sequence’s place within a larger narrative should also be 
taken into consideration. None of the golden age courtroom films as defined by 
Papke take place entirely in the courtroom and the extent and duration of the 
courtroom material contained within each film is highly variable. For example, 
perhaps the most famous “courtroom” film of all, 12 Angry Men, contains little 
depiction of a trial proceeding (but is an exemplary trial narrative, as Clover 
demonstrates). Anatomy and Judgment contain lengthy courtroom sequences woven 
into a larger narrative that consistently refers back to the case on trial. Scenes that 
take place outside of the courtroom thus nevertheless dramatize the hiring of legal 
professionals, the preliminary search for and questioning of trial witnesses, or 
depict other scenarios and characters that feed back into their courtroom scenes. 
Compulsion and Philadelphians do not become courtroom films until their final 
acts, but both build up to a trial sequence that we are made aware of earlier in the 
narrative and both end in the courtroom, thus permitting the court to act as a site of 
narrative climax and closure. Mockingbird does not end with its courtroom 
sequence but similarly to Compulsion and Philadelphians features a legal 
professional protagonist played by a major male star and preliminary scenes that 
build up to and make us aware of the trial sequence. Placing the courtroom trial 
sequence within a series of larger narrative strategies and patterns is integral to any 
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discussion of its use of convention, the specific choices made in representation, and 
the meanings contained therein.  
 
The Space of the Courtroom 
 
Considerations of the spatial configuration of the depicted courtroom trial 
must begin from the fixedness of the form noted by Greenfield et al., who argue 
that ‘the physical environment is a limited and known quantity and cannot be 
altered’.104 This raises several avenues of inquiry, allowing us to examine firstly 
what is ‘limited’ and ‘known’ about the spatial properties of the court, what 
meanings these properties are imbued with (especially in regards to establishing a 
relationship to the court as a symbol of law and justice) and how the 
representational strategies of the golden age trial film navigate the unalterable and 
limited qualities of the space. 
Representations of the courtroom must acknowledge the division of the 
space into two areas that evoke the theatre. We could term these areas the stage and 
the gallery. These two areas are physically separated, with the witness who moves 
from gallery to stand (and back) typically the only figure permitted to traverse both 
of them. Yet they are interdependent for several reasons. The sense of a diegetic 
audience, whether it consists of the spectators who fill the gallery or those we could 
term the on-stage figures of judge and jury, is pivotal to the thematic 
preoccupations and realistic aspirations of the golden age trial sequences. All 
engage with the notion of the courtroom as a public arena, one in which the key 
                                                          
104 Greenfield, Osborn and Robson, Film and the Law, p. 62. 
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participants must address others while subject to a wider scrutiny. I will return to 
this notion and the dramatic possibilities it permits in my following sections. 
Beyond this crude division of stage and gallery, the cinematic courtroom 
contains a series of subspaces that are also crucial to the dramatization of the trial. 
The following diagram (Fig. 1) sets up a standard construction of the courtroom 
space in classical Hollywood trial sequences, following the exact basic layout 
present in several of the golden age courtrooms: 
                                                
 
Fig. 1 
The diagram contains all of the spaces in the courtroom that are typically 
deemed necessary, in the interests of narrative development, staging and realism, 
for a trial procedure to be depicted. Although the positioning of these subspaces 
Judge’s Bench 
Defendant’s Table Plaintiff’s Table 
Jury 
Box 
Witness 
Box 
Gallery 
Stage 
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within the courtroom is not entirely immutable,105 they all figure individually in the 
golden age film’s visualisations of the trial space and invoke similar meanings 
through their relationships (both physical and symbolic) to one other. 
Judge’s Bench: The key features of the judge’s bench in relation to the courtroom 
space are its centrality, frontality and the dais that symbolises the judge’s standing 
as he watches over the rest of the courtroom. Its placement figures the judge, 
whatever degree of attention he is given during the trial sequence, as a symbol of 
law at work and in power, facing out on the rest of the courtroom. (I will return to 
the typical depiction of the judge shortly). 
Jury Box: This subspace is typically positioned either on the far left or far right of 
the stage, usually at a right angle to the judge’s bench, witness stand, and counsel 
tables. The placement of the jury box and the subsequent framing and editing of the 
sequence must negotiate the typical anonymity of the jury (as outlined by Clover) 
with the recognition that they are the main intended audience of the trial procedure.  
Witness Stand: This space is invariably stationed in proximity to the judge’s 
bench, typically situated directly in front of it or on a lowered platform to its left or 
right. The witness stand’s frontality also parallels the judge’s bench so that when 
the witness occupies the stand they face those in the gallery.  
Counsel tables: The separate tables, behind which prosecution and defence counsel 
are stationed during most of the trial, are positioned equidistantly from the centre of 
the courtroom. This positioning underlines the adversarial nature of the proceeding 
                                                          
105 It is worth noting that this layout appears more frequently in the American-set golden age 
criminal trial films. The British court of Witness for the Prosecution and the international military 
tribunal court of Judgment at Nuremberg proffer variations on this standard layout but 
nevertheless include all of the subspaces noted and employ the dominant stylistic strategies used 
in representing the courtroom that I outline in this chapter.  
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while also contributing to notions of legal impartiality in its augmentation of the 
court’s balance through design (to which I will return shortly). 
Gallery: Compared to the series of smaller seating spaces that make up the 
courtroom stage, the gallery is comprised only of one large seating area, which can 
be further divided by aisles along which, for instance, individuals may travel to and 
from the witness stand when prompted (as in Inherit and Mockingbird).  
Stage: Although we have already referred to the entirety of the non-spectator 
seating area as the stage, it is perhaps more apt to designate this term specifically to 
the space between the counsel tables and the judge’s bench or jury box, that space 
which the lawyer can traverse in addressing any combination of the three audiences 
(gallery, judge, and jury) present in the courtroom, as well as the individuals being 
questioned on the stand. This space is more officially termed the floor during the 
trial. 
Despite occasional differences in exact positioning, these subspaces share a 
basic set of relationships to each other that convey the courtroom’s power structures 
and suggests its dramatic potentialities. These relationships are in turn emphasised 
through conventional patterns of shot composition and staging across the golden 
age courtroom films. Due in part to the specificities of the narrative scenario, the 
representational strategies of the golden age trial films exemplify the construction 
of space in the classical Hollywood film as outlined by Bordwell et al. The 
imperatives they locate in classical shot composition, of ‘centering, balancing, 
frontality and depth’,106 are also inherent to the spatial configuration of the 
                                                          
106 David Bordwell, Janet Staiger and Kristin Thompson, The Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style 
and Mode of Production to 1960 (London: Routledge, 1985), p. 54. 
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courtroom as outlined above, which privileges a balanced organisation of the space, 
the frontal view it provides the gallery of the players on stage (and vice versa), and 
foregrounds the centrality that, depending on the role of the individual, is an 
immutable (in the case of the judge) or mutable (for lawyer and witness) feature of 
the court’s design. Classical constructions of diegetic space and the basic design 
model of the courtroom constitute a fit of scenario and style. Witnesses on the stand 
must face outwards towards the gallery, just as the actor playing the witness faces 
the camera that captures their performance of the character’s testimony (see Figs. 2-
3, 11-13, 16-18). The court’s subspaces are arranged to provide a sense of balance 
(for example, through the equidistant spacing of opposing counsels’ desks from the 
court’s centre-point, or the arrangement of seating in the jury box or gallery) just as 
centered shot compositions do in classical spatial configurations. These imperatives 
tend to coalesce in the representation of the trial; centering, balancing, frontality 
and depth of composition are evident in the majority of the figures included in this 
chapter and overwhelmingly characterise the framing and composition of the 
courtroom sequence across Hollywood cinema. Bordwell et al. highlight 
‘orientation’ as the central purpose of this organisation of the space; again both 
courtroom design and classical constructions of space share the function of 
clarifying the resonances of placement and perspective.  
The camera most frequently captures the courtroom during the trial 
sequence in medium to long shots. Possibilities for (or restrictions on) shot 
composition are related to the construction of the courtroom space and recur across 
the golden age films, inviting specific readings of the scenario. For example, action 
that occurs on the stage/floor of the courtroom is consistently presented in medium 
to long shot compositions that cannot fail to capture some semblance of the 
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audiences who surround the stage, integrating the theatrical quality inherent to the 
trial form and its element of public display into the frame. This merges with the 
expressive and thematic possibilities enabled through the contrast of the lawyer’s 
movement across the stage with the relative stasis of the other players; the 
awareness of both the camera and lawyer of the importance of the court’s audiences 
is played upon in their respective placements.  
Similarly, the witness stand’s proximity to the judge’s bench means that the 
judge is often figured into the frame during moments of witness testimony or cross-
examination (Fig. 2). One recurrent shot composition across the golden age films 
captures the witness, judge and lawyer in a triangular composition, with the judge 
typically occupying a raised position and the witness occupying the lower space of 
the frame (Figs. 3-4). These triangular configurations work to assert the power 
relations in the courtroom, conform to classical compositional strategies, including 
the T-configuration also theorised by Bordwell et al., and begin to convey the basic 
set of tensions at the heart of the trial scene – between formal and informal, 
intimate and theatrical, private and public, institution and citizen, evidential and 
emotional - that inform much of its depiction.  
 
Fig. 2 
 
61 
 
. 
 
Fig. 3 (top) and Fig. 4 (bottom) 
  
Note how both triangular compositions in Figs. 3-4 also figure the presence 
of the ubiquitous United States flag into the frame. The iconography of the 
courtroom is again largely fixed. We can expect the mise-en-scène of the courtroom 
to include the flag, a reminder of the close connections between law and national 
ideology.107 The subspaces and their arrangement accrue particular meanings. 
Characters deemed indispensable to notions of the courtroom trial also assume an 
iconographic function; the judge, attired in his black robes, is as much an 
iconographic element of the court as props and décor. Similarly, the courtroom 
stenographer, an oft-unmentioned figure who is nevertheless pivotal to cultural 
representations of the courtroom procedure, acts as the kind of detail that 
strengthens a film’s claims for realism while reminding us of the act(s) of 
narrativization fundamental to trial procedure.  
                                                          
107 It is worth noting that the Production Code dictated that ‘the use of the Flag shall be 
consistently respectful’, thus again necessitating a ‘respectful’ representation of the courtroom 
space. 
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This basic configuration of the courtroom space can be given specific 
inflections across films through elements of production design. Discussing the 
space of the courtroom in the golden age courtroom films, Papke argues that ‘The 
films feature a range of striking courtrooms, all symmetrical and blessed with 
handsome accoutrements’.108 Papke emphasises the ordered nature of the space, 
simultaneously formal and elegant. The adjectives he employs – symmetrical, 
handsome – convey the neat organisation of the courtroom that suggest a sense of 
awe and order. However this strikes me as a generalization. Rougher edges are 
often necessitated through considerations of setting and scenario. For example, in 
contrast to the ‘impressive’ courtrooms of Philadelphians, Compulsion, and 
Anatomy,109 the period, small-town, relatively impoverished settings of earlier 20th 
Century Southern communities in Inherit and Mockingbird necessitate less ornate 
features of design and décor. This is demonstrated (amongst other things) in the 
replacement of a witness box with a simple, unadorned chair from which testimony 
is given in Mockingbird, (Fig. 2) and the windows on the wall behind the judge’s 
bench in Inherit that give a view of the local stores across the street from the 
courthouse. These deliberate choices made in the mise-en-scène, choices possible 
even considering the fixedness of the courtroom space, invite specific 
interpretations, and both choices and interpretations will inform the readings of my 
case studies. 
The symmetry Papke notes in the design of the courtroom also recalls the fit 
between the courtroom scenario and classical stylistic imperatives I outlined earlier, 
with the courtroom’s symmetry paralleled in the classical cinema’s provision of 
                                                          
108 Papke, ‘Law, Cinema and Ideology’, p. 1478. 
109 The latter of which was filmed in an actual courtroom. 
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balance through composition. This fit could be seen to reflect a broader perspective 
on the law that recalls Rafter’s description of a ‘respectful’ approach to 
camerawork in trial depiction.110 This approach to visualising the courtroom 
provided in the golden age trial films corresponds with an avoidance of choices in 
mise-en-scène that could be deemed excessive or stylised. For instance, close-ups 
are largely utilised only for particularly emotional witness testimonies and 
corresponding reaction shots, with medium to medium-long shots the norm. Non-
diegetic scoring is rarely utilised during the trial itself (a point I will return to in my 
discussion of the courtroom spectators). When present, the score features at the end 
of the sequence, after all procedural elements have been depicted, as in 
Philadelphians and Judgment. It is also telling that all of the golden age courtroom 
dramas are filmed in black-and-white. The generic basis of classical Hollywood’s 
uses of colour and monochrome cinematography have been noted by Bordwell et al. 
who suggest that ‘Technicolor was identified with the musical, comedy, the historic 
genre, the adventure story, and the fantasy – in short, the genres of stylization and 
spectacle’.111 Thus, the use of black-and-white cinematography could be considered 
another stylistic choice employed as a gesture of respect to the court of law and the 
seriousness of the films’ subject matter, lessening expectations for ‘stylization and 
spectacle’ and diminishing the possibility of any accusations of sensationalism. On 
occasions when colour cinematography is employed,112 the colour schemes 
                                                          
110 Rafter, ‘American Criminal Trial Films’, p. 15. 
111 David Bordwell, Janet Staiger, and Kristin Thompson, Classical Hollywood Cinema, p. 355. 
112 For instance, in the two case studies included in my melodrama chapter, as well as in examples 
of other genres including the western [The Return of Frank James (Dir: Fritz Lang, 1940), Broken 
Lance (Dir: Edward Dmytryk, 1954)] and even the musical [Gentlemen Prefer Blondes (Dir: Howard 
Hawks, 1953)]  
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typically remain sober and respectful, utilising respectful, naturalistic colour tones 
including the conventional mahoganies of the courtroom’s benches and pews. 
And yet a total acquiescence to ‘respectful’ representation of the courtroom 
would imply a retreat from the elements of the trial that make the form most suited 
to dramatization. It is here we can return to Bordwell et al., and their assertion that 
the spatial construction of classical cinema is fundamentally in service of an 
‘anthroponcentric commitment’.113 What centrality, balancing, frontality and depth 
draw our attention to in actuality are the human individuals who occupy the 
courtroom space and complicate its organisational aspirations of neutrality and 
reason. If the design features of the courtroom gesture to the ideals of natural law, 
as outlined by both Rafter and Pribram,114 the consistent human presence gestures 
to the less stable domain of man-made (or positive) law. The series of subspaces 
discussed earlier have a symbolic resonance even when vacant, but when occupied 
with the correct players they set into motion a drama of conflict(s), revelation, and 
pressured and weighted expression and gesture. Close ups during the golden age 
trial scenes do not depict the court’s objects but rather individuals in states of 
emotional excitement. Lighting is predominantly even and employed with recourse 
to capturing individuals’ faces with as much clarity as possible. Camera movement 
is rarely independent of the characters, which lends an added layer of meaning to 
the lawyer’s ability to traverse the stage (and its contrast with the stasis of others). 
Even the relatively obtrusive camera movement of Judgment (consisting of 
recurrent arcing movements, or sudden zooms) acts in service of the characters and 
the pertinent relationships established in the courtroom (see Figs. 5-8), and its 
                                                          
113 David Bordwell, Janet Staiger, and Kristin Thompson, Classical Hollywood Cinema, p. 54. 
114 See Review of the Literature, pp. 39, 48. 
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compositions conform to classical expectation. Thus even the ‘inventive’ 
camerawork that Clover detects in trial depiction as a way of combatting the 
claustrophobic setting primarily functions in service of this same anthropocentric 
commitment.115 
 
Fig. 5 
 
Fig. 6 
 
Fig. 7 
                                                          
115 Clover, ‘“God Bless Juries!”’, p. 265. 
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Fig. 8. 
 
However, rather than isolating this anthropocentricism, I believe that 
courtroom scenes construct their specific appeal and central thematic network  
through the interplay of the representations of space and character, and the parallel 
tensions between natural and positive law. The ‘imperative contrast’ Jessica Silbey 
identifies in courtroom representation between the law – ordered, inhuman - and the 
citizen – emotional, human – can be located across the construction of space in the 
golden age trials.116 Although Silbey sees this contrast as primarily figured through 
a binary of emptiness and occupation in relation to the site of the court, I view it as 
a consistent, structuring element of representational strategy. The patterns I have 
located across the golden age constructions of courtroom space include the 
triangular configurations, the unavoidable presence of audiences within framings, 
an adherence to ordered and symmetrical compositions, and an overall fit between 
classical compositional imperatives and the dominant features of the courtroom’s 
design. All of these patterns speak to a tension between an idealised natural law, 
exemplified in the resonances underlying attempts to construct order and balance 
through space, and fallible positive law, at the mercy of all of the variables of 
human thought, action and emotion. In order to extend our consideration of this 
tension and its symbolic and dramatic significance, I wish now to consider 
                                                          
116 Jessica Silbey, ‘Patterns of Courtroom Justice’, p. 107. 
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dominant patterns of representation in relation to another fixed quantity, which is 
the characters who occupy the court during trial.  
 
Legal Actors: The Players in the Courtroom 
 
Examining patterns of spatial representation in the golden age courtrooms 
has revealed what I see as a central, structuring relationship between the court of/as 
law and the individuals who occupy the space. This relationship throws into relief 
the tensions between natural and positive law. With this in mind, I wish now to 
look at patterns of representing the characters we expect to appear in the courtroom 
scene.  I will focus initially on those we could deem as working for the institution 
of the law, beginning with the judge and jury, whose presences I will argue are 
primarily symbolic, before considering the more rounded characterisation of the 
golden age lawyer. This will introduce a discussion of the legal hero or justice 
figure, who seems particularly integral to the golden age courtroom film and its 
constructions of law and justice.  Finally, I will consider those present whose 
relationship to the courtroom differs, including the gallery spectators and 
journalists, and the pivotal legal outsiders who bring their charges, defences and 
testimonies to the court: defendant, plaintiff and witnesses.117  
 
 
                                                          
117 There are several minor figures we also expect to appear in the courtroom scene, including the 
aforementioned stenographer and courtroom guards. However, their function is primarily at the 
iconographic level and rarely do they contribute to the dramatic development of the trial scene, so 
I will not devote any extended discussion to their representation.  
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The Judge 
Papke describes ‘traditional’ depictions of the judge (implicitly associated 
with pre-1970s popular culture) as ‘flat’,118 arguing that the traditional cinematic 
judge  
lacked individualizing detail and was also static, that is, he did not develop 
or change in the course of the film [The judge] seldom interacted with the 
other characters in significant ways or altered the central course of events. 
In general, pop cultural judges were supposed to rule on objections, 
maintain order in the courtrooms, and sit sagely on high wearing a judicial 
robe.119   
 
This is certainly true of the judges in Mockingbird, Compulsion, Witness and 
Philadelphians, none of whom, crucially, we ever see outside of the trial. The 
golden age judges are in these instances primarily symbolic presences, and this is 
reflected in the fact that, of all of the figures present in the courtroom, they are the 
ones most frequently featured in neat, symmetrical compositions, framed centrally 
and frontally, oftentimes with even the items that surround them on the desk 
arranged symmetrically (Figs. 9-10). The respectful formal strategies outlined in the 
previous section parallel the respectfully flat depiction of the judge in these films. 
Issues of casting are also relevant to considering this characteristic flatness. Judges 
are not played by stars with personas that will create assumptions regarding the 
personality of the character,120 but by character actors either relatively unknown to 
                                                          
118 David Ray Papke, ‘From Flat to Round: Changing Portrayals of the Judge in American Popular 
Culture.’ J. Legal Prof. 31 (2007), p. 131. 
119 Ibid, pp. 131-132. 
120 The casting of Spencer Tracey as Judge Dan Haywood in Judgment at Nuremberg is the notable 
exception of the golden age trial films. 
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the general public,121 or known for playing similarly authoritative characters.122123 
Papke suggests that, despite the judge’s power, apparent in the recurrent moments 
in which the figure will rule over objections or admonish a murmuring audience, he 
possesses no real agency. The judge’s interjections augment the appearance of 
realism and underline the codes of conduct governing the trial, but his narrative 
function does not permit him the same level of dramatic involvement as, for 
example, a stirring closing speech from the defence attorney or a particularly 
revelatory piece of witness testimony.  
 
Fig. 9 
 
Fig. 10 
                                                          
121 This would be suggested, for example, in the fact that neither of the respective actors playing 
the judge in Compulsion and The Young Philadelphians, was given a screen credit for the role. 
122 Paul Fix, who plays Judge Taylor in To Kill a Mockingbird, would have been best known to 
audiences at the time for his role as a Marshall in the Western television series The Rifleman (1958-
1963). 
123 The casting of Joseph N. Welch, a non-actor most well known for being chief counsel for the 
United States army during its investigation for Communist activities in the Army-McCarthy hearings 
of 1954, as Judge Weaver in Anatomy of a Murder may seem anomalous, but actually exemplifies 
the qualities shared by all of these casting choices. Welch’s known background and unaffected 
performance style construct the flatness required to inspire respect for the character, as does the 
casting of the character actors in the other films. 
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 The aforementioned flatness is not the only model of characterisation in the 
golden age sequences. Levi broadly echoes Papke’s statements, arguing that 
generally ‘movies seem to portray judges as standing for justice itself’,124 but also 
detects ‘four distinct ways’ in which the judge is characterised: ‘strictly and sternly, 
with a folksy charm, wearily or cynically, or sometimes corrupted by greed or 
another nefarious motivation’, adding that the last category is ‘the exception rather 
than the rule’.125 Although the judge is often a figurehead, a symbol for justice, he 
can also be imbued with personal characteristics constructed through the level of 
interaction with other characters inside and outside of the courtroom. Thus the 
‘folksy charm’ of Judge Weaver (played by actual legal professional Joseph N. 
Welch) in Anatomy makes the character more memorable than the ‘strict, stern’ 
judges of Compulsion and Mockingbird. However, even when personal 
characteristics are evidenced they reflect positively on the judge as both an element 
of the legal system and an individual that works in the best interests of justice, as in 
Anatomy and Judgment, whose judge protagonist I will discuss in more detail as an 
example of the legal hero.  
To understand this, it is worth considering again why the flat 
characterisation is so prevalent with regards to the affirmation of the models of law 
and justice the films present. Central to viewer expectations that the legal system is 
working is the belief that the judge remains impartial. Thus one mode of invoking 
this belief in the golden age films is through the combination of the aforementioned 
lack of characterisation and balanced compositional framings that construct the 
                                                          
124 Ross D. Levi, The Celluloid Courtroom, p. 43. 
125 Ibid., p. 59. 
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‘flat’ depiction. Papke argues that golden age ‘characterisation depends on a 
political “centering” of the legal professionals’ and accordingly describes the 
judges in these films as ‘nonpartisan’.126 This again correlates to the notions of a 
respectful form, particularly evident in the inclusion of the term ‘centering’. I 
would complicate this line of argument and suggest that occasionally political 
allegiances are suggested or even stated within the films, but that even this serves 
eventually to indicate the judge’s lack of bias when making rulings or otherwise 
contributing to trial procedure.127  
Thus we begin to see how the judges of golden age trial films – all white 
men128– function symbolically to remind us of the workings of the legal institution 
and reflect positively its idealised non-partisan status. They are more often figured 
as symbols than individuals, evidenced in the symmetrical positions they frequently 
figure within, and even when more fleshed out as characters, are imbued with 
                                                          
126 David Ray Papke, ‘Law, Cinema and Ideology’, p. 1476. 
127 For example, both Inherit the Wind and To Kill a Mockingbird suggest political affiliations in their 
judge characters. In the latter film, the judge’s displeasure with the guilty verdict handed down to 
African-American defendant Tom Robinson (Brock Peters) by a racist jury is made evident by a shot 
that captures his displeased expression and subsequent departure from the court, incorporating 
most tellingly the force with which he slams the door behind him. The judge of Inherit the Wind is 
inversely heavily suggested to share the conservatism of the small-town community over which he 
observes, to the extent of being accused of bias during the trial by defence attorney Henry 
Drummond (Spencer Tracy). Yet, it is integral to the film’s affirmations of their constructions of 
good law and justice that this personal perspective co-exists with (what the film deems) the 
consistent fairness of the judge’s rulings – and, in the case of Inherit the Wind, his final verdict - in 
the courtroom. 
128 I have located in my research only two counter-examples across the range of Hollywood films 
viewed: a white female judge (played by Myrna Loy) in The Bachelor and the Bobby-Soxer (Dir: 
Irving Reis, 1947) and an African-American male judge (Juano Hernandez) in Trial (Dir: Mark 
Robson, 1955). In the latter, this decision is given narrative and thematic function as part of the 
film’s engagement with themes of racial prejudice and trial manipulation. And in the former, the 
decision is part of the film’s generic status as a romantic comedy (Loy’s character becomes the 
female love interest at the centre of the narrative, and her career is given less dramatic weight due 
to the comic mode of the film). 
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positive characteristics that reflect well upon the American legal institution and its 
constituent elements.129  
The Jury 
The trial jury shares with the judge a primarily symbolic presence in the 
golden age trial sequence, the judge’s flat characterisation paralleled in the non-
individualised jury. The jury’s presence is often conveyed through the body 
language and gesturing of the mobile lawyers more than their appearance on screen. 
When isolated shots of the jury are included, the level of anonymity is conveyed 
through the lack of close-ups and individualising detail. The jury, when we do see 
them, is typically all-white and all-middle aged, with a mixture of male and female 
jurors. These issues of representation must be considered with regards to Clover’s 
argument asserting the viewer’s role as jury surrogate in the trial film and the 
ideological implications of this positioning. Levi echoes Clover in asserting that the 
lack of attention given to the jury ‘is not an attempt to dismiss its centrality to the 
proper functioning of the legal system’ but rather a decision made ‘out of respect 
for the jury’s mystique. It seems the jury has been relegated to being an extra in 
legal cinema […] but in actuality it constitutes a character unto itself, whose mere 
silent presence seems a necessity for the portrayal of a just legal system’.130  
However, when a film attempts to raise certain social or legal issues through 
its depiction of the jury (as in accordance with Clover’s notion of the double-trial 
structure) attention may be drawn to specific configurations of the jury. For 
                                                          
129 The latter depiction corresponds with the more general treatment of professional patriarchal 
figures and the spaces they occupy in the classical Hollywood cinema. Doctors and their consulting 
rooms, or priests and their studies, are often imbued with an unquestioned and benevolent 
wisdom that refuses any interrogation of the suitability of either role or individual within American 
society. 
130 Ross D. Levi, The Celluloid Courtroom, p. 84. 
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example, Mockingbird considers the likelihood of bias underlying the deliberation 
of twelve white males from a small Southern community in the case of an African-
American male accused of raping a white woman.131 But otherwise the jury’s 
relative homogeneity is employed, as Clover argues, in order to avoid critiquing the 
institution of the jury. Their only action is a crucial one, the reading of the verdict, 
in which the jury foreman comes forward to state the jury’s ruling (included in 
Witness, Philadelphians, Anatomy and Mockingbird). Even at this moment, the 
individual foreman has no presence beyond this action; it is as if, in order to assert 
the fundamental soundness of the jury system (to paraphrase a speech made by 
Parnell [Arthur O’Connell] in Anatomy), “twelve minds have become one” at the 
point in which the verdict is read. 
Lawyers 
The centrality granted to the lawyer is one of the distinguishing features of 
the golden age courtroom drama, with the lawyer hero archetype (to which I will 
return shortly) featuring in Witness, Compulsion, Philadelphians, Inherit and 
Mockingbird. The defence lawyer in particular is granted a level of identification, 
narrative attention and psychological motivation denied the ‘flat’ figures of judge 
and jury in the golden age courtroom films, and in each of the aforementioned 
examples is featured as the protagonist or at least a major identification figure by 
the time we reach the courtroom. This focus on the defence lawyer in the golden 
age courtroom narratives is reflected in the casting of such major stars as Gregory 
                                                          
131 This is also an implication of 12 Angry Men. It is only the presence of dissenting Juror #8 (Henry 
Fonda) that prevents a unanimous ‘guilty’ verdict that is revealed to be influenced by the 
prejudices of a number of his fellow jurors.  
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Peck (Mockingbird), Paul Newman (Philadelphians) and Orson Welles 
(Compulsion) in defence lawyer roles.  
The casting of these stars already draws out a number of related 
conventional elements in the representation of golden age lawyers. The most 
immediately identifiable is that all of these stars, and thus all of the lawyer 
characters, are white males.132 This reflects and contributes to the typical gendering 
of the court on numerous levels, the significance of which I will return to. Star 
casting also suggests that the role of lawyer can easily be a showy one that draws 
the viewer’s attention through combination with the conventions of trial procedure 
depiction. A theatrical analogy again proves useful here – the lawyer is the star 
performer, the lead actor of the trial-as-theatrical-performance. This convention 
ensures that the character is given an agency that others in the courtroom are not 
regardless of the depth of characterisation with which he is imbued, an agency 
partly realised through the aforementioned distinction between the lawyer’s motion 
and the stasis of the other courtroom players. Similarly, the lawyer’s typical 
command of oratory and rhetoric is specific to this character and integral to a 
scenario in which mastery of the nuances of verbal expression is central. The 
importance of this is made evident in the procedural conventions of witness cross-
examination and opening/closing remarks (both of which I will consider in more 
depth shortly).  
I have referred mainly to the defence counsel because it is with these 
characters that the predominant focus of the golden age trial film lies. Prosecution 
                                                          
132 This is not to say that there are no female lawyer characters in classical Hollywood productions. 
However, in the few instances where female lawyers do appear as significant characters, as in 
Adam’s Rib (Dir: George Cukor, 1949) and Smart Woman (Dir: Edward A. Blatt, 1948), the generic 
terrain of the film tends towards the comic and/or romantic. 
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is not as well-defined in terms of characterisation,133 but their relative flatness is 
more ambivalently rendered than that of judge and juror. An exemplary 
characterisation of the prosecutor is Claude Dancer (George C. Scott) in Anatomy of 
a Murder. Dancer, who is rarely seen outside of the courtroom, unlike his 
counterpart, defence counsel Paul Biegler (James Stewart), is defined largely by his 
ruthless efficiency, including the use of “courtroom tricks” such as blocking a 
witness from Biegler’s view during examination. Part of the ambiguity of Anatomy 
lies in the gradual realisation that Biegler is not above such tricks himself, yet the 
film more overtly and conventionally exacerbates the antagonism inherent to the 
prosecutor type through its depiction of Dancer. These antagonistic qualities are 
also aided by casting. Whereas star performers take on the heroic defence roles in 
the majority of the golden age legal films, prosecution lawyers are portrayed by 
character actors who project fewer positive characteristics from an existing persona, 
as in Witness, Philadelphians and Mockingbird.134  
I wish to return to notions of the trial-as-performance in thinking about 
dominant representations of the lawyer. I have located in the golden age trial films 
several recurrent strategies of performance that relate also to casting and persona, 
and which I will elaborate on when considering the justice figure shortly. The film 
actor’s performance of the lawyer entails a second performance within the diegesis, 
to be given during the trial, a condition which the golden age films negotiate in 
several ways. Two different performance strategies are evident across the golden 
                                                          
133 One exception is Judgment at Nuremberg, where the choice to feature the judge as protagonist 
changes the emphases of the trial narrative – prosecution and defence counsel are more balanced 
in terms of characterisation as the film’s primary structure of identification resides with the 
presiding judge. 
134 One notable exception in the golden age films is Inherit the Wind, which underlines the 
characterisation of prosecuting attorney Matthew Brady as a celebrity, showman and performer 
within the diegesis by casting a star, Fredric March, in the role. 
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age defence lawyer roles that serve a similar function despite their contrasting 
means. The defence lawyer can be performed with an overt and displayed 
expressivity (evident in the performances of Newman, Welles, and Widmark [in 
Judgment]) or through a style of underplaying (utilised by Peck and Tracey135). The 
former conveys a more visibly impassioned commitment to the defence counsel 
role, the latter a quieter but no less powerful commitment; the shared element is that 
we view these performances as sincere reflections of the actual attitudes of the 
lawyers towards their cases.136  
A Note on the Justice Figure 
It is at this point that I wish to consider in more detail the notion of the 
justice figure with respect to the golden age trial films. One shared feature of the 
three aforementioned character types across the golden age trial films is that they 
permit the development of a heroic characterisation that correlates with the justice 
figure archetype theorised by Rafter. Each of the golden age films feature an 
individual working for the legal institution, as judge (Dan Haywood [Spencer 
Tracy]) in Judgment), juror (Juror #8 [Henry Fonda] in 12 Angry Men) or most 
frequently, defence attorney (Atticus Finch in Mockingbird, Jonathan Wilk in 
Compulsion, Anthony Lawrence in Philadelphians, and Henry Drummond in 
Inherit) as the central justice figure. All are depicted as crusaders for justice who 
face a series of challenges posed by others’ assumptions, prejudices and abuses of 
                                                          
135 To clarify, I refer here to Tracey’s performance in Inherit the Wind. I make this distinction 
because the actor also appears as the judge protagonist of Judgment at Nuremberg. 
136 The ambiguous meanings constructed through Biegler’s courtroom performance in Anatomy of 
a Murder is anomalous within the golden age corpus, again suggestive of the film’s more 
problematic relationship to the dominant affirmative representation of the adversarial trial system 
located across the other films. 
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the legal system. Jessica Silbey succinctly encapsulates the centrality of these 
characterisations to the images of American law and justice invoked:   
These films exemplify liberal legalism as they embolden the viewer’s 
expectations in law by rooting the promise of justice in the determined and 
enlightened individual. We come to believe that although the legal system 
can be a tortured place, a determined and enlightened individual (a legal 
hero, for example, whose enlightenment comes from the film’s self-
conscious display) can successfully navigate the legal system, participating 
in and thereby enacting the justice he has learned to demand from the 
idealized rule of law.137  
 
Silbey conveys how these films work to ‘embolden’ viewers’ belief in law despite 
(and partly through) their focus on the difficulties of achieving justice by proffering 
the legal hero as the definitive emblem of justice. Silbey notes the importance of the 
ideals of American liberalism, including fairness, freedom and equality under the 
law, to the films’ constructions of justice and hence their representation of the 
justice figure. It is evident that the very flatness of the dominant representations of 
judge and jury as outlined above can affirm these ideals of fairness and equality. 
But it is also worth considering how the more rounded characterisations granted to 
the legal hero correlate to these ideals. 
The justice figure characterisation necessitates a greater depth than the 
dominant patterns of representing the figures of judge and jury provide, which is 
why the legal heroes of 12 Angry Men and Judgment, Juror #8 and Judge Dan 
Haywood, are anomalous examples of, respectively, the golden age juror and judge. 
What we learn about these characters outside of the trial setting must reflect 
positively on what we believe their intentions and motivations to be within it. The 
                                                          
137 Silbey, Jessica, ‘A History of Representations of Justice: Coincident Preoccupations of Law and 
Film’ in Masson, Antoine and O’Connor, Kevin [Eds.], Representations of Justice (Brussels: Peter 
Lang, 2007), p. 146.  
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scenes of Atticus Finch’s home life that precede the trial scene of To Kill a 
Mockingbird convey that he is the ‘determined and enlightened individual’ we 
expect to see standing for liberalism’s ideal of justice in court.138  This conflation of 
characteristics presented inside and outside of the courtroom is also exemplified in 
the character of Judge Haywood in Judgment at Nuremberg. Haywood is described 
by Suzanne Shale as possessing ‘all of the down-home, plain-speaking, salt-of-the-
earth, and man-of-the-people American virtues’,139 but contrasts this with the 
character’s ‘more complex and ambivalent’ portrayal in the screenwriter’s initial 
outline.140 The casting of Spencer Tracy in the role is clearly meaningful in this 
instance. Tracy’s persona and acting style convey a sense of straightforwardness 
and decency, shown in his casting as an embodiment of liberal humanism in films 
such as Bad Day at Black Rock (1955, Dir: Robert Sturges). This lends him a 
gravitas that suits him to the portrayal of the justice figure.141  
The defence lawyer is the most persistent embodiment of liberal legalism 
because, as I have previously detailed, he is the court’s most active agent, and the 
trial form enables him possibilities for rhetoric that can espouse the ideals of 
liberalism. This is evident in the speechifying of Compulsion, Mockingbird and 
Inherit, to be considered at more length shortly. But, to return to the importance of 
performance to this dominant representation, it should be noted that the 
courtroom’s inherent theatricality can connote an ethically ambiguous notion of 
lawyer performativity that the golden age films must negotiate. The aforementioned 
                                                          
138 Indeed, the cultural resonance of the character of Atticus Finch has remained so prevalent that 
the American Film Institute named Finch the top movie hero of all time in 2003.  
139 ‘The Conflicts of Law and the Character of Men: Writing Reversal of Fortune and Judgment at 
Nuremberg’ University of San Francisco Law Review 30 (1995), pp. 999-1000. 
140 Ibid., p. 1008. 
141 Similar considerations of persona seem integral to the casting of Henry Fonda and Gregory Peck 
in their respective justice figure roles. 
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convergence or consistency of characteristics displayed both in and out of the 
courtroom is one method of managing this. Another method is to displace broader 
ambiguities surrounding notions of performance by guiding audience responses to 
what are presented as distinct types of performing. In 12 Angry Men the justice 
figure Juror #8, following his initial attempts to convert the jury to his perspective, 
has a conversation with Juror #7 (Jack Warden). The two men are contrasted 
through their opposed responses to the case they are deliberating over as well as 
aspects of costuming, physicality, stardom and performance. Their exchanges 
reveal that Juror #7 is a salesman, another profession inextricable from notions of 
performance. By contrasting Juror #8’s methods of persuasion in the jury room to 
his own (which he characterises through dialogue as “laughs, drinks, jokes, tricks”), 
Juror #7 diagnoses the other as a “soft sell” salesman. This contrast is integral to 
distinguishing between modes of performance as a way of gesturing to the moral 
and judicial rightness of one over the other. Juror #7 and Juror #8 present opposed 
relationships to the film’s construction of justice that are partly brought out through 
diegetic considerations of performance; the showier performer works towards 
emptier goals (the sale of marmalade) and is figured as obstructing justice in the 
jury room, whereas the “soft sell” character works towards the film’s morally 
sanctioned objective of achieving liberalistic justice. The notion that Juror #8 is 
acting, and the ethical connotations raised therein, is suggested by Juror #7 but 
undermined through the subsequent distinction.142 
                                                          
142 The dialectical connotations of underplaying with sincere liberalism and overacting with 
reinforcements of injustice reoccurs in the contrast between the performance styles of Henry 
Drummond/Spencer Tracey and Matthew Brady/Fredric March in Inherit the Wind, the latter being 
referred to as “all shine and no substance”.  
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Spectators and Journalists 
The presence of spectators in the courtroom is vital to the specific terms of 
the courtroom trial sequence. I noted in my first section that the compositional 
patterns of the trial sequence consistently figured the audiences of judge, jury or 
gallery into shot framings, entailing and maintaining an awareness of audience that 
I posit as integral to the specific dramatic appeal and thematic potentialities of the 
trial scenario. The spectatorship’s presence conveys a slightly different meaning to 
the other courtroom audiences of judge and jury, however. The crowded 
spectatorship conveys that the trial has become a diegetic spectacle within a broader 
social context of the film’s world, conveying a public interest in the case on trial 
that serves to underline for the viewer the form’s dramatic potential. All of the 
golden age trial films contain crowded courtrooms – some, as in Mockingbird, are 
visibly overcrowded – that construct broader meanings. The presence of a crowded 
spectatorship can invoke notions of wider communities both generally (in terms of 
American society) and specifically (for example, the small Southern U.S. 
communities of Mockingbird and Inherit). The specific handling of the 
spectatorship within individual films can inflect the tone and narrative meaning of 
the courtroom space and trial scene just as much as other elements of mise-en-scène 
I discussed in the initial section of this chapter. I will now detail how this is 
achieved.  
Firstly, it should be noted that the courtroom spectatorship allows for the 
film’s inclusion of key figures within the narrative inside the court despite their 
exclusion from the procedure of the trial itself. Any character who has a 
narratively-weighted relationship to the central players “on stage” can be included 
in the trial scene through their presence in the gallery. Reaction shots of these 
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individuals can guide the viewer’s emotional response or display the diversity of 
perspectives towards the events occurring on stage. In some instances, a momentary 
focus on these characters provides brief respite from the tonal gravity of the trial.143 
However, the broader, non-individualised crowd are also important to the 
courtroom trial sequence’s narrational strategies. A useful comparison can be made 
between the courtroom spectatorship and the Greek chorus; the collective, non-
individualised grouping comments upon the main narrative action and acts as an 
ideal audience, guiding the responses of the spectator to the diegesis.  
The spectatorship has an important aural as well as visual function, in effect 
replacing the musical score typically absent from the trial scene. Two recurrent 
reactions from the courtroom crowd attest to this function. Firstly, laughter from the 
spectators, particularly during earlier witness testimonies, figures as a way to ease 
the viewer into the courtroom trial before the tonal shift into a more serious 
register.144 By the time the final witness or defendant makes it to the stand, it is 
highly unlikely that there will be any laughter in the courtroom. Laughter also 
demonstrates the manner in which courtroom trials are considered entertainment for 
audiences, diegetic and otherwise, particularly when elicited by wisecracking 
comments from any of the courtroom players.  
The second recurrent aural device in the depiction of the courtroom 
spectatorship is the murmuring of the crowd, which occurs most often after 
particularly dramatic, unexpected, or shocking information has been relayed during 
                                                          
143 The character of Nurse Plimsoll (Elsa Lanchester) in Witness for the Prosecution is exemplary in 
this regard, interjecting humour into the trial sequences and underlining the theme of court as 
theatrical spectacle.  
144 Some courtroom films use this laughter to create a sense of irony or dissonance; one shot from 
Compulsion shows the two defendants, guilty of murdering a young child, laughing at one of the 
defence lawyer’s wisecracks along with the majority of the spectators, while behind them, one 
defendant’s parents appear visibly anguished, a reminder of the gravity of the situation. 
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the trial. Such murmuring guides audience reaction so that we can share in these 
feelings of investment. Its consistent inclusion on the soundtrack in response to 
other tropes of the courtroom drama (including the calling of a surprise witness to 
the stand, or a bold accusation made by the current witness) signals to us, the trial’s 
other audience, that such developments exist outside of the expected schema of 
events within the diegetic scenario and thus are particularly dramatic.145 It also 
relates to the tensions between formality (and ritual) and spectacle at play in the 
trial sequence, especially apparent in the response of the judge to noise from the 
spectatorship. His invariable orders that the gallery remain silent reminds us of the 
expected mode of behaviour (and often provides another aural jolt with its 
accompanied gavel banging). The trope of the courtroom’s murmurings signalling a 
particularly dramatic development in the trial appears in all of the golden age trial 
sequences, but has received no critical attention. Its inclusion is taken for granted, 
but it is an integral device to the specificities of the trial scene’s narration. 
 The presence of journalists in the courtroom functions similarly to the 
broader spectatorship, demonstrating more acutely the wresting of the personal into 
the arena of public spectacle. Their inclusion can suggest that the level of public 
interest in the trial has reached the national scale, reinforcing the socially relevant 
or potentially sensationalised nature of the cases at hand. The depiction of 
journalists can paradoxically critique the crassness of the media’s intrusion into 
personal lives and reassert the validity of the interest we, the viewer, have in the 
case. Nevertheless, the presence of newspapermen is often figured as an intrusion, 
                                                          
145 Of course the standardization of these very tropes paradoxically creates viewer expectations for 
them to appear. Murmuring thus often asserts diegetic shock to events the viewer had expected, 
thereby reminding us, despite our very expectation, that this development is a dramatic one within 
the diegesis.  
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with the accompanying photographer and the flashes of light emitted from his 
camera as he photographs dramatic events the most overt reminder of this 
intrusiveness (as when a photographer appears into the frame to take a photograph 
following a character’s physical collapse in court in Compulsion).  
Once again, the conventional representational strategies and narrative 
functions applied to particular characters (or in this instance groupings), can be 
inflected by a particular film’s thematic emphases. Inherit the Wind contains what 
could be described as an intensification of our awareness of the spectatorship and 
their typical meanings in line with the film’s thematic engagement with issues of 
rhetoric, the mob mentality inspired by religious fundamentalism, political 
campaigning and celebrity. Uelman examines how the film depicts the trial as a 
‘circus’ and this entails a play with these conventions and representational 
strategies,146 including frequent verbal comments from individuals in the gallery 
and the overtness with which Brady’s statements are directed to his fans in the 
gallery rather than the jury. Thus, the specific focus on the spectatorship in Inherit 
uses the aforementioned conventions expressively by intensifying their features.  
Legal Outsiders: Witnesses, Plaintiffs and Defendants 
The remaining characters who play a part upon the courtroom stage are 
those in the particularly pressured circumstance of giving testimony to the 
courtroom: plaintiff, defendant and witness. These characters appear before the 
courtroom and provide a version of events congruent with either the prosecution’s 
or defence’s account, that we can expect to be challenged by the opposing counsel. 
                                                          
146 G.F. Uelman, ‘Trial as a Circus: Inherit the Wind’, USFL Review 30 (1995), pp. 1221-1124. 
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Before looking in more detail at the patterns of representing these characters, I 
would like to consider several specific features of this figure’s relationship to the 
courtroom trial. All of the golden age trial scenes draw upon the assumption that, 
while not everyone has the specific skillset to be a lawyer, judge, or even a juror, 
almost any individual can be called to the witness stand. The golden age films 
feature a broad selection of witnesses who can, for a wide range of reasons, be 
deemed vulnerable and who are represented accordingly. It is most often through 
the treatment of vulnerable individuals on the stand that the golden age films, 
broadly respectful of the system of law otherwise, gesture to the systemic and 
ethical problems underlying the adversarial legal procedure.  
The witness stand is where the tensions between the ideals of liberal 
legalism and the dominant structures of difference in American society (expressed 
primarily around class, race and gender) become most apparent. The further outside 
of the courtroom’s dominant cultural category of white, educated male that an 
individual on the stand exists, the more tension can be wrung from their trial 
appearance. It is worth noting how often the justice figure, invariably a white male, 
works to achieve justice for a figure who falls outside of one or more of these 
cultural categories, a pattern present in 12 Angry Men, Mockingbird and, to a lesser 
degree, Anatomy. In films where this is not the case, the golden age trial scenes 
retain other witnesses who are characterised as particularly unsuited to the 
courtroom environment through cultural categorisations. Before considering in 
more detail how this relationship to the courtroom can be conveyed, it is worth 
detailing the types of characters we expect to feature in the witness stand and the 
representational strategies that I argue vary depending upon the character’s 
emotional proximity to the case on trial.  
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A dominant method of structuring the drama of the trial is to depict firstly 
the testimonies of individuals either entirely distanced from the personal 
relationships involved in the case on trial, or only incidentally related to them, 
before progressing to the testimonies of those who we would consider to be closely 
– and frequently emotionally - involved. This development builds tension, as the 
testimony of characters not personally involved in the crime on trial constructs a 
case-building narrative (of prosecution or defence) that can be complicated, 
opposed or reinforced as the sequence progresses. This structure also attests to the 
tension between reason and emotion that Pribram sees as central to the thematic 
structures of the law and order genres.147 The initially rational explanations of the 
earlier witnesses align with concrete notions of guilt and innocence (and right and 
wrong) as being discernible and accessible through similarly concrete facts and 
truths. But the rigidity of these notions are complicated (even if temporarily) by 
subsequent testimonies that gesture to the messiness of human emotions. 
One recurrent example of the first type of testifier is the expert or official 
witness, present in Witness, Compulsion, Anatomy, Inherit and Mockingbird. 
Typically a male professional such as a doctor, psychiatrist or scientist, the expert 
witness provides what is assumed to be an objective reasoning on, for example, the 
murder victim’s cause of death or the psychological state of the accused. The 
courtroom sequence often marks their first and only appearance within the 
narrative. They are, like the judge, patriarchal figures given limited shading in 
terms of characterisation beyond their professional status, and whose unquestioned 
authority holds the capacity to corroborate with or condemn the accused. The same 
applies for the law officials also liable to be included among these initial 
                                                          
147 See Review of the Literature, p. 47. 
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testimonies, including police officials (featured in Witness and Mockingbird). The 
defining feature of this type is that they appear in a professional capacity, with little 
to no personal or emotional investment in the outcome of the case.148  
A second grouping of case building witnesses includes minor characters that 
may or may not have appeared in the diegesis prior to the courtroom trial but whose 
relation to the main narrative remains incidental. The treatment of their testimony, 
like that of the previous witness type, is dictated by their relative distance from the 
defendant – they may work for or alongside, or simply be acquainted, with the 
individuals involved in the case, but they are demonstrably not personally close to 
them in the same terms as a family member, close friend, or romantic partner. The 
treatment of these characters on the stand can be used as a barometer of the 
sequence’s tone at the point of their appearance. Thus, when Janet (Una O’Connor) 
the housekeeper of the woman whose murder Leonard Vole (Tyrone Power) is on 
trial for in Witness, appears on the stand, the character functions largely as comic 
relief before the sequence progresses into the more serious register of the 
subsequent examinations.  
The figures who are personally involved in the relationships unveiled before 
the trial belong to the third type. This will typically include the defendant or 
plaintiff. The golden age films typically convey that these witnesses have 
something to lose by appearing on the stand, such as the exposal of a secret or 
destruction of their own character by the opposing attorney, and so their testimonial 
appearances are geared for drama in a way the aforementioned groups of witnesses 
                                                          
148 Another manner in which Anatomy of a Murder is anomalous within the golden age grouping is 
in its more subversive, self-conscious treatment of the expert witness trope than the other films, 
including two psychiatrist witnesses who provide conflicting opinions on the state of the accused. 
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are not. Unalterable conventions such as the spatial relationship of the witness stand 
to the rest of the court and the examination-cross examination pattern of 
questioning take on particular meanings in relation to this type of witness, 
signifying their exposure, the claustrophobia of the environment, and the 
expectation that their testimony will be challenged by a skilled cross-examiner. 
Norman Rosenberg’s legal insider/outsider distinction and related notion of legal 
translation become especially pertinent to the representations of these witness 
archetypes.149 The vulnerability of the witness, placed in an unfamiliar and highly 
pressured scenario, is often emphasised in the golden age trial scenes through a 
number of conventions. These include narrative tropes such as the recurrent 
instance of a witness being asked to speak up or repeat themselves at a moment 
when they have just divulged especially personal or painful information (featured in 
Compulsion, Anatomy and Judgment), and, most frequently, the witness breakdown 
or outburst, to be considered in detail in the next section. 
Different representational strategies across the types of witnesses convey the 
character’s relationship to the case and the courtroom, and the viewer’s relationship 
to the character. Consider three shots from the trial sequence of Compulsion that 
comprise the first images of a specific character on the stand. The first two 
characters, both doctors who provide a psychiatric opinion on the two young men 
who have murdered a child, are introduced in medium-long to medium shot that 
incorporates in both instances the examining lawyer into the frame (Figs. 11-12). 
The relative distance of the camera corresponds to the lack of emotional 
investment, on both the part of the character (towards the key individuals involved 
in the trial – defendant, plaintiff, deceased, etc.) and the viewer (towards this 
                                                          
149 See Review of the Literature, p. 35-38. 
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witness). However the shot of Ruth (Diane Varsi), a classmate of the two men who 
was romantically involved with one of them, introduces her in a tight close-up that 
immediately suggests a greater emotional identification (of both viewer with Ruth’s 
predicament and of Ruth with the events on trial) by making her expression the sole 
focal point of the shot (Fig. 13). This compositional intensification is also present in 
the trial sequences of Anatomy of a Murder, where the close-ups that have generally 
been avoided during the prior examinations are utilised when Laura Manion (Lee 
Remick), the woman whose alleged rape at the hands of bartender Barney Quill led 
her husband to shoot him (the act that has instigated the trial), takes to the stand.  
 
Fig. 11 
 
 
Fig. 12 
      
Fig. 13 
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This last point brings us into the realm of how identification relates to the 
creation of viewer engagement with the drama of the trial. I would like to continue 
with this thread of inquiry in my third section, as I consider the courtroom’s drama 
alongside representations of the trial’s procedural elements. 
 
Procedural and Dramatic Development: Courtroom/Drama 
 
I have detailed the dominant features of the golden age courtroom scene’s 
mise-en-scène and its patterns of representing the characters who occupy the space. 
These discussions have pivoted around considerations of the choices available 
when representing the fixed elements of the trial, and the meanings created by the 
choices made. This final section will synthesise the previous findings with an 
examination of the intersection of narrational strategies with the remaining major 
fixed element of trial depiction, the procedure of the trial itself. The central aim 
here is to consider how dramatic conventions emerge from and are integrated into 
trial procedure, which is relatively inflexible in terms of both its constitutive 
elements and their ordering. 
This involves placing at the heart of the trial sequence the same tensions I 
located in the courtroom sequence’s other representational strategies, between 
formality and spectacle, reason and emotion, and natural and positive law. All of 
these tensions embody a clash between what is fixed and what is unstable, and thus, 
when considering these terms as the foundational elements of cinematic trial 
representation, it is highly relevant to consider the intersection of trial procedure – 
an unalterable, known quantity with an embedded development – and what could be 
termed the “drama” of the courtroom drama.  One caveat of the trial scenario is that 
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the degree of formality accorded to courtroom procedure means that the range of 
actions available within this space is limited. Formality and pressured stasis 
ultimately gives more dramatic weight to actions that carry less meaning in other 
diegetic spaces. Verbal outbursts, gestures, even looks, provide a greater source of 
drama. The lawyer’s movements across the space of the stage take on a more 
dynamic quality. The limits imposed by the procedural development of the trial 
corresponds to a limited and conventionalised network of dramatic events 
(including breakdown and outburst) that simultaneously clash with and emerge 
from the procedural components. I will attempt to begin identifying them here. 
Similarly, the procedural framework imposes a fixedness in terms of 
narrative progression that individual films can nevertheless play with. Our 
investment in and response to the sequence is structured by what we take to be the 
assumed development of trial procedure, which as Bruzzi notes, provides a 
narrative form particularly attuned to the imperatives of Hollywood’s classical 
mode of narration. The trial proceeding embodies to a reassuring degree causality, 
linearity, and by its end, closure. However, the contained narrative of the courtroom 
functions within a larger narrative in each film that inflects the terms on which we 
engage with and respond to the trial material. In the instance of each golden age 
film we arrive at the courtroom with certain narrative information and certain 
structures of identification in place, so that the essential narrative concern 
underlying each sequence – what will the outcome of this trial be – is inflected by a 
broader network of concerns. In order both to consider in more detail the specific 
concerns of individual films and the convergence of representational patterns 
located throughout the chapter, I will employ textual analysis of moments 
considered in relation to specific films’ formal strategies.  
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Preliminaries: Arrivals, Coming to Order. 
The golden age films demonstrate that there is no standardized point during 
trial procedure at which the sequence begins. It could partly be due to the very 
standardization of depicting the courtroom trial in Hollywood cinema that this 
varies. The audience’s familiarity with (Hollywood’s dominant representation of) 
courtrooms and courtroom procedure, certainly established by the time the golden 
age trial films were produced, would have consolidated into a series of expectations 
that allow for a certain flexibility in choosing when we join the trial proceedings. 
There are also matters of choice based on each film’s narrative structure and 
contexts. These choices bring a subtle but distinct nuance to the sequence’s 
emphases, as do the extent to which the aspects of trial procedure are figured in the 
diegesis.    
Thus, the depiction of the process of court coming to order is not strictly 
necessitated – scenes can begin on an opening statement (as in Compulsion) or 
witness testimony (as in Philadelphians) – but its inclusion within the diegesis 
often acts as a way of dramatizing the transition from the outside world, with its 
own less rigidly ordered systems of interaction, to the formal, ritualistic space of the 
courtroom. Various arrivals into the courtroom (of legal professionals, defendants, 
spectators) may be depicted at the start of the sequence, with the use of long shots 
surveying the courtroom alongside these arrivals. Tighter compositions on 
individuals and smaller groupings and patterns of editing (including eyeline 
matches) can re-establish the key figures involved, and relationships at stake, in the 
case on trial. Throughout this, diegetic noise from the spectators signals a lack of 
order until, as in Mockingbird and Anatomy, the arrival of the judge signifies the 
beginning of the trial proceeding. The crowd is quieted by the banging of a gavel 
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and the respectful ritual of standing for the judge occurs before we are informed 
that “court is in session”.  
Choosing to depict court coming to order is one method of making the 
viewer aware that the courtroom material will be particularly important to the film’s 
overall narrative and that all of the conventional procedural elements of the trial 
will be depicted. The spectator now expects the scene’s development to be 
structured by the depiction of each of the prominent aspects of trial procedure. It 
signals what could be termed a courtroom sequence proper, as opposed to a more 
condensed representation of the trial that may only depict isolated procedural 
elements. I would also argue that it has another function similar to many of the 
aforementioned conventions of courtroom mise-en-scène, which is to act as a 
guarantor of realism. Thus Anatomy of a Murder, a film particularly interested in 
providing a realistic depiction of courtroom trial procedure,150 depicts many of the 
initial ritual aspects of trial procedure, including the arrival of the judge, his formal 
introductory speech to the courtroom, the jury being sworn in, and even a brief 
preliminary case brought before the court that is separate from the criminal case 
that comprises the main narrative. However, it should be noted that the golden age 
sequences that open during a later element of trial procedure, including Compulsion 
and Philadelphians, still introduce the scenario through establishing long shots or 
camera pans that survey the courtroom, and will include later moments of ritual that 
are not strictly necessitated narratively (e.g. depicting the witness being sworn in on 
the stand). This ensures the presence of the fundamental structuring relationship 
                                                          
150 See Papke, From Flat to Round: Changing Portrayals of the Judge (2007), pp. 132-134. 
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between these formalities and the dramatic events that invariably erupt over the 
course of the trial sequence.  
Opening Statement(s) 
 The opening statement is another element of trial procedure that can be 
depicted as a way of navigating the transition from the outside world to the court’s 
structures of address. One form of opening remarks are those made by the judge at 
the outset of the trial. This addresses both diegetic audience and the film’s viewer in 
conveying the appropriate or expected modes of response. However, the opening 
statements that demand greater attention (from both viewer and critic) are those 
given by the lead prosecution and defence counsel. They signal a shift into the 
dramatic substance of the trial, establishing the opposed narratives that will 
compete over the course of the trial. They also provide an introduction to the lawyer 
characters in their professional guises, allowing for the exhibition of oratory (and 
hence skill).  
It is worth reasserting that, as with the previous developments, the opening 
statements do not have to be included within the golden age trial sequence. Because 
their content and the representational strategies employed entail some overlap with 
the procedural element of the closing statement (to be discussed later in this 
section), certain golden age films exclude opening statements for the sake of the 
dramatic effect of the latter (Mockingbird). Compulsion negotiates this by depicting 
the opening statement of the prosecuting attorney and the closing statement of the 
defence (a choice which in itself, I would argue, guides viewer response). However, 
opening statements create certain possibilities that make their inclusion particularly 
relevant to individual films within the golden age corpus. For example, Judgment at 
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Nuremberg depicts the opening statements of both prosecution and defence counsel. 
This choice is rendered appropriate because the issues the trial raises are not 
reducible to a model of law in which guilt is determined through the discernment of 
concrete facts, but pivot around broader socio-cultural forces and ethical issues, 
specifically the individual accountability of legal officials under a totalitarian 
regime. Clover’s notion of the double-trial is of significance here; when aspects of 
the legal and judicial systems are themselves on trial, opening statements can help 
set into motion the viewer’s processes of judgment. Thus, Judgment depicts within 
the same scene two powerfully delivered opening statements that introduce the two 
opposed arguments, employing paralleled representational strategies that (with the 
exception of the star casting of Richard Widmark as the prosecution counsel) gives 
equal weight and attention to both parties and their arguments.151 The film’s address 
at this point encourages the viewer to consider the points made and acknowledge 
the complexity of the issues at hand (although its eventual narrative development 
will guide us to accept the final verdict made as the correct one), and achieves this 
through the inclusion and specific handling of the opening statements.  
On the Stand: Testimonies/Examinations and Cross Examinations 
Papke argues that in cinematic trial depictions ‘the greatest drama involves 
the prosecutor and defence counsel examining and cross-examining parties on the 
stand’.152 I imagine few critics would disagree, yet it is worth interrogating what we 
mean when we use the term ‘drama’ in this way. If we accept a dictionary 
                                                          
151 Maximillian Schell, the actor playing the defence attorney character, would have been familiar 
to American audiences who had seen his appearance in the earlier Playhouse 90 television version 
of Judgment at Nuremberg (CBS, 1959), but this was only his second appearance in an American 
film and thus he was not a star on the level of Widmark at the time of the film’s release. 
152 Papke, ‘Law, Cinema and Ideology’, p. 1479. 
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definition of ‘dramatic’ as ‘sudden and exciting or unexpected’ then we can begin 
to understand why examinations create the most potential for dramatic events.153 
The fundamental tensions that I have argued are exhibited in the interaction of the 
law with the individual are most evident in the scenario of the examination, for 
several reasons. Firstly, it presents the most sustained, aggressive form of this 
interaction, often placing individuals who (as I noted in the previous section) exist 
well outside of the domain of judicial familiarity at the mercy of the court. It is also 
the area of procedure in which the trial’s adversarial nature is in its fullest effect, 
with its various forms visible: between the competing narratives presented to the 
jury, between prosecuting and defending lawyers, and between legal actors and the 
civilians placed often reluctantly before the court. The sudden and unexpected can 
be evidenced not only in the behaviour of the witness or lawyer during 
examination, but in the narrative trope of the surprise witness, present in 
Philadelphians, Witness, Inherit and Anatomy, which demonstrates the 
precariousness of the procedure’s formal stability and asserts the notion that any 
individual can be made subject to the courtroom and placed in the pressured 
environment of the witness stand. 
Whether their appearance as a witness is a surprise within the diegesis or 
not, at the most basic level, the following set of elements dictates the action and 
structure of the witness examination. An individual takes to the stand as a witness 
for the defence or prosecution. Their account of events is drawn out by an 
examination from the lead counsel. The lawyer for the opposing party then attempts 
to challenge the witnesses’ narrative through a cross-examination that aims to 
                                                          
153 Della Thompson (ed.), The Pocket Oxford Dictionary of Current English (8th edn: Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), p. 261. 
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complicate or challenge this narrative by asking a series of questions. This 
generalisation excludes a great deal of what makes these examinations often the 
most dramatically engaging section of a trial sequence. One can again consider the 
choices made available to the filmmakers in bringing this procedural convention to 
the screen. For example, one early choice to be made is whether the filmmakers 
depict the witness traversing the stage and being sworn in before they take to the 
stand. It is telling how often this is included in full in the golden age trial scenes 
despite its narrative extraneousness. Its inclusion functions to underline the tension 
between the formal, ritualistic structures of law and its (often failed) attempts to 
submit the individual to its rigid systems of participation (as well as augmenting the 
sense of courtroom realism).  
I maintain that the ‘drama’ that Papke refers to in relation to witness 
testimonies emerges largely from the level of emotion rendered in these moments. 
The vulnerable type of witness I identified in the previous section, characterised 
through their closeness to the individuals and events at stake in the trial, are 
narratively positioned to undergo an emotionally gruelling experience on the stand. 
These are the moments during which, as Laster et al. state, the ‘polite rules 
governing the rituals of ordinary communication and the social mask which protects 
the private self are deliberately stripped from individuals during court 
proceedings’.154 This process typically provides the greatest source of the 
‘dramatic’ (as defined above) in the trial sequence, as it incurs emotional responses 
from the witness that are characterised as particularly sudden, unexpected and 
excessive within the schema of the trial ritual and procedure. The most prevalent 
trope related to emotion is the breakdown of, or outburst from, the individual on the 
                                                          
154 Kathy Laster et al. The Drama of the Courtroom (Federation Press, 2000), p. 9. 
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stand, identifiable as such through actions that include weeping, shouting and 
gestures of extreme stress and discomfort. Other tropes circulate around the 
emotional responses witness testimonies invoke in others, the clearest example 
being the defendant’s outburst in response to a witnesses’ comment, present in 
Anatomy, Witness and Judgment (Figs 14-15). The breakdown and/or outburst is 
rendered particularly dramatic as it punctures the governing principles of 
communication underlying procedure which dictate that speech will be permitted 
by the court, thereby disrupting, even if momentarily, the development of the trial. 
At least one outburst or breakdown is featured in every golden age film with the 
exception of Philadelphians (which, as I will demonstrate shortly, deliberately 
leaves little room for focus on anyone other than the lawyer hero). The prevalence 
of this convention demonstrates that, despite the respectful approach to the trial 
evidenced overall in its treatment in Hollywood cinema, dramatic action is still 
liable to be created from the clash of the trial’s formality and ritual with an 
individual viewpoint external to the legal procedure.  
 
Fig. 14 
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Fig. 15 
 
The centrality of emotional displays to courtroom drama also raises issues 
of identification here. Although the witnesses are not frequently major characters in 
the golden age films, the representational strategies commonly employed during 
examination brings the viewer in close alignment with their experience. The 
standard representation of these witness testimonies allow for audience 
identification regardless of the extent of our empathy for the characters elsewhere, 
due to the sustained focus and dramatization of a stressful situation in a highly 
pressurized environment and a dominant method of filming the scenario – through 
frontally framed medium or close-up shots, often accompanied by long takes – that 
provides a primary, sometimes sole, focus on the individual whose emotional 
vulnerability can provide a stark contrast with the courtroom’s other participants.155   
We can consider an example of highly dramatic courtroom testimony in To 
Kill a Mockingbird which demonstrates how drama is coerced through appeals to 
and portrayals of high emotion. The case on trial concerns plaintiff Mayella Ewell 
(Collin Wilcox) a young white woman who has accused African-American Tom 
                                                          
155 The potential of such testimonial roles for dynamic performance is evident in the casting of 
Judgment at Nuremberg, in which major stars Judy Garland and Montgomery Clift take on 
relatively small but showy roles as witnesses in the Nuremberg trials. Both were Oscar-nominated 
for their performances. 
99 
 
Robinson (Brock Peters) of beating and raping her. Although we have been aware 
of the case in advance of the trial sequence, we know little about the actual crime or 
the individuals involved, as much of the preceding narrative has dealt instead with 
the lives of defence attorney Atticus Finch and his children. However, the film’s 
themes of racial prejudice and social injustice in the American South of the 1930s, 
as well as the characterisation of Finch, construct our expectations regarding the 
terms of the film’s double-trial structure and the likelihood of Tom’s innocence.  
The characterisation of Mayella figures her in terms of gender, class, and 
education (identifiable through her manner of speaking and her simple, unadorned 
costuming) as an outsider to the domain of the courtroom. The decision to depict 
Mayella being sworn in on the stand in its entirety allows us to see her hesitancy 
and nervousness, which is reinforced in Wilcox’s halting delivery of her testimony. 
Already a sense of a rehearsed and distorted narrative is being conveyed (the 
thematic preoccupation with performance in trial depiction does not solely circulate 
around the lawyer character). During the cross-examination, the questioning by 
Atticus Finch raises an alternative narrative to the one Mayella has hesitantly 
presented on the stand, as Finch implies that Mayella was instead beaten by her 
father Bob. Wilcox’s performance and reaction shots of the scowling Bob give the 
audience indications of the truth here. When Atticus asks Mayella if her father has 
ever beaten her, Wilcox leaves a significantly lengthy pause before answering “my 
Pa’s never touched a hair on my head”. Her mode of response thus suggests the 
likelihood that Bob has hit her before and that she has invited Tom to the house 
before. Her testimony has, for the audience, begun to crumble, and when she is 
asked once again by Finch whether Tom hit her during the attack, her response - “I 
don’t recollect if he hit me” followed by a panicked “I mean yes! He hit me! He hit 
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me!”– is telling. Throughout this portion of testimony, the performances of Wilcox 
as Mayella and reaction shots of her father Bob already cue us in to the truth, with 
Wilcox’s gestures and body language conveying to us guilt, hesitancy and a sense 
of rehearsal to her early responses.  
Mayella is asked by Atticus to identify her attacker. She points to Tom, and 
Atticus asks the defendant to stand. It has been established that Mayella’s attacker 
was left-handed, but when Atticus now throws Tom a glass across the stage, he 
grabs it with his right hand. When Atticus asks him to try again using his other 
hand, we realise Tom cannot use his left hand at all. This revelation produces an 
audible reaction from the spectators, signalling its dramatic status within the 
diegesis. Following this damning refutation of the narrative Mayella has thus far 
offered, Atticus now asks “Do you want to tell us what really happened?” It is here 
that the pivotal moment of breakdown occurs, accompanied by a slow zoom in on 
Mayella that conveys the encroaching pressure on her (Figs. 16-17). She looks 
downwards (Fig. 16), which typically conveys introspection during this moment of 
intense public pressure, before becoming visibly emotional, crying out “He took 
advantage of me!” Mayella then addresses herself to the jury, angrily accusing them 
of being “lousy, stinkin’ cowards” for even daring to consider Tom innocent (Fig. 
18).  
 
Fig. 16 
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Fig. 17 
 
Fig. 18 
 
What is interesting here is that although Mayella’s breakdown does not 
bring her to a point where she admits the truth, it still works in much the same way 
as a moment where the excessive pressure of testifying before court leads to an 
outburst that unintentionally conveys the truth. Mayella is clearly lying, and must 
eventually appeal to the racial divisions of the community to ensure Tom is found 
guilty. But the character is not simply demonised. Wilcox’s performance grants us a 
sense of her guilt and fear, as well as her inability to, as Laster might state, ‘protect 
her private self’. Her lack of control is conveyed also through the insistent zoom-in 
on Mayella.  Her testimony can be compared with that given later by the defendant 
Tom, which is more dignified but no less emotional, and also leads to a moment of 
breakdown which is accompanied by close-up framings of the individual on the 
stand. This method of depicting and structuring the key testimonials gives us an 
intense focus on the individual on the stand even when the courtroom sequence 
marks their only appearance within the narrative.  
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This is just one example of rendered emotion forming part of the drama of 
the courtroom scene. Such emotion constructs certain meanings, particularly in its 
distinction from the codes of conduct expected from the court of law. It is often 
employed in the golden age films to raise issues of ethics, questioning the extent to 
which the goals of justice override the emotional battery and manipulation inflicted 
upon witnesses during cross-examination. This moment from Mockingbird balances 
its depiction of intense pressure on the witness with its broader consideration of 
Atticus Finch’s moral rightness. Films frequently depict the distortion or partiality 
of information gleaned from witness testimony through the lawyer’s modes of 
questioning.156 Judgment treats ambivalently the persistent aggression with which 
the emotionally vulnerable witnesses are treated on the stand by the zealous 
attorneys, even leading defendant Emil Janning (Burt Lancaster) to draw 
comparisons between the defendant’s badgering of the witnesses with the horrors of 
Nazism.  
Yet these ethical considerations can also be elided in golden age trial 
representation. Another mode of dramatic engagement can be constructed through a 
focus on the lawyer’s skill display during examinations. This is especially true in 
relation to the legal heroes, whereby our identification with the protagonist grants a 
specific inflection to their courtroom appearances. The spectator is likely to be 
invested not only in the details of the case on trial and the emotional outpourings of 
the witnesses on the stand, but also in the skill and success of the legal protagonist. 
                                                          
156 One typical example occurs in Judgment at Nuremberg, when a witness for the defence asked 
by the prosecuting attorney to describe conditions in Germany at time the Nazis came to power is 
then directly asked whether the Nazis improved some of these conditions. The witness replies 
“Yes, but-” before the rest of his statement is cut off by the lawyer. For the defence’s case, only the 
“Yes” was needed; the remainder of the witnesses’ statement (which evidently would entail a less 
favourable summation of the Nazi legacy) is irrelevant despite clearly containing his actual 
perspective.  
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Alongside the testimonies of Mayella and Tom, Mockingbird also engages viewer 
attention through the quietly impressive success of Atticus Finch’s questioning, 
evident in the skill and relative dynamism with which the thrown glass essentially 
proves for the audience that Tom could not have beaten Mayella. The sense of 
competition is integral to conveying the skill of lawyer characters and underlines 
the adversarial mode of the trial. Interjections and objections by opposing counsel 
during witness examinations provide consistent blockades against progress that 
must be dealt with before continuing, and which often become more frequent and 
intense as the sequence progresses. The ability to create new or opposing narratives 
to the one presented during initial examination leads cross-examiners to lean 
heavily on language; undermining unacknowledged ‘certainties’ (“Can you say for 
certain that this happened?” “Is it not possible that-?”) becomes the key convention 
here, pivotal to the structure and development of the examination and to conveying 
the ‘shift from prosecution to defence’ that Clover characterises as one of the 
fundamental conventions of trial narratives.157158 Examples in the golden age films 
include, in Witness, the defence counsel throwing into question the testimony of the 
murder victim’s housekeeper (that she heard the defendant and murder victim 
talking in the next room on the night of the crime) by making the court aware of the 
witnesses’ hearing impairment; the moment in 12 Angry Men when Juror #8 
produces a knife identical to the one that, found on the defendant, was used by the 
prosecution as evidence due to its uncommonness; and a key moment from 
Philadelphians which I will consider in more detail now. 
                                                          
157 The narrative development of 12 Angry Men relies almost entirely upon this convention. 
158 Carol Clover, ‘God Bless Juries!’, p. 270. 
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    The Young Philadelphians provides a clear example of the golden age trial 
sequence that builds its drama around the lawyer protagonist and his success in the 
courtroom. An example of the first case lawyer film,159 Philadelphians follows the 
inexperienced but eager young lawyer Tony Lawrence as he takes on his first 
criminal case defending old friend Chet Gwynn (Robert Vaughn) on a murder 
charge. The preceding narrative has followed Tony’s rise from education to 
apprenticeship to entering the legal profession, his hard work and luck contrasted 
with the wealthy, initially carefree Chet, whose status plummets while Lawrence’s 
rises. Chet has been charged with murdering Morton Sterns (Robert Douglas), a 
member of his wealthy family, following what appears to have been a failed 
blackmail attempt. The focus is very much on Tony as the court sequence begins. 
Myriad pressures face Tony in taking on the case and have escalated in the series of 
scenes leading up to the trial, beginning with his lack of courtroom experience. The 
desire of the patriarch Doctor Sterns (Frank Conroy) to avoid public scandal 
(evidently by sacrificing Chet if needs be), has led him to threaten Tony with social 
disgrace by revealing the long-hidden scandal of his own paternity if he does not 
bend to his will in court. Tony’s relationship with Sterns’ niece Joan (Barbara 
Rush) has also been affected when she questions his suitability for the role of 
defending attorney. Nevertheless Tony’s decency and solidarity with Chet keeps 
him on the case. The highly emotional story of Chet’s decline and the events 
surrounding the night of the crime (which we the audience have not seen) have 
been revealed in a pre-trial sequence between Tony and Chet which is written like a 
courtroom examination but crucially takes place before the trial in Chet’s jail cell. 
Thus, the emotional breakdown of the defendant which we might expect to 
                                                          
159 Another example is Trial (Dir: Mark Robson, 1955). 
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comprise the climactic moment of the trial depiction has already occurred by the 
time we reach the trial sequence, allowing for our primary identification to be 
refigured on to the lawyer figure and his courtroom performance. Crucially, there is 
little sense of the double-trial at work in Philadelphians, which appears to have no 
other agenda regarding interrogating the adversarial system. The court is largely a 
device through which our protagonist’s goals will be achieved. 
The centrepiece of Philadelphian’s trial sequence is Tony’s cross-
examination of a key witness, George Archibald (Richard Deacon), Sterns’ butler. 
This is the first and only appearance of Archibald within the narrative. The 
characterisation and Deacon’s performance correspond to a common type of an 
elitist, arrogant figure blindly following a belief in class divisions that fits with the 
film’s emphasis on the divergence between class status and personal integrity. 
Thus, the empathic identification that can be encouraged towards the witness is 
refuted in this instance, and viewer identification remains with Tony. The first shot 
of the courtroom sequence (which opens on Archibald’s cross-examination) shows 
Archibald’s slightly elevated position in a framing that displays the triangular 
configuration of judge, lawyer and witness mentioned earlier (Fig. 19), imbuing 
him with a sense of his own elevated authority. This modification of assumed 
courtroom power relations also grants Archibald the appearance of a worthy 
opponent for Tony.  
The cross-examination begins with Tony’s facetiously posited recognition 
of Archibald’s seeming infallibility as a witness for the prosecution, commending 
the butler for his “remarkable memory and incredible powers of observation” 
during the earlier testimony to which the audience have not been witness (depicting 
the examination would have deflected our attention away from Tony/Newman for 
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too long). Having established that Archibald became aware of Chet’s presence in 
Sterns’ house on the night of the crime due to his ability to detect the smell of the 
cheap rye he had been drinking, Tony asks if Archibald would mind 
“demonstrating” this “remarkable talent” to the jury. 
 
Fig. 19 
 
 This question prompts a cut away from the triangular shot configuration to 
the first interjection from the prosecution, Louis Donetti (Paul Picerni). Donetti fits 
the dominant characterisation of the prosecuting attorney outlined in the previous 
section. He is a former law school classmate of Tony’s who has appeared 
periodically throughout the preceding narrative and whom we are likewise primed 
to root against in favour of Tony/Newman during the trial sequence. Donetti objects 
to the question, arguing it is neither “material” nor “relevant” (These two terms 
reoccur, specifically between the opposed lawyer figures, across trial scenes). 
Lawrence counter-argues that Archibald’s ability to detect types of liquor by its 
smell is the basis of the prosecution’s argument and Donetti’s follow-up objection 
that it is unfair to test Archibald’s sense of smell in the courtroom environment is 
overruled by the judge. This becomes the first victory for Tony that we witness in 
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the courtroom. Objections and their rulings are pivotal to discerning successes in 
the courtroom battle between prosecution and defence.  
 The test on Archibald’s “remarkable talent” begins as Tony unveils three 
carafes which he explains contain three different types of alcohol. The murmuring 
courtroom spectators and photo-snapping journalists in the background of the frame 
as Tony unveils the drinks situate this as a dramatic courtroom spectacle, and a sign 
of Tony’s increasingly charismatic hold over the court. Archibald arrogantly 
describes the drinks as they are presented to him, until finally, a sip from what he 
assumes to be a cup of water, but which is actually the “cheap rye” he thought he 
detected on the night of the crime, reveals his fallibility. This leads to another 
objection from Donetti, and as the pair of opposing lawyers plead their cases before 
the judge, they raise their voices in argument. The subsequent series of shots that 
frame them together augments the feeling of a competition (Figs. 20-21). Donetti’s 
objection is again overruled, cementing what is being presented as Tony’s 
triumphant performance.  
 
 
Figs. 20 (top) and 21 
(bottom) 
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From this point on, having gained the upper hand and demonstrated his 
skill, Tony/Newman takes control of the remainder of this section of the sequence. 
When Tony proceeds with his questioning of Archibald, the earlier triangular 
configuration that privileged the witness is replaced with a tracking shot that moves 
alongside Tony, resituating him as the focal point. The subsequent reverse shot 
(Fig. 22) incorporates the jury into the frame, a reminder of the audience to whom 
his performance is addressed. Tony’s command over the situation allows him to 
undermine Archibald’s certainty to the point at which the latter must finally admit 
sheepishly that he does not know for sure that the sound he heard on the evening of 
the crime was the sound of Chet leaving the house. On this, there is a cut to a shot 
of journalists rushing out of the courtroom amidst the noise of spectators, both of 
which convey the dramatic breakthrough made in the case. Mrs. Allen (Billie 
Burke), a member of the Sterns dynasty then states excitedly “Is it possible the boy 
didn’t do it?” before the fade to the verdict. Her stunned reaction serves as one final 
reminder of Tony’s courtroom success – the apparent obviousness of Chet’s guilt to 
even his own family has been undermined by Tony’s skill as a lawyer.  
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Figs. 22 (top) and 23 (bottom) 
 
 The dramatic potential of this element of courtroom procedure thus makes 
available any number of strategies for viewer engagement. The inherent adversarial 
nature of the courtroom trial is most evidenced in the cross-examinations of the 
golden age trial scenes, as are the possibilities for renderings of explicit emotion 
that take on a greater dramatic resonance in the light of the bounded, ritualistic 
systems of ordering at work in the court. Meanings are constructed through our 
modes of identification that can lead us to pity the legal outsider or revel in the 
triumph of the legal hero.   
Out of Order: Recesses, Adjournments. 
The courtroom recess is an often overlooked aspect of trial procedure, but is 
common to representations and often pivotal to the structuring of the drama. The 
recess can be simply referred to, providing an ellipsis without taking us out of the 
courtroom (as in Philadelphians and Mockingbird). It can also be depicted, 
presenting a short scene of characters invariably talking about the trial’s 
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developments outside of the space of the courtroom. In both instances, the recess 
acts as a brief respite for characters and audience, reasserting what is on stake in the 
trial, and what certain developments might mean for its progression. Including a 
recess helps to structure the drama of the courtroom so that a series of dramatic 
escalations are depicted, rather than a simpler escalation of tension over the course 
of the sequence. It can also emphasise the inherent theatricality of the courtroom 
proceeding, depicting the backstage mechanics that construct what the jurors see in 
the courtroom and capturing any differences in behaviour or performance from the 
trial participants. This is central to the thematic content of Inherit, Judgment and 
Anatomy. Recesses and adjournments also allow the films to deal with the issue of 
time. For the sake of plausibility, a sense must be conveyed that the trial depicted 
occurs over a significant period of time, and the inclusion of recesses and 
adjournments serves to remind the spectator that these trials are often prolonged 
affairs.  
 If we expand the definition of recess beyond its specific meaning within the 
trial scenario to include any scene that takes place outside of the courtroom once 
trial has begun, then a greater number of possibilities and meanings emerge. The 
homogenisation of the golden age classification is again complicated when the 
films’ positioning of their trial material in relation to broader narrative and thematic 
concerns is considered. On one end of the spectrum, Mockingbird and 
Philadelphians present their trial material in one continuous sequence in which 
recesses, adjournments and other passages of time are referenced but elided through 
ellipses. Witness, Inherit, Anatomy and Judgment, however, establish a relational 
development that juxtapose scenes set in the courtroom (spanning what can be days, 
weeks or months of the film’s world) with scenes set outside of it. These 
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differences of narrative structure create different possibilities for meaning 
construction. I would argue that the continuous depiction of Mockingbird aids the 
film’s affirmation of courts as “the great levellers”, as it entails less engagement 
with the ethical and performative complexities posited in scenes that go backstage 
once trial is underway. The law emerges intact, presented in a form that gestures 
more towards the natural rather than the positive model. Anatomy, in contrast, uses 
its out-of-court scenes to reassert its themes of the centrality of image, appearance 
and performance to the trial (and the moral and ethical murkiness this entails) by 
showing the behaviour underlying what is viewed by the courtroom. Inherit and 
Judgment occupy a middle-ground, demonstrating the outside influences that can 
influence the rulings made in court, but finally deferring to the innate integrity of 
the justice figure played by Spencer Tracy and the unimpeachable fairness of the 
court’s decisions.  The juxtaposition of trial material with other sequences as a 
constituent feature of narrative structure is the main difference between many of the 
golden age trial scenes and my later case studies which (with a few exceptions), 
restrict the entirety of their diegetic trial material to one continuous sequence with 
ellipses employed to convey passages of time. The major issue to be garnered from 
discussions of the recess is to remind ourselves that the trial sequence (like any 
shot, scene or sequence to be analysed in film) must be considered in relation to the 
formal and narrational patterns established elsewhere in the film if its meanings are 
to be discerned.  
Closing Statement(s) 
 Before considering the closing statement convention specifically I would 
like to return to the notion of the speech in the courtroom more generally, 
considering what possibilities the inclusion of speeches provides the courtroom 
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sequence in terms of drama and meaning. Several of the golden age trial sequences 
contain climactic speeches made before the courtroom by legal professionals. These 
speeches again signify and demonstrate the skill of the legal protagonist, and 
substitute the visual and dramatic restrictions of the courtroom for a command of 
oratory that is one of the site’s specificities. Laster et al. state that:  
the kind of oratory found in the opening and closing speeches of the film 
courtroom hark back to earlier rhetorical traditions of public discourse […] 
This kind of display would appear affected and inappropriate in most 
settings. In film, however, these old fashioned modes of persuasion and 
argument are accepted, even admired. The poetry of some courtroom films 
might be dubious, but it is gripping.160  
 
Laster et al. are here attuned to the specificities of the courtroom setting, situating 
the trial as one of the few scenarios where this ‘kind of oratory’ can occur in 
Hollywood cinema. I noted in my discussion of the opening statement that such 
oratory seemed particularly relevant to films that employed the double-trial 
structure. The correlation between the courtroom form and socially conscious 
Hollywood cinema (to be explored in more detail in the next chapter) partly 
emerges from a shared predisposition towards presenting issues through 
speechmaking. Characters make an address that directly articulates what these 
social issues are and posits solutions to them that are often rooted in the ideals of 
mid-century American liberalism. Trial sequences allow for this convention 
because the diegetic scenario and procedural development provide a space in which 
sustained attention is granted to an individual character who makes an address to 
diegetic audiences and the film spectator. Throughout the questioning portion of the 
trial, the lawyer is liable to be constantly halted by interjections and objections (as 
                                                          
160 Laster et al., The Drama of the Courtroom, p. 10. 
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we have seen) but the prolonged speech allows a professional, authoritative figure 
to deliver a message without interruption. Hence this moment of courtroom 
depiction often allows for a social message to be conveyed through the film, in a 
convention that has seen the courtroom film frequently allied with the social 
problem film.161  
The closing statement is particularly useful in this regard for acting as a 
more emphatic final word from both the character and film; the justice figure’s 
rhetoric is also the film’s rhetoric. I will now consider the two most significant 
dramatisations of the defender’s closing statement in court, those contained in 
Compulsion and To Kill a Mockingbird. Both films use the closing statement to 
present issues regarding society and the legal system and act as the centrepiece of 
the respective courtroom sequences. Atticus Finch’s closing plea to the jury in 
Mockingbird moves from the evidential details of the case at the outset of the 
speech – reminding the jury of the left-handedness of Mayella’s attacker, for 
example – before making broader assertions regarding the unspoken codes of their 
society regarding race. He continues to refer to courts as the ‘great levellers’ of 
society, where all men are equal. Throughout this speech, the camera remains 
largely on Finch/Peck in a series of long takes (Fig. 24), broken up only by a 
scattering of reaction shots of African-American characters that serve to underline 
the theme of racial injustice. The courtroom sequence of Compulsion ends with a 
speech made by defence attorney Jonathan Wilk (Orson Welles) that has been 
considered ‘one of the longest by a single character in the American cinema’ and 
                                                          
161 See the chapter ‘Social Problem Film and Courtroom Drama’ in Casper, Drew Hollywood Film 
1963-1976. 
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was even released as a record.162 The character of Wilk has commanded the film in 
its final act, due not only to the casting of Welles, but also so that the character can 
act as the film’s primary mouthpiece for legal liberalism. Compulsion is a film in 
which we know that the two defendants are indeed guilty of – and almost entirely 
remorseless about - the crime they are on trial for. Thus Wilk’s (and Welles’) 
function is to convince both judge and spectator that capital punishment is not the 
appropriate penalty. Both of these pivotal closing statements are filmed in an 
unobtrusive manner, employing mostly long takes. This choice privileges the star 
performer and the speeches themselves, which ultimately valorise the American 
legal system and its workings. The dignified yet forceful speeches work to convince 
audiences of the value of the institution of law and the adversarial trial system more 
than any other element of trial procedure and also appear to address the audience to 
a greater degree. They also function as the most explicit rendering of the necessity 
of emotion to the justice genres as noted by Pribram. The impassioned appeals of 
the justice figure reside in an ideal midpoint between the excessive emotion of the 
vulnerable witness and the flatly-defined reason of the judge.  
 
Fig. 24 
                                                          
162 Hakopian, Kevin, ‘Film Notes – Compulsion’, New York State Writers’ Institute, 
http://www.albany.edu/writers-inst/webpages4/filmnotes/fnf00n2.html, accessed 05 November 
2013.   
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Fig. 25 
Verdict and Coda 
The verdict provides a cathartic sense of narrative closure even when the 
outcome is not the one the audience and its identification figures have hoped for 
and correspondingly, it appears in all of the golden age representations. Once again, 
the procedural elements are known and limited, allowing little in the way of 
variation. In the most common treatment, the verdict is read out by the jury 
foreman. When there is no jury (as in Judgment), the verdict will be given by the 
presiding judge, and in both instances, the latter’s subsequent sentencing can also 
be included into the sequence. In its representational strategies, the golden age trial 
scene marks a return to the pared down arena of formality. The atmosphere evoked 
is tense but not explosive, and there is less rendered emotion that during the 
examinations or speeches. Emotion is primarily conveyed through reaction shots of 
the key participants. However, the response following the verdict is crucial to the 
tone of the sequence; the immediate outburst of jubilation or anger from the 
spectatorship can reflect or contrast with the reactions of the characters we identify 
with the most.  
The trial sequence can end on the verdict, as in Anatomy of a Murder, but 
several golden age films remain in the courtroom to present the initial individual 
responses to the trial’s outcome and sometimes reveal the true intentions of the 
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sequence. Many of the golden age films end in or around the courtroom (Witness, 
Compulsion, 12 Angry Men, Inherit, Philadelphians) and in each instance this 
serves to bind narrative closure with the reification of the law. Often these 
courtroom codas solidify the film’s ideological imperatives and affirmations of 
American law and justice. The trial form ‘embodies closure’ as Bruzzi notes, but it 
is often the moments that follow the end of the procedure that consolidate the trial 
scene’s meanings. Rosenberg notes how the final images of Philadelphians, 
capturing the reconciliation of Tony and Joan within the now emptied courtroom, 
suggests ‘the power of legal trials to resolve both public and private difficulties’.163 
By remaining in the courtroom and providing closure on these major relationships, 
such post-verdict codas remind us of the stakes of the trial whilst also bringing us 
out of the world of formality and ritual and back to the level of everyday 
relationships and human triumphs and disappointments. Perhaps the most iconic 
moment of Mockingbird’s courtroom sequence, one that valorises Atticus Finch for 
his attempt to defend Tom Robinson against a racist environment, occurs after the 
reading of the ‘guilty’ verdict, when the African-American spectators who have 
viewed the trial from the upper balcony of the court stand for Finch as he walks 
past. Witness saves its final revelations until the trial has finished, essentially 
revealing the entirety of the trial to have been a performance manipulated by 
Leonard and Christine Vole (Marlene Dietrich), but also figuring the empty 
courtroom as the stage for ensuing developments to finally ensure that justice is 
served. The wide variance of narrative developments evidenced in the courtroom 
codas demonstrate the importance of looking at individual films in detail, but it is 
telling that the end of the trial sequences in the golden age films (with an exception, 
                                                          
163 Norman Rosenberg, ‘Hollywood on Trials’, p. 346. 
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as ever, identifiable in the ambivalence of Anatomy of a Murder) locates in the 
court system the possibility of justice regardless of the final verdict.  
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2. The Great Levellers?: Social Issues on Trial and the Social Problem Film 
Courtroom Sequence 
 
 I have surveyed the dominant conventions informing the classical 
Hollywood courtroom trial sequence and have begun to suggest the prevalent tone 
with which the trial as setting and symbol is depicted. I detected a broadly 
respectful depiction of the American court system that held in tension a rigidly 
ordered, formal institution and procedure (reflected not only in the visual 
presentation of the courtroom space, but also in the treatment of figures such as the 
judge and jury) and the dramatic engagement with individuals whose stories – often 
those presented, contested, and evaluated in the courtroom - we are invested in. The 
golden age trial films I examined together affirmed the possibility of justice within 
the court system, despite the obstacles necessitated in the interests of drama, often 
through the presence of a central justice figure who spoke to and in most instances 
achieved (the film’s conception of) justice. The courts were ultimately figured, to 
quote justice figure par excellence Atticus Finch, as “the great levellers” of society.  
I now intend to consider the social problem film, which I believe cleaves 
relatively closely to this dominant “great levellers” model. I would like to consider 
why the courtroom trial and the social problem film forms appear particularly 
suited to each other, and how social problem films use the “great levellers” with 
regards to their treatment of the specific social problem depicted. However, I will 
also examine, through close analyses of specific sequences, the specificities of 
individual depictions, the multiplicity of strategies employed, and the multiple, 
often contradictory meanings conveyed.  
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The close association between the social problem genre and the courtroom 
drama has been noted,164 and occasionally examined,165 but not in relation to the 
classical Hollywood cinema. This is especially surprising when one considers the 
frequency with which contemporary social issues are incorporated into the golden 
age trial film narratives; of the nine films Papke discusses in ‘Law, Cinema and 
Ideology’, I would maintain that several foreground social issues through their 
courtroom sequences that are contemporaneous to each film’s production 
(regardless of whether the films employ period settings, as for example, 
Compulsion and To Kill a Mockingbird do).166 Clover’s concept of the double-trial 
structure suggests the fit between the trial form and the depiction of topical social 
issues. The failure sufficiently to consider the close relation between the social 
problem film and the courtroom drama may result from the relative scarcity of 
literature on the social problem genre, and the various debates surrounding the 
social problem film’s status and defining features. Therefore, I will engage with the 
literature on the social problem film, considering these key definitions and debates, 
and begin identifying the possible ways in which one can conceive of a social 
problem courtroom sequence. 
The ‘Social Problem’ Problem 
 
The body of literature on the social problem film is relatively small and 
narrow in its approach. I largely limit my discussion to four studies which I think 
                                                          
164 Drew Casper’s book Hollywood Film 1963-1976: Years of Revolution and Reaction (Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), groups the two in a chapter titled ‘Social Problem Film and Courtroom 
Drama’.  
165 Matthias Kuzina, ‘The Social Issue Courtroom Drama as an Expression of American Popular 
Culture’ Journal of Law and Society 28:1 (March 2001), pp. 79-96. 
166 I raise this point because it is central to the definitions of the social problem film that I discuss in 
detail in the following section. 
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are both representative of the field and offer individual insights that can be applied 
to my own consideration of the social problem film. The earliest book-length study 
of the social problem film is Peter Roffman and Jim Purdy’s The Hollywood Social 
Problem Film (1981). The authors look at films of the classical period, considering 
various phases and incarnations of the social problem genre from the 1930s through 
to the 1950s. It should be immediately noted that, unlike many other writers on the 
social problem film, Roffman and Purdy do consider their corpus to constitute a 
genre (albeit one with much generic overlap). They argue that ‘the central dramatic 
conflict’ of this genre ‘revolves around the interaction of the individual with social 
institutions’,167 and that the problem film must ‘[combine] social analysis and 
dramatic conflict within a coherent narrative structure’. They take the genre’s ‘most 
distinguishing feature’ to be its ‘didacticism’.168  
This definition has been viewed as problematically broad, and Roffman and 
Purdy’s work has been criticised for the vagueness of the related terminology they 
employ, including ‘social issues’ and ‘social content’ (see Maland, 1988; Pells 
1981). It is true that the aforementioned interaction they take to be the focus of the 
‘genre’ could be identified in a far greater number of films than those they include; 
in fact, the case could be made that this interaction is a tenet of the majority (if not 
all) of American film narratives. The impreciseness of its application as a defining 
feature here plays into the conflicting notion that the ‘promulgation’ of 
contemporary social issues ‘in films of all kinds in the 1930s and 1940s 
complicates the idea of a totally separate social problem genre’ (Neale, 2000).169 I 
                                                          
167 Peter Roffman and Jim Purdy, The Hollywood Social Problem Film: madness, despair and politics 
from the Depression to the fifties (Bloomington, In: Indiana University Press, 1981), p. viii. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Steve Neale, Genre and Hollywood (London ; New York : Routledge, 2000), p. 109. 
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think it is worth unpacking the very notion of defining genre before continuing, as 
the majority of the scholars who weigh in on the generic status of the social 
problem film assume a straightforwardness to the term genre that I believe only 
muddies our understanding further.  
 Stanley Cavell considers issues of defining genre, arguing that recourse to a 
genre’s ‘features’ during the process of generic identification is less useful than 
thinking of ‘the common inheritance of the members of a genre as a story’.170 He 
suggests replacing the terms used when discussing genre, typically as if referring to 
an object’s features (or ‘properties’), with ‘an idea of the clauses or provisions of a 
story’.171 For Cavell, this leads the critic to begin thinking of individual members of 
a genre in terms of its interpretation of this story, moving away from a model of 
classification that rigidly adheres to identifying a fixed number of features (a model 
which, Cavell convincingly argues, would logically result in an indistinguishable 
set of films). This model has a number of interrelated implications, two of which 
are, firstly, the production of ‘adjacent genres’ that emerge in the changing of the 
story’s provisions,172 and secondly, the role such changes have in determining a 
film’s broader mode.173  
This model allows us a way of thinking about genre which does not focus 
on visual style (an often presumed pre-requisite that expels the social problem film 
from genre status) but which remains specific enough to distinguish the social 
                                                          
170 Stanley Cavell, Pursuits of Happiness: The Hollywood Comedy of Remarriage (Cambridge, Mass.; 
London, England: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 31. 
171 Ibid, p. 32. 
172 Ibid, p. 31. 
173 The example Cavell gives here pertains to Random Harvest (Dir: Mervyn LeRoy, 1942). Cavell 
argues that this film shares the same basic story as the comedies of remarriage that are his primary 
area of study. But by changing one of the later provisions of this basic story, Random Harvest 
emerges as a member of an adjacent genre, that, in the change it makes, also adopts a primarily 
dramatic register. 
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problem film from the overwhelming number of films that incorporate social issues 
into their narrative. I do not intend to treat Cavell’s case as an inarguable one, but I 
think it allows us possibilities of countering the vagueness of Roffman and Purdy’s 
definition, and of thinking of the subsequent critics productively in terms of their 
identification of their accounts of the social problem film’s story. It should be noted 
here that I would maintain that the provisions of the story serve to ground its telling 
in the dramatic mode.  
Considering Roffman and Purdy’s initial configuration of the social 
problem film alongside Cavell’s model of genre poses specific parallels between 
the social problem film and the courtroom trial form (itself a problematically 
situated genre) that helps us to understand better the fit between the two. The trial, 
like the social problem film, revolves around the interaction between the individual 
and the larger social institution (in this instance, the court). It permits a ‘coherent 
narrative structure’ through its format, ‘social analysis’ through narrative 
contextualisation and, crucially, ‘didacticism’ through its conventions.174  
The trial sequence dramatises the presentation and evaluation of multiple 
perspectives on actions and events that can easily be made to reflect broader social 
conflicts, and also allows for the direct verbalisation of a film’s didactic message 
via one of several courtroom figures (judge, lawyer, or even witness), as 
demonstrated in the closing statements of Compulsion and To Kill a 
Mockingbird.175 The shared seriousness of the golden age trial films – with the tone 
                                                          
174 For example, Chris Cagle links the didacticism exhibited in Knock on Any Door (Dir: Nicholas Ray, 
1949), a social problem film that deals with juvenile delinquency, to the film’s courtroom scenes, 
arguing that the defence attorney’s final statement allows for the inclusion of the film’s message 
regarding the environmental determinants of crime. See Chris Cagle, ‘Knock on Any Door: Realist 
Form and Popularized Social Science’ in Rybin and Schiebel (eds.), Lonely Places, Dangerous 
Ground: Nicholas Ray in American Cinema (New York: SUNY Press, 2014), p. 43.  
175 See Chapter One, pp. 111-114. 
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dictated by the respect accorded to the court and the gravity of the cases on trial – 
corresponds to the dramatic register of the social problem film, which implies a 
serious engagement with the problem that constitutes its subject matter.176  
Another manner in which the social problem film does not seem to fit with 
conventional classifications of genre is that much of the critical attention is 
concerned primarily with its ideology rather than its formal ‘features’. A crucial 
aspect of Roffman and Purdy’s methodology involves analysing the ideological 
underpinnings of the genre, and this has remained the dominant critical approach to 
the social problem film. Despite a conclusion in which they attempt to mount a 
defence of the social problem picture, Roffman and Purdy are largely critical of the 
social problem film’s schema. This is evident from the outset of their study, in 
which they argue that: 
While the genre places great importance on the surface mechanisms of 
society, there is only an indirect concern with broader social values (those of 
the family, sexuality, religion, etc.), the values that function behind the 
mechanisms. As such, the genre often seemed glib in its social analysis, 
viewing America as a series of social agencies that from time to time 
experience “problems” which must be corrected. For the most part, the films 
attack such problems in order to inspire limited social change or reinforce 
the status quo.177  
 
An earlier study by Russell Campbell is similarly critical of the social problem’s 
glibness.  Campbell presents a more rigorous examination of what he terms the 
social consciousness film by considering three 1940s films produced by Darryl F. 
Zanuck: The Grapes of Wrath (Dir: John Ford, 1940), Gentleman’s Agreement 
(Dir: Elia Kazan, 1947) and Pinky. Campbell applies the broad ideological 
                                                          
176 I would also use Cavell’s reasoning to argue that, despite the manner in which the trial scenario 
has a built-in engagement with social issues, this does not mean that all trial scenes are social 
problem trial scenes.  
177 Ibid. 
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manoeuvrings he detects in these three films to the wider schema of the social 
consciousness film. 
Campbell’s conception of the social consciousness film views it as ‘part of 
the liberal branch of bourgeois ideology’, despite a recurrent ‘conservative 
inflection’ he detects that ‘evokes an attitude of condescension towards the poor 
and underprivileged’.178 This raises a further parallel between the socially conscious 
film narrative and the golden age trial films, which, as I outlined in the previous 
chapter, simultaneously endorse an idealised legal liberalism while locating it solely 
in the mouth(piece)s of educated white males. It should also be noted that the films 
are typically addressed to a liberal audience who are already presumed to be 
“enlightened” with regards to the problem subject matter (a factor I will return to in 
my discussion of Pinky). Campbell maintains that ultimately, ‘the liberal purpose of 
focusing attention on a social problem in order to provoke corrective action remains 
uppermost’,179 arguing that this emphasis on corrective action ultimately affirms 
dominant (‘bourgeois’) ideology and upholds the status quo: 
By raising the possibility of such corrective action, the SC movie, while 
portraying negative aspects of American society, paradoxically celebrates 
the system for being flexible and susceptible to amelioration. In a similar 
way, social critics in literature or journalism are lauded for proving that in 
the United States free speech prevails.180 
 
Campbell recognises the recurrent depiction in the social problem film of flexible 
systems that are capable of correcting what are viewed as regressive societal 
elements, and he also links U.S. bourgeois ideology to the notion of free speech. 
                                                          
178 Russell Campbell, ‘The ideology of the social consciousness movie: Three films of Darryl F. 
Zanuck.’ Quarterly Review of Film & Video 3.1 (1978), p. 60. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid. 
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The consequences for the depiction of the courtroom trial within this configuration 
of the social problem film are twofold. Firstly, the court, as symbol and mechanism 
of the American legal institution, represents the system that Campbell argues the 
SC movie ultimately celebrates. Thus, we could hypothesise that the social problem 
court will be, even when initially problematized, ultimately celebrated within its 
narratives. The analogous paradox Campbell then provides is also telling, in that the 
notion of free speech he raises is central to the U.S mid-20th Century liberalism and 
the model of trial depiction I will outline in this chapter. The court, I argue, 
becomes the site in which social injustices can be firstly articulated and then 
rectified, affirming the courtroom as “great leveller”. Campbell proceeds to argue 
that the three Zanuck films ‘depict social problems as aberrations within a 
fundamentally sound system’ (paralleling the argument of Roffman and Purdy) and 
present solutions that ‘may be entertained without contemplating any decisive shift 
in existing power relationships’.181 It can easily be suggested, then, that the 
courtroom trial can be incorporated into the narrative to act as the indicator of the 
‘fundamentally sound system’ of American society, and that the trial form’s 
predisposal to provide solutions (or, at the very least, resolution) allows for the 
problems raised to be recuperated through the depiction of a legal system working 
in the interests of justice.  
Charles Maland (1988) similarly pivots his conceptualisation of the social 
problem film around the narratives’ shared recuperation and rehabilitation of the 
problem depicted; he notes that ‘implicit in the very notion of the term social 
problem is the belief that something can be done about it – that the problem has a 
                                                          
181 Ibid. 
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solution’.182 This problem-(re)solution assumption corresponds to Maland’s 
assertion that the pre-1970 social problem films he considers mostly conform to the 
tenets of the classical Hollywood narrative as originally conceptualised by 
Bordwell et al. (1985). They provide narrative closure that makes the provision of 
some kind of solution to the problem presented inevitable. Although Maland does 
not classify the social problem film as a genre, his ‘working definition’ provides a 
neat summary of the grouping’s shared qualities. This definition consists of four 
central features: 
1) The social problem (implicitly singular) as a central narrative concern 
2) The implication that the problem presented ‘can be treated or even 
eliminated through well-intentioned liberal social reform’.183  
3) A contemporary setting to the narrative that identifies the social problem 
as a current one. 
4) A ‘humane concern for the victim(s) of or crusader(s) against the social 
problem’.184 
The first two features overlap with the outlines provided by Campbell and Roffman 
and Purdy. Here I wish to draw attention only to the fact that, as all of these critics 
note, the films themselves explicitly draw attention to only one social problem, and, 
as Roffman and Purdy note, only ‘indirectly’ concern themselves with problems 
relating to ‘broader social values’. For example, the predicaments of the titular 
Pinky explicitly revolve around race, and although interlocking concerns – or 
problems - of gender and class also circulate throughout the film’s narrative, it is 
                                                          
182 Charles Maland, ‘The Social Problem Film.’ in: Handbook of American film genres Ed: Wes D. 
Gehrig (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), p. 306. 
183 Ibid, p. 307. 
184 Ibid. 
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the race problem, exemplified in Pinky’s acceptance of her black identity, that is 
most directly addressed and most emphatically (if glibly) resolved by the film’s 
end.  
Maland’s remaining two features warrant further interrogation. The 
contemporary setting is an interesting caveat, as it expels from inclusion any 
number of period films dealing with social issues that are nevertheless relevant to 
contemporaneous concerns.185 Maland’s consideration of the ‘victim(s) of or 
crusader(s) against’ the social problem also correlates to the character types 
inherent to courtroom narratives. My initial chapter looked at the distributions of 
focus and point of view between legal insiders and outsiders, noting that the golden 
age trial films were often primarily - and straightforwardly - aligned with the heroic 
justice figure (or, to employ Maland’s term, ‘the crusader against’ injustice) but that 
their agency was juxtaposed with the more victimised and passive individuals on 
the stand. I think this feature of Maland’s definition bears consideration alongside 
Campbell’s detection of ‘an attitude of condescension towards the poor and 
underprivileged’ in the social problem film that I wish to examine by considering 
the distribution of speech and authority in my case studies. The implications of the 
‘humane concern’ engendered by the social problem film go unmentioned by 
Maland, but the term invokes notions of emotional identification, specifically 
empathy for the individual (be they crusader or victim) at the heart of the narrative, 
that threaten to displace the broader social and political concerns. Stephen Neale 
employs a similar argument but disputes Maland’s suggestion that the genre solves 
                                                          
185 For example, I would argue that the golden age trial films To Kill a Mockingbird and Compulsion 
both address their messages regarding (respectively) racial prejudice and capital punishment to the 
liberal audience of the late 1950s/early 1960s regardless of their period settings. However, this 
location of contemporaneous issues in the past also acts as a safeguard against controversy to 
some extent, an issue I wish to return to in my discussion of Dust Be My Destiny.  
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its problems (at least, not in terms of the social), noting that social problem films 
‘tend as a rule to insist that the problems they deal with are not resolved, and […] 
often replace the possible resolution of social problems with the actual resolution of 
personal ones’.186 Such debates serves as reminder that it is imperative when 
dealing with these films to consider what kinds of solutions are provided and the 
scale at which they are pitched. 
These issues are engaged with more rigorously by a recent contribution to 
the literature on the social problem film. Cindy Patton considers ‘the emergence 
and depoliticization of the “problem film,” circa 1947-1959’ with regards to a 
number of interrelated contexts.187  One of these, and one which constitutes a novel 
approach to the social problem film, is the influence of the Method style of acting. 
Patton argues that the publicising of the Method actor’s strategies ‘politicized the 
psychology of the Method, reinforcing the idea that basic human experiences – 
including “being oppressed” – could be universally sensed’.188 The Method style 
also 
converges with the rise of a very American conceptualization of 
personal and social identity. This milquetoast humanism promotes 
tolerance, but understands tolerance to be the property of white, 
Christian males who use it to re-establish their position as the Universal 
from which are distinguished the particulars who need to be tolerated 
(Blacks, Jews, eventually women, other ethnic groups, the aged and 
disabled, and, arguably, gays and lesbians).189  
 
I will return to the issues Patton raises here shortly, but firstly wish to consider her 
definition of the problem film. Patton considers previous conceptualisations of the 
                                                          
186 Neale, Genre and Hollywood, p. 108. 
187 Patton, Cindy. Cinematic Identity: Anatomy of a Problem Film (London; Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 2007), p. 3. 
188 Ibid., p. 15. 
189 Ibid., p. 3. 
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social problem film to have identified ‘a quasi-genre whose distinguishing 
commonality is thematic rather than formal’ but argues that the commonalities 
identified ‘binds the works into a mutually referential block, a genre defined by its 
ambition to enlighten post-World War II Americans and to modernize their 
attitudes toward “social” issues’.190 She then argues that this previous work has 
overlooked the genre’s 
self-conscious attention to the psychological structuring of prejudice and 
bigotry and their presumption that forms of oppression are, if harder and 
easier to cope with, substantively interchangeable. There is an 
uncomfortable and unspoken premise that an individual’s pathological 
prejudice looms larger than the systems and structures that maintain white 
middle-class-ness against variegated difference.191   
 
Patton’s work overlaps with previous work on the social problem film, drawing 
attention to the genre’s shifting of the political on to the personal, and the avoidance 
of any overt critique of America’s broader structures. But she considers to a greater 
degree the role of emotional identification in the social problem film and the 
meanings entailed. Patton considers the genre’s primary strategy to be the 
production of ‘emotional miscegenation’, which the films encourage in order to 
construct the new empathic American citizen (and which, to consider her argument 
with Maland’s conceptualisation in mind, becomes the solution posed by the 
problem films).192 Emotional miscegenation is partly enabled by the 
aforementioned politicising of Method performance and, crucially, the uses of 
melodrama.  
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Patton determines that ‘the most important of the problem films – 
Gentlemen’s Agreement and Pinky – are melodramas whose audience was 
predominantly female at a historic apex of female consumerism, at the moment 
when consumption began most decisively to mark social identity, and at a time 
when U.S. governmentality defined social problems as domestic – even feminine – 
and political – problems as public and masculine’.193 These two films and their 
respective source materials, fuel much of Patton’s discussion, particularly Pinky. By 
bringing melodrama into her consideration of the social problem film’s strategies, 
Patton demonstrates a productive engagement with the interaction of genres and 
modes. Although she does not define her own understanding of the term, Patton 
appears to consider melodrama primarily in terms of its focus on rendering and 
producing emotion, which she ties to the social film’s project of emotional 
miscegenation:   
The production of the problem through melodrama is significant […] 
because it suggests that learning about the new social problems would occur 
less through direct experience or political debate than through acquisition of 
the proper emotions and structures of identification.194  
 
The key term here is ‘proper’; Patton argues that Gentlemen’s Agreement 
specifically regulates the amount of emotion required in attaining the new citizen 
status, concluding that ‘the new citizen turns out to be a Christian, white, 
heterosexual male’.195 Although Patton shares with previous critics a fundamental 
understanding that the problem film addresses itself to the liberal element of the 
bourgeois status quo, she goes further in locating the ‘new citizen’ as this specific 
figure. This is relevant to reconsidering the liberal justice figure and how social 
                                                          
193 Ibid., p. 6. 
194 Ibid., p. 36. 
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consciousness is exhibited in several of the golden age trial films. It allows us to 
view the ‘Christian, white, heterosexual male’ who speaks to liberal humanistic 
enlightenment in such films as To Kill a Mockingbird and 12 Angry Men in relation 
to the more “problematic” citizens who they, in doing so, effectively – and, in the 
case of the latter, literally - silence. Again, the cinematic courtroom can be viewed 
as negotiating a set of interrelated tensions – between emotion and reason, the 
social(/domestic) and political(/public), the feminine and the masculine – but, in 
doing so, ultimately favouring the ‘new citizen’ as outlined by Patton.   
 
Fig. 26 
 
Fig. 27 
 
Fig. 28 
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Fig. 29 
 
Patton also gestures towards the ideological manoeuvres underlining what 
we could see as the liberal legalist underpinnings of the problem films’ rhetoric, 
arguing for example that hiding ‘America within the concept of freedom enables 
the production of a national identity that simultaneously transcends nation to speak 
of humanity and does so in the context of a community of nations, not world 
communism’.196 I think this specific example is applicable to the discourse of both 
the golden age trial films and the social problem genre and will locate it in my case 
studies. Despite Patton’s argument that the social problem genre emerged as a post-
war phenomenon, I think aspects of her argument can be applied to what others 
have viewed as earlier examples of the genre, and I will consider my 1930s case 
study Dust Be My Destiny in relation to her concepts of the ‘new citizen’ and the 
centrality of emotional identification to the social problem film.  
It is worth summarising what has been discerned from the body of work on 
the social problem film, both in relation to the problem film’s critical status and its 
relationship to the mode of trial representation outlined in my previous chapter. 
Firstly, I think it is important to note that the work I have considered displays a 
broadly similar attitude towards the social problem film that views its object of 
                                                          
196 Ibid., p. 43. 
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study negatively. The recurrent view of the social problem film as glib, shallow, 
naïve and committed to affirming the status quo can be contrasted with the field of 
film noir criticism (to be considered in my detail in my final chapter), which 
consistently associates its topic with achievement, aesthetic and narrative 
innovation, and ideological subversion. I think we can link these same attitudes to 
those commonly invoked in relation to courtroom narratives – that they are stagy, 
theatrical, too talky, visually inert, etc. Both the trial drama and the social problem 
film are considered forms that tell rather than show, often considered an indication 
of a film’s artistic failure.197  
One area in which the fields of both noir and social problem film overlap is 
in the recurrent debates over their generic status. With regards to the social problem 
film, even Roffman and Purdy, who do classify it as a genre, acknowledge what 
they deem the paradoxical ‘extensive crossing of genres, since many problem films 
also fall into other movie categories’.198 This paradoxical crossing, and the failure 
of any work on the social problem film to locate a specific shared visual style, 
setting, and iconography, leads to disagreement over the status of specific films. 
Roffman and Purdy’s inclusion of Mr Deeds Goes to Town (1936, Dir: Frank 
Capra) in their discussion diverges from Maland’s placement of Capra’s films ‘at 
the periphery of the form’ despite an acknowledgment that they contain social 
problem conventions.199 However, the fact that the social problem film does not 
                                                          
197 V.F. Perkins in Film as Film, a text on film criticism that deals in questions of evaluation, argues 
that accomplished films form their significance at a level that is ‘contained’ rather than ‘imposed’. 
Considering the latter type of significance, Perkins argues that the imposed ‘description will 
indicate its status as meaning which is created by the superficial effort of organization involved in 
such manoeuvres as using a character as the mouthpiece for a speech’. [see V.F. Perkins, Film as 
Film, (London: Penguin Books, 1972 [1991 reprint]), p. 119]. The example he provides is a central 
convention of both the trial form and the social problem film, which perhaps explains the relative 
inattention that the field of film criticism has granted them. 
198 Roffman and Purdy, The Hollywood Social Problem Film, p. viii. 
199 Maland, ‘The Social Problem Film’, p. 308. 
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necessarily constitute a genre aids rather than hinders my own discussion. The 
courtroom trial form itself constructs its own set of conventions while alternately 
adopting from and bleeding into the conventions of other forms depending on the 
types of diegetic environment in which it appears. It is in this extensive crossing of 
generic boundaries that new patterns of representation emerge that are often more 
legible than their separated generic fields. Part of my interest lies in examining 
whether the intersection of the conventions of courtroom trial depiction and those 
of the social problem film produce distinct patterns of representation across a body 
of films.  
The social problem film criticism I have looked at also suggests the specific 
appeal of the trial form to the social problem narrative. I hypothesise that social 
problem courtroom sequences are broadly distinguished by their didacticism, and 
function to allow for the articulation of the film’s central social concern within a 
convention that also guarantees the affirmation of the status quo (as represented by 
a legal institution that ultimately works in the best interests of the ‘victims of and 
crusaders against’ social injustice). The conventions of the trial allow for individual 
characters to serve as mouthpieces that provide legible solutions to the 
contemporaneous social concern at play, and enables, through strategies outlined in 
my previous chapter, for the appropriate structures of emotional identification to be 
set into place. This also raises the more problematic issues that can arise in trial 
depiction and the social problem’s strategies; in its distribution of the social and the 
personal, how regularly does it defer to presenting the white, educated male as the 
universal citizen, able to identify with and speak on behalf of (while maintaining a 
pivotal distance from) the socially disenfranchised other? My following readings of 
two social problem courtroom sequences will consider their strategies in relation to 
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this configuration of the social problem courtroom trial, but will also demonstrate 
how individual films contain their own strategies in representing the trial. I wish not 
simply to detect the defining features of what could be termed a social problem 
model of trial representation, but to look closely at how my case studies 
individually treat their narratives’ emphases on a specific social problem through 
the inclusion of courtroom material.  
 
The Courts, the Roads and the “Place to Hang your Hat”: Dust Be My Destiny 
 
 Dust Be My Destiny contains two trial sequences that exemplify the specific 
appeal of the courtroom trial sequence for the social problem film. The different 
narrative functions and representational strategies of the two sequences demonstrate 
the film’s negotiation of attitudes towards the social institutions which the court 
epitomises, with a literal double-trial structure employed to both demonstrate the 
systemic social problems that comprise the film’s subject matter and (in the case of 
the latter trial) assure that faith in this same system is restored by the conclusion.  
The social issues with which Dust Be My Destiny deals are specifically 
issues of homelessness and poverty in the United States of the Great Depression 
years, 200 and how this problem impacts the younger generation of American men 
and women. 201 It is worth considering what other generic frameworks the film 
                                                          
200 It is worth noting that the release of Dust be My Destiny precedes the film adaptation of The 
Grapes of Wrath (Dir: John Ford, 1940), a more popular and acclaimed example of the Great 
Depression as social problem film that deals with similar subject matter. 
201 The film opens on Joe Bell (John Garfield) meeting with the prison warden at the institution of 
his current incarceration. The Warden informs Joe that the actual culprit of the crime for which he 
has been imprisoned has been caught, and Joe is thus free to go. Understandably embittered, Joe 
promises to “turn the other way” when compelled to intervene in instances of injustice from now 
on. However, Joe’s subsequent inability to travel without jumping boxcars lands him in more 
trouble with the law, when a burglar Joe encounters on the boxcar implicates him in his own 
crimes. Joe ends up on trial, and his previous convictions, vagrant status and refusal to be silenced 
136 
 
draws from, and how it positions itself as a commercial film as well as a social 
document. Contemporary publicity for the film emphasises its social consciousness, 
with a summary in fan magazine Photoplay providing one example: ‘In this 
depressing, although gripping study of social problems, John Garfield again plays a 
young have-not who has been imprisoned unjustly and whose attempts at 
readjustments [sic] are thwarted by current conditions’.202  
This summation typifies the positioning of social problem pictures as 
important works, ‘studies’ of ‘current conditions’ within U.S. society, that are 
implicitly contrasted with the bulk of studios’ output (considered mere 
entertainment). However, their ability to engage - or, to use this review’s phrasing, 
‘grip’ - the audience must also be evidenced, and the Independent Exhibitors Film 
Bulletin summary goes further, suggesting that the filmmakers ‘naturally lay more 
stress on the romantic and melodramatic features of the story than the social’.203 
This exists alongside the fact that the year of the film’s release – 1939 – is already 
some way removed from the worst years of the Great Depression. This is a post-
New Deal and pre-U.S. WWII intervention film, and thus its central problem is 
                                                          
during trial leads him to be sent to a prison work farm. It is here that he encounters a sadistic, 
alcoholic warden, but also the latter’s niece Mabel (Priscilla Lane), with whom Joe falls in love. The 
young couple are discovered together by the warden, who attacks Joe and suffers a lethal heart 
attack. A panicked Joe and Mabel escape the work farm and go on the run. They marry, and are 
subsequently taken in by kindly diner owner Nick (Henry Armetta), to whom they divulge their 
fugitive status. The police track the pair and jail Mabel, but Joe, enlisting Nick’s help, is able to 
break her out of jail before continuing their escape from the law. Nearing destitution, Joe finds 
work as a photographer for newspaper editor Mike Leonard (Alan Hale) after managing to obtain 
photos of a bank robbery. Once again, the couple decide to disclose their fugitive status to an 
understanding Mike. When Joe subsequently saves Mike from an attack by the robbers who he 
previously photographed, Mabel realises in the ensuing publicity that Joe must turn himself in. 
Against Joe’s will, Mabel turns him in to the police, and a courtroom trial ensues in which Joe 
condemns the jury – and by implication, society – for their refusal to see him and others like him as 
fellow citizens. However, emotional appeals in the courtroom by, firstly, Joe’s defence attorney 
(Moroni Olsen), and secondly Mabel, sway the jury, and Joe is found not guilty of the work farm 
warden’s murder. Joe and Mabel are reunited, and begin planning their life together. 
202 Anon. “Dust Be My Destiny – Review” Photoplay Jul - Dec 1939: 65. Print. 
203 Anon. “Previews” Independent Exhibitors Film Bulletin Jan 14 1939: n. pag. Print 
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arguably less “current” (and thus less controversial) than it could have been.204 
Already a tension between the film’s social function and its status as entertainment 
product is evident, one that exists in all examples of the social problem film, and 
that the films must negotiate.205 Thus, the casting of established star screen couple 
John Garfield and Priscilla Lane,206 pairing them in a lovers-on-the-run romance, 
suggests a combination of generic frameworks and existing conventions designed to 
increase the film’s viability as entertainment. Likewise, the Warner Brothers 
studio’s association with social realism and the emerging star persona of Garfield 
were factors that seemed to solidify the film’s status as a social problem picture that 
could nevertheless engage the commercial audience.207  
The specific treatment of this basic generic material clearly demonstrates 
how social consciousness and entertainment are married in Dust Be My Destiny. 
The film is focused upon the romantic pairing of Garfield and Lane and their 
subsequent struggle to make a life for themselves, rather than other potential 
avenues available to the crime narrative which rely more upon violence, action and 
criminal behaviour. This decision allows for the ‘humane concern for the victim(s) 
of [...] the social problem’ that Maland considers one of the defining features of the 
social problem film to be integrated into its structure. This also appears to have 
                                                          
204 Tellingly, the date of the narrative events themselves are never identified within the film. By 
refusing to overtly date itself, the film can claim to both deal with a ‘current’ issue and position this 
issue safely in the recent past. 
205 For more on the debates surrounding the social problem picture’s problematic relation to the 
American cinema’s emphasis on producing entertainment, see Campbell, ‘The ideology of the 
social consciousness movie’ (1978), pages 57-58. 
206 Garfield and Lane has previously co-starred in Four Daughters (1938, Dir: Michael Curtiz) – a 
star-making film for Garfield, which earned him his first Oscar nomination – and Daughters 
Courageous (1939, Dir: Michael Curtiz). 
207 John Garfield had previously played disenfranchised working-class heroes in Warner Brothers 
features They Made me a Criminal (1939, Dir: Busby Berkeley) and Four Daughters, and would 
continue to be associated with socially conscious films throughout his career including Gentlemen’s 
Agreement (1947, Dir: Elia Kazan) and Force of Evil (1948, Dir: Abraham Polonsky).  
138 
 
been a concern of the filmmakers, with Warner Brothers producer and scenarist 
Mark Hellinger stating in a letter to Hal Wallis that ‘You’ve got to feel sorry for 
Mabel and Joe from the very moment you meet them […] Dust Be My Destiny 
should be treated as a love story – not as a gangster film’.208  
Dust Be My Destiny casts Garfield to type as Joe Bell.209 The film asserts 
from its opening scene, in which he is released from prison, that Joe is 
fundamentally a decent citizen, only technically a criminal, and more importantly, 
doubly victimized by circumstance and an uncaring system. The factors that 
conspire to place him on a work farm within what we assume is days of his release 
from prison (and minutes of the film’s screen time) are listed in his dialogue to 
fellow workers: 
“If it ain’t a couple of tramps it’s a railroad digger, if it ain’t a railroad 
digger it’s a  judge, if it ain’t a judge it’s a screwy foreman, if it ain’t a 
screwy foreman it’s a dame. Whatever it is, it’s gotta happen to me.” 
This speech, recited facetiously by Garfield, exemplifies the film’s careful 
negotiation of the blame for Joe’s predicaments, and the conflicting impulses of the 
social problem film. On the one hand, Joe can be seen to be merely unlucky 
(“Whatever it is, it’s gotta happen to me”), a reading bolstered by Joe’s/Garfield’s 
flippant delivery of the dialogue. On the other hand, the series of misfortunes that 
                                                          
208 Letter reproduced in Herzberg, Bob. The Left Side of the Screen: Communist and Left-Wing 
Ideology in Hollywood, 1929-2009 (McFarland, 2011), pg. 86. 
209 James N. Beaver provides a neat summary of Garfield’s film persona that applies to the use of 
him as star in Dust Be My Destiny: ‘Here was a man […] who felt little pride in himself and none in 
the society that had spawned him. He verged on paranoia in the fear and disgust he felt for 
“them,” the unseen powers that were “out to get him.” His stout insistence on fending for himself, 
coupled with his distaste for a steady job within the system, put him at odds, not only with 
contemporary society, but with his own cynical, yet basically decent, self.’ [James N. Beaver, John 
Garfield: His Life and Films (South Brunswick and New York; London: A.S. Barners and Company; 
Thomas Yoseloff Ltd, 1978), p. 19].  
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befall Joe are also indicative of a broken social system, particularly in his 
references to the ‘screwy’ foreman and the judge. Joe’s circumstances justify his 
cynical mistrust of the institutions that have failed him.  
The judge he refers to appears in a preceding trial scene. This scene 
exemplifies the presentation early in the film of the broken system, contrasting the 
sympathetic portrayal of the prison warden in the opening with a biased judicial 
official and depicting a court system which treats Joe unfairly. The sequence opens 
on a shot of the County Justice of the Peace (John Sheehan), sat behind his desk. 
His physical type and costuming instantly carries a set of connotations that do not 
correlate with the typical image of the cinematic judge (Fig. 30). He is gaunt, 
haggard, and ill-presented in a poorly fitted suit; his appearance fits the stereotype 
of the hard-nosed, over-worked and uncompassionate official. The dialogue given 
the character from the outset of the scene conveys not just a lack of compassion, but 
a clear bias against the social type to which Joe and his friends belong. Thus, 
instead of summoning Jimmy (Bobby Jordan) to him in a formal manner, he states 
brusquely “You, come here”. No sooner have the boys begun pleading their case 
than he replies dismissively, “Oh, tramps huh?” The dialogue and Sheehan’s 
performance convey a prejudice against the boys contrasted with Joe’s insistence 
that they are hard-working citizens. The judge is often seen looking down at his 
notes rather than up at the court, yet he is also the only legal representative in the 
room, and the choice to open the sequence on a shot of him not only establishes the 
scenario, but serves to establish the unquestioned authority he holds over the space. 
Such an impression of the judicial official, particularly the character who holds 
judgement, and who is typically figured as nonpartisan,210 gestures towards a 
                                                          
210 See Chapter One, pp. 68-72. 
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critique of the legal system at this point in the narrative, one which Dust Be My 
Destiny will have to counter to ensure the affirmation of national ideology and the 
approval of the Production Code.211  
 
Fig. 30. 
  
The judge’s barely concealed prejudice is one of the many ways in which 
this hearing diverges from the conventions of the courtroom trial sequence outlined 
in my previous chapter. These divergences are crucial in that they convey the 
systemic social problems that the film is addressing; that is, they convey the 
mistreatment and marginalisation of the Joe Bells of the world, by presenting not a 
proper trial (and corresponding trial sequence), but a trial that fails to imbue its 
cases with any significance. This is a minor case that takes place in a localised court 
and which is presided over by a County Justice of the Peace rather than a judicial 
                                                          
211 The unsympathetic depiction of the judge in Dust Be My Destiny’s first trial can be contrasted 
with the benevolent, compassionate judge of the early trial sequence in Gun Crazy (1949; Dir: 
Joseph H. Lewis) a later film that doubles as both social issues film – dealing with the problem of 
juvenile delinquency – and fugitive couple narrative. Glenn Erickson suggests that the sympathetic 
portrait of the legal system established in this sequence was a key contributor to the film’s ability 
to receive Production Code approval despite its subsequent sustained depiction of a criminal 
lifestyle [see Glenn Erickson, audio commentary on Gun Crazy (1949) (DVD, Warner Brothers, USA, 
2004) ASIN: B000244EWY]. Inversely, I would suggest, the highly critical treatment of the trial in 
this first scene of Dust Be My Destiny is countered by the following narrative, with its sympathetic 
and non-criminal central romantic couple and the ultimate affirmation of the criminal justice 
system at the film’s climax. 
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officer of higher ranking.212 There is an absence of the procedural conventions and 
iconographic signifiers that typically work to present the trial as a socially 
significant and formalized event. The room in which the sentencing takes place 
bears little relation to the ornate courtroom settings of several golden age films, but 
instead is small and bare, provided only with individual chairs (Fig. 31). Including 
the coat hooks that adorn the walls, the production design overall suggests that this 
space occupies several functions aside from court, and it is not imbued with the 
specific meaning of a courtroom set (even the ubiquitous U.S. flag appears to be 
absent). A smattering of individuals, mostly anonymous, shoddily-dressed men, 
comprise the spectatorship. Of these spectators, Pop (Charley Grapewin) is the only 
character who has appeared in the preceding scenes. Yet, like the production 
design, the presence of the solitary rail-worker (while a compassionate figure) also 
suggests an impoverished milieu. The overall impression is of a makeshift space, 
one in which trial proceedings occur swiftly and with little investment on the behalf 
of the system, reflecting the mistreatment of Joe and his fellow forgotten boys by 
society’s institutions.  
                                                          
212 For context on the role of the Justice of the Peace (and, specifically, the relative inferiority of 
this role in comparison to the judicial officers usually present in films’ trial sequences), I include the 
following definition of the title from A Dictionary of Law (Henry Campbell Black, 1891): 
“In American law. A judicial officer of inferior rank, holding a court not of record, and 
having (usually) civil jurisdiction of a limited nature, for the trial of minor cases, to an 
extent prescribed by statute, and for the conservation of the peace and the preliminary 
hearing of criminal complaints and the commitment of offenders.” (672)  
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Fig. 31. 
 The trio have no legal representation, and their differing behaviours in the 
court space swiftly conveys respective familiarities with and attitudes towards the 
law. Jimmy’s muteness on the stand conveys the fear of an individual unfamiliar 
with the law, and demonstrates the silencing the system’s structures can impose on 
the disenfranchised. He is contrasted with Joe, whose inability to keep silent 
demonstrates at different points his concern with injustice (characterising him as 
someone who cannot “look the other way”, despite his promise in the opening 
scene) and his cynical attitude towards the court system (and the other structuring 
systems in American society). If the two brothers are new to the vagrant’s life, Joe 
is an old hand and understandably embittered. He approaches the Justice’s desk and 
interjects during the questioning of Jimmy – which would be a more dramatic 
development within the highly regimented procedures of the sophisticated trial 
(sequence), but is tellingly not granted the same emphasis here – and states, when 
Hank expresses concern that Joe’s behaviour will bring harsher judgement upon 
them, “I’ve been in courts before, I know the answer for guys like us.” This is the 
direct articulation of the mistreatment of Joe and his kind by a flawed system, and 
both a reiteration and affirmation of Joe’s lack of faith in this system. When the 
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verdict is given, Joe gets extra-time for “contempt of court”, a decision rendered 
ironic by the shabby state of this court and its processes, and another indication of 
the biases the film suggests are swaying the judgment of the Justice of the Peace. It 
also establishes the theme of Joe’s outspokenness getting him into trouble with 
authority figures, another characteristic of Garfield’s persona.  
The ensuing work farm scenes re-assert the features of Joe’s 
characterisation and the depiction of a world in which he is continually punished for 
his refusal to stay silent. The foreman’s first interaction with the new band of 
workers climaxes in his slapping Joe and the warning “first thing you’ll learn here 
is to keep your mouth shut.” Mabel warns Joe on their first meeting “You’re too 
free with your tongue.” However, the ensuing romance between Mabel and Joe 
functions to soften the edges of Joe’s character, establishing in him a desired 
relationship to the kind of life that we have only seen him in opposition to at this 
point in the narrative. This is a specifically American way of life typified by the 
values of domesticity, stability, and (rewarded) hard work. Its assumed attainability 
for Joe and Mabel is dependent upon an implied belief in the American dream to 
which upward social mobility is a central promise.213 The fugitive section of Dust 
Be My Destiny does not dramatise the wilful escape from this way of life, but rather 
the repeatedly frustrated attempts to construct it whilst on the run, typified by the 
motif in the dialogue of the desired “place to hang your hat”. Mabel functions as a 
                                                          
213 The American dream was a term that first came to prominence through its appearance in James 
Thurslow Adams’ book The Epic of America (1931). Adams theorised an idealised image of America 
as a meritocracy in which all American citizens were accorded the opportunity to attain a better life 
for themselves through hard work and achievement. Adams’ book was written in the early years of 
the Great Depression and Dust be my Destiny, for much of its narrative, can be seen to draw upon a 
tension between the notion of the ever-attainable American dream and the limited opportunities 
afforded the working classes in a capitalist society during a time of economic crisis (by the film’s 
end, it would appear that the former is affirmed). 
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consistent reminder to the audience of Joe’s desired relationship to this way of life, 
as well as a condition of it.  
The section of the narrative which features Joe and Mabel on the run is 
punctuated by the appearance of a series of characters who represent the decency of 
the common American, thus tempering (and one might argue, softening) the film’s 
social critique with a recurrent gesturing to the goodness of the individual as the 
enabler of the couple’s survival. Amongst these characters, of whom Pop serves as 
the first clear example, the most prominent are diner-owner Nick (Henry Armetta) 
and newspaper editor Mike (Alan Hale). Together they constitute a vision of a 
patriarchal America centred on the affirmation of masculine nurture and aggression. 
These characters function, at different points in the narrative, to affirm Joe and 
Mabel’s essential decency, providing them with housing and work and aiding them 
even when their fugitive status is revealed. Their treatment of Joe and Mabel – and 
inversely, the couple’s treatment of them – suggests to the viewer the attainability 
of a stable way of life through individual compassion, and consistently figures the 
couple as suited to and eager for this lifestyle. The newspaper in particular is seen 
as the locus of U.S. goodness; both the small town paper and Hale as a screen 
presence would contain positive associations for the audience.214 When contrasted 
with Joe’s treatment by the Justice of the Peace in the initial trial, it is clear that the 
film begins to posit compassion as the solution to the social problem it presents, 
displacing the broader social issues on to the level of individual interaction.215 
                                                          
214 Hale was a highly prolific and popular character actor who frequently played sidekicks to leading 
men of the era including most often Errol Flynn (in films such as The Adventures of Robin Hood (Dir: 
Michael Curtiz, 1938) and Dodge City (Dir: Michael Curtiz, 1939)). 
215 One interesting element of the film’s depiction of American-ness is the space it allows for 
immigrant characters (including, most obviously, Nick, but also the grocery store proprietress 
whom Joe encounters later in the film). Interestingly, the proprietress is the only female character 
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Solutions are grounded in personal relationships, and the emotional identification 
that Patton argues is central to the later social problem cycle is clearly evidenced 
here too.  
The fugitive mid-section of the film’s narrative allows for the central 
couple’s decency to be underlined. This is particularly the case with Joe, who is 
consistently figured as incapable of committing a crime against another human 
being, an inability most obvious during the scene in which, during the worst of the 
couple’s destitution, he fails to rob a grocery store as per his initial intention. In this 
sense, the main body of the film is itself evidential, providing a version of Joe’s 
character that the audience can juxtapose with that presented by the prosecution in 
the final court sequence. What the film emphasises in its divergence from other 
possibilities available to the fugitive scenario is the quandary of the decent 
individual(s) forced into fugitive status. This allows it to posit a circumstantial basis 
in a certain type of criminality (i.e. the essentially harmless and necessitated minor 
crimes of the Joe Bells of Depression-era America), and, with a more conservative 
inflection, juxtapose this criminality against the thrill-seeking and mercenary 
criminal behaviour of the gangster archetype. The presence of gangster figures late 
in the narrative will make this point of comparison explicit.     
Joe and Mabel’s exclusion from domesticity and inability to ascend to social 
convention is thus a pivotal thematic element and source of dramatic tension 
throughout the fugitive portion of the film. This is exemplified in the treatment of 
their marriage, an event which is typically emblematic of the ascent to bourgeois 
domesticity, but which here becomes a painful reminder of the exclusion from it. 
                                                          
outside of the central couple who is granted the “decent American” treatment, which again attests 
to the aggressively patriarchal image of good America the film presents. 
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The couple are lured into a wedding ceremony that is staged for an audience of 
onlookers as paid entertainment, and becomes a humiliating public spectacle that 
anticipates the terms of the climactic trial. The wedding serves as their first 
exposure to public scrutiny and judgment, anticipating the trial but also articulating 
the impossibility of reconciling their life as societal outsiders with their desired 
domesticity.  
It is the combination of the two aforementioned factors – the decency of the 
common American, and the rightness of the sanctioned American way of life – that 
constitutes the solution to the social problem the film raises, and which reaches its 
full articulation in the climactic courtroom sequence. Before looking in detail at this 
sequence, it is worth considering what is at stake narratively (and ideologically) by 
the time we reach the courtroom proper. The essential conflict is one of Mabel’s 
belief that the system of American social institutions, exemplified by the court, 
works to benefit its citizens, and Joe’s insistence that the system is biased against 
him and those like him. Thus, the issue of innocence and guilt in the courtroom 
takes on an added resonance in keeping with the schema of the social problem film 
and the double-trial structure. A guilty verdict means a broken system; a not guilty 
verdict affirms faith in the system.  
Much of the tension with which this trial is imbued also stems from the 
earlier trial scene, in which a bias against Joe was made evident. This second trial 
sequence opens similarly, recalling the earlier abuses of the system by presenting a 
shot of the Judge (George Irving) sat behind his desk, in this instance as the 
opening statement of the off-screen Prosecutor is heard on the soundtrack. The 
same shot composition is employed as in the earlier sequence; the differences lie 
largely in the appearances of the judges themselves (see Figs. 32-33 for a 
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comparison). The inherent flatness of the judge (treatment of him is, as convention 
dictates, respectfully distant) here generates some ambiguity as to his character. We 
are left to wonder whether the legal institution will simply repeat its biases and 
flaws.  
    
 
Figs. 32 (top) and 33 (bottom) 
 
From this initial framing of the judge, the camera pans right to establish the 
rest of the courtroom space, then tracks to follow the Prosecutor (John Litel) as he 
makes his opening statement to the jury. The more spectacular nature of this trial, 
conveyed in the reframing’s incorporation of the crowded spectatorship, stands in 
contrast to the insignificance of the earlier proceeding. The montage of news 
headlines regarding the trial that immediately precedes the sequence demonstrates 
the media intrusion often evoked in trial depictions, which draw attention to the 
inevitability of the reduction – or outright distortion – of the facts to their most 
sensationalistic elements.  
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Similarly, the Prosecutor’s statement constructs a version of Joe’s character 
and history that we know to be a distortion based on the events we have witnessed 
in the preceding narrative – the court is informed that Joe “drifted into this town a 
vicious criminal, with a history of ten arrests” and “reached the pinnacle of his 
career of crime by committing a cold-blooded murder.” While the charges against 
Joe’s character escalate, the camera’s movement shifts from following the 
prosecutor to tracking in on Joe himself. He is not looking up at the Prosecutor, and 
his body language, with his head resting on his hand, suggests that he is not 
listening either. Thus our first impression of Joe in the court is one of a resigned 
figure, the individual who expects an unfair treatment from the court and no longer 
has the will to fight it (contrast this with the equally cynical, but considerably more 
animated Joe of the earlier trial). A more emotionally engaged perspective is 
offered by the following shot of a concerned Mabel and Mike, who are visibly 
responsive to the opening statement’s distortion of Joe’s character. Thus Joe’s loss 
of faith in the system – and his failure to attempt to fight it – is immediately shown 
to be narratively significant, and the inclusion of Mabel’s distress reiterates that the 
conflict of their attitudes needs to be reconciled for narrative resolution.   
The sequence proceeds by employing the convention of the series of witness 
testimonies, presented in short segments and culminating in the testimony of Joe 
himself. This portion of the sequence groups the testimonials together through a 
patterning of narrative event and shared stylistic rendering of each questioning 
through an accelerated pattern of shot/reverse shot edits and transitions that wipe 
from one witness to the next. Narratively, in each instance the witness, attempting 
to convey their more nuanced understanding of Joe’s character, is undermined by 
the Prosecutor, whose tactics involve several recurrent strategies: implying the 
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witnesses’ culpability in aiding and abetting Joe; dismissing their defences of Joe’s 
character as evidentially immaterial; and tearing down their character through 
reference to their own social status. The latter tactic is especially apparent when 
Hank takes to the stand; his brief appearance again suggests the abuses of the 
previous trial as the Prosecutor uses his “criminal” and vagrant status to dismiss his 
testimony.216 The relative absence of dramatic emphasis and differentiation given to 
these portions of testimony swiftly demonstrates the trial process’s flattening of the 
issues down to a few facts that will inevitably prove Joe’s “guilt”.  The legal system 
must be shown to be working, at this point in the trial, to the detriment of Joe for 
the sake of dramatic tension. But the strategies employed by prosecutor and 
filmmaker also allows the film to dramatise the central social problem with which it 
is concerned, the unfair treatment of vagrants by society and its institutions.  
Thus, the legal institution – at this point, personified by the actions of the 
prosecutor - is initially ambivalently presented as working against the interests of 
justice, an ambivalence which is rendered through the selective depiction of the 
trial’s procedural conventions. The first witness depicted, the work farm employee 
who found the foreman’s body but who maintains that “he didn’t look […] as if 
he’d been hurt bad” is admonished by the Prosecutor for “interpreting” events that 
he should be merely “describing”. Pop then takes to the stand as a character witness 
for Joe. Referring to the box car incident, Pop states “I meet a lot of kids like [Joe] 
and whenever I get a chance, I give them a break. I think they need it,” a clear 
reiteration of Pop’s homespun decency, endorsed by the film. Following this 
statement, there is a cut to the Judge, who instructs Pop sternly to “Just answer the 
                                                          
216 Of course, as with Joe, what we know about the character distinguishes him from the type of 
criminal referred to in the prosecutor’s statements. 
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questions.” The following exchange between the Prosecutor and Pop, that ends the 
presentation of his testimony, exemplifies how the processes of the trial are 
represented in this section of the sequence. The Prosecutor brings up the fact that 
Pop has only met Joe twice but is testifying as a character witness, then states a 
dismissive “That’s all” to the court. Pop’s attempt to reassert his perspective by 
exclaiming “but you don’t understand” is interrupted by a more emphatic “That’s 
all”, effectively silencing the frustrated Pop and granting the system and its 
representative the final word.217 This continues the theme of silencing being 
enforced through power relations that has been present throughout the film, and 
typifies the prosecution’s ability to disallow any divergent perspective to be 
entertained. The fact that Pop and Hank are sympathetic characters who have 
appeared in the preceding narrative invites the viewer to identify with them over the 
law and its flat representative. Of course, the tension of the sequence resides in the 
current inability of Joe’s innocence – both of the crime in question, and in relation 
to the social system (i.e. the notion of Joe as a decent citizen) – to be articulated 
within the courtroom.  
The convention of placing individuals who have an emotional investment in 
the case on the witness stand continues with Nick, the following witness, whose 
fundamentally decent, common-sense value system is reiterated here and 
juxtaposed with the legal point of view. Nick admits he gave Joe a job because 
“Back in the old country […] somebody help me, I help somebody else.” He asserts 
when asked that he is a law-abiding American citizen (thus making explicit the 
Americanism of his values), but when the Prosecutor responds by arguing that in 
aiding and abetting he broke the laws, Nick becomes visibly emotional. His 
                                                          
217 I considered this convention of the trial scene in the previous chapter, see page 102. 
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response, “you know, some time, what is in a man’s heart, it’s-a stronger than the 
law”, is part of the conventional positioning of emotion-based understanding as 
beyond the access of the law, or at the very least, inaccessible to its processes.218 
Nick is easily a sympathetic character whose perspective we can take on in this 
moment. His emotion here introduces a mode of persuasion into the trial that 
reaches its fullest articulation when Mabel takes to the stand later on. The structures 
of emotional identification noted by Patton and Maland that guide viewer response 
to the social problem are, at this moment, employed to cast the law in an 
antagonistic light. However, the later developments will subsume the rendered 
emotions into the depiction of a just trial outcome, increasingly integrating 
emotional identification into the trial’s processes. 
Mike is the following witness, and his comparatively superior social 
standing to the previous witnesses correlates to a more relaxed and less emotional 
demeanour on the stand. He instantly exudes a sense of authority, augmented by the 
transition to him at a point when he, rather than the Prosecutor, is speaking. Thus 
the sense of the depicted event as a questioning, and the correspondent power 
dynamic that suggests, is undermined; opening on Mike mid-statement makes the 
moment feel more like an independent proclamation than a response required by 
law. Mike states “All he needed was a break. I guess there are a lot of boys like Joe 
Bell running around, desperately groping for a chance. And it seems to me there are 
those of us who could help them who never even stop and take time out to think 
about them.” The Prosecutor responds by suggesting Mike “save his editorials” for 
his newspaper. The film’s self-consciousness here does not obscure but underlines 
                                                          
218 The screen presence of John Garfield also lends itself well to a discourse that prioritises the 
emotional over other factors. 
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the earnestness with which Mike’s suggestion is being framed. The culpability of 
society in the problem of homelessness is raised, and Mike’s dialogue clearly 
addresses both the “us” of the courtroom, and the “us” of a broader society which 
includes the film spectator. Mike’s association of Joe Bell with the other “boys 
running around” invites the audience to contemplate similar narratives taking place 
off-screen, although the critical edge of the address (chastising the audience for 
their neglect) is tempered by the introduction of a solution implied to be a simple 
one – “all he needs” is a “break”, the kind that has been depicted throughout the 
preceding narrative. Mike’s testimony anticipates the following speech, made by 
the defence attorney, in the didacticism achieved by associating Joe’s story with the 
broader social concerns of the film, and by drawing attention to the wider group for 
which Joe acts as a representative.   
The previous testimonies can be grouped together through their shared 
structure and development, forming a pattern that reiterates what appears at this 
point in the narrative to be a bias against Joe. The remainder of the trial sequence 
forms another pattern, looser but more emphatically presented, that has three 
characters address the jury (and by extension the film spectator) consecutively. The 
different ways in which Joe, the defence attorney and Mabel address the jury, and 
how these addresses are represented, particularly in their considerations of the jury, 
together form a development that fully articulates the social problem the film 
wishes to address before restoring faith in the court system. 
There is a transition from Mike to Joe on the stand. By this point in the 
narrative, the case against the defendant has been presented through the undermined 
defences of the witnesses. At this point, Joe’s attitude towards the legal system has 
understandably undergone no change, and his simultaneously resigned and 
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defensive demeanour remains in place. When the Prosecutor asks why he did not 
attempt to clear his name upon realising he was accused of murder, Joe replies “I 
once served time for something I didn’t do. I told them the truth and they threw me 
in jail. They wouldn’t believe me then, why should I expect them to believe me 
now?” There is a cut to the judge, who admonishes Joe: “Young man, this is an 
American court. Under our laws a man is considered innocent until he’s proven 
guilty. Are you under the impression that you’re not being tried by a representative 
American jury of your equals?” Once again in this moment the judge is situated as 
both impartial voice of the law, speaking to (explicitly situated) American, 
democratic values, and a more ambivalent figure, whose admonishment could also 
speak to a lack of compassion. The film has to begin forgiving the system at this 
point, but an ambiguity is permitted in the light of the “screwy” individuals we 
know to have previously persecuted Joe (the burglar who falsely implicated Joe in 
his crimes, the justice of the peace). The “equals” the judge speaks of could be of 
this type as much as they could be of the compassionate group (Pops, Nick, Mike) 
presented in the fugitive section of the narrative. 
The judge’s question elicits a speech from Joe that damns the jurors as 
representatives of a  society that has no place for him, and which constitutes the 
most direct criticism of society and the ideology upholding the judicial system’s 
workings thus far presented in the film. Joe states “Equals? They don’t think I’m 
their equal. Why should they? I’m not a responsible member of their society […] 
This case isn’t going to be decided on whether or not I committed this murder, but 
on who I am”. During this speech, shots place the camera behind Joe’s shoulder to 
view the jury. The viewer’s line of vision thus aligns with Joe’s, and the ensuing 
inscrutability of the jury is both played for tension and implicitly (through this 
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inscrutability) allows us to see them briefly from Joe’s highly cynical worldview 
(Fig. 34). Following Joe’s speech, the off-screen gavel is heard, and there is a cut to 
the judge, who once again admonishes Joe, reiterating that the jury will base their 
verdict on the facts only. The judge’s statement, however, does not sufficiently 
counter the depiction of a previously biased legal system, and Joe’s failure to adjust 
his attitude subsequently is carried out to the extent of “confessing” on the stand 
that the prosecution’s distortions have been the truth in order to “get this thing over 
with.” The extent of Joe’s cynicism towards the system leads him to willingly 
accept the possibility of a death sentence.  
     
Fig. 34 
The film must now negotiate the validity of his anger with the happy 
resolution that has to occur. By this point in the trial sequence, the tension between 
the film’s pivotal climactic articulation of its social problem and the ideological and 
conventional imperatives of the Hollywood cinema are most evident. Joe’s 
cynicism and rage must be seen to be justified to some extent, but the subsequent 
narrative developments share two linked goals; to see justice served, and to restore 
faith in the system which Joe has criticised on the stand. Of course, this will be 
achieved through the eventual reading of a not guilty verdict. But in order to get to 
this point convincingly, a significant emphasis is placed on the following two 
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monologues, and their varying addresses to both diegetic and film spectators that 
serve to explain and excuse Joe’s own speech.  
 The first of these is the defence attorney’s statement, a convention that 
tends towards affirmative depictions of the judicial system. The transition from Joe 
to the defence attorney (Moroni Olsen) is telling. The same shot incorporates Joe’s 
journey back to his seat from the stand and the attorney’s gesture of standing and 
approaching the jury to begin delivering his statement. The fluidity of the transition 
leaves the viewer little time to process Joe’s defeatist admission and justifiable rage 
at society, as the more ideologically reassuring character type of the judicious 
attorney assumes the role of the audience’s primary identification figure. The 
defence attorney’s subsequent monologue is central to the sequence, situating him 
as the mouthpiece for the film’s didactic message, and the personification of a 
functional judicial system in a manner that anticipates the justice figures of the 
golden age trial films.219 The attorney’s uninterrupted speech encompasses two and 
a half minutes of screen time and is comprised of only five shots, all centred on this 
personification of justice.220 His flatness – the character has not appeared in the film 
                                                          
219 Both the climactic speeches of Atticus Finch in To Kill a Mockingbird and Jonathan Wilk in 
Compulsion bear striking similarities to the content and approach of this section of Dust Be My 
Destiny. 
220 The length and significance of the speech itself necessitates a transcript: 
 
Joe Bell has summed up the issue in this case far better than any other could. And he went 
right to the heart of things when he said this trial is being judged not on whether or not Joe 
Bell killed this man, but on who Joe Bell is. And he answered that for you too. He’s nobody. 
Just nobody. Well there are an awful lot of nobodies in this world, a great many more than 
there are somebodies, and if they were all to be judged only on that basis, then you’ll have 
to say that the whole system of American democracy that we believe in is wrong. And 
that’s why this trial is so important. Now the prosecuting attorney’s tried to make you 
believe that this boy was already a hardened criminal when he first got into this town. If he 
was, by the light of the testimony that’s been introduced here, then you’ve got to say that 
thousands of boys like him, wandering over the face of this country, looking for their little 
spot in the sun, are criminals too. And I don’t think you believe that. And that’s another 
reason why this trial is so important. Because it means an awful lot, not only to Joe Bell but 
to those thousands of other boys who are like Joe Bell, and who are watching this trial 
because they feel that what happens to him here in this courtroom will happen to them 
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prior to this sequence, and will not be seen outside of the courtroom – is significant 
for several reasons. It allows him to embody the virtues of the judicial system 
which the film must now affirm (its fairness, its lack of bias, its sincerity, etc.) 
without any personal characteristics intruding upon the presentation of these 
virtues. This same lack of depth also allows the character to convincingly assume 
the role of mouthpiece for the film’s didacticism. The sincerity with which Olsen 
performs the role – his tone is emphatic yet gentle – is also of significance, as his 
benevolent impression works to counter the depiction of legal and social institutions 
(and their representatives) elsewhere in the film. The jury here is consistently 
evoked as the attorney’s audience; they are never in the frame, but his movement, 
gestures, and the staging of the sequence ensures that their presence is felt.  
The attorney’s speech continues the theme of linking Joe to the other 
“nobodies” in American society, through which the film registers itself as being 
committed to a wider social problem. This correlates with a broadening of the 
speech’s address from the diegetic jury spectatorship to the filmic spectator, which 
is embedded in the dialogue’s self-conscious, paradoxical acknowledgement of the 
“boys who are watching [my italics] this trial” outside of the courtroom. This line 
of dialogue relies upon an assumed visual (“watching”) broadcast of the trial within 
the film’s world to make logical sense, which is highly unlikely. A more 
convincing argument suggests instead that the film here collapses its doubled 
audiences and provides a direct address to the viewer and thus to the social world 
                                                          
too. And you can’t let them believe that. Ladies and gentlemen, you cannot brand them as 
criminals and kill them all off. A criminal’s grave must not be their destiny. And it must not 
be their share of the earth we call America. Now I think all you need is not a lot of legal 
testimony, but just to understand this boy. To feel what’s really inside his heart. And I 
guess the only way you can ever feel that is to have the person who’s closest to his heart 
tell you about it: Mabel. 
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the film represents and reflects. The possibility for such directness of address is 
arguably the most beneficial element of the trial form for the socially conscious 
narrative film, and is used to full effect here. 
Of course it would be remiss not to consider also the actual content of the 
monologue. The issue of social prejudice, raised by Joe, is reiterated, but in the 
gentler, more appeasing register of the defence attorney. His speech reconfigures 
the terms of this prejudice, relating it to issues of patriotism and the rightness of the 
American judicial process; to judge Joe on a prejudicial basis is to “say that the 
whole system of American democracy that we [my italics] believe in is wrong”. 
The sequence begins the process of affirming the essential features of the American 
democratic system – which is implicitly universally understood to be a correct one - 
after the preceding critique by Joe (and the earlier critique embedded in the first 
trial sequence). But the final shift of the speech’s tone brings us to the role of the 
emotional appeal, as the attorney states “all you need is not a lot of legal testimony, 
but just to understand this boy. To feel what’s really inside his heart.” This 
continues the strain of emotionalism that began with Nick, and which will reach an 
apotheosis with Mabel, and acts as the cue to invite the latter to the stand. It recalls 
Pribram’s contention that the law-and-order genres and juridicial processes share an 
‘indispensable engagement with emotions’ despite their protestations otherwise.221 
Here, the attorney implies the inadequacy of man-made law (“not a lot of legal 
testimony”) and instead situates the processes of emotional identification viewed by 
Patton as central to the workings of the social problem film, as the key to a just 
                                                          
221 See Review of the Literature, page 47. 
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outcome. Justice is contingent upon, and natural law aligned with, emotional 
identification.  
Mabel’s subsequent appeal on the stand constitutes the final portion of the 
climactic trifecta of speeches. The primacy now given to the emotional appeal also 
recalls Maland’s designation of a ‘humane concern for the victim(s) of […] the 
social problem’ as central to the social problem film. The choice to make Mabel so 
crucial to the sequence in its climactic moments serves as a reminder of the other 
major narrative thread that must be resolved in the courtroom, which is the fracture 
of the Joe/Mabel relationship. Mabel’s testimony is preceded by a shot in which she 
approaches the stand. Her brief attempt to reach Joe by placing out her hand as she 
walks by, which he ignores, and the camera’s subsequent push in on an anguished 
Joe, reiterates the personal factors at stake.  
The scene then fades to Mabel’s testimony, with an initial medium shot 
framing that moves into a close-up as the camera slowly pushes in on her (Figs. 35-
36).222 The camera movement emphasises Mabel’s emotional state, especially in 
combination with Lane’s performance style and the simultaneous introduction of 
low-tempo orchestral scoring, uncommon within the courtroom sequence and 
hitherto unutilised in this sequence. Voice tremulous and eyes brimming with tears, 
Mabel’s testimony speaks again to the essential decency of the central couple, 
marking the return of the “place to hang your hat” motif and signalling through 
Mabel’s devotion to Joe the sincerity and rightness of their coupling.  Although 
pitched differently in terms of tone, Mabel’s testimony parallels the preceding 
                                                          
222 The choices of framing, composition and camera movement relates to the strategies employed 
to invoke viewer emotional identification with the witness outlined in the previous chapter (see pp. 
83-89).  
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speech in its direct appeal to the jury, as she states of Joe “he thinks that the world 
is against him, that he hasn’t got a chance. But he’s wrong. You’ve got to prove to 
him that he’s wrong. I believe you will. I believed it so much that I took a chance 
on turning him in.” The ideals of belief and trust evoked here again speak to the 
affirmation of putting faith in individual decency and the notion that decency is 
itself universally legible and visible (which again relates to ideas surrounding 
universal moral principles that underlie the concept of natural law). Lane’s eye-line 
in these shots moves between Joe and the jury (both out-of-shot), linking the two 
together through her teary-eyed faith in both.  
 
Figs 35 (top) and 36 (bottom). 
Mabel’s speech culminates in emotional breakdown on the stand, conveyed 
through the acts of sobbing and lowering her head (Fig. 39). Herzberg details how 
Hall Wallis insisted upon eliciting as highly emotional a performance from Priscilla 
Lane in this scene as possible. In a memo sent to the film’s director and studio 
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scenarist, Wallis argued that ‘unless she convinces the audience, it is going to be 
pretty hard to swallow the fact that she also convinces the jury in spite of all the 
evidence against the boy, he should be acquitted’.223 This suggests the underlying 
precariousness of the resolution with respect to the preceding narrative 
developments. In order for the turnaround to be ‘convincing’, the emotion must be 
heightened enough to obscure the likelihood that (due to the prosecution’s case and 
the social prejudices which the film has drawn attention to) Joe would be found 
guilty. Wallis’ memo is also interesting in that it again links the audiences of 
diegetic jury and filmic spectator, in a desired shared reaction to Mabel’s address.  
It is imperative, then, to consider how Mabel’s speech and its depiction 
works to convince these doubled audiences and ensure the sequence’s resolution. 
Firstly, there is the content of the speech itself. It includes the aforementioned 
element of the emotional appeal, the demonstration of Mabel’s devotion to Joe, an 
integration of some evidential testimony (Mabel manages to remind the jury that 
her stepfather was already “a sick man” at the time of his death), and the joining of 
her emotional state to the film’s social message, most notably when Mabel argues 
that a guilty verdict would prove “there’s no hope for people like us”. But what 
Mabel says is of less importance than (as per Wallis’ memo) the emotional impact 
it must be seen to have upon her and the jury. Mabel’s increasingly emotional 
testimony, conveyed largely in close-up, is interspersed with reaction shots of the 
jury. This is not in itself an unusual choice, but the fact that these reaction shots 
actually convey the emotional responses of jurors is a modification of the 
representational strategies that typically deny the jury any individualising 
                                                          
223 Bob Herzberg, The Left Side of the Screen, p. 85. 
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presence.224 The manner in which the film attempts to convince the spectator that 
the jury would reach a not guilty verdict is to show them being convinced by 
Mabel’s testimony. This leads to the presence in reaction shots of such figures as 
the female juror who is visibly moved by Mabel’s appeal and leans forward in what 
could be viewed as an impotent but empathetic gesture (Figs. 37-38).  
 
 
Figs. 37 (top) and 38 (bottom) 
 
The development of the sequence over the course of the three final speakers 
then, can I think be most clearly distinguished through how the jury is represented. 
During Joe’s outburst, the jury are distant, inscrutable. This is in keeping with Joe’s 
anger at a society from which he feels rejected and which, at this moment, the jury 
represents. During the attorney’s speech, the jury’s presence is constantly alluded 
to, but they are not seen. This is because his speech is the one most specifically 
                                                          
224 See Chapter One, pp. 72-73. 
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designed to convey the film’s social message, and is thus addressed as much at the 
filmic spectator as the diegetic jury. Finally, Mabel’s testimony must demonstrate 
the jury’s emotional engagement in order to elicit the ‘convincing’ resolution and 
counter the earlier critiques of the jury system and thus American society made by 
Joe. It is not only the jury whom Mabel convinces here; reaction shots of Joe, 
finally concerned and engaged with the witness box as he looks up at the off-screen 
Mabel (see Fig. 40), also gesture towards their post-verdict reconciliation.    
  
 
Figs. 39 (top.) and 40 (bottom) 
Thus the climactic courtroom sequence of Dust Me My Destiny allows the 
film to articulate and resolve its social problem and restore faith in the network of 
American social institutions (represented by the court) by the time the “not guilty” 
verdict is read out.  The final shots of the sequence emphasise the values of trust 
and community (in contrast to Joe’s earlier, isolating cynicism) by including the 
surrogate family that the couple have accrued (Figs 41-42). This ending drastically 
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differs from one proposed by the film’s credited screenwriter Robert Rossen, who 
intended for Joe and Mabel to be shot to death at the film’s end.225 However, the 
recent box office failure of You Only Live Once (1937, Dir: Fritz Lang), which 
contained a similarly tragic ending for its central couple, necessitated a rewrite.226 
As opposed to the tragic ending originally considered, the existing courtroom 
conclusion is positive to the extent that even the convention of the photographer’s 
camera appearing within the frame (Figs. 41-42) does not convey press intrusion 
into private matters (the conventional meaning), but simply the capturing of a 
celebratory moment.227 The sudden turnaround of the system that the not guilty 
verdict represents correlates with Campbell’s configuration of the social problem 
film as presenting a system that is ‘flexible and susceptible to amelioration’.228 The 
precariousness of this flexibility (which had not been evidenced earlier in the 
narrative) is challenged by the earlier depiction of a localised court, and which has 
been achieved only through extensive emotional appeal situated in opposition to the 
structures of man-made law, is overshadowed by the utopianism of its post-verdict 
moments. Mabel and Joe are reunited, their guardians Nick and Mike are present, 
and the trial system, through its outcome, can be said to work in the interests of 
justice.   
                                                          
225 Herzberg, The Left Side of the Screen, p. 86. 
226 See Herzberg, The Left Side of the Screen, p. 86. 
227 This is in keeping with the changing treatment of photography over the course of the 
film. In order to demonstrate the shift from a life lived in fear of surveillance and 
detection to one with nothing to hide, Joe sheds his fear of being photographed. Similarly, 
it is his own photography that provides him the career opportunity of working for Mike. 
228 Russell Campbell, ‘The ideology of the social consciousness movie’, p. 60. 
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Figs. 41 (top) and 42 (bottom) 
Thus, the systemic social issues which Dust Be My Destiny deals with are 
ultimately resolved by a trial proceeding that works in Joe and Mabel’s favour. 
However, the neatness of the climactic moments and the not guilty verdict are 
countered by Joe’s prior speech condemning the society that mistrusts and neglects 
him, the precariousness of the happy ending, and the film’s earlier trial sequence in 
which the law was presided over by a prejudiced justice of the peace. The overtness 
of the emotional appeals introduced into the sequence situate the just outcome as 
the result more of structures of emotional identification than of the trial process, 
thus affirming to some extent claims that it is personal rather than social problems 
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that are treated by the social problem film. The treatment of the courtroom(s) in 
Dust Be My Destiny embodies the tensions that govern the social problem film. The 
trial both allows for the articulation of the central social problems, but also provides 
the solution to those problems, paradoxically affirming in its final moments the 
systems of American democracy, law and society through extensive recourse to the 
emotional and the individual.  
 
 “…to be tried because she is a Negro”: The Problem Trial in Pinky 
 
Pinky has been written about by many critics, with much of the literature on 
the film seeing its climactic trial sequence as representative of the film’s 
ideologically problematic depiction of race relations. Yet, despite its acknowledged 
prominence to the narrative and didacticism of Pinky, there have been few close 
analyses of this sequence as a locus of the film’s contradictions, complexities, and 
its negotiation of competing influences in representing – and treating - the social 
problem of racial prejudice.  
 Pinky shares with Dust be my Destiny a focus on a social problem 
contemporaneous to the film’s production date, through the depiction of the 
prejudice experienced by the protagonist, a fundamentally decent individual whose 
mistreatment is seen to arise solely from these prejudices.229 Both films also proffer 
                                                          
229 Pinky concerns Patricia ‘Pinky’ Johnson (Jeanne Crain). The film begins with her returning home 
to an unnamed part of the American South following several years of nursing training in the North. 
She is greeted by her grandmother Dicey (Ethel Waters), a washerwoman who soon realises that 
the light-skinned ‘Pinky’ has been passing for white while in the North – not only this, but she has 
acquired a white boyfriend Tom (William Lundigan), himself unaware of her racial heritage. Back in 
her childhood surroundings, Pinky encounters several instances of overt racial prejudice, each 
pivoted around an initial misrecognition of her as a white woman followed by assault and 
mistreatment when her actual racial identity is revealed. In one such instance, Pinky is arrested by 
the town’s racist sheriff Anderson (Arthur Hunnicut). Appalled by the racism she encounters, Pinky 
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the aid of benevolent emblems of liberalism, including the compassionate figures 
within the court system, as part of the solution to the problem. However, the social 
problem picture’s legibility as a prestigious and marketable product had increased 
in the intervening decade between the release dates of Dust Be My Destiny and 
Pinky. The critical and commercial successes of such films as The Lost Weekend 
(Dir: Billy Wilder, 1945), The Best Years of our Lives (Dir: William Wyler, 1946), 
The Snake Pit (Dir: Anatole Litvak, 1948), and two previous Darryl F. Zanuck 
productions, The Grapes of Wrath and Gentlemen’s Agreement (Dir: Elia Kazan, 
1947) places Pinky within a specific cycle of 1940s ‘A’ pictures that made 
contemporary social problems their subject matter and which remain the films that 
are most often associated with the term social problem film.230 Like these other 
films, Pinky was a commercial success and received a (reservedly) positive critical 
response, earning three Academy Award nominations.231 However, the film was 
also subject to controversy and divisive response. 
                                                          
plans to return North, but is convinced by Dicey to stay and nurse Em (Ethel Barrymore), a dying 
member of the slave-era aristocracy. Initially reluctant to nurse what she assumes to be another 
prejudicial white Southerner, Pinky eventually forms a bond with the cantankerous but good-
hearted Em. Meanwhile, Tom visits Pinky, and decides to stand by her when she admits she is not 
white. Em dies, leaving her inheritance – including her manor house – to Pinky. The will is 
contested by Em’s greedy relatives, the Woolleys, but rather than escaping to the North and letting 
the Woolleys assume Em’s inheritance by default, Pinky decides to stay for the trial, despite the 
overwhelming hostility of the community. Pinky convinces Em’s friend Judge Walker (Basil 
Ruysdael) to take her case, which is eventually ruled in Pinky’s favour. Having not obtained the 
satisfaction she had assumed she would upon winning the case, Pinky ultimately recognises what 
Em would have wished for her to do with the inheritance. Pinky refuses to leave for the North with 
Tom and instead stays in the community, transforming Em’s home into ‘Miss Em’s Clinic and 
Nursery School’, a clinic specifically for the black community. 
230 These films, in particular Gentlement’s Agreement and Pinky, are referred to by Cindy Patton 
(Anatomy of a Problem Film, 2007) as the first in the social problem film cycle. 
231 The nominations were for Best Actress in a Leading Role (Jeanne Crain) and Best Actress in a 
Supporting Role (Ethel Waters and Ethel Barrymore). Although this pales in comparison to the 
number of Academy Award nominations and wins granted to previous films in the 1940s social 
problem cycle, it still demonstrates a level of industry support towards the film (and made Waters 
only the second African-American to be nominated for an Academy Award). 
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Pinky was under particular scrutiny as ‘the first liberal A-movie about 
racism in America’,232 typically viewed as part of a cycle of films released in 1949 
that addressed the topic of racial prejudice, alongside Intruder in the Dust (1949, 
Dir: Clarence Brown), Home of the Brave (1949, Dir: Mark Robson) and Lost 
Boundaries (1949, Dir: Alfred L. Werker).233 Considerable pre-production 
wrangling over the source material’s adaptation took place in order to produce a 
script that would satisfy both the mass (white) audience and the African-American 
audience.234 This is detailed by Cripps, who notes the debates between the NAACP 
and producer Darryl F. Zanuck over the title character’s ‘lack of militism’, 
evidenced by the former in her recourse to the court system. Cripps states that 
‘Zanuck persisted, reminding them that the conscience-liberalism that had risen 
during the war had been an organically white-angled phenomenon and that whites 
were the target of his Pinky’.235 This comment makes clear both that Pinky was a 
film about black experience made for a predominantly white audience, and that this 
meant that ideologically, the film had to make certain choices in order to 
accommodate this mass white audience.  
These negotiations are most immediately evident to the modern viewer in 
the casting of Jeanne Crain, a white actress, in the role of Pinky. The purpose of 
casting a known white actress in the role as a way of inviting the white audience to 
engage more rigorously with the film’s social message is discussed by Jones (1981) 
                                                          
232 Tomáš Popíšil, ‘The Liberal Message Films of the Late 1940s and the Position of African-
Americans’, Brno Studies in English 30:10 (2004), p. 182. 
233 See Jones, 1981; Kydd, 2000; Pospíšil, 2004.  
234 The source material in question is Cid Ricketts Sumner’s novel Quality (1946). Another recent 
“passing” novel, Kingsblood Royal, written by Sinclair Lewis and published in 1947, provides an 
interesting contrast to the source material of Pinky; despite its similar subject matter of U.S. racial 
discrimination and “passing,” Kingsblood Royal was more satirical in tone and too controversial to 
be considered adaptable for film.  
235 Thomas Cripps, Making Movies Black : The Hollywood Message Movie from World War II to the 
Civil Rights Era (New York ; Oxford : Oxford University Press, c1993), p. 234. 
168 
 
and Kydd (2000), and relates to the emotional miscegenation outlined by Patton; for 
this audience to see the prejudicial treatment of the black community inflicted upon 
a white female body paradoxically strengthened their engagement with the race 
problem, an outcome desired regardless of the problematic connotations of its 
underlying structures of identification.236 
The film’s negotiations are also evidenced in the film’s overarching 
narrative development, critiqued by both contemporaneous reviewers and in 
subsequent criticism of the film.237 For example, Campbell argues that: 
The ideology of Pinky is that of separate development; and the dependence 
of black on white is implicit in the film’s final scene of Pinky bustling about 
caring for “her people” in the house left to her by the generous nature of a 
white woman and guaranteed to her by the firm commitment to justice of a 
white court.238  
 
Campbell’s perspective on the implications raised by the film’s resolution is shared 
by Jones and Kydd. All, to varying degrees, see the inclusion and function of the 
trial in the narrative as affirming separatist and paternalistic solutions; as Kydd 
succinctly summarises the issue, ‘Inheritance is the strategy by which racism can be 
addressed, but this means that control remains with the white community; the legal 
system maintains the ability to define and position others’.239 We can also begin to 
think here about issues of censorship. Filmmakers working within the studio system 
would have been aware of the scrutiny with which the censors (at both national and 
localised levels) would be approaching a film dealing in this type of sensitive 
                                                          
236 It should be noted that similar casting practices were not unknown in studio-era Hollywood, and 
were evident in other films that presented messages of racial tolerance, understanding, and 
equality. One contemporaneous example is the casting of white actors Jeff Chandler and Debra 
Paget in Native American roles in the following year’s Broken Arrow (Dir: Delmer Daves, 1950).    
237 For an overview of the contemporary critical response, see Cripps, p. 238. 
238 Campbell, ‘The Ideology of the Social Consciousness Movie’, p. 67. 
239 Elspeth Kydd, ‘“The Ineffaceable Curse of Cain”: Racial Marking and Embodiment in Pinky’ 
Camera Obscura 15:1 (2000), p. 111. 
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subject matter. An ‘A’ picture such as Pinky would have to negotiate its social 
didacticism and the tenets of various censorship guidelines. For example, the 
casting of a white actress also made the issue of miscegenation (forbidden by the 
PCA) more palatable. Thus the series of narrative strategies made by Pinky can be 
considered partly as choices designed to ward off censorship issues, the trial and its 
outcome being of particular relevance.240 
In order to begin thinking about the debates over the court’s function as a 
site of resolution, however, the other narrative strategies and imperatives of the film 
should first be considered. Pinky positions itself as a film about personal identity. 
The focus on a female protagonist makes it a film about problems of gender as well 
as race and class. The film has been considered alongside the “mulatta” narratives 
of 19th Century American literature, including Uncle Tom’s Cabin (1852 novel by 
Harriet Beecher Stowe), Clotel; or, the President’s Daughter (1853 novel by 
William Wells Brown) and the short stories of Lydia Maria Child,241 a context 
which can give us some insight into how Pinky situates itself.242 Doane argues that 
the  
tragic mulatta is “tragic” because she is usually delineated as caught 
between two cultures and her dilemma is seen as irresolvable in any 
satisfactory way […] The fact that these are dramas of recognition and 
misrecognition and, as one critic points out, scenes of revelation are crucial 
to the genre, indicates an affinity with the structure of melodrama.243  
                                                          
240 These issues of Pinky’s navigation of censorship issues are considered at length in Margaret T. 
McGehee, ‘Disturbing the Peace: Lost Boundaries, Pinky, and Censorship in Atlanta, Georgia, 1949-
1952’ Cinema Journal, 46:1 (Autumn, 2006), pp. 23-51. 
241 For example, Slavery’s Peasant Homes (1843) 
242 The most famous predecessor of the tragic mulatta in the Hollywood cinema is the character of 
Peola (played by Fredi Washington) in Imitation of Life (Dir: John M. Stahl, 1934), itself an 
adaptation of a novel by Fannie Hurst. 
243 Mary Ann Doane, Femmes Fatales: Femininsm, Film Theory, Psychoanalysis (New York: 
Routledge, 1991), pp. 233-4. 
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Pinky draws upon the melodramatic treatment of the mulatta to some degree, 
dealing initially with the pains of recognition and misrecognition (of both oneself 
and by others), and, in its depiction of an individual’s struggle to find a place within 
a hierarchical social world, clearly working in melodramatic terrain. The opening 
scene establishes that North/South and white/black form the terms of the two 
cultures between which she is torn. Pinky’s sense of not belonging is recurrently 
figured also through the treatment of space in the film. Tracking and long shots of 
Pinky navigating her way through both her own neighbourhood and Miss Em’s 
“slave built, slave run” house invite us to register the discomfort she feels in her 
surroundings, conveying her feelings of entrapment and exclusion.  
Pinky only seems at peace when she is alone in nature, outside of the film’s 
social world. Whenever she is seen within the community, she is subject to the 
scrutinizing gaze of others, too visibly white to be at home within the black part of 
town, and too known as black for a white middle-class way of life to be attainable. 
Another effect of the aforementioned tracking shots is that they also allow for the 
inclusion of other individuals, watching and reacting to Pinky, within the frame. 
The first two instances of overt racial prejudice depicted in the film revolve around 
an initial misrecognition that conveys the differing treatments Pinky encounters 
when recognised as white then black, and the romantic subplot also pivots around 
the irresolvable tensions surrounding her racial identity. Thus we see how much of 
the film, in line with the conventions of the melodramatic mulatta narrative, 
foregrounds the difficulties of Pinky’s situation, and aligns its structures of 
identification with Pinky’s experiences of racial prejudice, asserting Patton’s 
argument of the role of melodramatic emotional identification structures to the 
social problem film’s didacticism. 
171 
 
However, the film also diverges from the conventions and structures of 
melodrama in ways that make evident the trial sequence’s primary allegiance to the 
structures of the social problem film. The ‘scenes of revelation’ that Doane deems 
crucial to melodrama are notably absent from the trial, and the motif of Pinky-as-
spectacle-to-others, which could easily be indulged by the trial form, is 
downplayed. This is telling, especially in relation to the case studies of my 
following chapter, which will demonstrate the centrality of (mis)recognition and 
revelation to what I term the melodramatic mode of trial depiction. Similarly, the 
outcome of the trial ultimately posits Pinky as a triumphant rather than tragic 
figure, suggesting that the mulatta’s situation is, in this instance, resolvable. Here 
we can recall Maland’s assertion that the term ‘social problem’ itself implies a 
solution. Yet, one advantage of the melodramatic form, that its structures of 
identification sustain a high level of emotional engagement with the victimised 
protagonist, is notably absent from the trial scene, which is about Pinky, but keeps 
her largely silent. I argue that this decision, which I will discuss in more detail 
shortly, downplays the sense of the trial’s outcome as a personal triumph. 
It is already evident that the trial is not the sole site of narrative resolution 
and closure. Most discussion of Pinky pays more attention to the ideological 
implications of the film’s final scene, which depicts our heroine running the 
African-American clinic from the home she has inherited from Em. Campbell 
contrasts what he argues as the proposal made by Gentlemen’s Agreement of the 
‘dissolution of Jewish identity’ as the solution to anti-Semitism to Pinky’s solution 
of ‘black pride’.244 He finds this model of black pride no less problematic, however, 
arguing that the film proffers a paternalistic and conservative ‘implication […] that 
                                                          
244 Campbell, ‘Ideology of the Social Consciousness Film’, p. 66. 
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blacks should not entertain the ambition of moving outside their ghettoes, of 
aspiring to a white middle-class way of life’.245 It is worth considering how the 
film’s earlier strategies lead it to this conclusion. Throughout the earlier narrative, 
the film’s discourse around race posits racial background as integral to one’s 
identity, recurrently referring to the importance of “place” and criticising Pinky’s 
“pretending”. Pinky’s anger at what she sees as racial discrimination is, on at least 
three separate occasions within the diegesis, made to seem unreasonable (she 
herself is seen to misrecognise a racially-motivated element to her treatment more 
than once), and her “passing” rendered unacceptable through recourse to notions of 
“denying oneself”, “pretending” and other terms used within the dialogue to 
ultimately affirm the black pride/separatist solution. The terms of this debate are 
thus placed on an individual level, often situating the problem with Pinky herself. 
This evades any critique of the systems and structures that, to recall Kydd, ‘define 
and position’ based on race, instead invoking contradictory messages of race as, on 
the one hand, being of no importance to one’s identity (thus indulging, to some 
degree, in the ‘dissolution’ of identity Campbell identifies in Gentlemen’s 
Agreement) and, on the other, of being central to knowing one’s ‘place’ (which, the 
film finally suggests, is amongst your own race).246 The film’s own contradictory 
                                                          
245 Ibid, p. 67. 
246 This contradiction is most notably evidenced in consecutive encounters Pinky has in the same 
scene, firstly with her grandmother, and secondly with Dr. Canady (Kennedy Washington), a young 
African-American doctor who studied in the North but resides and practices in the Southern 
community. In the first instance, Pinky’s complaint to Dicey that Em “means to put me in my place 
and keep me there, just as she’s kept you all these years” is countered by Dicey’s “when folks is 
real friends, they ain’t no such thing as place”. However, only minutes later, Canady tells Pinky, 
when discussing his return to the South to work after completing medical school, that he “felt that 
my place was here”. Two contrasting notions of ‘place’ are invoked: the first, a socio-culturally 
constructed image of the black individual’s place, undermined in order to absolve certain white 
characters (and, by extension, the intended liberal white audience) of racism; the second, figured 
more abstractly (a ‘feeling’ of place), but still most likely governed by socio-cultural factors, that is 
used to affirm the essential rightness of remaining within one’s ‘ghettoes’.  
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constructions of race demonstrate the influence of competing ideologies, which are 
displayed in my analysis of the trial sequence. 
 With these contexts in place, the specificities of the trial sequence can be 
addressed. It is firstly worth noting that the case on trial is a civil action. The 
sequence does largely employ the conventions of representing the criminal 
proceeding, presenting competing narratives in a court setting, and structuring its 
development around a set of procedural elements that include opening statements, 
witness testimonies, and a final verdict. Nevertheless, the lack of an explicitly 
criminal component to the drama lessens the likelihood of the heightened emotion 
of the climactic trial of Dust be My Destiny. This trial is not a matter of life and 
death (at least not explicitly), but of issues of inheritance that are made to reflect the 
broader issues of race within the community. The relatively subdued dramatics of 
the scene reflects the film’s cautiousness in endorsing the kind of ‘militism’ that the 
NAACP believed the film lacked.247 Change is enacted through recourse to the 
system, which is shown to operate relatively smoothly. However, there are enough 
ambivalences and implications rendered throughout the sequence to ensure that the 
court system is not depicted as the guarantor of resolution to the same extent as 
Dust Be My Destiny.    
This leads to the other important diegetic context of the sequence, which is 
the broader milieu of the setting. Pinky takes place in the American South, and its 
court is depicted as a specifically Southern courtroom. This has a bearing on 
audience expectations and the representation of the court, emerging largely from 
the courtroom’s dual resonances, existing in tension with one another, as both an 
                                                          
247 See Cripps, Making Movies Black, p. 234. 
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impartial site of justice and a public arena likely to bear the influence of the local 
community. It also relates to the aforementioned issues of the civil case, as the 
monetary dispute at the heart of the case is given an added inflection within the 
context of the mid-20th century American South, typically depicted as 
impoverished.  
The community’s influence within the court creates the main source of 
tension in the sequence. The specific nuance offered from having no jury comes 
into play here; Judge Shoreham (Raymond Greenleaf) is the only person counsel 
needs to appeal to, and so the rest of the spectatorship can take on a more 
aggressively combatant function. The implication throughout is that a jury made up 
of members of this community would undoubtedly side with Melba Woolley 
(Evelyn Varden) and against Patricia Johnson (that is, Pinky) due to racial 
prejudice. This anticipates the racially motivated outcome of the trial depicted in To 
Kill a Mockingbird and again gestures toward the intended audience of the film, the 
white liberal North American audience populated in urban, educated areas above 
the Mason-Dixon line, who would be less inclined to take offense at a depiction of 
U.S. white racism displaced on to another group within a different geographical 
region. The film thus exhibits the same delineation between its white characters that 
Pospíšil discusses in relation to Intruder in the Dust:  
on the one hand there is the mob of anonymous racists; on the other hand 
there are members of the “enlightened” establishment. They are capable of 
transcending their previous prejudice (i.e. “facts” that can be blinding) and 
start treating everyone equally; while doing so they are willing to take 
considerable risks and confront the wrath of the fanatic white majority.248  
 
                                                          
248 Popíšil, ‘The Liberal Message Films of the Late 1940s’, p. 182. 
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Pinky exists in a similar milieu, where the ‘enlightened’ white establishment 
(consisting of Em, and – with some reservation - Judges Shoreham and Walker) are 
far outnumbered by the ‘unenlightened’ community. The presence of this 
community alters the stakes of the trial scene, gesturing to a world that has never 
recovered from the Civil War by presenting a white mob that is as socially deprived 
as the African-American community, but which still sees itself as in allegiance with 
the white courts in a segregated environment that insists upon race as the central 
classifier of difference.    
The film devotes considerable screen time to events that occur between the 
realisation that Em’s will is most likely to be contested and the trial itself. This 
portion of the narrative is crucial to establishing the full force of opposition Pinky 
faces within the community for taking the legal route, encapsulated by Dr. Joe’s 
comment when he informs Pinky of Em’s will: “I don’t know how the folks around 
here are gonna take this.” The motif of having Pinky subjected to an objectifying 
gaze by others is escalated in these scenes, exemplified by the moment in which 
Pinky checks the court notice of her case while silently observed by grinning locals. 
The trial becomes a litmus test for the other characters; the reluctance even of Judge 
Walker to get involved demonstrates the sheer oppositional force Pinky faces in 
deciding to go ahead with the trial – even the ‘enlightened’ need to be convinced. 
The other major emphasis of the pre-trial segment of the narrative is the 
steadfastness of Pinky’s resolve to stay on for the trial, despite the protestations of 
the majority of the other important characters, black and white (Dicey, Jake 
[Frederick O’Neal], Tom). One emphatically situated reason for this is Pinky’s 
belief in justice, which in turn feeds into the film’s affirmation of the judicial 
process. Pinky is in alignment with the law regardless of the potential outcome of 
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the case, and elsewhere, she notes that she wants to go to court because she wants 
the Woolleys’ attempts to take what is rightfully hers to occur “right out in the 
open”. In a sense, Pinky wants to press on with the trial because, not in spite of, the 
public scrutiny involved. Despite her fundamental knowledge that she is right by 
the law, these scenes ultimately serve to create the expectation that that the 
courtroom will be a largely hostile environment, one which will bear the mark of 
the racist community quite evidently. It is a site that will, in complex combinations, 
address, deflect and reflect the conditions of systemic racism.  
 The Southern-ness of the court is immediately evident from an establishing 
long shot of the courtroom, with the sheer number of hand fans evident within the 
frame conveying the literally and figuratively heated environment. This establishing 
shot depicts the opening statement of Melba Wooley’s attorney Mr. Stanley (Dan 
Riss), which continues over a series of shots of key characters including Pinky, 
Tom and Dicey. These initial moments set up our awareness of both the courtroom 
space and the absorption of racial prejudices into the body of the trial. In the first 
shot, Stanley refers to “the defendant, Pinky Johnson – colored,” placing an 
emphasis on the final word, followed with what is posited as a deliberate pause as 
he looks over at her. Several shots later, the medium-long shot composition frames 
Stanley in the foreground as he presents the case against the defendant (Fig. 43). A 
camera pan follows Stanley’s movement over to the plaintiff’s desk, and his 
subsequent emphatic mention of “reliable witnesses” as he nods respectfully to his 
client, Melba, now in frame, provides contrast to the prior reference to the 
“colored” defendant and the vicious destruction of her character (Fig. 44). This 
conveys how the case against Pinky is rooted in assumptions regarding racial 
difference. The insinuations made by Stanley also serve to imbue this character 
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with the negative characteristics of the lawyer character, but in a way that makes 
Judges Walker and Shoreham seem nobler in comparison. Thus the negative 
depiction of one lawyer paradoxically reaffirms the idea of law as the correct form 
for achieving justice, with the characterisations corresponding to the 
representational paradigms for the defence and prosecuting lawyers I noted in the 
previous chapter.249  
 
 
 This opening also establishes the expressive depth of staging throughout the 
sequence, which allows for the inclusion of multiple viewpoints within one frame. 
The majority of the sequence’s long shots view the courtroom from the space 
occupied by the judge, framing in some combination both sets of lawyers and their 
clients, and the gallery. The depth of field utilised throughout the sequence, in 
                                                          
249 See pages 73-75. 
Figs. 43 (top) and 44 (bottom) 
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combination with the staging, often balances viewer attention between individuals 
in the fore- mid- and backgrounds of the frame. One specific example, which 
exemplifies this more democratic staging, is the consistent inclusion of Aunt Dicey 
in the frame behind Pinky, contrasting the older woman’s melancholic withdrawal 
from the action of the trial with Pinky’s investment. Thus, although the film’s 
didacticism (which I will detail further shortly), in keeping with the conventions of 
the social problem film, is undeniable, our response is not guided as bluntly as it is 
through the tighter framings and close-ups of Dust be My Destiny. 
 Judge Walker’s opening statement follows Stanley’s, and the commotion 
that accompanies his action of standing to address Judge Shoreham (audible 
murmurs from the spectatorship, followed by the familiar banging of the judge’s 
gavel) demonstrates the extent of the community’s oppositional stance towards 
Pinky and the problem she represents. Walker’s statement verbalises the case’s 
grounding in racial prejudice and allows the social problem film to directly 
incorporate, via the mouthpiece of the legal professional, its didactic message into 
the diegesis. Walker argues that “the counsel for the plaintiff has made it perfectly 
clear that my client, in effect, is to be tried because she is a Negro.” On this there is 
a telling cut to the spectatorship, with Sheriff Anderson (Arthur Hunnicut), the 
emblem of local, racist law enforcement, in the foreground of the shot. As Walker 
continues “and because a Negro cannot be permitted to inherit property”, there is a 
cut to Dicey, framed with the spectators in the background. Dicey is unresponsive 
to the comment and to the subsequent murmuring it inspires from the gallery (I will 
return to the implications of her withdrawn demeanour when she appears on the 
stand later in the sequence). Walker’s statement continues over a series of 
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shot/reverse shot edits of Judges Shoreham and Walker, and I will here transcribe 
the remainder of the statement in full: 
Your Honor, this is a small country town. We’ve always thought that what 
happened here was our own private concern. But that is no longer true. Just 
as it is no longer true that our country as a whole can exist entirely to itself. 
What is done in our courts in cases such as this become a matter of moment 
in the eyes of the world. Let us examine our conscience. Let us look into our 
attitude and our tradition. Let us take care lest it be said of us that here, 
there is neither law nor justice. 
Walker’s statement makes clear the broader project of Pinky to deliver a legible 
message to its audience. This message parallels that of Dust Be My Destiny in its 
explicit broadening of the social issue at hand to include the cinematic spectator 
through the use of third person pronouns, as well as the appeal to the ideals fostered 
by American ideology (“our attitude and tradition”), an ideal that Walker’s speech 
both situates as attainable and which is made to incorporate a forward-thinking 
policy on race. The main difference is the subsequent broadening of the issues onto 
an international scale, a reflection perhaps of the post-war production date, which 
recalls Patton’s identification of a post-WWII social problem address producing an 
image of ‘national identity that […] transcends nation to speak of humanity and 
does so in the context of a community of nations’.250   
However, despite the similarity of the message to that evidenced in the 
speeches of Dust Be My Destiny, the representational strategies employed during 
Walker’s statement results in a comparatively subtle didacticism. The possibilities 
offered by the lack of a jury means that the sense of a direct address through the 
blurring of diegetic and film spectator is downplayed. The moment is limited to a 
                                                          
250 Cindy Patton, Anatomy of a Problem Film, p. 43. 
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series of shot/reverse shots of the two judges, with the potential diegetic audience 
of the gallery unaddressed, and the sense of direct address to the film spectator 
refuted through the staging. The judges are always looking at each other, not out at 
any broader audience. Nor is Ruysdael’s delivery of Walker’s speech grandiose or 
portentous. The relative restraint at work again belies the film’s withdrawal from 
melodramatic structures of identification (based in emotion) and its care to avoid 
suggesting that the system represented by the courts need undergo any significant 
change in order for the problem of racism to be effectively addressed.  
 Following this, there is a moment in which the odds stacked against Pinky 
are amplified (correspondingly escalating the intensity of the audience’s 
involvement in proceedings) when it is established that, Dr. Joe, the only witness 
for the defence, is absent from the courtroom. The sequence then progresses on to a 
series of witness testimonies, beginning with Sheriff Anderson, that convey the 
relationship of each character, figured through their social standing (and pivoted 
around race, class and gender distinctions), to the courtroom space. However, 
before looking at these witness testimonies, I would like to consider Pinky’s 
aforementioned (relative) lack of visibility throughout the sequence.  
At no point during the sequence does Pinky herself take to the stand, and her 
dialogue is restricted to asides made to Judge Walker. It is perhaps in this lack of 
visibility in the courtroom scene that the paternalism with which the trial material 
has been charged is most evident. Although my melodrama case studies will 
demonstrate how a deliberate silence on the part of the female can contain a 
challenge to the patriarchal structures of the court, Pinky does not critique the act of 
silencing its heroine in the courtroom. Instead, we watch a series of white male 
authority figures debate and finally cast judgment upon the issues the minority 
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figure represents, a troubling inflection of the socially conscious courtroom drama 
that anticipates similar acts of silencing and speaking for in several of the golden 
age trial films. Here, the matter of the female defendant gives a specific inflection, 
evident also in Outrage (Dir: Ida Lupino, 1950), a social problem film addressing 
the aftermath of a rape that also contains a climactic courtroom scene. The issues 
that the female’s mistreatment brings to light are articulated, debated, and judged 
upon by the white male authority figures who retain control over the courtroom 
setting, while the dispossessed individual is effectively silenced.251 In both cases 
this follows a pattern of development that has viewed the social problem through a 
consistent and intense emotional involvement with the female protagonist. The 
social problem model of representation seems to lean towards this transition 
through the climactic trials, which serve to realign the terms on which the problem 
subject is considered from (as befits Patton’s argument) the 
domestic/female/emotional/personal to the public/political/masculine.  
With this in mind, I return to the remainder of the sequence. The first shot of 
Anderson and Stanley presented during the former’s testimony places Anderson 
mid-frame with his arms folded, and Stanley leaning back in the left of the frame 
with his arms rested up on the bench behind him (Fig. 45). Their combined body 
language conveys a shared arrogant attitude towards the trial and the matters at 
hand. The duo, as white, male figures with some measure of authority in the 
community, and in the face of an African-American adversary, display the 
privileged confidence that their perspectives will be accepted (their sense of the 
                                                          
251 This is granted a particularly striking inflection in Outrage through the female protagonist’s 
muteness, incurred from the trauma of the crime that has brought her to trial. 
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courtroom as an extension of their boy’s club is augmented by the cigarette smoke 
that trails from Stanley’s hand).  
 
Fig. 45 
The events that Anderson recalls as testimony (presumably as a way of 
revealing Pinky’s “true” character) were also the first explicit example of racial 
prejudice depicted in the film.252 Thus Anderson is automatically identified with the 
racist abuse of power, and the presentation of this incident as his testimony 
strengthens the film’s own case that the issue on trial is rooted in racial prejudice. 
Over the course of one take and following the examination in which Anderson 
recaps these events (from his entirely biased perspective), Walker enters the frame 
to cross-examine Anderson. Walker’s own proximity to the events of Anderson’s 
testimony – it was he whom Pinky was taken to by the police - is unusual for the 
lawyer character, but integral to the implications of the sequence. Walker asks 
Anderson to clarify that no charges were brought against Pinky, to which Anderson 
responds “You generally always let them off with a good talking to like you give 
her. You know how it is. Why, you put them niggers in jail every time something 
                                                          
252 The unlawful arrest of Pinky alongside two other African-Americans after the police initially 
mistook her for a white woman being harassed by the black couple.  
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like that happens-” before Walker interjects. The direction of Anderson’s comment 
in this moment, as he looks over ingratiatingly to the off-screen space occupied by 
the judge, conveys that this is an attitude he expects the entire community, 
including the legal representatives, to share. Similarly, the inclusion of Walker into 
his statement (‘You generally always let them off’) speaks to a presumed 
complicity. This moment is surprisingly complex in its implications surrounding 
power and race relations in the film’s social world. Although it is presented so that 
the audience will be shocked by Anderson’s comment and sympathise with Judge 
Walker’s interjection, there is a certain irony invoked when considering the latter’s 
proximity to and complicity in the events Anderson recalls and the attitude he 
adopted at the time. The text thus positions us to see the entire community at fault. 
The fact that Walker’s subsequent request for the testimony to be stricken is denied 
also presents the possibility of a bias on behalf of Judge Shoreham too (who, as per 
convention, and advantageously to the suspense of the sequence, is inscrutable at 
this point).  
 A dissolve transitions to the testimony given by Melba Woolley, another 
witness who recounts events depicted earlier in the film from a perspective that 
reveals her own biases. In this instance, Melba discusses the details of her visit with 
Em, and the actions or gestures which we earlier saw were Em’s way of coping 
with her insufferable relative (feigning “fits” and insisting Pinky stay in the room 
with them), are used by Melba as evidence of Pinky’s “undue influence” on the 
deceased. The audience can understand how the actions Melba describes could have 
been misinterpreted, and yet we are in no way asked to sympathise with or excuse 
her. Associated with the crumbling Southern aristocracy epitomised by Em’s manor 
house, Melba is positioned, in class terms, above the ‘unenlightened mob’, but this 
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modifies rather than lessens her form of racism. It is not the overt racism of a 
Sheriff Anderson, but a kind rooted in an ingrained sense of superiority inextricable 
from class boundaries, and expressed through assumption and insinuation.  
Melba is characterised on the stand as both ridiculous and harmful. The 
former is conveyed through her consistent action of turning to face Stanley, as if in 
conversation, when answering his questions, to which he must repeatedly 
physically prompt her to face the judge. His guidance also threads into the 
suggestions of rehearsal evident during the examination. The performances convey 
the characters’ own performativity on the stand, with Varden’s Melba seen to be 
playing the role of the concerned relative (as she had in the earlier scene at Em’s 
bedside, where instances of her true character were juxtaposed with a performed 
persona of Southern gentility), and Stanley playing the upstanding moral guardian. 
This is most clearly evidenced when Melba unconvincingly breaks down, mustering 
up tears as she states with an exaggeratedly performative flourish, “I’m just glad 
that Cousin Em was allowed to die a natural death in her bed.” The reaction shot of 
Judge Shoreham depicts him half-obscuring his face with his fan, an ambiguously 
situated moment of disguised mockery. The depiction of Melba on the stand invites 
the audience’s mockery also, once again distinguishing us (the white-liberal 
audience of Zanuck’s intent) from the ‘unenlightened’ white character by inciting a 
feeling of superiority; her comic lack of self-awareness inspires a doubled 
detachment from the character. 
Both the overtness of Melba’s performativity and Judge Shoreham’s 
reaction to it guides our own response to the character of Melba, whose true colours 
are made apparent during the cross-examination, when Varden strikes the same 
vicious tone that she had in the prior scene at the goods store (another of the film’s 
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most emphatic depictions of racial prejudice). The switch in examiner corresponds 
to a change in Melba’s tone and body language, in keeping with her 
characterisation as insincere. When Walker suggests that Em agreed with Pinky’s 
suggestion to make a will (a point we know to be true, having seen the exchange in 
the earlier scene of Melba’s visit), Melba retorts viciously “Were you there, Judge 
Walker or are you bein’ primed by that girl over there?” This is another moment 
rich in racist implications: that Pinky/Patricia does not merit being referred to by 
name or even looked at directly (the inclusion of Pinky within the frame draws 
attention to this); that Pinky is manipulative and conniving; and that there is a 
sexual component to this manipulation, the older white male influenced by the 
seductive possibilities of the young African-American female. Walker subsequently 
asks Melba whether she “know[s] the penalty for perjury”, to which Stanley jumps 
up to object. The objection is sustained, and a reaction shot of the spectatorship, all 
white, nearly all male, captures them erupting into applause. There is a cut to the 
spectatorship with Anderson, once again in the foreground of the shot, turning 
around to state out loud “Didn’t I tell ya he’s a good’un.” Once again, the 
community is figured as a negative force. Their unruliness evacuates the notions of 
the courtroom as a site of impartiality to be accorded reverence. The 
unambiguously informal attachment to Stanley associates him with the 
‘unenlightened’ mob to a far greater degree than the other legal professionals. 
This display of white unity in opposition to black expression is juxtaposed 
with the following cut to a shot of Dicey on the stand. Dicey’s defeatist attitude 
towards the outcome of the trial, expressed in an earlier scene in which she tries to 
get Pinky to default the will, arguing that white people always get what they want, 
in part explains her demeanour. Whereas Pinky is to be viewed as the emblem of a 
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forward-thinking African-American generation who uses the system for 
advancement, Dicey represents an older generation, complacent in their belief that 
the system will never work in favour of the minority group (of course, it is worth 
considering that the terms of this opposition never steps outside of the framework 
of said system). Just as Melba is a type based in traditional archetypes of the 
remnants of aristocratic Southern femininity, Dicey is typed as the emblem of an 
older generation of African-American womanhood: devoutly religious, uneducated, 
kind-hearted and proud, but subservient to the white ruling class. Both through the 
typing of the character, and in her role as the only African-American character to 
take to the stand, Dicey is figured through structures of gender, race and class as an 
outsider to the court process, and of all the characters, she has been seen to be the 
one most removed from the surrounding business of the trial. Her melancholic 
withdrawal anticipates the female defendants of my melodrama case studies, whose 
exclusion from the discourses of the legal system is emphasised.  
Attitudes surrounding race are both critiqued and reinforced in the depiction 
of Dicey’s testimony. Stanley’s condescending and manipulative treatment of 
Dicey is evidenced in his emphasis upon the underlying Christian elements of 
courtroom rhetoric during her examination (and present during no one else’s), 
warning her at one point “to tell the truth before God” and at another to “answer 
[…] the gospel truth.” The tension of this portion of testimony resides in another 
stereotype grounded in intersecting assumptions surrounding race and class - the 
issue of illiteracy. Dicey was present during the signing of Em’s will but would not 
have been able to comprehend the document itself, and as Pinky explains to Walker 
during Stanley’s questioning of Dicey on this issue, Stanley “knows she can’t read 
and she’ll never admit it.” The reliance on both of these tropes speaks to what 
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Pospíšil sees in the characterisation of the film’s other major African-American 
characters as a ‘flatness, sometimes verging on traditional racial caricatures’ which 
‘indicates how difficult it was for the majority of filmmakers […] to avoid such 
established clichés’.253 However, the recourse to these stereotypes in this instance 
also affords an opportunity for the film to display an awareness of the legal 
system’s own shortcomings in dealing with minorities. The issue of illiteracy is 
fundamental to the awareness that Dicey is not equipped to deal with the mechanics 
of the trial system, just as the legal system does not accommodate individuals of 
Dicey’s social standing. The expected public shaming inherent to the revelation of 
illiteracy is, however, evaded by Dicey’s coy response “You know sir, as well as 
me, it ain’t manners to read what ain’t meant for you to read,” which raises a gale 
of laughter from the spectators.  
Patton views this moment as a particularly striking and radical one that 
‘smuggle[s]’ into the film a racial sensibility supressed elsewhere.254 Considering 
Dicey’s illiteracy in relation to the character’s relationship to ‘white time’ (as 
embodied by the written word’s status as law), Patton argues that this ‘crucial scene 
juxtaposes the Law’s demand for literacy with a form of Black knowing that cannot 
be admitted into a court of law’,255 revealing the biases in the structures of knowing 
and witnessing demanded by the (resolutely white) court, and the types of knowing 
and witnessing it neglects: 
Dicey finally signifies on Mr. Stanley by playing two whites values against 
each other: the demand for Black illiteracy and the demand for Black 
respect for white property, white space. She wins, and the entire court 
knows it […] In this moment of triumph she has produced a different phrase 
                                                          
253 Tomáš Popíšil, ‘The Liberal Message Films of the Late 1940s’, p. 184. 
254 Patton, Anatomy of a Problem Film, p. 128. 
255 Ibid., p. 135. 
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universe, one in which she is the rhetor, and she has forced the lawyer – 
usually the rhetor par excellence – to stand as a listener.256  
 
Thus, in this brief moment, Pinky inverts the legal insider/outsider distinction and 
the translation metaphor outlined by Rosenberg.257 Dicey is able to use her 
illiteracy, hence her exclusion from the white order of knowing that underlies the 
structures of law, to force said law to occupy a position outside of her own forms of 
knowing, witnessing and (what Patton refers to as) ‘signifyin’’.258   
However, Dicey’s statement here ushers a response from Stanley that 
reveals the performativity of his earlier gentleness, and his aggressively performed 
insistence that she admit that the will could “have been written at some other time, 
couldn’t it, couldn’t it?” as he waves his finger at her, his hairstyle inadvertently 
ruffled with the force of his gesturing, results in the desired response. Dicey meekly 
admits that there is a possibility that Pinky could have helped to write Em’s will, 
and the examination is ended. Dicey’s victory was decisive but brief, overturned by 
the force of white law’s power. Walker waives the subsequent cross-examination, 
signalling the return to Dicey’s treatment as unsuited to the courtroom setting. The 
character, depicted as principled and strong in previous scenes, is rendered weak, 
meek and largely passive in the courtroom, a commentary on the court’s reflection 
of hierarchical social structures, but is permitted a moment of triumph that acts as 
the  sole allusion to the rigid, exclusively white, but ultimately restricted structures 
of knowing and communicating demanded by the court.  
                                                          
256 Ibid. 
257 See Review of the Literature, pp. 35-38. 
258 Ibid., p. 136 
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 It is during Dicey’s examination that the narrative thread of Dr. Joe’s 
absence comes back into play, as it is revealed that the doctor will not be able to 
appear as a witness. The moment in which Stanley mockingly/facetiously recites 
Dr. Joe’s note of absence to the courtroom, inciting more laughter from the 
spectatorship, is the final reminder of the community’s aggressively arrogant 
attitude. The conviction that they have already won the case is evidenced in the ease 
with which they find humour in the trial. In the previous chapter I argued that the 
convention of gallery laughter is usually utilised nearer the opening stages of the 
trial scene in order to be muted as events escalate in seriousness. The decision to 
include laughter even at this point in the trial speaks to the specific nuances of 
Pinky’s courtroom scene, pivoted around the adversarial nature of the spectatorship 
towards Pinky, and the assumed, unshakable authority of the unenlightened white 
population.  
 It is at this point that the sequence arrives at the verdict. The sequence has 
thus far conveyed the sheer weight of the odds stacked against Pinky and the force 
with which the community opposes her, consistently reasserting the basis of this 
opposition in racial prejudice. The relatively undramatic development of the trial – 
especially once it becomes clear that there will be no last-minute witnesses – 
together with the arrogance displayed by Stanley, Woolley and the communal mob 
that comprises the spectatorship, carries the suggestion that racial inequality and 
enforced powerlessness are the norm for this type of proceeding. With this in mind, 
consider the staging of the verdict. A series of long shots capture Walker and 
Stanley as they prepare for the reading. Walker already looks unhopeful, whereas 
Stanley busies himself fiddling with his tie as if readying himself for glory, and 
similarly thanks Judge Shoreham in advance several times over. The expectation 
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that the verdict will rule in favour of the Woolleys has only intensified over the 
course of the trial, and Judge Shoreham’s preliminary comments in the build-up to 
his verdict (“There’s no point in dragging this out”, “I do not intend to defend the 
wisdom of this request”) again speak to notions of the depressingly cut-and-dried 
nature of the case. 
  Thus, expectations are built so that Shoreham’s declaration that the will is 
“good and valid” marks an abrupt reversal. However, the specific diegetic contexts 
of this trial offer a set of responses in reaction to the verdict that complicate the 
joyous union of law and community with which the convention of the verdict and 
its aftermath is often imbued in the Hollywood film (evidenced in Dust Be My 
Destiny). There is a cut to Pinky and Dicey just after Shoreham’s declaration in 
which this complexity of response is evidenced in the contrast between Pinky’s 
elated expression and Dicey’s near-catatonic lack of acknowledgment. A cut to a 
long shot shows Judge Walker registering neither happiness nor relief, but retaining 
a grave expression, while the courtroom erupts into loud, unintelligible noise 
unlikely to be mistaken for cheers or applause.  
 The subsequent courtroom coda is enacted over the course of one extended 
take that immediately punctures any sense of victory. Pinky gets up from the desk, 
and pausing briefly in frightened hesitation as she looks over at the off-screen 
Melba and Stanley, approaches Judge Walker, thanking him. He replies:  
“Well, Pinky, you won, you got the house and the land. And you got justice. 
But I doubt if any other interests of this community have been served.”  
This response is as startling as the verdict, and the manner in which Ruysdael 
performs it suggests the intentionality of this affect, as the gentle intonation of the 
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first two lines jars with a sudden severity of tone in the third. Our shock is shared 
by Pinky, whose eyes follow Walker as he leaves the frame. The composition now 
frames her, alone, surrounded by the noise of the crowd. She turns around, and 
facing away from the static camera, walks slowly over to the spectators. The 
camera then begins to track alongside Pinky as Dicey trails behind her. The pair 
walk past as the sound and movement of the crowd dwindles to a silent, collective 
gaze upon the two women. A series of framings show the women surrounded by a 
hostile but stationary crowd, until finally Tom approaches and they leave the 
courtroom together. 
The content of this extended take conveys the immediate ramifications of 
Pinky’s now ambiguously situated victory. Walker’s comments are accompanied by 
an evacuation of the frame so that Pinky’s isolation is made apparent, and the 
subsequent prolonged exit through the crowd conveys that the racist mentality of 
the community has not altered, and will most likely be exacerbated by the trial’s 
outcome. Kydd argues that ‘Pinky’s racialization is associated not only with 
sexualization but with an intense and potentially violent scrutinizing gaze’ 
exemplified by this moment at the end of the trial.259 I would posit that the 
sexualisation and the scrutinising gaze are held in tension with one another rather 
than opposed. The conventions of narratives about the American South dictate that 
racially-motivated physical violence be inflicted upon male African-American 
characters, and sexual violence inflicted upon females; sexualisation and violence 
                                                          
259 Kydd, ‘“The Ineffaceable Curse of Cain”’, p. 105. 
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are thus twin implications of the intimidation of Pinky, and the scene concludes on 
a moment of disquiet that sharply contrasts with Dust be my Destiny.260  
How do we make sense of the many ambivalent notes contained within this 
trial sequence, which previous discussions have disregarded? On the one hand, the 
unrelenting hostility of the community towards Pinky contrasts with the rightness 
of the court system, which achieves justice in spite of the oppressively prejudicial 
atmosphere. On the other hand, the scene ends with a series of startling reminders 
that the verdict will affect no broader positive change to the community, and in fact 
suggests a greater negative response in retaliation. Overall, the court scene of Pinky 
displays a more complex message than the film has been given credit for, one that 
places faith in the court system but which also addresses its inability to resolve all 
of the broader socio-cultural issues that congregate around its adversarial form. The 
abandonment of Walker, who immediately sheds his professional guise upon the 
                                                          
260 It is up to the concluding scenes that follow the trial to tidy up, for the benefits of the three 
interrelated frameworks of narrative, ideology and industry (i.e. the Production Code), some of the 
matters left unresolved by the trial scene. Thus, Pinky and Tom are depicted parting ways upon 
Tom’s insistence on moving North (a development which navigates the Code ban on 
miscegenation) and Pinky subsequently turns Em’s home into a school and clinic for the African-
American community, cementing her commitment to what the film views finally as “her” 
community and “her” people. Similar narrative developments were being used in later years to 
resolve the censor-baiting and ideologically disquieting issues of miscegenation in the Hollywood 
cinema. Kings Go Forth (Dir: Delmer Daves, 1958) ends not with the Caucasian male and biracial 
female couple entering into a romantic relationship, but with the former, Sam (Frank Sinatra), 
visiting the latter, Monique (played, in another instance of race problem casting practices, by 
Natalie Wood), at the school in France in which she teaches children orphaned by the war (much of 
the action is set during the final years of WWII). Their initial conversation contains several 
instances of dialogue that allude to, but never explicitly address, the problems of race and romance 
(he refers to her as “friend”: on being asked if she is happy, she responds with advice given to her 
mother that alludes to the problem of her race and the issue of personal responsibility – “Everyone 
in the world has some kind of a burden. But it is not the burden that’s important. It’s how you carry 
it”). Presenting Sam to her class, Monique then has her pupils sing a song for the visiting American 
soldier. The looks exchanged between the two as the children sing suggests the possibility of a 
romantic reconciliation. Thus the final scene negotiates a separatism arguably demanded by the 
Code and its ideological imperatives (with Monique’s commitment to her community signalled, in 
numerous ways, by her teaching status) and the ambiguous suggestion of romance reflective of a 
loosening, not dematerialisation, of these demands (but in line with one of the major narrative 
conventions of the classical Hollywood cinema, the heterosexual romance).   
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trial’s end, attests to this. There is also a moment of radicalism glimpsed in Dicey’s 
brief triumph that allows the film to speak to the court’s own racially segregated 
structures of knowing and communicating. Law and society do not in this instance 
converge in an agreed judgment and understanding, and both the social problem 
and the personal problem (to be resolved outside of the courtroom) are 
ambivalently treated. 
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3. Laws of Desire: The Courtroom Sequence in the Woman’s Melodrama 
 
 
In this chapter I wish to consider the melodrama, specifically the female-
centred or woman’s melodrama, in terms of its representations of the courtroom 
trial. I will employ two films as my main case studies: Peyton Place and Madame 
X. These films parallel my previous case studies in that their courtroom sequences 
are climactic narrative events that feature major characters as defendants in a trial. 
The main terms of difference between the diegetic scenarios of these case studies 
and those I examined previously are that firstly, the defendant character is female, 
and secondly (in contrast to the previous female defendant in Pinky) they have 
committed the crimes of which they are accused. These case studies enable a 
consideration of representations of women in the trial sequence more broadly 
within the Hollywood cinema, but also allow an examination of the specific 
inflections provided by the melodrama, in which the female point-of-view is 
primary and, in both films, at cross-purposes to the court.  
It is important to clarify what I mean when I refer to melodrama in the 
context of this chapter. Conceptualisations of film melodrama range from 
positioning it as a discrete genre to identifying melodrama as a modality that 
governs the representational structures of all mainstream narrative cinema (to give 
one example, my previous chapter considered Cindy Patton’s invocation of 
melodrama as a mode crucial to the social problem film’s production of emotional 
identification with its protagonists). My primary area of concern in this chapter lies 
with two overlapping subgenres of American film melodrama, the family 
melodrama and the woman’s melodrama, although it should be noted that the 
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generic status of both is in itself a source of debate within the field. I will begin by 
mapping out how these two subgenres have been approached by scholars, and how 
I relate the conventions and meanings identified in them to the conventions of trial 
representation I have already considered. This will build to an examination of 
existing material that looks at figurations of law, justice and the trial in the 
melodrama, before applying my findings to my two case studies. 
Conceptualisations of Film Melodrama (1): The Family Melodrama 
 
The family melodrama’s generic status seemed firmly established by the 
time it was granted a chapter in Thomas Schatz’s book Hollywood Genres (1981). 
Mercer and Shingler (2004) provide a basic model of the family melodrama genre 
that summarises the features outlined by the collective previous work. In this 
model, the genre’s narrative framework concerns the middle-class family and, 
although frequently depicting economic and social issues, places its emphasis on 
‘personal emotional traumas’.261 The family melodrama encourages a high level of 
identification with a victimised protagonist, and dramatizes Freudian repression 
through depictions of such symptoms as ‘hysteria, oedipal conflict, impotence and 
alcoholism’.262 Finally, the use of ‘spectacle, dramatic action and suspense’ are 
viewed as particularly important to the family melodrama, with ‘bold and effective 
climaxes’ employed and the emotional action heightened and punctuated by the use 
of music. Although any generic model of this type can be complicated with relative 
ease, this basic model is broad enough to include a significant number of films 
                                                          
261 John Mercer and Martin Shingler, Melodrama: genre, style, sensibility (London; New York: 
Wallflower, 2004), p. 12. 
262 Ibid., p. 13. 
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while also allowing me to consider the specificities of my case studies as films 
indebted, but not bound to, a monolithic conception of the genre.  
One early conceptualisation of the family melodrama suggests the 
possibilities a trial scene presents the genre. Thomas Elsaesser’s influential essay 
‘Tales of Sound and Fury: Observations on the Family Melodrama’ considers the 
Hollywood family melodramas produced between 1940 and 1963. He discusses 
several facets of this genre that later work would draw upon, including 
melodrama’s potential for critique of the dominant bourgeois ideology through its 
focus on its characters’ ‘experience [of] the contradictions of American 
civilization’,263 and the expressive qualities of its visual style. Elsaesser employs as 
a catalyst for this discussion the dictionary definition of melodrama as a ‘dramatic 
narrative’ that employs musical accompaniment to heighten emotional effects, 
subsequently defining ‘melodramatic elements […] as constituents of a system of 
punctuation […] orchestrating the emotional ups and downs of the intrigue’.264 He 
accordingly considers film melodrama as ‘a particular form of dramatic mise-en-
scène’,265 one in which cinematic style expresses(/orchestrates) the emotional and 
psychological conflicts of the characters, whose lack of fulfilment is incurred by a 
rigidly ordered society and bourgeois ideology that is typically reproduced at the 
familial level. The dramatic mise-en-scène constructed through the melodrama’s 
uses of colour and the widescreen frame, décor, props and gesture (among other 
elements) ‘become functional and integral elements in the construction of 
meaning’, enacting ‘a sublimation of dramatic conflict […] which in the best 
                                                          
263 Thomas Elsaesser, ‘Tales of Sound and Fury: Observations on the Family Melodrama’ [1972] in 
Marcia Landy (ed.) Imitations of Life: a reader on film & television melodrama (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1991), p. 89. 
264 Ibid., p. 74. 
265 Ibid., p. 75 
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melodramas is perfectly thematised in terms of the characters’ emotional and 
psychological predicaments’.266 This utilisation of ‘style-as-meaning’ corresponds 
for Elsaesser with the American post-war popularisation of Freud (as the previous 
reference to sublimation suggests),267 with the style’s rendering of unconscious 
motivations or desires encouraged by the genre’s ‘restricted scope for external 
action determined by the subject[s], and because everything […] happens 
“inside”’.268    
The inward turning nature of the family melodrama is illuminated through 
Elsaesser’s comparisons of melodrama with other genres including the Western. 
Elsaesser argues that although the melodrama shares with the Western a recurrent 
focus on ‘themes of emotional and moral identity’,269 its replacement of the 
Western’s expansive exterior settings and action-oriented characters means that ‘it 
more often records the failure of the protagonist to act in a way that could shape the 
events and influence the emotional environment, let alone change the stifling social 
milieu. The world is closed, and the characters are acted upon’.270 These closed, 
inward-looking, stifling environments, with the family melodrama iconographically 
fixed to the domestic sphere and small-town setting, correspond to a limited range 
of what Elsaesser terms ‘“strong” actions’ 
The tellingly impotent gesture, the social gaffe, the hysterical outburst 
replaces any more directly liberating or self-annihilating action, and the 
cathartic violence of a shoot-out or a chase becomes an inner violence, often 
one which the characters turn against themselves.271  
 
                                                          
266 Ibid., p. 76. 
267 Ibid., p. 77. 
268 Ibid., p. 76. 
269 Ibid., p. 79. 
270 Ibid., p. 79. 
271 Ibid. 
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The world of the melodrama thus acts for Elsaesser as one in which the 
characteristics of the American cinema, ‘violence, the strong action, the dynamic 
movement, the full articulation and the fleshed-out emotions […] become the very 
signs of the characters’ alienation, and thus serve to formulate a devastating critique 
of the ideology that supports it’.272  Themes of failure, inferiority and confinement 
circulate within the genre, reflecting the conflict between the individual’s 
psychological or emotional state and the limited and limiting external world. 
Elsaesser accordingly posits as one of the family melodrama’s central subjects the 
‘victimisation and enforced passivity of women’, although he does not spend any 
more time on the genre’s gender representations.273   
Elsaesser’s conceptualization of the family melodrama has proven 
influential, and it also offers a number of ways to begin approaching the 
melodrama’s courtroom scenes. The courtroom in Hollywood cinema is a social 
symbolic space, one that reflects the ordering processes of the external bourgeois 
world. It is a place where the actions of individuals, and more relevantly to this 
conceptualisation of the melodrama, the thoughts and feelings motivating these 
actions, are made to be accounted for in a public arena, and are examined in relation 
to broader societal codes of being. This is presided over by a court of law that can 
easily be shown to reproduce the stifling social milieu in its enforced passivity and 
scrutiny. The irresolvable conflict between the individual and society, internal and 
external, that Elsaesser views as the overarching subject of the family melodrama, 
is duplicated in the basic structure of the trial (assuming that our protagonists are 
legal outsiders).  
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199 
 
The courtroom, although not part of the domestic sphere Elsaesser 
associates with the genre, nevertheless represents the ‘closed world’ of the family 
melodrama, a space in which a rigid code of behaviours and rituals limits the ‘range 
of strong actions’. I have noted elsewhere the degree to which the trial scenario 
permits a narrow but intensely situated group of what I termed dramatic events; it is 
telling that these events overlap with Elsaesser’s examples of ‘strong actions’. The 
legal outsiders made subject to the court’s closed world are acted upon by the 
narrowed range of sanctioned behaviours, and any action that falls outside of this 
model – be it the dynamic movement, gesture or verbal outburst – is both rendered 
more dramatic within the trial scenario and imbued with a greater sense of futility 
through its opposition to the court’s governing structures. In the Western, the 
(male) protagonist typically does not need to account for his cathartic violent 
actions in the courtroom,274 whereas in my melodrama case studies, the (female) 
protagonist who takes such liberating violent action is made to answer to the court 
of law. Thus, the ‘liberating’ action offers only a momentary freedom from the 
‘victimisation and enforced passivity’ of the external world, a passivity that is 
reasserted through the formal structures of the courtroom trial. One final method of 
approaching the family melodrama’s courtroom is to consider the extent to which 
the genre’s ‘dramatic mise-en-scène’ presents any ruptures of, or challenges to, the 
respectful representational strategies I outlined earlier, an issue which I will return 
to in my consideration of melodramatic excess shortly.  
                                                          
274 There are, as ever, exceptions: courtroom trials feature in the Westerns The Return of Frank 
James (Dir: Fritz Lang, 1940), Broken Lance (Dir: Edward Dmytryk, 1954) and Valerie (Dir: Gerd 
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Conceptualisations of Film Melodrama (2): The Woman’s Melodrama 
Later conceptualisations of Hollywood melodrama, linked with the rise in 
feminist film criticism, began to emphasise the genre’s specific appeal to women, 
locating in Elsaesser’s model (and subsequent examinations of the family 
melodrama, including that of Schatz in Hollywood Genres) an auteurist 
overemphasis on formally sophisticated and ideologically progressive melodramas 
directed by Douglas Sirk, Nicholas Ray and Vincente Minnelli at the expense of a 
broader maligned corpus of “woman’s” films. Mulvey (1977-78) makes a 
distinction between tragic melodrama, aligned primarily with the male point of 
view, and a woman’s melodrama structured through identification with the female 
viewpoint. Doane positions the woman’s melodrama as one subgenre of the 
‘woman’s film’, of which she provides an introductory summation  
The films deal with a female protagonist and often appear to allow her 
significant access to point of view structures and the enunciative level of the 
filmic discourse. They treat problems defined as “female” (problems 
revolving around domestic life, the family, children, self-sacrifice, and the 
relationship between woman and production vs. that between women and 
reproduction), and, most crucially, are directed toward a female 
audience’.275  
 
Pam Cook addresses the specificities of the woman’s melodrama in terms of the 
same point of view structures and female address outlined by Doane, contrasting it 
with the tragic melodrama she implicitly connects to Elsaesser’s conceptualisation 
of the genre. A number of different conventions and concerns emerge from these 
contrasts that are useful to my project. Cook defines the construction of a female 
point-of-view as the methods whereby ‘the female protagonist’s perspective is 
presented through a combination of first-person (subjective) and third-person 
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(objective) strategies’.276 Cook argues that in the woman’s melodrama, these 
strategies problematize the protagonist’s point-of-view, presenting her desires as 
fantasy and developing a hierarchical point of view structure that encourages the 
spectator to see the limits of her viewpoint from a privileged position of knowledge. 
For Cook, the melodrama’s ‘construction of the woman’s point of view privileges 
intuition, emotion, accident, questioning the validity of female desire in that very 
construction’.277 In contrast to Elsaesser’s conceptualisation of the dramatic mise-
en-scène of the family melodrama, Cook views the visual code of the women’s 
melodrama as another way of identifying female desire as fantasy while 
concurrently expressing her feelings and allowing the spectator to identify with her 
point of view. Similarly, Cook inverts Elsaesser’s construction of the melodrama’s 
‘closed world’ with its alienated male hero, arguing that in the woman’s 
melodrama, the protagonist’s ‘transgression resides in her desire to act against 
socially accepted definitions of femininity, bring[ing] her face to face with 
society’.278  
Cook concludes that the male-oriented dominant narrative must ‘mark the 
woman’s desire to escape her fate as pure fantasy, ultimately unrealisable’ by 
problematizing her point of view.279 She also asserts that notions of traditional 
femininity are often called upon as a ‘corrective’ to masculine destructiveness in 
the melodrama, but that the traditional basis of these notions, invoked in the service 
of ‘balance’ means that the feminine ‘can modify, mediate, but it can never act to 
destroy, or to radically change society […] Moreover, it is a femininity defined 
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exclusively as maternal’.280 These conclusions posit interesting implications for the 
inclusions of trial scenes within women’s melodrama. The prioritisation of emotion, 
intuition, accident and fantasy in the construction of female point-of-view presents 
obvious points of contrast to the prevailing conceptualisation of law’s processes 
called upon in Hollywood cinema (situating in the law impartiality, reason, and 
objectivity). The impossibility of radical destruction or change rooted in the 
feminine once again finds an ideal site of dramatization in the patriarchal 
courtroom, as does the transgressive female’s enforced confrontation with society. I 
wish to use my case studies to see how these confrontations between the female 
point-of-view and the masculine courtroom develop within the melodrama 
narrative, and will return to Cook’s argument when considering two scholars who 
see greater radical potential in the melodramatic construction of a female 
viewpoint.  
Melodrama and Emotion 
 
I wish now to spend more time extrapolating the role of emotion and affect 
in film melodrama, features that have been crucial to all of the conceptualisations of 
melodrama considered thus far (beginning with Patton in the previous chapter), and 
emotion’s relation to the conventions of trial representation. The rendering and 
production of intense emotional states is often considered a defining feature of 
melodrama, with work by Neale (1986) and Liebowitz (1986) interrogating its 
centrality to melodrama’s specific appeal and progressive potential, and Cook 
arguing that emotion constitutes a primary element of its construction of a female 
point of view. I would argue that the melodrama’s processes of engendering 
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specific emotional responses are pivotal to understanding its uses of the trial form, 
and wish to begin extrapolating this through reference to Pribram, who considers 
the nuanced relationships between melodrama, emotion and the ‘justice genres’ 
Melodrama has often been closely associated with emotion; indeed, it is 
often dismissed due to its oversaturated emotionality, discussed as a 
limiting quality […] In contrast, the absence or marginalization of emotion 
is commonly presumed to be the case in the justice genres […] Conversely, 
at the same time that the absence of emotions is hypothesized in the justice 
genres, other analysts speak of these same genres in terms of their 
emotional excess, in a parallel to melodrama.281  
 
These conflicting conclusions are to some degree both correct because (as Pribram 
and my previous chapters have demonstrated) there co-exists in all trial 
representations a perception that the trial process is ‘grounded in reason’ and an 
‘indispensable engagement with emotions’. The depiction of an objectivised 
juridicial process that claims to be reliant solely upon facts and reasoning exists 
alongside the inability of films to extricate their concepts of justice from structures 
of emotional engagement. This combination can exist in a variety of forms. For 
example, my social problem case studies used the heightened emotion associated 
with melodrama differently. Dust Be My Destiny, a film which for most of its 
running time bears little relation to the conventions of melodrama outlined above 
relies heavily upon rendered states of emotion and the heightening of viewer 
emotional response in its climactic trial scene in order to render the trial’s outcome 
as convincing. Meanwhile, Pinky, a film heavily indebted to women’s melodrama 
that dramatizes the identity crisis of a female protagonist and aligns itself primarily 
with her point of view, downplays the emotional potentialities of its trial sequence, 
with its primary source of emotion residing in the audience’s acknowledgment of 
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the unfairness of her prejudicial mistreatment. What is important is that, in both 
cases, this tension between emotion and reason is subsumed into an affirmation of 
the court’s process through the depiction of a positive outcome. Justice is served, 
and the methods by which this occurred (be they extensive emotional appeal, fact-
based reasoning, or a complex combination of the two), as well as the 
precariousness of these methods, are retroactively rendered insignificant. 
 I argue that it is in the divergence of the woman’s melodrama genre’s 
emotional structures of identification and the court’s perceived uses of emotion that 
the former begins to differ from the dominant constructions of law and justice in the 
Hollywood cinema. The reason that the justice genres are considered to be 
simultaneously grounded in reason and engaged with emotions is because (as in my 
social problem case studies) they consistently attempt to combine reason and 
emotion under a unifying concept of justice. The woman’s melodrama holds a more 
ambivalent relationship to the court’s model of justice, and its uses of emotion often 
place a justice rooted in the emotional and the feminine in direct contrast to the 
man-made (in multiple senses) constructions of courtroom justice. This poses yet 
another figuration of the positive/natural law distinction and the double-trial 
structure. The melodrama’s focus on female emotion is not subsumed into the 
court’s processes, but challenges, complicates or halts them in ways that are largely 
absent from the previous trial representations I have considered. 
Melodrama’s Aesthetic of Justice and Relationships to the Law 
 I now wish to look at work which has dealt explicitly with 
conceptualisations of law, justice and the trial in the women’s melodrama. It should 
be qualified immediately that much of this discussion builds upon literary theorist 
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Peter Brooks’ conceptualisation of early (eighteenth and nineteenth century) 
melodrama. Brooks argues that melodrama emerged to respond to ‘a world where 
the traditional imperatives of truth and ethics’ had been violently questioned, but in 
which models of truth and ethics were still deemed necessary.282 Lang’s American 
film melodrama: Griffith, Vidor, Minnelli (1989) builds upon Brooks’ consideration 
of melodrama as articulating an essential moral universe and the struggles over it. 
He argues that in film melodramas of the 1930s-1950s, this moral universe ‘loses 
its overtly Christian inflection and the struggles tend to focus on the extent to which 
social conditions determine characters’ destinies, before it becomes understood that 
the essential struggle is one for individual identity within a familial context’.283 
Lang links this struggle to patriarchal oppression, concluding that the melodrama 
post-D.W. Griffith consistently represents ‘a struggle against, or within, the 
patriarchy’ over identities that have been repressed by it.284 For Lang, the function 
of law within the melodrama demonstrates the oppressive nature of patriarchy. 
Lang argues that the melodrama ‘recognizes that we are all – men and women – 
subject to the Law’ but uses his analyses of specific films to demonstrate that ‘the 
nature of this Law – “the legally established social order” – [is] founded on and 
based in the difference between the sexes’.285 Lang continues to argue that:  
All the discourses of the Law – religious, social and sexual – are 
melodramatic in their binary nature, based at the start on the fact of 
difference, with the masculine principle privileged. Even language, to use 
the term in its broadest sense, is masculine […] All meaning and value in 
our culture derives from the moral need to distinguish between good and 
bad, and those terms, bound up inextricably with the difference between 
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men and women, have always been the terms of our moral universe, which 
it is the melodrama’s prime concern to articulate.286  
 
Lang draws upon Lacanian psychoanalysis to identify what he believes are duelling 
symbolic and imaginary impulses in every film, ‘the symbolic impulse towards 
narrative order, closure, etc., and the impulse of the Imaginary that […] contradicts 
what the Symbolic stands for. It is towards bliss, the shattering of boundaries, the 
subversion of the Symbolic, in music, all moments of excess, non-sense, perhaps all 
emotion itself’.287 Lang thus argues that the melodrama ‘is more on the side of the 
Imaginary than are other modes. Whatever is excessive in the melodrama is 
precisely so because it is beyond language. It is not recoverable by the driving 
impulses of the Symbolic to codify’.288 Although Lang does draw parallels between 
the Symbolic order and men/masculinity, and the Imaginary order and 
women/femininity, he argues that fundamentally the melodrama addresses any 
spectator who ‘is not alone in his or her desire for […] a logic that challenges 
mastery’, and that appeals to emotion over ‘reason or intellect’ are a major part of 
this address.289 
Lang’s discussion once again asserts the terms of difference evidenced in 
and embodied by the melodrama that can be transferred to its specific inflection of 
the trial’s meaning. The courtroom becomes a patriarchal apparatus that enforces a 
specifically masculine moral code, with language its primary codifying tool. This 
explains the ease with which the “universal” (white, male, educated) subject enters 
into the courtroom’s modes of conduct. Similarly, the symbolic impulse to achieve 
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narrative order and closure is typified in the American cinema’s dominant use of 
the trial form (which, as Bruzzi notes, embodies closure). Yet melodrama’s own 
‘logic’ conflicts with this structuring, and prioritises a different perspective on the 
moral universe that is aligned with the emotional and the feminine. Its appeal to the 
Imaginary is clearly at odds with what the courtroom trial represents (or claims to 
represent), undermining the tenets of reason, intellect and language upon which the 
court proceeding rests. Thus, in aiming to depict what is “beyond language”, the 
melodrama is necessarily aiming at that which is beyond the understanding of the 
court. To me, this correlates with Doane’s argument that the spectator and female 
protagonist are granted the ‘ability to see through the evidence of the surface [...] 
which the Law and its representatives lack’ in the trial scenes of two female-centred 
family melodramas, Beyond the Forest (1949, Dir: King Vidor) and Johnny Belinda 
(1948, Dir: Jean Negulesco).290 
Other critics have extrapolated further upon the melodramatic constructions 
of justice argued by Lang. Gledhill (2001), working from an initial framing of the 
melodrama as a modality rather than a discrete genre, identifies melodrama as an 
‘aesthetic of justice’ that makes moral judgments (located in designations of 
innocence and villainy) against a landscape of shifting social values. Drawing upon 
Steven Neale’s notion of cultural verisimilitude as the ‘signs and conventions by 
which a society represents what it believes to be the case’,291 Gledhill argues that 
since melodrama is an aesthetic of justice and any ‘body’ can fill the place 
of innocence versus villainy, its genres may draw on the contested signs of 
cultural verisimilitude and bring radical as well as conservative images and 
voices into dialogic encounter at the boundaries where different genres or 
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polarised protagonists engage with each other in conflict, or indeed, in 
desire.292 
  
Gledhill’s conceptualisation offers a way of recognising the trial form’s function 
across all of Hollywood cinema as an enabler of the ‘dialogic encounter’ between 
adversaries representing opposed sets of cultural values. But to think of it 
exclusively within the current context, Gledhill inspires us to think about the 
construction of justice being called upon in the women’s melodrama through the 
specific conflict embodied by the female versus the courtroom. Linda Williams also 
identifies melodrama primarily through ‘the sense of justice that [it] insists upon’ 
rather than any set of formal or narrative elements.293 Dismissing notions of 
melodrama and realism as opposed forms, and the frequent positioning of the latter 
as the dominant mode of contemporary film and television, Williams argues that 
melodrama ‘renews itself and makes itself modern by adapting the most recent 
awareness of social problems and failures of justice to melodramatic ends’.294 Once 
again, a consideration of the use of the trial form within the woman’s melodrama 
must consider how the ‘sense of justice’ the film insists upon through its 
protagonists interacts with the representation of trial justice. This is particularly 
relevant to Williams’ subsequent examination of how the melodrama’s recognition 
of virtue is figured in relation to the depiction of institutions in contemporary screen 
melodrama. Williams argues more recent screen melodrama can demonstrate that 
‘institutions cannot embrace the good in any full way, as institutions, despite the 
many individuals who try to achieve justice within them’.295 I wish to ask whether 
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we can detect a similar construction of meaning in an earlier form of screen 
melodrama, the woman’s film, and identify the extent to which this critique of the 
institution can be located in its representations of the trial.  
Few scholars have considered the specific role of the trial in women’s 
melodrama despite the persistent interest in its aesthetic of justice and recognition 
of virtue. Kruger (1994) and Moulds (2013) have looked at the representation of 
female witnesses in the courtroom scenes of 19th century literary melodrama,296 
locating in these novels the same structures of opposition between 
emotion/femininity and law/masculinity that I identify in my case studies, with the 
former being posited as a more dependable elicitor of truth in spite of its 
marginalisation by the latter. Issues of language are also raised by these literary 
scholars, who note in their texts ‘a recurrent theme: the inability of the masculine 
legal system to comprehend women’s speech’.297 Moulds argues that the courtroom 
depictions of melodrama ‘favour not only the language of emotion but also the 
more marginalised speaker (the woman)’.298  
I think that the issues raised by Kruger and Moulds are broadly applicable to 
the forms of melodrama I discuss. However, I have found only one piece of 
criticism that looks specifically at trial representation in film melodrama and which 
similarly considers the critique enabled by depicting the interaction between the 
masculinised courtroom space and the melodrama’s alignment with a female 
viewpoint. Austin-Smith (2012) looks at the trial scene in three examples of the 
maternal melodrama subgenre (which I will return to in more detail shortly): 
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Confession (Dir: Joe May, 1937), Johnny Belinda and my second case study, 
Madame X.  Austin-Smith argues that the trial scene in each of these films 
‘promotes a radical critique of the ethics sanctioned by the courtroom’ and 
‘interrogates the law […] revealing its limitations when it is confronted with an 
agent whose sacrificial motive for violence cannot be accommodated to it, but to 
which it must accommodate itself if justice is to be served’.299 She relates this 
critique to Carol Clover’s concept of the double-trial,300 arguing that in the maternal 
melodramas the unofficial second trial pertains to the (mis)treatment of female 
victims as defendants. This argument can be applied to both my case studies. 
However, Austin-Smith also employs certain terms and lines of argument 
that emerge from the body of literature on film melodrama that I think muddy her 
argument, and which I wish to differentiate from my own methods of approaching 
the trial melodrama. Austin-Smith discusses her case studies within the framework 
of theatricality.301 This seems understandable given that the term recurrently figures 
in conceptualisations of both the courtroom trial and the melodrama. However its 
use by Austin-Smith, along with other terms borrowed from previous 
conceptualisations of melodrama, feels at points overdetermined. For example, she 
quotes Peter Brooks’ observation that melodrama ‘at heart represents the theatrical 
impulse itself, the impulse toward dramatization, heightening expression, acting 
out’,302 then relates this notion of melodramatic theatricality to the concept of 
excess that much criticism (beginning with Brooks) has posited as central to the 
melodramatic mode. She designates each of the female protagonists of her case 
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studies’ trial scenes as excessive ‘first in her murderousness, then in her silence, 
and finally in her expressiveness’.303 The emphasis upon excess is problematic 
given, firstly, that the ‘passionate outburst[s]’ she identifies as an example of the 
melodramatic excess of these trial scenes are a convention I have noted elsewhere 
that is not specific to the trials of maternal melodrama,304 and secondly, that the 
concept of excess as a specific property of melodrama (defined as excessive in 
relation a more classical model of cinema) has been challenged by Williams (2012). 
Similarly, the argument that the mise-en-scène of the trial scenes ‘reinforces the 
sense of the courtroom as a theatrical space’, 305  is presented without examples 
from the scenes themselves, and fails to consider the inherently theatrical 
connotations of all filmic representations of the courtroom trial.306  
I believe that a more productive manner of identifying melodramatic excess 
in these scenes involves referring back to the conventions of trial representation, 
and the restrictions imposed that render a significant number of narrative 
developments and representational strategies excessive. This allows us to engage 
more rigorously with the interaction between what is commonly viewed as the 
heightened representational strategies of melodrama and the respectful form of trial 
representation. Using this model, I would argue that Austin-Smith’s reference to 
excessive silence is more convincing than the other excesses mentioned, as such 
deliberate silence is a convention less commonly evoked outside of the female-
centred melodrama and thus positioned as ‘excessive’ more effectively within it.307  
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Austin-Smith argues that the maternal melodramas she examines ‘create 
from the tension between legal truth and maternal desire a verdict that sides with 
desire’.308 I will return to the specificities of this tension in my discussion of 
Madame X and maternal melodrama. I wish now to present the following quote 
from Austin-Smith’s conclusion and posit it as a way of approaching the role of the 
courtroom trial in the female-centred melodrama more broadly: ‘the trial scene 
takes the place of the menacing mill saws and train tracks to which the heroine is 
bound in early sensational film melodrama. We watch in suspense to see if the 
defendant will be rescued from the jaws not of villainy, but of the law’.309  
This investigation of a number of approaches to film melodrama has 
revealed several avenues of inquiry through which to examine my case studies. The 
woman’s melodrama has been argued to provide a specific construction of justice, 
aligned with the female protagonist, that diverges from the constructions of law and 
justice sanctioned by the court. The terms of difference repeatedly evoked situate 
the masculine law of the courtroom in direct opposition to the melodrama’s own 
forms of address (which rely upon emotion, intuition, and non-verbal forms that are 
considered ‘beyond language’). My case studies can be used to examine how these 
opposed terms are navigated in the woman’s melodrama, and the extents to which 
the courtroom sequences of my case studies problematise the female point of view 
or present radical challenges to the courtroom’s legal ethics. To return to the 
concepts of trial representation outlined in my review of literature, these case 
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studies demonstrate the possible avenues of development for Hollywood narrative 
when the ‘justice figure’ is a female who is cast in opposition to the legal process.  
Home Truths: The Courtroom Trial Sequence of Peyton Place  
 
Peyton Place can be considered as both family melodrama and woman’s 
melodrama. An adaptation of ‘the most commercially successful American novel of 
the 1950s’,310 and a very popular film upon its release,311 the film presents the 
stories of an ensemble of characters within the titular setting, fitting Schatz’s 
description of the family melodrama’s narrative formula – ‘its interrelated family of 
characters, its repressive small-town milieu, and its preoccupation with America’s 
sociosexual mores’.312 The drama builds to a climactic courtroom sequence which 
puts several of its major characters on the stand, including its three central female 
characters, one of whom is the defendant in the case. 313  The scene in one sense 
                                                          
310 Axel Knoenagel, ‘Inside Peyton Place: The Life of Grace Metalious’, The International Fiction 
Review 29:1/2 (2002) <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/IFR/article/view/7726/8783>, 
accessed 13 June 2015. 
311 Both a major box office success and the recipient of 9 Academy Award nominations. 
312 Thomas Schatz, Hollywood Genres, p. 151. 
313 The following is a summary of the film’s plot: Peyton Place tells the stories of a number of 
inhabitants of the titular small-town over the course of several years incorporating the build-up to 
and beginning of the U.S. intervention in World War II. The central drama pivots around two 
families, the MacKenzies and the Crosses. Constance MacKenzie (Lana Turner), a middle-class 
single mother, rejects the romantic interest of the town high school’s new principal Michael Rossi 
(Lee Philips) and attempts to discourage her daughter Allison’s own budding romantic and sexual 
curiosity, becoming increasingly paranoid over the state of Allison’s friendship with her introverted 
classmate Norman Page (Russ Tamblyn). In the Cross household, Lucas (Arthur Kennedy) rapes and 
impregnates stepdaughter Selena (Hope Lange). Lucas is blackmailed into signing a confession and 
leaving town by Dr. Swain (Lloyd Nolan) who secretly “assists” Selena with a miscarriage 
(necessitated after she suffers a fall while being chased by Lucas). Selena’s mother Nellie, who is 
also Constance’s housekeeper, is distraught by these familial traumas and the potential scandal 
they will bring to the family, and commits suicide in the MacKenzie home. Her body is discovered 
by Allison immediately after Constance has revealed the truth regarding her birth during an 
argument in which Constance, motivated by the gossip of the community, has become (wrongly) 
convinced that Allison has gone skinny-dipping with Norman; Allison was the product of an affair 
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dress shop and is courted by aspiring lawyer Ted Carter (David Nelson). However, Lucas’ return to 
the shack leads Selena to kill him in self-defence. She hides the body, but confesses the murder to 
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appears conventionally as an enabler of narrative resolution and closure, 
culminating in the defendant cleared and the titular community united following an 
address made on the stand by the town doctor, a development Schatz dismisses as a 
‘utopian vision and neat happily-ever-after resolution’ in contrast to what he sees as 
the deliberate arbitrariness of the endings of Sirk’s melodramas.314 Schatz argues 
that the film ‘resorts to a ritual sequence – a sensationalized small-town trial – in 
which the community comes to its collective sense and renegotiates its system of 
values and beliefs’.315 I believe that there is more to examine within this sequence 
in the light of my investigation of critical approaches to melodrama, but which can 
actually incorporate Schatz’s dissatisfaction as a starting point. The trial sequence, I 
argue, appears as a locus of the film’s negotiation of contrasting, differently-
gendered points of view. It employs this dissatisfying final address in order to 
subdue the alignment with a female point of view that is evidenced in the scene’s 
preceding narrative developments and representational strategies. I wish to look at 
the development of these conflicting points of view across the film and how they 
manifest, interact and resolve in the climactic trial sequence.  
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and the case goes to a trial, for which Allison and Norman – now a paratrooper – both return to 
Peyton Place. Constance’s attempts to reconcile with Allison are rebuffed by her daughter, who 
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There are a number of contexts that should be considered before looking in 
detail at the film’s trial scene, including firstly the nature of the film’s relationship 
to models of both the family and woman’s melodrama. The sheer number of 
characters included within the film’s ensemble complicates assumed features of 
both (sub)genres, because rather than focusing on the singular middle-class family 
or sole female protagonist, Peyton Place incorporates a number of characters with 
whom it encourages audience identification across boundaries of gender, age,316 
and class. Competing viewpoints and generic registers can be detected in the text, 
evident from the opening scenes, in which the point-of-view structures assumed by 
the opening voiceover narration from adolescent female Allison MacKenzie are 
held in tension with the subsequent (albeit temporary) focus on Michael Rossi, an 
older male whose introduction to the town doubles for the spectator’s and thus 
positions him as another identification figure. In this sense, Peyton Place 
anticipates the identification strategies of the television soap opera,317 and can be 
read in terms of Tania Modleski’s argument that the soap opera form encourages an 
empathetic spectator response through identification with multiple viewpoints. 
The status of Peyton Place as a family melodrama is most evident in its uses 
of the ‘repressive small-town milieu’ familiar to the genre. Schatz extrapolates the 
dual meaning of the term ‘family’ within his model of the family melodrama:  
Ideally, the family represents a “natural” as well as a social collective, a 
self-contained society in and of itself. But in the melodrama this ideal is 
undercut by the family’s status within a highly structured socioeconomic 
milieu, and therefore, its identity as an autonomous human community is 
denied – the family roles are determined by the larger social community. 
The American small town, with its acute class-consciousness, its gossip and 
judgment by appearances, and its reactionary commitment to fading values 
                                                          
316 The narrative attention granted to the various adolescent characters as they navigate the world 
of sex, relationships and adulthood could be used to posit Peyton Place as an example of the teen 
film genre. 
317 It should be noted here that Metalious’ novel was subsequently adapted for television in one of 
the first instances of the American television soap opera (Peyton Place [1964-1969]). 
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and mores, represents an extended but perverted family in which human 
elements (love, honesty, interpersonal contact, generosity) have either 
solidified into repressive social conventions or disappeared altogether.318  
 
Peyton Place exemplifies the small town Schatz identifies, with the film 
particularly attuned to the damaging effects of the community as typified by its 
older generation (with several important exceptions, to whom I will return shortly). 
Fears of scandal and gossip, of the reverberations of domestic trauma within the 
social community, are emphasised across the film, motivating Constance’s fear of 
sexuality and Nellie’s suicide, and reach an apotheosis in the trial sequence. The 
trial provides a space in which a series of repressed truths (Selena’s abuse, 
Constance’s failures as a parent) will be forced into the open and shared with the 
titular community. But it is also a space in which the community will be confronted 
with its own status as a ‘perverted family’. Whereas the sense of scandal and public 
attention granted to the trial is present in the majority of courtroom sequences, 
Peyton Place uses the trial to depict the gathering of the community rocked by a 
scandal that involves them all, and eventually will see them addressed directly.  
However, the community of Peyton Place does not entirely figure in a 
negative light. The film parallels the division of the community in Pinky in its 
presentation of an enlightened minority who remain impervious to the ‘class-
consciousness’, ‘gossip’, ‘judgment’ and conservatism of the broader social sphere. 
These characters include Michael Rossi, Doctor Swain, and the schoolteacher Elsie 
Thornton (Mildred Dunnock).319 However, these characteristics are designated so 
                                                          
318 Thomas Schatz, Hollywood Genres, p. 153. 
319 This figure is a recurrent character type in the family melodrama, often depicted as a romantic 
interest for the female lead (essentially Rossi’s function in Peyton Place), whose appeal lies in his 
non-conformist refusal to adhere to the ‘repressive social conventions’ of the community. 
Examples include Dr. Robert Richardson (Lew Ayres) in Johnny Belinda and Ron Kirby (Rock 
Hudson) in All That Heaven Allows (Dir: Douglas Sirk, 1955). 
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that it is primarily white, male authority figures who appear as and perhaps more 
crucially speak to the model of the progressive citizen, a construction that is held in 
tension with the film’s frequent alignment with the female point of view. The way 
the film handles Rossi’s employment as school principal (at the expense of Elsie, 
who is expected to be given the job) is especially interesting in this regard. Elsie’s 
passive acquiescence to Rossi’s employment in the light of his progressive ideas on 
education (including his intention to teach “a minimum of facts and a maximum of 
ideas” at the high school) could be viewed as an example of the film’s 
problematizing of the female point-of-view. Elsie’s desire to become principal is 
quickly discarded by the narrative, and a male takes the position of authority 
without significant attention being granted to this particular narrative thread 
thereafter: this correlates to Cook’s argument that the male-oriented dominant 
narrative must ‘mark the woman’s desire to escape her fate as pure fantasy, 
ultimately unrealisable’. However, the brief but emotionally resonant moments that 
initially focus on Elsie after she realises that Michael has been given the position 
(including her advice to Allison and Selena: “if there is anything in life you want, 
go out and get it. Don’t wait for somebody to give it to you”) exemplifies the force 
of the film’s emotional identification with its female characters, and the degree to 
which this is used to construct particular notions of injustice. The sense of an 
injustice perpetrated against Elsie lingers, and at no point during the remaining 
narrative does the film focus on Michael’s emotional state to the same extent. 
The film’s primary dramatic focus and structures of emotional identification 
for much of the narrative resides with its female characters, particularly Allison, 
Constance and Selena. The film’s concerns with expressivity – focusing on, as the 
voiceover from Allison asserts “what people were saying to each other, or were not 
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saying” – and its affirmation of emotional openness as a solution to personal 
problems (to be discussed in more detail shortly) are aligned with a traditionally 
feminine point-of-view, the film bookended by voiceover narration from 
Allison/Varsi that considers love as a “fifth season” said to reside in “you” (a direct 
address to the viewer). The opening voiceover, in which Allison discusses the 
passing of the seasons in Peyton Place in terms of the feelings they evoke, is 
typically melodramatic in the associations it draws between temporality and 
emotional states, with the emotions she mentions – “regret” “memory” and “desire” 
amongst them – recurrent themes of the melodrama that hold particular 
relationships to narrative temporality and the production of emotion.320  
The most dramatic and emotionally heightened events depicted in Peyton 
Place are accordingly those that involve its central female characters, members of 
the Cross and MacKenzie families, whose dramas intersect and parallel each other 
throughout the film. The Crosses are the first family to appear, as the eldest son, 
driven to a breaking point by his stepfather’s drinking, leaves town. The setting (a 
small shack and surrounding rural exterior), costumes, and performances 
immediately situate this troubled family as, in American ideological terms, the class 
other. The following scene presents Cross matriarch Nellie (Betty Field) arriving at 
her housekeeping job at the MacKenzie home. The differences between the two 
worlds are evident in the juxtaposition of the Cross family shack with the 
Mackenzie’s white picket-fenced household, introduced via a ‘MacKenzie’-marked 
mailbox and accompanied by the sound of diegetic piano-playing emanating from 
                                                          
320 Critics have viewed the heightened emotional qualities of the melodrama as the result of the 
temporality of narrative events, connecting the production of irony and pathos characteristic of the 
melodrama to the thematic role of time’s irreversibility; significant emotional moments often 
depict a crucial development occurring past the point at which it would have affected the 
characters positively (see Steven Neale [1986] and Linda Williams (1991)).  
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within. The MacKenzies are resolutely middle-class, locked inside the bourgeois 
domestic sphere that is the familiar setting of the family melodrama. Yet the 
underlying similarities between the MacKenzies and the Crosses become evident 
over the course of the film and will be forced into the public sphere in the climactic 
trial sequence.  
Throughout the film the juxtaposition of scenes featuring different 
characters serve to reveal the deeper similarities underlying the surface contrasts 
across divisions of age and social class (for instance, in the cross-cutting between 
Constance and Allison’s interactions with the opposite sex, and the consecutive 
scenes of parental violence towards the female child in, respectively, the 
MacKenzie and Cross households), exemplifying the use of ‘parallel situations and 
metaphoric connections’ that Elsaesser identifies in the family melodrama. 321 The 
drama of the MacKenzies pivots around the damage caused by the sexually 
repressed Constance’s attempts to control her daughter’s budding romantic 
curiosity, in what is revealed to be an effort to suppress her own sexual history.322 
The repression that characterises Constance, a convention familiar to family 
melodrama and which is evidenced in her hysterical overreaction to matters of 
sexuality, is consistently viewed as a negative, damaging element, constructed in 
opposition to what the film deems to be the more appropriate attitudes of Allison 
and Michael. Its destructiveness leads to the revelation that Allison was borne out 
of wedlock, a dramatic event immediately followed by Allison’s discovery of 
Nellie’s body. The dovetailing of these revelations again presents us with the 
                                                          
321 Thomas Elsaesser, ‘Tales of Sound and Fury’, p. 82. 
322 Peyton Place anticipates a later melodrama, Splendour in the Grass (Dir: Elia Kazan, 1961), which 
also dramatises a young woman’s sexual repression and subsequent breakdown as a result of a 
controlling older generation. 
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‘parallel situations and metaphoric connections’ of the family melodrama, but their 
blurring also allows Constance to continue to repress her own role in Allison’s 
subsequent breakdown.  
The third central female character of the film is Selena Cross, who appears 
as defendant in the trial. The trial is prompted by Lucas’ unexpected return to the 
Cross shack late in the narrative, when his attempt to rape Selena again leads her to 
kill him in self-defence. This return marks the sudden reversal of fortune that for 
Lea Jacobs typifies melodramatic narrative structures, arriving at a point in the 
narrative when Selena appears to have recovered from her domestic traumas. This 
recovery is evidenced in Selena’s employment at Constance’s tweed shop, her 
unwavering romantic attachment to Ted, and her renovation of the Cross family 
shack. Whereas the narrative of male rise is typically about making money, 
Selena’s rise prior to her trial is both economic and social. The manner in which the 
appearance of the Cross’ shack is transformed via set and production design 
demonstrates how Peyton Place makes Selena a bourgeois figure without any 
hesitation, just as the association with Constance’s tweed shop connotes a 
respectable femininity (allowing the female to work but ensuring that the work 
remains intertwined with the domestic/feminine sphere). Jacobs argues that the 
narrative structures of melodrama, which are reliant on ‘abrupt reversals’, 
coincidence and external ‘contingencies to which the hero does not contribute or for 
which he is not responsible’ enforce passivity upon its characters or only exacerbate 
their suffering when they do attempt to take action.323 That defending herself 
against Lucas on his return only worsens Selena’s situation is a tenet of 
                                                          
323 Lea Jacobs, ‘The Woman’s Picture and the Poetics of Melodrama’ Camera Obscura 11:1 
(January/May 1993), p. 136. 
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melodramatic narrative, in stark contrast to the cathartic violence of the male 
Western hero. But it also leaves no doubt for the viewer that Selena is a victim by 
the time of the trial. Both Selena’s ascension to bourgeois status and her explicit 
victimisation function to make her a safe figure of audience identification. 
Melodrama’s ‘aesthetic of justice’ and emotional alignment with the victim ensure 
this.  
However, sympathy exists in tension with a desire of Selena’s that begins to 
complicate a straightforward response to the stakes of the trial. Selena has 
knowledge that she wishes to keep secret from the court or, more accurately, the 
community, and which is shared only with the audience and one other character 
within the diegesis. Dr. Swain knows that the murder of Lucas was an act of self-
defence motivated by Selena’s previous rape, and that revealing this would most 
likely see Selena cleared of the homicide charge. Yet Selena refuses to reveal the 
truth regarding her sexual abuse by Lucas in court for fear that in the ensuing 
scandal she will “lose Ted” - or rather, that aspiring lawyer Ted will lose social 
status in being associated with the scandal of the Crosses. A central irony here is 
that it is Ted’s entry into the masculine sphere of law that Selena is trying to protect 
through her own challenge to the court.324 When in a scene prior to the trial, Dr. 
Swain has attempted to convince Selena to tell the truth in court by warning her that 
“prison can be a kind of dying,” her response - “losing Ted would be a worse kind 
of dying”– demonstrates the primacy granted the emotional in the woman’s 
melodrama. The paradox that the potential emergence of the truth regarding 
                                                          
324 The trope of the female defendant having an emotionally-rooted reason for refusing divulge 
information in the courtroom occurs in other woman’s melodramas including All This, and Heaven 
Too (Dir: Anatole Litvak, 1940), Confession, and my next case study, Madame X. This trope works to 
place on an adversarial level the legal and female viewpoints. 
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Selena’s abuse would both see her freed and, from Selena’s perspective, ruin her 
life, and the tension that results from this, is one of two major narrative strands we 
expect to comprise the trial sequence. The other is the familial conflict between 
Allison and Constance, both of whom are called to the stand as witnesses for the 
defence. Selena’s trial brings Allison back to Peyton Place, and it is during the 
climactic trial sequence that the domestic dramas of the MacKenzies and the 
Crosses again dovetail. 
 This brings us to the issue of resolution and the question of how the film has 
guided the spectator to expect a certain type of resolution from its court sequence. 
A brief consideration of how other narrative threads have been resolved prior to the 
trial gives us a strong indication of this, beginning with the final scene between 
Betty Harrington (Terry Moore) and her father-in-law Mr. Harrington (Leon 
Ames). Mr. Harrington, who had voiced a strong disapproval of his son’s “flashy” 
choice of wife, apologises upon his son’s death in the War, and is chastised by 
Betty for teaching his son that “appearances counted more than feelings”. Mr. 
Harrington’s acceptance of Betty provides a closure to this storyline that is rooted 
in an emphasis upon “feelings” over the upholding of hierarchical social divisions. 
The other storyline that has reached closure prior to the court scene is the romantic 
union of Constance and Michael. Constance, despite her concern that he will “want 
anything but the truth” upon hearing it, confesses Allison’s illegitimacy, which 
provokes Michael’s reassurance that he is committed to her completely. This notion 
of truth-telling is especially relevant to a character (Constance) who has been 
characterised largely by her repression. Finally, another potential reconciliation of a 
personal relationship is suggested when Norman explains to Allison moments prior 
to the trial scene that he is returning to Peyton Place to “work things out” with his 
223 
 
controlling, possessive mother (another clear instance of parallelism between two 
sets of characters in the film). These narrative strands all point to a positioning of 
emotional reconciliation and truth-telling, stood in opposition to the social 
pressures of the community, as the source of resolution to the various domestic 
traumas, a reminder of the centrality of expressivity to melodrama. Thus, the 
narrative has guided the viewer to expect a continuation of this form of resolution 
in the courtroom scene, both with respect to the fracture in the Constance/Allison 
relationship and, much more ambivalently, Selena’s secret.  
One final context that must be considered before looking at the trial scene in 
detail is the relationship of Peyton Place to the Production Code censorship 
guidelines. The climactic trial can be seen as an integral element of the 
manoeuvring with which Peyton Place’s highly controversial source material was 
adapted for the Hollywood cinema of 1957. The film’s production coincided with 
changes that took place in the censorship structures of Hollywood cinema during 
the 1950s. Leff and Simmons discuss the ‘major Production Code rewrite’ 
undertaken in 1956 ‘that lifted all remaining taboos except nudity, sexual 
perversion, and venereal disease’ and led to the attitude that ‘from now on […] “it’s 
the treatment that counts”’.325 Leff and Simmons specifically refer to Peyton Place 
and its sequel Return to Peyton Place (Dir: Jose Ferrer, 1964) as films that were 
able to circumvent censorship guidelines through their “treatment” of such 
sensational topics as sexual violence, abortion and suicide,326 a circumvention 
                                                          
325Leonard J Leff,. and Jerold L Simmons,. The Dame in the Kimono: Hollywood Censorship and the 
Production Code (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 2001), p. 225. 
326 Similarly to other melodramas such as Leave Her to Heaven (Dir: John Stahl, 1945) and Beyond 
the Forest (Dir: King Vidor, 1949), the issue of abortion is both elided and alluded to through the 
depiction of accidental or deliberate miscarriage. The major difference is that, in contrast to the 
villainous females of the aforementioned films, whose deliberate decisions to incur a miscarriage 
are presented as evidence of their amorality, Selena’s miscarriage is more ambiguously situated. 
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deemed especially important for a big-budget prestige studio production with 
Academy Award potential. Peyton Place’s adjustment to the genre framework of 
the melodrama in the course of its adaptation from the source material in some part 
demonstrates its specific ‘treatment’ of controversial material. For instance, the 
aforementioned subplot resolutions, structured around emotional reconciliations, 
function to counter the bleak view of society and human relationships presented in 
the novel. The trial sequence’s placement as the narrative climax also tasks it with 
working through and making acceptable the challenges to the Production Code it 
has presented in the preceding narrative, including the ambiguities surrounding 
Selena’s “miscarriage” and the fact that the protagonist has committed the crime of 
which they are accused. The audience wishes Selena to be found not guilty for 
reasons other than, strictly speaking, innocence. The scenario of the trial itself 
offers a safer means of navigating this material, treating its troubling discourse via 
the legitimately proper narrative device of the courtroom.327  
Thus the trial sequence, as the narrative climax of Peyton Place, is tasked 
with managing a number of elements beyond depicting the outcome of the case. 
These include dealing with both the cross-purposes of the legal proceeding and 
Selena’s desire, and the rift in the MacKenzies’ relationship, within the structures 
of resolution set into place by the aforementioned narrative subplots. It also 
                                                          
The action of Swain “assisting [Selena] with a miscarriage” can be read as either an abortion (a 
reading given added validity through its parallel to the events of the novel) or, the more censor-
proof alternative, a medical procedure necessitated by Selena’s fall (i.e. she has already begun to 
miscarry and Swain’s “assistance” was merely to ensure the remainder of the miscarriage occurred 
with the minimum of damage to Selena). The ambiguous treatment allows the more sophisticated 
viewer (especially a reader of Metalious’ novel) to the former interpretation while the latter 
appeases the censors.  
327 Anatomy of a Murder another film that tackles the subject of rape, also uses the courtroom 
setting to legitimate the inclusion of otherwise controversial language within a legalistic context. 
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includes navigating the potential challenges to the Production Code through its 
specific treatment of issues including homicide, rape and abortion.  
For the sake of the theme of scandal, the melodramatic emphasis on 
expressivity, and the subsequent final address, it is also imperative that a sense of 
the diegetic community’s presence is given during the trial. The visualisation of the 
sequence ensures that the wider community is consistently present throughout, 
through a combination of the elements I mentioned in my first chapter328 and 
reaction shots of specific members of the community. The reaction shots include 
not only our central females and their male companions, but figures such as Dr. 
Swain, local newspaper editor Seth Bushwell (Robert H. Harris), and Mrs. Partridge 
(Peg Hilias), whose presences individually gesture towards the inclusion of a 
particular strata of the community. Mrs. Partridge for example, sat among a 
selection of similarly dressed middle-aged women, is the archetypal town gossip 
figure, emblematic of the community’s ‘gossip and judgment by appearances’, and 
thus figures as a particularly pointed target of Swain’s final address. 329 The use of 
the widescreen Cinemascope frame more generally allows for the inclusion of many 
individuals even within relatively tight framings (see Figs. 48-49) and makes the 
viewer consistently aware of the considerable turnout necessitated by the film’s 
diegetic contexts.  
Once again, the courtroom players are incorporated into the sequence to 
orient the viewer and provide verisimilitude, but are relegated to narrative 
                                                          
328 Shot compositions that incorporate the spectators within the frame and the aural responses 
from the spectators that punctuate the sequence. 
329 Other notable examples of this figure in the melodrama, who function in a similar manner, 
include the character of Mona in All That Heaven Allows (Dir: Douglas Sirk, 1955) and the elderly 
women of the community in Johnny Belinda. 
226 
 
insignificance. The jurors are presented in a manner that refuses to individualise 
them (Fig. 46). The judge appears in a recurrent symmetrical framing that denies 
him a presence beyond his symbolic function (Fig. 47). Part of the tension of the 
trial sequence emerges from the resolutely flat characterisation of the prosecutor 
(Lorne Greene), who has no emotional investment in the case, no prior connection 
to the narrative or the community, and who is described prior to his first appearance 
in court as “thoroughly competent and relentless as the law itself”. The lawyer for 
the defence is a more familiar face, Mr. Partridge (Staats Cotsworth), but is 
crucially not a figure of emotional identification for the spectator on the level of 
any of the central female characters. I mention the lawyers, jury and judge to 
demonstrate how little interest the film and its spectator has in them (although the 
characterisation of the prosecutor will serve an expressive function later in the 
sequence). These representational choices work on one level to convey the sense of 
order that implicitly affirms the trial system. There is certainly no explicit attempt 
to critique or subvert the legal institution through its visual representation in Peyton 
Place. Instead, the flat characterisation of the courtroom players redistributes focus 
on to the relationships between the significant characters present. It is the specific 
treatment of these relationships that I wish to examine as the melodrama’s major 
inflection of trial convention.  
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Figs. 46 (top) and 47 (bottom) 
For example, the business of ‘court coming to order’ at the start of the 
sequence transpires alongside shots of Allison and Constance, on separate sides of 
the spectator’s gallery, noticing and either hoping for or refusing communication 
with the other, their eye-lines contrasted with the surrounding individuals in the 
frame who uniformly face the court’s stage (Figs. 48-49). This provides a clear 
example of the film’s recurrent strategy of depicting private dramas during 
communal events, thus juxtaposing the individual and communal mood.330 The 
exchange between Allison and Constance establishes this relationship as one that 
will be dramatically important to the sequence, and yet it is a relationship that exists 
outside of the ritual of the trial. This already suggests the film’s own structures of 
point of view and their potential divergence from the legal narrative.  
 
                                                          
330 A previous example occurs in the scene that immediately follows Selena’s rape by Lucas; the 
scene depicts the high school graduation ceremony, where, during Allison’s address to the 
graduating class, a close-up of Selena depicts her melancholic withdrawal. 
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Fig. 48 
 
Fig. 49 
 Selena is not one of the last individuals to take to the stand, but instead 
gives testimony after Joey (Scotty Morrow), the first witness depicted. Both before 
and after her testimony, reaction shots show Selena to be unresponsive to the on-
stage events, as if preoccupied with her own private dilemma. The moments in 
which Joey takes to the stand prior to her own questioning typify this. The presence 
of a precocious child on the stand allows some humour to be injected into the 
sequence,331 but reaction shots of Selena convey her withdrawal, a parallel to the 
shots of her during the earlier graduation scene. When Selena is called to the stand, 
                                                          
331 The humorous tone of Joey’s testimony, augmented by the diegetic laughter from the 
spectatorship, is in line with the conventions I outlined earlier (see page 81). A lighter tone is 
acceptable in the earlier portion of the sequence, but the transition into a more serious tone must 
occur at some point, especially in light of the film’s subject matter (rape, murder, miscarriage). 
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a shot captures her emerging from her distracted introspection before standing. 
These gestures, however minor, are crucial to underlining the presence of factors 
which are beyond language and the conventional understanding of the court, and 
which are located in Selena’s private emotional world.  
Selena must now take to the stand and speak, submitting to the structures of 
the court and attempting to defend herself without revealing the truth she wishes to 
keep secret. Selena/Lange speaks hesitantly and quietly at the outset of her cross-
examination. Cinemascope framings dwarf her within the image and emphasise the 
isolation of her private turmoil, continuing a visual patterning throughout the film 
of utilising the widescreen frame to isolate Selena and convey her victimisation at 
the hands of various external factors (Figs 50-52). However, as the prosecutor’s 
questioning becomes more accusatory, Selena becomes visibly frustrated. Reaction 
shots of Ted and Joey, who listen to the prosecutor accuse Selena of “inviting boys 
in” while Lucas was away, remind us of the truth of the situation as opposed to the 
scenario the prosecutor is attempting to imply. These insinuations are rooted in 
assumptions surrounding class and respectability; as with those made on the stand 
by Melba Wooley in Pinky, there is an implicit judgment of the class other, 
particularly when she is a young female, as sexually promiscuous. On a medium 
close-up of Selena, the prosecutor continues, “When you thought [Lucas] was going 
to change all that, did you kill him?” and her angry, tearful response, “No! Lucas 
was drunk and tried to beat me!” is accompanied by her clasping her hands to the 
arms of her chair. Lange’s performance, through the use of such gestures and her 
pained facial expressions, conveys the emotional conflict she experiences in her 
attempts to both hide certain facts and adequately defend herself against the 
prosecutor’s accusations. These are the ‘tellingly impotent gestures’ Elsaesser 
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identifies in the family melodrama, typifying the blockages to direct action 
constructed by the repressive social world and intensified in the scrutinising public 
arena of the courtroom. The intensity of the prosecutor and Selena’s emotional 
response is given a specific inflection for the spectator due to the knowledge of 
Selena’s previous abuse, an inflection that is rendered explicit when Partridge 
accuses the prosecutor of “not cross-examining but harassing the witness”. This 
moment reveals the parallels between the forces oppressing Selena in the courtroom 
and her treatment at home earlier in the film. Not only is the inherently masculinist 
aggression of the courtroom revealed, but it is equated with the victimisation 
endured by the woman in the domestic sphere; Selena is forced into passivity in 
both scenarios by men.332 Austin-Smith’s notion of the double-trial structure being 
employed to demonstrate the victimisation of the female in the courtroom is 
exemplified here. 
  
 
                                                          
332 In the equivalent courtroom scenes in Confession, All This and Heaven Too, and Johnny Belinda 
the patriarchal structuring of the courtroom is made evident in shots of all-male jurors and other 
legal actors. In these instances, the sole female in the courtroom is cast in opposition to an entirely 
masculinist legal proceeding, making clear the woman’s marginalised position and the terms of 
difference that suggest it is unlikely she will receive fair treatment by the court. 
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The following two witnesses are Allison and Constance. Their consecutive 
trips to the witness stand are written so that the questioning given to both characters 
relates back to their relationship. This comes to share equal narrative prominence to 
Selena’s case, making clear the parallels between the respectable middle-class 
family and the more overtly disreputable Crosses, as well as signalling the 
continued surrender of the legal narrative to a heavily emotional, feminine point of 
view. Allison takes to the stand first. Following the initial shot in which she is both 
called up and approaches the witness box, there is a cut to a medium two-shot of 
Rossi and a nervous looking Constance. It is important to note the differences 
between Allison and Selena on the stand. Allison’s costuming (a navy blue 
shoulder-padded two-piece and matching hat, with a polka dot cravat and white 
gloves) befits her social ascent, conveying through its colour, shape and use of 
accessories the image of the career woman/city girl.333 This invites a contrast with 
the relative limits of Selena’s social rise. Selena wears a simple lavender dress in 
keeping with the more traditionally feminine costumes both characters have worn 
                                                          
333 Similar choices in costuming – pivoted around the subtle masculinisation of the career woman’s 
clothing through the use of darker colour schemes (navy blue, grey) in combination with more 
feminine accessorises that connote a level of cosmopolitan glamour (and wealth) - appear in The 
Best of Everything (Dir: Jean Negulesco, 1959), which depicts the lives of a series of New York 
career women who work, like Allison, in the publishing industry.  
 
Fig. 50 (top image); Fig. 51 
(middle image); Fig. 52 (bottom 
image)  
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earlier in the film. A further contrast is evidenced in Allison’s confidence on the 
stand - at one point during the questioning she turns to the judge and asks “Do I 
have to answer these questions?” an action unthinkable for Selena. Again, issues of 
the cultural categories into which a witness falls become prominent as the young 
female’s relationship to the courtroom (and accordingly, the law) is constructed 
through indications of social position.   
The dramatic purpose of Allison’s cross-examination is to begin the process 
of making public the parallels between the MacKenzies and the Crosses. Following 
the opening question, an ellipsis takes us to what is presumably a later moment in 
the questioning. The prosecutor asks Allison, in response to her claim of witnessing 
Lucas slap Selena earlier in the narrative, “Have you ever been slapped Miss 
MacKenzie?” A series of cuts between Allison and Constance follows as the former 
admits to being slapped by her mother. Reaction shots of Constance reconfigure the 
emphasis of the moment to focus on the mother/daughter relationship, and our 
awareness of the spatial positions of the two women allows for a series of private 
glances to be exchanged beyond the on-screen space (and, implicitly, beyond the 
view of the courtroom spectators). The slap Allison saw Lucas give earlier, which is 
being used by the former as evidence of his domestic abuse, is explicitly equated 
with the slap her own mother gave her earlier via the prosecutor’s questioning. 
Constance then takes to the stand as another witness for the defence. The 
shot of the two crossing paths allows for a further dramatisation of the offer and 
refusal of communication depicted at the outset, again constructed as a private 
interaction limited by the public context. The repression that has been a defining 
element of the characterisation of Constance serves the film dramatically in her 
appearance in the trial sequence. The confessional mode permitted by the trial form 
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can take on a more explicitly psychological or emotional resonance when applied to 
the melodrama’s concern with expressivity. The trial, which functions as a means 
of applying emotional pressure to the individual in order to have them reveal 
(advertently or otherwise) evidential truths, figures here melodramatically in order 
to force Constance to acknowledge her failings as a parent. From the moment that 
Constance takes the stand, repeated glances to the off-screen space occupied by 
Allison convey her distraction and its source (Fig. 53). On only her second 
question, Constance must ask for it to be repeated as she glances at this off-screen 
space. A reverse shot displays Allison leaning forward in her chair, another 
expressive but powerless physical gesture that conveys her increasing concern for 
her mother (Fig. 54). A potential moment of reconciliation is thus constructed that 
is rendered impossible by the procedural and rigidly bound courtroom setting.  
The notion of the female being forced outside of her terrain (e.g. the 
domestic space) in the courtroom is especially pertinent in relation to Constance. 
Throughout the questioning she is defined through her motherhood and relationship 
to the domestic in a manner that also begins to bring out the parallels between her 
own dramas and those of the Crosses. Thus, when she mentions the death of Nellie 
and is reminded by the prosecutor that “we’re not concerned here with Mrs. Cross’ 
suicide”, a look of displeasure crosses Constance’s face and she interjects “but I 
don’t see why not. There was something terribly wrong in the Cross family life. 
Somethin’ wrong when a woman had to raise a daughter up almost alone”. It is 
from this point that the repeated return of Constance’s eye-line to the off-screen 
space occupied by Allison corresponds to her growing awareness of the parallels 
between her own family and the Crosses, an awareness captured through our 
awareness of the space (the spectator knows who Constance is looking at) and 
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Turner’s performance. The questioning turns to the issue of the slap Allison saw 
Lucas give Selena. We learn through Constance’s responses that Allison did not tell 
her mother about this incident, which is then used by the prosecutor to insinuate 
that Allison has lied. The idea that Allison would “bring her problems home” is 
thus configured as legal evidence of a healthy mother/daughter relationship, and 
Constance’s inability to counter this leads her to recognise her maternal failings. 
Constance must confess on the stand that Allison “did bring her troubles home” but 
that she as a mother “wouldn’t understand”, before repeating the latter phrase 
loudly in distress as she breaks down, interrupting the prosecutor’s questioning 
(Figs. 55-56).  
 
Fig. 53     
 
Fig. 54  
 
Fig. 55 
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Fig. 56  
The breakdown of the female on the stand conveys a sense of specific 
pressure that the female and her implicitly excessive emotional life cannot cope 
with. This is inscribed in the conventions of the trial scene across the Hollywood 
cinema in terms of its representation of female witnesses.334 But it is given a 
specific inflection in this instance through the conventions of melodrama and Lana 
Turner’s star persona. Turner is a star who holds particularly strong associations 
with the woman’s film and melodrama genres.335 Dyer argues that many of her 
films use the connotations of artificiality accrued through Turner’s persona and 
performing style to depict at a climactic moment an emotional breakdown that 
produces an effect of ‘Turner shedding her actor’s artifices and giving us naked 
emotion’ in a manner that ‘make[s] a formal break’ from the film’s presentation of 
her.336 Although Dyer makes this argument in relation to two films where Turner 
plays a professional performer,337 I think it can be related to Peyton Place given 
that repression is such a crucial facet of the characterisation of Turner’s character. 
                                                          
334 Female witnesses are often characterised through emotional reactions on the stand that are 
deemed excessive in relation to the trial’s purpose and formality. These reactions include 
screaming, crying and fainting. Instances are too numerous to be detailed here, but significant 
examples within the golden age corpus include the outburst of Mayella in To Kill a Mockingbird  
and the behaviours of Irene Hoffman (Judy Garland) in Judgment at Nuremberg and – in what is 
eventually revealed to be, in a subversion of this convention, a performance of female courtroom 
hysteria – Christine Vole (Marlene Dietrich) in Witness for the Prosecution.  
335 She starred in a number of examples of the genres, including (but not limited to) A Life of Her 
Own (Dir: George Cukor, 1950), The Bad and the Beautiful (Dir: Vincente Minnelli, 1952), Peyton 
Place, Imitation of Life (Dir: Douglas Sirk, 1959), Portrait in Black (Dir: Michael Gordon, 1960), Love 
Has Many Faces (Dir: Alexander Singer, 1964) and Madame X. 
336 Richard Dyer, ‘Four Films of Lana Turner’ in Marcia Landy (ed.) Imitations of Life: a reader on 
film & television melodrama (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991), p. 427. 
337 The Bad and the Beautiful and Imitation of Life. 
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The trial scene allows for a cathartic release of ‘naked emotion’ from a previously 
repressed character and, considered in relation to the public scenario, also functions 
as a punishment for that same repression (to have this display of suffering occur in 
the public realm parallels her fear of scandal).338 The staging of the breakdown, 
with Constance also framed within long shots that emphasise her isolation on the 
stand, guides us towards a sympathetic response towards her, however, so that the 
primary narrative goal of resolution through reconciliation remains intact. 
Another specifically melodramatic inflection of this moment resides in the 
direction of the emotional outburst. The public release of emotion does not work 
conventionally in the interests of the procedural development of the trial or the 
spectator’s understanding of the crime’s context.339 Rather, Constance’s 
breakdown, in both the representational strategies that align us with her response to 
a private matter external to the trial, and its effect on the narrative development of 
the scene, disrupts the advancement of the trial proceeding. The moment is 
constituted as excessive within the specific context of the trial, as demonstrated by 
the recess it incurs, another instance of the melodrama’s complex relationship to 
gendered points of view. The spectator is aligned with Constance’s emotional 
turmoil in this moment, but it is also problematized as a blockage to the court’s 
overarching goals. These moments in which the emotional emphases of the 
melodrama (typically aligned with the point of view of a central female character) 
overrides the legal(/masculine) narrative recur in the melodrama as an inflection of 
                                                          
338 I would argue that a similar tension emerges from the treatment of the character of Marylee 
Hadley (Dorothy Malone) in the climactic trial scene of Written on the Wind. The character’s 
private confession, emotionally rendered during her testimony, functions as part-redemption of, 
and part-punishment for, her earlier transgressions. 
339 Compare it, for example, to the role Mayella’s breakdown plays in To Kill a Mockingbird in 
heavily suggesting that her accusation is false, or the crucial role the emotional appeal of Mabel in 
Dust Be My Destiny plays in the subsequent “not guilty” verdict.  
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courtroom convention. It is frequently connected to the inclusion of exchanged 
looks between individuals in the courtroom of the type captured in Peyton Place. 
Other examples feature in Blossoms in the Dust (Dir: Mervyn LeRoy, 1941), 
Written on the Wind (Figs. 57-58), 340 and Confession. These looks, crucial to the 
development of the scenes, register an emotional understanding between two 
characters that goes unseen by the procedural structures of the law (and the rest of 
the courtroom). Aligned strongly with the female point of view, these looks reassert 
Lang’s conceptualisation of an imaginary mode rooted in that which is ‘beyond 
language’ and which stands in opposition to law’s need to order and codify through 
language.   
    
 
Figs. 57 (top) and 58 (bottom) 
 
                                                          
340 I wish to provide some narrative contexts for this pivotal nonverbal courtroom exchange. The 
climactic inquest in Written on the Wind is dramatically structured around the intention of Marylee 
Hadley (Dorothy Malone) to falsely testify to having witnessed the murder of her brother by Mitch 
Wayne (Rock Hudson) as vengeance for the latter’s failure to return her unrequited love for him. 
However, on the stand, the crucial exchange of tender looks between Marylee and Mitch elicits a 
confession from Marylee of the truth as depicted earlier in the film.  
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However, this momentary shattering of the law’s structures in Peyton Place 
is problematised by the rendering of Constance’s emotional response as excessive 
within the formal structures of the courtroom. The subsequent climactic 
development is Dr. Swain’s address, which functions to reassert the ordering 
masculine structures of law. Constance’s breakdown leads to an adjournment, the 
narrative purpose of which is to dramatize the motivation underlying Dr. Swain’s 
decision to take to the stand and take charge of the procedure. The females on the 
stand are thus contrasted with the doctor who, at the climax of the sequence, reveals 
the truth about Selena and condemns the community for their complicity. His 
statement that “we’ve wasted too much time torturing a girl who’s emotionally 
unable to speak for herself” encapsulates the symbolic’s opposition to the 
imaginary mode in its dismissal of the imaginary’s prioritisation of emotion and the 
non-verbal. Emotion is instead figured as a blockage to the speech that is needed to 
reaffirm the structures of law and order, and thus Selena’s challenge to the 
courtroom is quashed by the good patriarch (both scientist and wise man). This 
development also appears in other female-centred melodramas, including Outrage, 
in which the female defendant is rendered mute in the courtroom and must have a 
priest speak on her behalf, and Johnny Belinda, in which the deaf-mute defendant 
must have her testimony literally translated by the male lead, who uses the 
opportunity to present his case for the defence. Tellingly, in all three of these films, 
the female has been raped and her silence is situated by others as symptomatic of 
the trauma she has endured rather than as a deliberate challenge to the court’s 
reliance on verbal communication to process and codify.  
The representational strategies employed during Swain’s testimony 
underline the authority with which he takes command of the court. A greater sense 
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of an authoritative awareness of and address to the audience within the courtroom is 
conveyed through the volume and clarity of Swain’s voice, the close-up framings of 
him on the stand (contrast with the long shots used to undermine the authority of 
the female witnesses) and reaction shots of other major characters. There is also a 
sense of (masculine) bravery and agency in Swain’s actions, not only in taking to 
the stand, but of the potential threat to his career in his revelations regarding his 
“assistance of Selena with a miscarriage”. The assertion of Swain’s qualities as an 
authority figure (his command of oratory, his common-sense value system) is one 
manner of leading the viewer away from the suggestions of abortion and his 
admitted ethical misconduct. The film affirms him even further by having the 
judge, an even more weighted symbol of patriarchal authority, state when the 
prosecutor tries to interject during Swain’s address that “Dr. Swain has come 
forward at considerable risk to himself and I intend to hear him through without 
further interruption.” Similarly, it is notable that Swain’s address to the courtroom 
is emphasised over the business of the signed confession from Lucas that he also 
brings to the stand; the individual is given primacy over the evidential.  
The treatment of Doctor Swain on the stand reflects the gender divide 
inscribed across courtroom sequences within Hollywood cinema. Swain, as a 
patriarchal figure with a considerable measure of masculine authority, is in control 
of language and his surroundings on the stand. His role as enlightened member of 
the community is used to make him the mouthpiece for a moralising speech that 
makes the titular community ‘come to its collective sense’. The confessional mode 
of the melodrama is replaced with the didactic mode of the social problem film, in a 
manner that diverges from the ambivalent narrative resolutions of the family 
melodramas of Sirk, Ray and Minnelli, as well as Metalious’ novel. The problem of 
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Peyton Place is given its solution, and it is this neatness that constitutes Schatz’s 
main issue with the trial scene. However, ambivalence is a quality of the subsequent 
moments of the sequence, which contain point of view constructions that act as the 
final reminders of the film’s alignment with Selena’s desires and the divergence of 
these desires from the trial’s imperatives.  
Following the end of Dr. Swain’s testimony, there is a fade to the verdict. 
The “not guilty” verdict is read out before the court, but instead of a unified 
reaction of celebration (as in the equivalent moment from Dust Be My Destiny), 
there is a momentary ambivalence as non-diegetic scoring is utilised for the first 
time in the sequence, a sombre repeated bass note. The verdict is read out over a 
shot of Selena, looking down, disengaged from the surrounding spectacle. When 
the “not guilty” verdict is read out her only gesture is to shut her eyes gravely, 
concurrent with a low bass sting on the soundtrack (Fig. 59). There follows a series 
of reaction shots while this scoring continues; Dr. Swain stood amongst other 
spectators, Ted lowering his head next to an incongruously pleased Joey (Fig. 60), 
and Constance leaning into her husband Rossi with an exhausted rather than joyous 
sense of relief (Fig. 61). There is no roar of approval from the courtroom spectators. 
It is not until the reunion of Ted and Selena in medium close-up that the latter 
smiles for the first time in the sequence, and her absorption back into the 
community outside of the courtroom affirms that the community has indeed, to 
quote Schatz, ‘come to its collective sense’. The depiction of the verdict itself 
makes evident the split between the verdict of the court and what Austin-Smith 
would term the ‘verdict that sides with desire’. 
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Fig. 59 
 
Fig. 60 
 
Fig. 61 
 
This ambivalence at the end of the courtroom sequence is interesting with 
regards to the agendas that Peyton Place is trying to address. There has been a 
moralising address from Dr. Swain, and the subsequent post-courtroom final scene 
in which Allison and Constance are reunited, heading into the house alongside 
Michael and Norman in another example of what Dyer describes in relation to the 
ending of Imitation of Life as ‘the cobbling together of the nuclear family 
characteristic of the postwar film melodrama’,341 before Allison’s voiceover 
reminds us of the healing power of love. All of these choices work to affirm a 
dominant bourgeois ideology in the film’s final moments. In this context, Selena 
and the relative non-entity Ted are, if not discarded, then certainly shied away from. 
Although Peyton Place is able to have a young victimised female’s homicide 
                                                          
341 Richard Dyer, ‘Four Films of Lana Turner’, p. 426. 
242 
 
rendered justifiable, the film is still very wary of celebrating this scenario, and ends 
instead with the reunion of the MacKenzies. 
Thus the trial sequence of Peyton Place exemplifies its navigation of 
conflicting impulses throughout the film. The relinquishing of speech and authority 
to Dr. Swain demonstrates the patriarchal constructions underlying trial depiction 
that grant the white, middle-class male an unquestioned access to the court’s modes 
of communication. However, this is countered by the consistent inclusion of 
moments that, as Moulds notes of the court scenes of literature, ‘seems to favour 
not only the language of emotion but also the more marginalised speaker (the 
woman)’. The emotional preoccupations of Selena, Constance and Allison threaten 
to overwhelm the legal narrative, and the film gestures, particularly through Selena, 
to a construction of justice that challenges the court’s own judicial process. I wish 
now to consider a film that presents a less compromised challenge to the court 
through a more rigorous engagement with the female point of view.  
The Mother and The Law in Madame X 
 
Madame X parallels Peyton Place in the general narrative context of its 
climactic trial sequence. The protagonist again acts as defendant, on trial for a 
crime that she has committed, and possessing knowledge pertaining to this crime 
(and shared with the spectator) that she wishes to keep from the courtroom. Once 
again the female and the law are placed at cross-purposes, encouraging a double-
trial structure through their adversarial relationship. However Madame X provides a 
more consistent and radical critique of the law than Peyton Place, which I will 
locate in its uses of melodramatic formal strategies to produce intense states of 
emotion, and a more committed engagement with the female viewpoint, reflected in 
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the use of “excessive” devices that overwhelm the conventions of trial 
representation. Rafter argues that Madame X ‘may be the worst trial film ever 
made’.342 However, it is in the extent to which the film diverges from the trial film 
model of representation in speaking to its own construction of justice that its 
achievement lies. 
The generic status of Madame X is evident from the opening credits’ 
announcement of ‘Lana Turner as Madame X’, which serves to foreground a female 
star who is particularly associated with melodrama, and indicate that this female 
star will be the film’s protagonist. This is expressed not only through the above the 
title billing – a given considering Turner’s star status - but also in the phrasing that 
positions that star “as” the title character, and features a title that, by 1966, brings 
its own associations with a particular melodrama narrative.343 These factors in 
combination situate Madame X as a woman’s melodrama, but I wish to briefly look 
at them in isolation. The role of Turner’s star presence to understanding this 
particular text is important, especially given that, in contrast to Peyton Place, the 
star is the sole protagonist of the film.344 Madame X was produced towards the end 
of Turner’s star career, at a point when, as Richard Dyer notes, her films ‘seem in 
parts like mere illustrations of her life’.345 The public details of Turner’s own 
personal life, including a highly publicised murder trial in 1958 and a volatile 
relationship with her daughter,346 are woven into her film persona and affect films’ 
                                                          
342 Nicole Rafter, ‘American Criminal Trial Films’, p. 18. 
343 The bold yellow font, styled in an imitation of elegant handwriting, and the lush musical score 
accompanying the credits also make clear the generic terrain of the film. 
344 Although Turner is undoubtedly the bankable star name of the Peyton Place cast, my previous 
discussion demonstrated that strategies of audience identification and narrative focus are 
distributed among a larger number of characters. 
345 Dyer, ‘Four Films of Lana Turner’, p. 410. 
346 On April 14th 1958, Turner’s daughter Cheryl Crane stabbed and killed her mother’s boyfriend 
Johnny Stompanato. The matter was taken to an inquest, where it was ruled a justifiable homicide. 
These events, including Turner’s emotional testimony at the inquest, were highly publicised, and 
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uses of it. Turner as the suffering mother of the melodrama, inviting audience 
empathy while simultaneously punished for her excessive desires, is a narrative 
congruent with the star’s off-screen persona,347 utilised in Peyton Place and 
Imitation of Life,348 and which reaches its apotheosis with Madame X.349  
Audience expectations regarding Madame X also reflect the material’s status 
as an existing property, a 1908 French stage play by Alexandre Bisson that had 
                                                          
have been said to have considerably boosted the box-office of Peyton Place, which was playing in 
theaters at the time. It is impossible to imagine that these events – which were rumoured to have 
inspired the novel Where Love Has Gone by Harold Robbins (1962) and its subsequent film 
adaptation, Where Love Has Gone (Dir: Edward Dmytryk, 1964) – were not on the minds of the 
filmmakers and audiences of Madame X.  
347 The conflicting impulses of the public commentary, combining sympathy for and condemnation 
of Turner, are evident in this headline subsequent to Stompanato’s death: “TRY THOUGH SHE DID, 
TURNER COULD NOT PROTECT CHERYL…TOO MANY FATHERS, TOO MUCH TROUBLE CREATED THE 
INEVITABLE TRAGEDY”. 
348 This film in particular features a line that serves as a summary of the Turner persona, uttered by 
her character Lora Meredith: “I want more. Everything. Maybe too much.” 
349 The following is a plot summary of the film: Holly Parker (Lana Turner), a former shopgirl, 
marries the aristocrat Clayton Anderson (John Forsythe) and moves to his family manor, where 
they live with his mother Estelle (Constance Bennett). The couple soon have a son, Clayton Jr. 
(Teddy Quinn), but Holly’s happiness is compromised by Clayton’s frequent absences in pursuit of a 
political career. Holly retreats into solitude, but is persuaded by Estelle to keep up her duties on 
the upper class social scene. In the process, Holly meets playboy Phil Benton (Ricardo Montalban), 
with whom she develops a romantic relationship. Phil is accidentally killed during an attempt by 
Holly to call off the relationship for the sake of her marriage and child, and a panicked Holly 
discovers that Estelle has been monitoring her actions and is aware of the affair. Estelle blackmails 
Holly into faking her own death so that the scandal resulting from Phil’s death will not disgrace the 
Anderson family name. Holly reluctantly agrees, and her disappearance is arranged while on a boat 
trip with Clayton Jr. Holly sinks into depression, with the following years containing only a brief 
interlude of happiness with a European composer Christian Torben (John Van Dreelen). Holly flees 
Torben, unable to forge a new life without her son. She then becomes a prostitute in a variety of 
locations, meeting in Mexico a fellow American, Dan Sullivan (Burgess Meredith), who learns the 
truth of her identity and devises a plan to blackmail the Andersons. Under false pretences, he 
brings Holly to America, but when she learns of his plan, she shoots him dead. She is arrested and 
refuses to give her identity to the police, becoming in the process of signing of confession with an 
‘X’ the eponymous Madame. Unbeknownst to either party, Holly’s court-appointed attorney is her 
son (now played by Keir Dullea), on his first case. The trial begins, and over the course of 
proceedings the truth of Holly’s identity is revealed to Estelle and Clayton Sr., before Holly herself 
realises her relationship to her attorney. Unwilling even now to disgrace the Andersons, Holly 
relinquishes her silence and gives testimony in which she explains her motivations without 
revealing to Clay Jr. (and the court) the secret of her identity. Clay’s closing statement is a 
testament to Holly’s motherly love. As the trial is adjourned for juror deliberations, Holly collapses. 
On her deathbed, she has a final interaction with her son. The pair form a close bond, but Holly 
keeps her secret and dies just before the verdict is to be announced. Father and son leave Holly’s 
deathbed to return to the courtroom. 
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spawned four previous American screen adaptations.350 A presumed audience 
familiarity with the developments of the Madame X narrative is evident in the 
film’s original trailer, which refers to the climactic developments (“in blazing 
headlines and sensational trial, she faced the world as Madame X”). The audience 
expects a climactic trial scene, but one in alignment with the conventions of the 
woman’s melodrama (as opposed to the conventions of the more traditional trial 
films examined in my first chapter). This familiar narrative (the specificities of 
which I will discuss further shortly) is presented in this adaptation alongside the 
formal signifiers developed by the 1950s family melodrama. Douglas Sirk was 
attached to Madame X in its planning stages,351 and the presence of several of Sirk’s 
frequent collaborators from his Hollywood career, including not only Turner (the 
star of Imitation of Life), but producer Ross Hunter, musical composer Frank 
Skinner and cinematographer Russell Metty, all suggest that Madame X was 
attempting to recreate the commercially successful formula of Sirk’s films, offering 
an emotional story to a predominantly female audience and employing a dramatic 
yet sumptuous mise-en-scène.  
Thus several of the film’s key contexts establish its generic alignment and 
offer ways to approach an analysis of it. One other crucial context is the specific 
type of narrative model it presents. Madame X is a paradigmatic example of the 
maternal melodrama subgenre, a term coined by Viviani in an article that used the 
1920 and 1966 adaptations of Bisson’s play to demarcate its birth and death 
                                                          
350 Madame X (Dir: George F. Marion, 1916), Madame X (Dir: Frank Lloyd, 1920), Madame X (Dir: 
Lionel Barrymore, 1929), and Madame X (Dir: Sam Wood, 1937).  
351 See Christian Viviani ‘Who is Without Sin: the Maternal Melodrama in American Film, 1930-
1939’ [1980] in ‘The Moving Image: Pathos and the Maternal’ in Marcia Landy (ed.) Imitations of 
Life: a reader on film and television melodrama, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991),p. 
170; and Jean-Loup Bourget, ‘Sirk and the Critics’, Bright Lights Film Journal (April 2005) < 
http://brightlightsfilm.com/sirk-and-the-critics/#.Vcdb5_lVikp> accessed 09 August 2015.  
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(respectively).352 Viviani argues that the first adaptations of Madame X established 
the ‘structural and dramaturgical’ model of the maternal melodrama in the 
American cinema for the following decades, which he presents as follows:353   
A woman is separated from her child, falls from her social class and 
founders in disgrace. The child grows up in respectability and enters 
established society […] The mother watches the social rise of her child from 
afar; she cannot risk jeopardizing his fortunes by contamination with her 
own bad repute. Chance draws them together again, and the partial or total 
rehabilitation of the mother is accomplished, often through a cathartic trial 
scene.354  
 
This model fits particularly well with the other elements suggested by the film’s 
star and by the broader generic field: the maternal melodrama’s focus on female 
desire and suffering within a restricted, hierarchical social world which has seen it 
designated ‘the paradigmatic type of the woman’s film’.355 Other critics have 
considered the implications of this for the film’s feminist potential. Doane 
considers the subgenre’s prevalence to be a result of melodrama’s close alignment 
‘with the delineation of a lack of social power […] characteristic of the cultural 
positioning of women’ subsequently arguing that from ‘this point of view, it is not 
surprising that the social function most rigorously associated with femininity – that 
of motherhood – should form the focus of a group of films which exploit the 
pathetic effect’.356 Williams, despite acknowledging that there is a masochistic 
element to the female spectator’s response to the suffering mother, refutes claims 
                                                          
352 Prominent examples of the subgenre (in terms of initial popular response or subsequent 
appraisal) include The Sin of Madelon Claudet (Dir: Edgar Selwyn, 1931), the first two versions of 
Stella Dallas (Dir: Henry King, 1925; Dir: King Vidor, 1937), The Great Lie (Dir: Edmund Goulding, 
1941) and To Each His Own (Dir: Mitchell Liesen, 1946).  
353 Christian Viviani, ‘Who is Without Sin’, p. 171. 
354 Ibid. 
355 Mary Ann Doane The Desire to Desire, p. 73; quoted in Brenda Austin-Smith, ‘The Ethics of 
Murder’, p. 102. 
356 Mary Ann Doane, ‘The Moving Image: Pathos and the Maternal’ in Marcia Landy (ed.) Imitations 
of Life: a reader on film and television melodrama, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991), p. 
286. 
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that the maternal melodrama merely serves to punish the transgressive woman, 
arguing that it holds progressive potential through its simultaneous management of 
multiple points of view and subject positions. Williams maintains that ‘[r]ather than 
raging against a fate that the audience has learned to accept, the female hero often 
accepts a fate that the audience at least partially questions’.357 Williams argues that 
ultimately, ‘the maternal melodrama presents a recognizable picture of woman's 
ambivalent position under patriarchy’.358 The prominence given to the trial in all of 
the adaptations of Madame X makes explicit this ambivalence by making the 
female subject to a patriarchal courtroom. I wish now to look at this particular 
adaptation in detail.  
The struggles over identity against or within patriarchy that Lang sees as 
constitutive of melodrama’s subject matter are evident throughout Madame X, 
beginning with its title. Holly Anderson is presented as an individual whose identity 
is continually reinvented and subject to the control of a series of male (and, in one 
crucial instance, female) characters, incorporating roles from wife and mother to 
society hostess and fallen woman. Although her refusal to forge any kind of 
positive new identity following her separation from Clay Jr. suggests a ‘devaluation 
of the individual’ at the expense of a maternal ideal, it also manifests as a refusal to 
perform the identities projected on to her by Christian and Dan. The 
commodification of Holly by men reaches its apotheosis in her eventual turn 
towards prostitution (it is at this point in the narrative that she refers to herself as 
“merchandise”), but this is merely the logical continuation of a theme throughout 
                                                          
357 Linda Williams ‘“Something Else besides a Mother”: Stella Dallas and the Maternal Melodrama’ 
Cinema Journal 24:1 (Autumn, 1984), p. 22. 
358 Ibid., p. 23. 
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the narrative that begins with the scenes of life in the aristocratic Anderson family 
social world.  
This world constitutes the repressive and superficial social sphere familiar 
to the melodrama, what Benton refers to as “the breeding ground of the shallow set” 
where “facades” hide the underlying toxicity. In this particular instance, it is class-
consciousness which comes to the fore of the negative representation of the social 
world, and which lies at the root of Holly’s unhappiness. The opening scene of 
Holly’s arrival at the Anderson mansion immediately makes evident the distance of 
this world from her own background (she notes “and I thought I was living on a 
grand scale when I moved into a five room apartment”). The most telling of these 
opening moments revolves around the series of portraits of the male Anderson 
ancestors in the mansion’s hallway, which inspire Holly to joke to Clay “were all 
your ancestors men?” The Anderson lineage relies on both a suppression of female 
identity and a rigid, repeated construction of masculine identity that already 
suggests Holly’s fate in this environment. Her difference will be articulated by 
Benton, who tells Holly that “you’re a real, live human being. Clay’s a blueprint of 
the Anderson male” (although it is telling that, even here, Benton’s assertion is part 
of his own attempt to construct an idealised image of Holly). Subsequent montages 
of the Anderson lifestyle, featuring society page headlines that refer to Holly as a 
“socialite” underlines the extent to which the Andersons live under a public gaze, 
crucial to establishing the issues of class and scandal that structure the narrative. 
Holly’s essential incompatibility with this lifestyle is located in her desire for a 
“little red-frame house” referenced in the dialogue at numerous points (and integral 
in its repetitions to the film’s melodramatic mode of narration). But this desire is 
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not compatible with the governing expectations of the social sphere she finds 
herself in.359  
The other crucial character in the development of this theme is Estelle, the 
only fellow female Anderson presented. An addition to the ‘Madame X’ narrative 
(no equivalent character appears in any of the preceding film versions), Estelle 
functions as a contrast to Holly; she has subsumed her own identity into the 
patriarchal status constructions demanded by the Anderson name. Her advice to 
Holly regarding Clayton’s absences early in the narrative – reminding her of “social 
obligations” and adding that “Anderson wives must learn to wait” – does not 
acknowledge Holly’s emotional state (which is conveyed partly through shots of 
Holly framed in windows and mirrors, a typical melodramatic device for expressing 
domestic entrapment) but proffers her an inherited model of behaviour that denies 
her any autonomy. Estelle’s dissatisfaction with Holly, alluded to throughout the 
early part of the narrative, is articulated in their confrontation following Benton’s 
death, when her mother-in-law states that “I knew what you were the moment I laid 
eyes on you […] you’ve always been a little shopgirl from San Francisco.” Estelle’s 
absolute adherence to structures of class division and maintenance of social position 
blinds her to Holly’s positive qualities, and its manifestation in the relentless 
avoidance of scandal is more destructive than the scandalous act itself. It is during 
Estelle’s machinations to get rid of Holly that the specific connotations of a trial to 
                                                          
359 Madame X belongs to another model of family melodrama in which the middle-class milieu is 
replaced with an upper-class environment in which status is defined by distinctions between 
inherited and acquired wealth (or “old” and “new” money). Examples include Written on the Wind, 
Cat on a Hot Tin Roof (Dir: Richard Brooks, 1958) and Home From the Hill (Dir: Vincente Minnelli, 
1960). Ellen Seiter notes that within these narrative models ‘upward social mobility affects the 
happiness of characters’ [see Ellen Seiter, ‘Men, Sex, and Money in Recent Family Melodrama’ in 
Marcia Landy (ed.) Imitations of Life: a reader on film and television melodrama, (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1991), p. 526.]. 
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the film’s melodramatic social world is established. When convincing Holly to fake 
her death and save the Anderson name, Estelle mentions the hypothetical 
“unsavoury trial” that would ensue following Phil’s death. The trial is situated 
primarily in relation to its role in the destruction of social position rather than as a 
platform for justice. 
Throughout these events audience identification remains with Holly, whose 
point of view is, as per the woman’s melodrama, aligned with a prioritisation of the 
emotional that stands in contrast to the “façade”-obsessed social world.  
Throughout the film the mise-en-scène, corresponding to Cook’s conceptualisation 
of woman’s film style, expresses Holly’s emotional state through uses of lighting, 
colour, framing, scoring, setting (including multiple instances of pathetic fallacy) 
and more overt instances of subjectivisation achieved through voiceover narration 
(the voices of Clay Jr. and Sr. heard on the soundtrack over shots of Holly alone on 
a train, visibly reacting to these “memories”) and hallucinatory interludes that the 
spectator experiences with Holly (including a shot of Clay Jr. as a child that a 
subsequent shot “reveals” to both Holly and the audience to be a different 
actor/character). Emotion, both in its depiction and production, is crucial to the 
meanings of Madame X specifically and the maternal melodrama generally, with 
Doane arguing that:  
Of the various subgenres of the woman’s film, the maternal melodrama is 
the one which appears to fully earn the label “weepie.” The plight of the 
mother with respect to her child, the necessary separations, losses, and 
humiliations she must suffer are often moving and often “move” the 
spectator to tears. The films obsessively structure themselves around just-
missed moments, recognitions which occur “too late,” and blockages of 
communication which might have been avoided.360  
                                                          
360 Mary Ann Doane, ‘The Moving Image’, p. 299. 
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These moments, recognitions and blockages are crucial to the narration of Madame 
X. Steve Neale, considering the tear-inducing pathos of the melodrama, argues that 
the films often utilise a ‘hierarchical point of view structure’ in which the spectator 
knows more than the characters,361 and a differentiation between ‘optical point of 
view and character knowledge’an add so that acts of seeing and recognising 
become distinguished from one another.362 These discrepancies in knowledge and 
point of view must appear alongside the second characteristic of melodrama’s 
narrative mode, which is a recognition of ‘temporal irreversibility’ – the ‘too late’ 
referred to by Doane - in order to produce the poignancy and pathos that induce 
tears. 
This hierarchical point of view structure will reach a highly elaborated (and 
thus especially emotional) climax in Madame X’s trial scene, which is why I have 
introduced its qualities here. But it is established earlier in the film during Holly’s 
final interactions with her husband and son. The final interaction with Clay Sr. over 
the telephone exemplifies the play with character knowledge, with the device of 
long-distance communication giving the moment an added layer of pathos through 
Clay’s inability to see Holly in this scenario (thus giving the spectator knowledge 
that is denied Clay; not only does the spectator know the truth that Clay does not, 
we see the emotional cues given by Holly that he cannot). A slightly different effect 
is at work during Holly’s last scene with Clay Jr. as a child. Clay Jr. seems to on 
some level intuit the ensuing events of which he has no external knowledge, asking 
“what is ‘to die?’” and hysterically telling Holly he misses her when she comes to 
his room to say goodnight. However, this does not undermine the pathos of the 
                                                          
361 Steve Neale ‘Melodrama and tears’ Screen 27.6 (1986), p. 12. 
362 Ibid, p. 10. 
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moment. Rather, it exacerbates it through recourse to a mother/son bond that goes 
beyond reason and language, that is located firmly in the imaginary sphere (as per 
Lang’s argument), and which will reappear in the final stages of the narrative, 
including the trial, where it will overwhelm the legal narrative’s structures of 
reason.   
The emotional power of the mother/son bond forms a paradoxical 
relationship to Clay Jr’s subsequent development. On one level, the separation of 
Holly and Clay Jr. exemplifies Williams’ psychoanalytic reading of the maternal 
melodrama’s narrative development, in that the male child ‘separates from his 
mother to identify with his father and take on a masculine identity of greater 
autonomy’.363  This parallels the narrative development of Madame X, with Clay 
following his father into the masculinised profession of law and in a sense 
following the “blueprint” of the Anderson male. It is telling that the two professions 
associated with the male Andersons are law and politics, both professions that 
propel the individual into the public sphere and exemplify a traditional, specifically 
masculine engagement with the social world, aligned with a command of language, 
which stands in direct opposition to the feminine domestic sphere. Yet there also 
exists an acknowledgment that Clay Jr’s specific choices in his social ascent are in 
one sense aligned with the female (or at least the female’s sacrifice), in a 
mechanism similar to Selena’s attempted sacrifice for the sake of Ted’s legal career 
in Peyton Place. When Estelle, in a scene prior to the trial, asks Clay Jr. “Whatever 
possessed an Anderson to go into criminal law?”, his response “Because I’m 50% 
Parker” again suggests the hidden reliance of the male’s ascension to an 
                                                          
363 Linda Williams, ‘“Somelthing Else Besides a Mother”’, p. 9. 
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autonomous identity upon a female inheritance (and, unbeknownst to Clay, a 
female sacrifice).  
The scenes featured between Holly’s murder of Dan and the courtroom trial 
reintroduce the Andersons (Clays Jr. and Sr., and Estelle) into the narrative, thus 
setting into motion the series of recognitions and misrecognitions that the 
differentiation of character and spectator knowledge leads us to expect from the 
film’s final act. However, a choice is made here that differs from the previous 
classical Hollywood adaptation of Madame X and which I believe is telling. In the 
1937 version, the spectator is made aware of the relationship of the attorney to his 
client prior to their first interaction with each other. However, in this version, the 
initial meeting of client and attorney does not give the spectator this additional level 
of knowledge over the characters. This choice, I would argue, entails less 
problematisation of the female point of view; denying the spectator omniscience 
allows us to experience the same process of seeing then recognising that increases 
our empathy for all of the characters. The hierarchical point of view structure is also 
reliant upon the matter of Holly’s silence. If she reveals anything about her history 
or her motives for the crime prior to the trial, then the precise moments of 
recognition upon which the emotional climax depends will not appear. She must 
become “Madame X”.  
Yet, the specific treatment of Holly’s silence imbues it with a further 
resonance that I wish to consider. It is made clear during Holly’s medical 
examination that her initial, total silence is not the result of catatonia but a wilful 
tactic made by Holly (when the doctor mentions the “psycho ward” in front of her, 
she speaks, agreeing to sign a confession). Thus Holly’s subsequent recourse to 
silence in the courtroom is figured not as an unambiguous marker of melodrama’s 
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passive protagonist, but as Holly’s challenge to the patriarchal power-structures of 
the court. It is, as Austin-Smith asserts, an excessive silence, one that poses a 
challenge to the court’s methods of inquiry, evaluation and judgment. Such silences 
often function as the female’s main challenge to the court, featuring also in 
Confession and Outrage. They reveal the unquestioned authority granted language 
by the courtroom, and language’s alignment with a patriarchal construction of law 
and justice that marginalises the female.  
However, Holly’s silence for the initial portion of the courtroom scene also 
permits its initial adherence to a more conventional use of the trial form. The first 
few minutes of the trial scene are structured around Clay Jr’s courtroom 
performance, with the film drawing heavily upon the conventions of the trial film I 
identified in the first chapter. The transition to the courtroom scene demonstrates 
this, fading from an image of Clay Jr. having just realised a trial strategy (to “try 
Dan Sullivan for his own murder”) to a medium shot of Holly, her expression 
blank, staring ahead of herself as the prosecutor’s opening statement is heard on the 
soundtrack.  
Holly’s blankness and the rounded depiction of the attorney allows narrative 
emphasis at this point to be directed towards Clay Jr’s courtroom prowess,364 and 
the juxtaposition of the preliminary discussion of trial tactics with the trial itself 
guides the viewer towards this structure of identification. The tropes employed in 
The Young Philadelphians as a way of signifying the inexperienced lawyer’s 
courtroom skill reappear, including the judge ruling in Clay’s favour after an 
                                                          
364 Compare the characterisation of Clay Jr. to the more typical ‘flat’ characterisations of the judge 
(Carl Benton Reid) and prosecutor (Warren Stevens), neither of whom we see outside of the 
courtroom. 
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objection is posed by the attorney, and reaction shots of the prideful Clay Sr. and 
Estelle. The treatment of the witness examinations performs a similar function, 
allowing the spectator to see how the strategies introduced in the preceding 
sequence serve Clay Jr’s case for the defence. The examinations are presented with 
a conventional economy through elliptical cuts or having the examination and 
cross-examination of a single witness depicted within a single take. This befits the 
non-emotional investment of the witness characters and the prioritisation (at this 
point in the sequence) of the legal narrative. Each of the four initial witnesses 
provides, from Clay’s questioning, information that collectively constitutes a case 
for the defence: the first witness establishes that Holly appeared to have gone into 
shock; the second that there were no witnesses to the actual murder; the third that 
Dan Sullivan had a history of perpetrating crimes against women; and the fourth 
that Holly is addicted to absinthe.  
The fourth witness is Dr. Evans (Frank Maxwell), whose presence functions 
similarly to Dr. Swain’s in Peyton Place. He provides a perspective that bridges the 
gap between the procedural rigidity of the courtroom and the excessively emotional 
perspective of the female. The depiction of his testimony also climaxes in the 
crucial moment that re-aligns the point of view of the scene with the female 
protagonist and thus reconstructs the dramaturgical and narrative emphases of the 
subsequent developments. Clay Jr. asks Dr. Evans whether “it would be possible 
for an individual to be legally sane but medically insane?” and the doctor responds 
“Tragically so”.365 For the third time the prosecutor proceeds to object to Clayton’s 
line of questioning, stating firmly that the “medical sanity of the defendant has no 
bearing on this case.” Beginning on a shot of the prosecutor behind his desk, the 
                                                          
365 A response that leaves no doubt where the doctor’s – and the film’s – sympathies lie.  
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camera tracks right to follow him as he walks towards the out-of-frame Clayton, but 
then halts this movement and tracks in instead on a now disturbed looking Holly. 
The two attorneys’ argument and the banging of the judge’s gavel are heard, but 
over a close-up of Holly, who begins to twitch nervously. Non-diegetic scoring 
begins to stir, low in the mix but underlining Holly’s unease. This is the first use of 
the non-diegetic scoring that will henceforth be employed throughout the sequence. 
I have noted how uncommon the use of non-diegetic scoring is in the courtroom 
sequence generally,366 and in this instance it is clearly aligned with Holly’s 
experience in the courtroom, signifying a mental disturbance that anticipates her 
subsequent breakdown.  
Holly’s breakdown and outburst is important not only in terms of story (it 
leads to the recognition by her former husband and mother-in-law and thus 
produces a tonal shift in the emphases of the sequence) but because, in aligning 
itself so concretely with Holly’s point of view through its representational 
strategies, it presents a radical rupture of the respectful form and objective point of 
view structures implicitly demanded by the dominant trial depiction paradigm. The 
score leads the viewer into a subjective representation of Holly’s delirium. The 
camera remains on a close-up of Holly as the two lawyers argue, but now 
superimposes under the shot an image of the two attorneys and the judge (Fig. 62). 
The angle of this superimposed image begins to cant, and a third superimposed 
shot, a whip pan of the “spinning” courtroom, further augments the disorientation 
that the film is clearly aligning with Holly’s interior state. A close-up image of the 
judge’s gavel being pounded appears alongside the other superimposed images on 
the right of the frame, and Holly looks continually more disturbed as the argument 
                                                          
366 See Chapter One, p. 200-202. 
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of the attorneys blends into an inaudible noise (Fig. 63). The scoring continues but 
at a gradually increasing volume, intermingling with the diegetic cacophony. 
Finally, Holly shouts “Stop it!” and leaps upwards out of frame, ending this 
nightmarish interlude. There is a cut to a shot of the judge, the two lawyers and the 
witness all turning to look at the finally responsive Holly, startled by her 
reponsiveness. Holly leans forward and moves around the desk, grasping it as if 
weak as she cries “Stop it! I can’t bear any more.” The moment becomes doubly 
excessive; both the female’s subjectivity and the female’s outburst are ruptures to 
the respectful form of the trial.  
  
 
Figs. 62 (top) and 63 (bottom) 
 
The following moments set into motion the series of changes in the film’s 
hierarchical point of view structure, as several central characters attain a level of 
knowledge held by the spectator; they see and recognise. The multiplicity of 
character viewpoints included (Holly, Clay Sr. and Estelle all undergo realisations 
of other identities in the subsequent moments) intensifies the empathetic emotional 
258 
 
engagement with the sequence, shifting focus away from the procedural narrative 
and into the melodramatic web of private looks and emotional revelations. Upon 
Holly’s outburst, there is a cut to a close-up of Estelle, who leans forward in alarm, 
her eyes widened. The following long shot is aligned with Estelle’s point of view as 
the camera zooms in to a reframed medium shot of Holly, who hysterically asks 
“How long must I wait?” before convulsing as Clay Jr. rushes to her side. Estelle’s 
recognition of Holly at this moment is pivotal. The character who forced Holly to 
abandon her family now becomes the only character (other than Holly) to be 
entirely aware of the situation of ‘Madame X’. Ignoring the judge’s requests for her 
to “compose herself”, Holly leaps out of Clayton’s arms as the music builds to a 
crescendo, and cries out to the judge “Take my life! The sooner, the better, but take 
it!” underlining the sacrificial element of her actions. There is murmuring from the 
courtroom throughout, and the non-diegetic scoring continues, which, when 
combined with Holly’s own failure to “compose herself” demonstrates the excess 
(both diegetic and non-diegetic) on display.  
The emotional outburst cannot be contained within the courtroom ritual, and 
a recess is called in order to prevent any further excesses. The recess cements the 
scene’s tonal shift as the procedural and ‘first time lawyer’ narrative focus of the 
pre-recess portion contrasts with the domestic drama of recognition and reunion 
post-recess. It is worth noting that Dr. Evans appears in the recess interlude, tending 
to Holly at her jail cell bedside - his ability to work across these spaces 
demonstrates his alignment with a common sense compassion and understanding 
that is implicitly lacking in the institution of the law. The doctor informs Clay that 
Holly is “worn out in spirit as well as body. She can’t endure much more”. This line 
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begins to prepare the audience for Holly’s death, a fate that escalates the dramatic 
stakes of the subsequent revelations and recognitions.  
The audience returns to the courtroom with Holly. The following 
recognitions (of Holly by Clay Sr. and vice versa, and of son by mother) occur 
alongside the prosecutor’s closing statement. I wish to pay close attention to this 
segment as it demonstrates clearly the infiltration of trial convention by the 
concerns of the woman’s melodrama. The prosecutor’s closing statement is treated 
in a conventional manner at its outset, with a medium long shot of the prosecutor 
stood before the jury box. The shot places the spectator within the jury box with the 
prosecutor frontally shot on the left of frame – representational strategies that 
correspond with strategies of the trial film as outlined by Clover, spatially 
positioning the spectator in the role of juror. Yet the conventional development is 
eschewed when the subsequent edits shift the spectator’s attention to a series of 
close-ups that cut between Holly and Clay Sr., depicting their hesitant mutual 
recognition as the prosecutor continues, heard on the soundtrack but off-screen. The 
placement of this moment outside or beyond the legal narrative is visualised by the 
arcing camera movement that moves with Holly as she turns back to face the 
courtroom stage, her expression nevertheless conveying her preoccupation (Figs. 
64-65).   
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Figs. 64 (top) and 65 (bottom) 
 
There is a cut in to a close-up of Holly, followed by a shot of the prosecutor 
stood next to the jury box and gesturing to the off-screen space occupied by Holly 
and Clay as he states that “the defence attorney comes before us on his first case, 
young and eager, son of a brilliant and famous father, and I’m sure Governor 
Anderson…”. There is a cut to the recurrent two-shot composition of the defence’s 
bench with Clay Jr on the left of frame and Holly on the right as the prosecution 
continues “…is proud of the resourceful fight that Clayton Anderson Jr. has waged 
in this courtroom.” There is a flicker of realisation on Holly’s face, before the 
camera cuts in to a close-up of her as she turns her head to Clay Jr. with a stunned 
look accompanied by a sting from the score. Another set of looks is exchanged 
between Clay Sr. and Holly (Figs 66-67); their expressions are pained, and Clay Sr. 
moves his weight forward and opens his mouth as if to speak in an impotent gesture 
that captures the impossibility of any dynamic action within the scenario. In 
keeping with the conventions of the melodrama, the immediate social environment 
acts as a blockage to the desired action. The remainder of the prosecutor’s closing 
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statement is relegated to off-screen sound as a series of two-shots and close-ups cut 
between the figures in the domestic drama occurring concurrently.  
Following the initial shock of Holly’s realisation(s), the tone shifts in order 
to convey the overwhelming maternal love felt by Holly that is juxtaposed with the 
prosecutor’s concurrent damning critique of her character. Her expression softens 
and the gentle theme that has been featured in earlier scenes depicting Holly’s 
relationship with Clay begins to play. While the prosecutor states that “Madame X 
is a murderess,” a medium close-up of Holly shows her begin to smile, her gaze still 
fixed upon her son (Fig. 68), followed by a cut to a subjective shot (from Holly’s 
perspective) of Clay Jr. in profile (Fig. 69). The contrasts between the Holly the 
spectator sees in these moments and the character being built in the court case are 
rendered ironic, and simultaneously demonstrate both the primacy of the emotional 
to the female point of view (which the use of subjective shots aligns the spectator 
with) and the inefficiency of the legal point of view. Prior to this moment, the 
primary source of irony has been that we knew what none of the characters did – 
that Holly’s defence attorney is her son. This moment entails the point in the 
narrative at which Holly’s level of knowledge and point of view comes to parallel 
ours. This crucially alters our reaction to the sequence. The discrepancies in point 
of view and knowledge remain, but it is now primarily the court (as embodied here 
by the prosecutor) whose knowledge and point of view is seen to be limited. Irony 
emerges at the expense of the law; the deliberate juxtaposition of the prosecutor’s 
“murderess” narrative and Holly’s maternal feeling problematizes the legal, rather 
than the female, point of view.  
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Figs. 66 (top) and 67 (bottom) 
 
Figs. 68 (top) and 69 (bottom) 
  Holly’s realisation leads to a penultimate inflection of the courtroom 
procedural convention. She asks to take to the stand just before Clay Jr. is to give 
his closing statement to the jury, stating in response to Clay’s concern that she is 
“not prepared as a witness” that “I know exactly what I want to say”. The audience 
is implicitly aware that her unprepared statement (the notion of speaking from the 
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heart pivotal to the female melodrama’s concerns with expressivity) will convey the 
emotional truth even though Holly will not reveal to Clay that he is the son she is 
protecting. Thus Holly takes to the stand, accompanied by a supportive and 
unknowing Clayton. She delivers her testimony, explaining to Clay that he alone 
has made her silence impossible before begging his forgiveness for her prior lack of 
cooperation. She asks him “not to fight any longer”, explaining that she killed Dan 
Sullivan because he “was going to tell my child that I was alive, and what I’d 
become.” She states that “I don’t have much to leave my son. Only a lie. That his 
mother was clean, and good.” When asked by Clayton “Why did you leave your 
family?” Holly states that “I wasn’t suitable. I really wasn’t. I wonder why it took 
me so long to see it?” She concludes, her gaze fixed upon Clayton, that “I killed 
Dan Sullivan. To keep my son from knowing about me. I’m not sorry. And if time 
could turn back, I’d kill him again. That’s the truth, child. The truth.”  
 Apart from an early acknowledgment of the spectators in front of her, and a 
few instances of turning to face the judge, this testimony has Holly direct her 
statement and her gaze specifically to Clay Jr. The shot sequence is limited mostly 
to alternating close-ups of Holly and Clay Jr. and reaction shots of the elder Clayton 
and Estelle. There is no sense of a broader public gaze, especially when combined 
with the specificity of the speech’s address. Although Holly’s remarks concerning 
her respectability and cleanliness suggest that she has internalised the attitudes that 
led her to separate from the Andersons initially, the reaction shots of the visibly 
upset Estelle complicate the film’s affirmation of these remarks. The sequence also 
works to produce the intensified pathos of the maternal melodrama. Unlike the 
expressive reaction shots of Clay Sr. and Estelle during Holly’s speech, which 
convey their overwhelming emotions, the reaction shots of Clay Jr. do not display 
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this same intensity of feeling. He is listening to Holly’s narrative, but he cannot 
comprehend its relevance to him; the acts of seeing and recognising are 
differentiated, increasing the pathetic effect. Even though Holly has technically told 
Clay and the courtroom “the truth,” we know that there is more that she cannot tell; 
the telling word in her final sentence is not “truth” but the “child” that follows.  
Rather than granting Holly the final word in the courtroom sequence, 
Madame X provides one further melodramatic inflection of the courtroom 
procedure as, immediately upon the end of Holly’s testimony, there is a fade to 
Clay’s closing statement. I have outlined how this element of trial procedure is 
given a particular dramatic emphasis in the golden age trial films, but it is here 
inflected by the terms of the maternal melodrama, the content of the statement 
favouring emotion over reason, rather than attempting to unify the two under an 
overarching justice model, and making explicit the affirmation of a model of justice 
that diverges from the court’s. This closing statement also underlines the scene’s 
pathos as Clayton articulates his admiration and love for the woman whom he will 
never realise is his mother. The sincerity of Clay’s speech, which must be conveyed 
due to the connotations of lawyering-as-acting (and the ethical ambivalence 
entailed) that I outlined earlier,367 is established by invoking the notion of the 
unrehearsed, as Clay opens by telling the jury that “There is a speech I was going to 
make, but I can’t make it now. Not after those simple, heart-breaking words of 
hers”.368 Reaction shots of the distraught Clay Sr. and Estelle and a proud yet 
tremulous Holly punctuate the subsequent statement, perhaps most significantly (in 
                                                          
367 See Chapter One, p. 78-79. 
368 The fact that Clay has been sympathetically characterised outside of the courtroom also guides 
the spectator to view this statement as truth rather than part of an attorney’s courtroom 
“performance”.  
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keeping with the intensifying pathos of the scenario) the close-up of Holly beaming 
with pride, tearful and trembling as Clay tells the jury that “Her son will never 
know how deeply he is loved.”  
The content of this closing statement is structured entirely around 
considerations of the maternal, invoked in opposition to the court’s constructions of 
law and justice in a manner that evokes the distinctions between natural and 
positive law. The love of the mother is aligned with a natural ideal of law, these 
qualities asserted by Clay Jr.’s parallel of Madame X’s crime with the violent acts 
employed by the “lioness” and the “mother bear” in order to protect their young. 
This construction of natural law appealed to is also, unsurprisingly, aligned with the 
emotional. Clay states that ‘There is a point, at which even justice is unjust’ […] 
Justice must be fair. It must be merciful. It must be understanding.” At the point in 
which the golden age trial films typically present and affirm a standardized model 
of justice, a new construction of justice is being appealed to that is in alignment 
with the point of view of the melodrama (prioritising emotion). This closing 
statement exemplifies what Austin-Smith identifies as the melodrama’s revelation 
of the law’s ‘limitations when it is confronted with an agent whose sacrificial 
motive for violence cannot be accommodated to it, but to which it must 
accommodate itself if justice is to be served’. The melodrama’s role as an aesthetic 
of justice constructs a model of justice that is aligned with the maternal and the 
emotional. 
The trial procedure draws to a close as the court is adjourned for juror 
deliberations. But as Holly and Clay stand up to leave the courtroom, Holly bends 
forward in pain. Madame X’s final scene will not take place within the courtroom, 
but will depict Clay Jr. at Holly’s deathbed, still unaware of the truth regarding her 
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identity. The outcome of the trial is not depicted and the spectator will not be made 
aware of the jury’s verdict. The death of the protagonist could be seen at least in 
part as a narrative development necessitated by censorship. While we may wish to 
see Holly freed, she is nevertheless guilty of (and unrepentant for) the murder of 
Dan Sullivan, and thus her death allows for a nobler and more tragic resolution for 
the character. However, the death also demonstrates the lack of importance the trial 
procedure has had, with the courtroom simply providing the means through which 
‘Madame X’ could finally tell her story and reunite with her son. Their final 
exchanges provide further possibilities for the production of emotion through irony 
and pathos, especially when the dialogue returns to the motif of the “little red-frame 
house” (“Did you have a house like that?” Clay Jr. asks. “Almost” replies his 
mother).  
Now that these goals have been achieved, the story of Madame X, and of 
Holly Anderson, is complete, and the film ends with the elder Clayton coaxing his 
son back to the courtroom for the reading of the jury’s verdict. “The jury is ready to 
come back” he says. “You’re going to win this case, son.” Clay replies “It doesn’t 
matter now.” His final lines demonstrate the film’s complete surrender to the 
Imaginary sphere as he turns to his father and states “I don’t know why, but I loved 
her. From the moment I saw her, I loved her.” Clay’s illogical, purely emotional 
recognition of his mother – “I don’t know why, but I loved her” – recalls his parting 
moments with Holly as a child. This recognition goes beyond language, beyond 
reason and intellect, and speaks instead to other ways of seeing, communicating, 
and judging to which the court has no access. Within this context, the court’s 
verdict is rendered redundant. It speaks to a model of justice which is not the one 
that the film, by this point, has affirmed so thoroughly. 
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 Thus Madame X succeeds where Peyton Place fails in overwhelming the 
dominant voice of law through recourse to the other voice of melodrama. The 
dominance of our alignment with Holly’s subjectivity, and the manner in which the 
legal point of view becomes increasingly deficient over the course of the trial, guide 
the sequence. The conventions of cinematic trial procedure are employed, but are 
consistently figured as deficient in relation to the emotional point of view: the 
language of emotion, shared by Holly and the spectator. The female-centred 
melodrama’s challenge to the dominant structures of the courtroom (and of 
courtroom representation) is thoroughly enacted, demarcating the female 
protagonist not simply as the suffering passive heroine of melodrama, but as a 
justice figure who struggles valiantly against the patriarchal courtroom. 
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4. Disorder and the Caught: The Courtroom Trial Sequence in Film Noir 
 
My research has identified the law noir, a form that critiques the American 
trial system through its use of the double-trial structure. I wish now to pay more 
attention to the interaction between the trial convention and the strategies of noir as 
a broader genre with its own structures of representing law, crime, justice, society 
and the individual. I will begin to conceptualise this interaction by considering the 
field of noir criticism. I will then look at two deliberately oblique uses of the trial 
form in noir (in Scarlet Street and Phantom Lady), before analysing in detail the 
subversion and exaggeration of dominant courtroom representation exhibited 
through the strategies of noir in two films, Stranger on the Third Floor and The 
Lady from Shanghai.   
Defining Noir 
The field of literature on film noir is vast, and an interest in noir has 
persisted in film studies. As a term, noir has been applied within an even greater 
array of contexts than melodrama.369 This means that much noir criticism takes on 
an aspect of metacritique (including Naremore, but also evident in work by Ewing 
[1987], Neale [2000] and Langford  [2005]), studying prior criticism’s 
conceptualisations, contexts and related terminology at least as much as film texts. 
However, as my methodological focus is on textual analysis, I intend to deal with 
literature that looks predominantly at textual aspects of noir: issues of genre, style, 
narrative, content and representation. A thorough examination of the field is beyond 
                                                          
369 In the space of one book Naremore (1998) examines noir as an idea (or ‘discursive construct’), 
within contexts political (as a vehicle for post-WWII left-wing politics) and economic (discussing the 
centrality of B-movie production contexts to noir convention and classification), in terms of its 
racial representation, and as on ongoing cross-media concept.  
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the remit of this project, and so I intend to deal with a number of central and 
interlocking issues, including noir’s generic status, its most consistently identifiable 
features, and its assumed difference from conventional forms in Hollywood cinema. 
I will then consider how these aforementioned issues offer particular ways of 
considering the interaction of noir with the trial convention.  
To consider film noir as a group of films with a set of constitutive elements 
is to return to the notions of genre and legibility I have examined elsewhere. A 
consideration of noir benefits from the same caveat of classification I applied to the 
social problem film using the work of Stanley Cavell; attempting to identify genre 
on the basis of the presence of an immutable set of elements is unproductive. It 
suffices to say that the elements of noir I shall discuss are not essential features that 
fit together to form some complete picture. Rather these elements exist in complex 
combinations across examples of the form. Some appear more often than others, 
some are less common, and none are entirely exclusive to the film noir canon.  
 Yet the issue of whether noir constitutes a genre remains one of the key 
areas of debate within the field. Even early English-language criticism on noir 
disagrees over its generic status; Higham and Greenberg (1968) argue that the 
matching of a specific visual style with stories of fatal interaction between the sexes 
gave noir ‘its completeness as a genre’,370 whereas Schrader (1972) explicitly 
refutes the notion of noir as genre, situating it as a moment in film history as well as 
a cinematic mood.371 Bordwell et al. (1985), Neale (2000) and Langford (2005) 
have noted, and to varying degrees criticised, the invention of noir by critics as an 
                                                          
370 Charles Higham and Joel Greenberg, ‘Noir Cinema’ in Silver and Ursini (eds.) Film Noir Reader. 
(New York: Limelight Editions, 2000), p. 28.   
371 Paul Schrader, ‘Notes on Film Noir’ in Silver and Ursini (eds.) Film Noir Reader. Eds: Silver and 
Ursini (New York: Limelight Editions, 2000), pp. 53-64. 
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after the fact classification of a heterogeneous group of films. I find myself inclined 
to agree with Walker, who argues that:  
The issue of whether the noir cycle constitutes a genre is not very 
interesting: it all depends on how genre is defined, and the fact that it was 
not a genre for the Hollywood studios and filmmakers at the time is not a 
valid argument against its being considered one in retrospect.372  
  
However, I do not wish to sidestep this question entirely, as the issues that have 
circulated around it are pertinent to my own project. Thinking about the fluidity of 
noir’s generic framework, for example, is beneficial to understanding the 
interaction of noir and the trial form. Many studies of noir have focused on genre 
hybridity and the interaction of the noir mode with other generic frameworks. Polan 
(1985) and Krutnik (1991) both posit the specificity of the film noir in its 
modifications of the hard-boiled detective novel literary tradition, and work has 
located noir elements across classical Hollywood genres (including the western373 
and the horror film374). No film relies solely on a homogenized set of conventions 
particular to a single genre, and I would argue that, whether noir is posited as a 
distinct genre or a mode/mood/style/cycle etc., it strikingly and fairly consistently 
inflects the conventions of the trial form when trial sequences do appear within its 
corpus. Considering the interaction of the two cinematic traditions of film noir and 
courtroom depiction may well provide us with a keener understanding of the 
particularities of both. 
                                                          
372 Michael Walker, ‘Film Noir: An Introduction’, p. 38. 
373 See James Ursini, ‘Noir Westerns’ in Silver and Ursini (eds.), Film Noir Reader 4, (New Jersey: 
Limelight Editions, 2004), pp. 247-260; and Robin Wood, ‘Rancho Notorious (1952): A Noir Western 
in Color’ in Film Noir Reader 4, pp. 261-276.  
374 Paul Meehan, Horror Noir: where cinema’s dark sisters met (Jefferson, N.C.; McFarland & Co., 
2011). 
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It is worth establishing what patterns of representation critics have identified 
in noir. Generally, the basic tenet of the noir story (to again borrow Cavell’s 
terminology) is seen to be the presence of crime, considered by Borde and 
Chaumeton (1955) as ‘its most constant characteristic’ and consistently featured in 
definitions since.375 Smith adds to the foundation of crime other ‘left-handed forms 
of human endeavor’ such as adultery, violence, and corruption,376 a useful addition 
that gestures towards the particularities of the milieus of noir: settings of pervasive 
badness. The particular relevance of noir to my topic begins to reveal itself. Noir 
narratives require the presence of crime in a way that melodrama and the social 
problem genres do not. But noir is also different from the crime film genre. It is the 
treatment of crime that contributes to noir’s specificity, and suggests its uneasy 
relationship to the dominant patterns of representing the courtroom trial.  
Michael Walker differentiates noir from earlier crime films through ‘the 
hero’s entanglement in the passions of the criminal world’, a formulation which 
brings us closer to the developments of the noir story.377 Walker’s inventory of the 
key features of film noir also includes its ‘distinctive […] visual style, an unusual 
narrative complexity [and] a generally more critical and subversive view of 
American ideology than the norm’,378 all features that are frequently evoked 
elsewhere and which I will discuss individually in more detail shortly. But Walker’s 
elaboration of the aforementioned ‘entanglement’ at the heart of noir narratives is 
                                                          
375 Raymond Borde and Étienne Chaumeton, ‘Towards a Definition of Film Noir’ in Silver and Ursini 
(eds.) Film Noir Reader. (New York: Limelight Editions, 2000), p. 19. 
376 Imogen Sara Smith, ‘In Lonely Places: Film Noir Outside the City’, Bright Lights Film 
Journal, (August 2009), <http://www.brightlightsfilm.com/65/65noir.php>, accessed 11 July 2015. 
377 Michael Walker, ‘Film Noir: Introduction’ in Cameron (ed.) The Movie Book of Film Noir  
(United Kingdom: Studio Vista, 1994), p. 8. 
378 Ibid. 
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most relevant to my discussion. Walker considers the relation the hero of noir bears 
to the chaotic, criminal ‘noir world’ he or she is plunged into, arguing that  
The noir world and the hero or heroine’s interaction with it are central to 
what is distinctive about film noir. At the beginning of the story, the 
protagonist is leading a safe, ordinary life in the ‘respectable world’. […] 
Then, as the result of a chance meeting or event, or an act of villainy, or – in 
the private-eye films – a seemingly simple commission, he/she is plunged 
into the dangers of the noir world.379  
 
I think this is a good narrative model (even though, as Walker himself admits, it 
cannot account for all examples of film noir) as it is broadly applicable and 
convincingly related by Walker to another commonly identified feature of noir, its 
focus on the hero’s subjectivity. Walker relates oft-discussed noir devices to this 
focus, arguing for instance that ‘the subjective voiceover personalises the 
experience of the recollected past in a very direct way, contributing both thoughts 
and feelings to the narrative’ and that ‘the noir world is reinflected, through the 
flashback structure, as a personal nightmare’.380 The focus on interiority in the 
genre means that the noir world, Walker argues, can be said to have ‘moved inside 
the disturbed protagonist’ over the course of the narrative.381 The subjectivised 
narratives of noir (noted also by Frank Krutnik [1991] and Neale [2000]), have 
been related to the strategies of the family melodrama (both genres being 
influenced by the popularisation of psychoanalysis during the mid-twentieth 
century) and have seen it considered the gendered flipside of the women’s 
melodrama, referred to by Jacobowitz (1992) and Staiger (2008), for example, as 
male melodrama. Walker argues that ‘the interaction with the noir world also 
                                                          
379 Ibid., p. 22. 
380 Ibid., p. 23. 
381 Ibid., p. 15. 
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reveals a fundamental crisis in male control, and, behind this, in Dyer’s words, ‘an 
anxiety over the existence and definition of masculinity and normality’’.382 To 
consider this in relation to Cook’s conceptualisation of the woman’s film,383 one 
could argue that, in noir, it is the male point of view which is ‘problematized’.  
 Indeed this subjectivising can also be said to entail a dramatic mise-en-scène 
analogous to that of the melodrama. Place and Peterson identify a number of visual 
motifs in film noir, including low-key lighting, scenes set at night and shot “night 
for night”, a considerable depth of field (and related use of wide-angle lens 
photography), and ‘bizarre’ imbalanced compositions,384 that they argue constitute 
stylistic ‘distortions and disruptions’ that visually parallel the moral relativism of 
the characters.385 It is worth once again clarifying that these stylistic elements (and 
their identified meanings) are not essential characteristics of film noir. But 
identifying distortions and disruptions of the respectful form associated with 
courtroom convention can be useful to beginning to identify noir’s play with these 
conventions. I maintain that there are patterns of stylistic rupture to the respectful 
form in the courtroom scenes of film noir that range from the minor ruptures of 
They Won’t Believe Me, The File on Thelma Jordan (Dir: Robert Siodmak, 1950) 
and Angel Face (Dir: Otto Preminger, 1952) to the major stylistic interventions of 
this chapter’s case studies. Not all of these stylistic elements are consistently 
present and they are not all foregrounded to the same extent, but their meanings and 
prominence as ruptures to the conventional form are consistent. It should also be 
                                                          
382 Richard Dyer, ‘Resistance Through Charisma: Rita Hayworth and Gilda’ [1978]; quoted in 
Michael Walker, Film Noir: An Introduction, p. 22. 
383 See Chapter Three, pp 192-194. 
384Janey Ann Place and Lowell S. Peterson, ‘Some visual motifs of film noir’ Film Comment 10:1 
(1974), p. 31. 
385 Ibid., p. 32. 
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noted here that Place and Peterson refer to these visual motifs as ‘antitraditional’, a 
term in keeping with the emphasis in much critical scholarship upon noir’s 
difference from convention, an emphasis that I will return to shortly.  
 Noir is also frequently identified as ‘a narrative method that tends to be 
convoluted, murky, ambiguous and disorienting, deliberately rendering the 
audience uneasy, confused or disturbed’.386 As the prior quote demonstrates, this 
narrative method is frequently considered in terms of how it externalises the 
feelings of the noir hero. To use examples of noirs that contain courtroom scenes, 
even films such as The File on Thelma Jordan, Angel Face and The Tattered Dress 
(Dir: Jack Arnold, 1957), which do not employ the subjective devices of voiceover 
or flashback, convey disorientation through convoluted narrative methods that are 
characterised by dense plotting, surprise twists and narrative enigmas. Subverting 
the assumed straightforwardness of the court scene, typically anchored to cause-
effect storytelling and relative closure through its bounded elements, is one way in 
which these films disturb or confuse the spectator.  
Noir’s Essential Difference 
 All of the aforementioned elements, as well as the degree of fascination with 
noir exhibited in the sheer amount of criticism in existence,387 share one basic 
implication that has relevance to my project. This is noir’s distinction from what is 
considered conventional Hollywood filmmaking. Belton notes that ‘[w]hat struck 
French critics about film noir was its essential difference from earlier American 
                                                          
386 Imogen Sara Smith, ‘In Lonely Places’. 
387 It is also worth noting that this fascination is bound with appreciation: “noir” is rarely employed 
as a pejorative term as “melodrama” often is, connoting instead a positive response. 
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films’”.388 The narrative complexity, ideological critique and ‘antitraditional’ visual 
strategies detected in noir are used to distinguish it from notions of the conventional 
classical Hollywood film, which is implicitly situated as less complex and 
challenging. The adjectives frequently used to describe noir – ambivalent, 
pessimistic, fatalistic, cynical, etc. – form part of a critical project of demarcating 
and championing noir’s ‘essential difference’, as do the designations of noir as 
mood, atmosphere or spirit rather than genre. This is why much early criticism on 
noir now appears inclined to the kind of poetic but inaccurate generalisation evident 
in Borde and Chaumeton’s claim that ‘death always comes at the end of a tortured 
journey’.389 Although later work debates the degree to which noir does constitute a 
departure from Hollywood convention (Dale Ewing Jr. states that ‘although films 
noirs were supposed to be more nihilistic than the usual Hollywood films, they 
were still Hollywood films’),390 its “difference” remains central to the critical 
attention it has been accorded. The subversive qualities of noir can again be 
examined through a consideration of the noir courtroom trial sequence. Seeing how, 
and to what extent, the trial sequences of film noir depart from Hollywood cinema’s 
conventions of depicting the courtroom allows us a means of measuring the extent 
of noir’s subversive potentialities.  
J.P. Telotte (1989) makes a case for how noir narratives distinguished 
themselves from classical convention. Telotte argues that noir ‘seems to be 
fundamentally about violations: vice, corruption, unrestrained desire, and, most 
fundamental of all, abrogation of the American dream’s most basic promises – of 
                                                          
388 John Belton, American Cinema, American Culture (New York: McGraw Hill, 1994), p. 190; quoted 
in Steve Neale, Genre and Hollywood (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 156. 
389 Borde and Chaumeton, ‘Towards a definition of film noir’, p. 19. 
390 Dale Ewing Jr., ‘Film Noir: Style and Content,’ Journal of Popular Film and Television 16:2 (1988), 
p. 61. 
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hope, prosperity, and safety from persecution’.391 Noir is situated as a form that 
reveals corruption and crime to be pervasive societal elements, but Telotte argues 
that, additionally, the ‘patterns of violation’ noir draws attention to  
also appear to be the patterns of our cultural and human order […] the 
narrative voice that drives these films […] talks not simply about crime and 
corruption but about how we understand and give formulation to self and 
society; it asks how we see ourselves, individually and culturally.392 
 
One of my chief interests in Telotte’s work in relation to my own project is this 
emphasis on the narrative voice of noir, which intersects in useful ways with the 
underlying assumptions regarding voice in trial representations and helps to clarify 
noir’s terms of difference. Telotte argues that noirs ‘served a significant liberating 
function for the American cinema’ through their ability to ‘voice violation, to 
articulate what the classical cinema might normally have muted or stifled’.393 Noir 
‘pushes at the very boundaries of classical narrative’,394395 through strategies – 
including the combined voice-over and flashback structure and subjective 
camerawork - that point to ‘a compelling urge to understand, formulate, and 
articulate the human situation at a time when our old formulations […] no longer 
seemed adequate’.396 Thus Telotte sees in the subjectivised narratives of noir the 
attempt at new forms of expression. My interest in this argument arises from the 
implication this holds for the courtroom form, which conventionally typifies the 
                                                          
391 J.P. Telotte, Voices in the Dark: the narrative patterns of film noir (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 1989), p. 2. 
392 Ibid. 
393 Ibid., p. 5. 
394 Ibid. 
395 The ‘classical narrative’ is identified through its relatively objective point of view structure, 
cause-effect logic, goal-oriented characters, and narrative closure. 
396 Ibid., p. 14. 
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classical voice. To apply Telotte’s argument to the noir courtroom suggests a clash 
of voices.  
Tellote argues that the noir voice brings attention ‘to the very power of our 
cultural discourse to permit speech and to impose silence’.397 This ability to draw 
attention to the potentially autocratic powers of cultural discourse is relevant to my 
project. The law itself can be said to establish ‘its own particular kind of cultural 
discourse’ (Robert Post, 1991, viii) that the classical Hollywood cinema (partly 
through its typical affirmation of the court system) normalises. However, noir, for 
Telotte, demonstrates through  ‘a thematic focus on our discourse […] how 
fundamentally our communications […] carry a certain estranging force, one that 
renders all discourse precarious and every effort at human communication a risky 
wager against misunderstanding and alienation’.398 Telotte sees noir’s project of 
prioritising the subjective ‘as an alternative to the objectivity we implicitly attribute 
to classical narrative’ as a way of articulating the self’s desire for a voice against 
popular discourse’s attempts at submission.399 This ‘thematic focus on discourse’ is 
of course liable to inflect the depiction of the courtroom trial, which both 
dramatises the use of a particular form of cultural discourse and depicts the attempt 
to discern objective truths through communication. The implication is that an 
uncommonly critical view of the courtroom will be identified in noir. 
 Reconsidering Law Noir 
 
Norman Rosenberg’s introduction of the term law noir400 also arises from 
the desire to differentiate between an affirmative dominant model of representation 
                                                          
397 Ibid., p. 5. 
398 Telotte, Voices in the Dark, p. 30. 
399 Ibid., p. 17. 
400 See Review of Literature, page 35. 
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and an alternative model that lends itself more readily to critiquing society and its 
institutions. Rosenberg’s discussion of law noir bears striking similarities to 
Telotte’s argument. Both pivot around the notion of voice; Telotte’s distinction 
between the conventional cinematic voice and the noir voice parallels Rosenberg’s 
distinction between a model designed to erase anxieties surrounding ‘the 
specialized discourses’ of the courtroom and noir’s propensity to problematise these 
discourses.401 Telotte and Rosenberg both view noir as a form that brings attention 
to the manner in which cultural discourses can silence, rather than give voice to, the 
individual, but Rosenberg considers this specifically in relation to the role of law 
and the court in noir.  
Rosenberg also viewed the law noir’s refusal to utilise the court scene as a 
mechanism for narrative closure as part of its divergence from conventional 
affirmative depictions. This is another issue I wish to expand on. Again the noir 
narrative method does not correlate with the positioning of the courtroom trial as 
the embodiment of closure, and neither the case studies I look at in this chapter nor 
the majority of the other examples employ the trial in this manner. Unlike my case 
studies in the other chapters, noirs do not tend to utilise a trial scene as the dramatic 
climax.402 Trials instead can appear near the outset of the narrative (Stranger on the 
Third Floor, Phantom Lady), in advance of the final act (The Lady from Shanghai, 
Angel Face, The Postman Always Rings Twice [Dir: Tay Garnett, 1946], The 
Wrong Man [Dir: Alfred Hitchcock, 1956]), or more broadly at points where they 
precede a narrative twist that undoes the conventional closure elicited from the trial 
                                                          
401 Norman Rosenberg, ‘Hollywood on Trials’, p. 344. 
402 An anomaly is The Tattered Dress, a film whose generic atypicality has seen it described as ‘a 
curious late entry in the main period of film noir’ (see Bruce Crowther, Film Noir [Random House, 
2011], p. 116.  
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scene (The File on Thelma Jordan, Please Murder Me! [Dir: Peter Godfrey, 1956], 
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt [Dir: Fritz Lang, 1957]).403 I wish to consider some 
further ways in which noir’s specific terms of difference from conventional forms 
can inflect its depiction of law and the courts.  
Looking at the relationship between noir and law as an institution offers a 
new strategy for reconsidering the terminology frequently applied to noir but less 
frequently interrogated; the kinds of ‘negative terms’ that Ewing argues ‘have been 
applied so loosely as to have lost all meaning”.404 For example, Robert B. Pippin’s 
use of terms such as fatalism and entrapment are elucidated when applied within the 
specific context of noir’s representations of legal institutions. Pippin provides a neat 
summation of the ‘standard picture’ of noir as consisting of three variations on 
entrapment: entrapment by the self (or by who the self has become), entrapment by 
chance or fate, and entrapment ‘by an anonymous and autonomous social order or 
societal machine’.405It is the latter that I wish to discuss. Pippin’s assertion that the 
figures who represent society’s institutions, including politicians and the police, are 
‘if not corrupt then maddeningly incompetent, almost always and with righteous 
self-confidence arresting the wrong man’ is a generalisation,406 but one that can 
nevertheless permit us to begin thinking about the terms in which the figures of 
legal authority in the courtroom are represented. The depicted corruption or 
                                                          
403 This final subversion of convention is particularly interesting in that it anticipates the narrative 
twists of certain conventional trial films, including Witness for the Prosecution. However Witness, 
unlike the majority of the law noirs, negotiates its climactic twist so that the possibility of law and 
justice within the court system is affirmed. 
404 Dale Ewing Jr., ‘Film Noir: Style and Content,’ p. 68. 
405 Robert B. Pippin, Fatalism in American Film Noir: some cinematic philosophy (Charlottesville; 
London: University of Virginia Press, 2012), p. 11. 
406 Ibid., p. 6. 
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incompetence of authority figures are part of how noir’s pessimism (to which the 
majority of these overemployed terms are related) reveals itself.  
The conceptualisation of the pessimistic treatment of societal institutions 
evokes work on representations of the legal system in films directed by Alfred 
Hitchcock. I wish to introduce what I see as the parallels between noir’s model of 
representing the legal process and the representational strategies of Hitchcock’s 
courtroom scenes. Rostron, writing on three Hitchcock films that explicitly deal 
with the law and trial systems,407 argues that:  
Taking comfort in neither divine nor earthly law, Hitchcock viewed the 
world as a place where innocence and guilt are confused and a thin veneer 
of order and civilization stretches over chaos and uncertainty […] His 
movies reflect this fear of disorder and the breakdown of institutions and 
systems – especially legal ones – designed to keep the irrational and absurd 
at bay. In his films, innocents die along with the guilty. Legal processes 
constantly go awry and never can achieve justice.408  
 
These Hitchcock films share with the more traditionally situated noirs,409 a view of 
legal institutions that is demonstrated in their parallel representational strategies (to 
be discussed in more detail across the chapter). The intrusion of the noir world 
attests to the ‘thin veneer of order and civilization’ stretched over ‘chaos and 
uncertainty’, and Rostron’s description gives a good indicator of how the 
pessimism frequently associated with noir could effect its depictions of the trial 
system.  
                                                          
407 The Paradine Case (Dir: Alfred Hitchcock, 1947), I, Confess (Dir: Alfred Hitchcock, 1953), and The 
Wrong Man (Dir: Alfred Hitchcock, 1957). 
408 Allen K. Rostron, ‘Lawyers, Law & the Movies: The Hitchcock Cases,’ California Law 
Review 86:1 (Jan 1998), p. 226. 
409 Hitchcock’s relationship to the noir canon is usually overlooked in favour of an auteurist 
separation of his films from other groupings. Nevertheless, like a number of other “auteurs” in the 
Hollywood cinema (Lang, Preminger, Welles), his consistent treatment of the trial system bears a 
number of striking parallels to the model of representation I outline in this chapter. 
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The representation of legal professionals as corrupt or inept, in line with 
noir’s critique of American institutions, can be examined through analyses of the 
films. But such analyses should also consider the roles noir heroes play in the 
courtroom scene. One way to approach this is to think about Walker’s basic 
narrative model and examine the extent to which (and the devices through which) 
the courtroom represents the ‘noir world’. However, this must be nuanced by 
considering the range of heroes noir offers us and how these characterisations 
construct specific relationships to law, crime and decency. We can begin by 
thinking about the legal outsider hero who has broken the law. Fluck argues that 
noir’s frequent restructuring of conventional criminal characterisations so that the 
central criminal figure is often an ordinary citizen rather than a professional 
criminal (i.e. the gangster), in combination with the subjective devices of noir, 
means that ‘Traditional models of explanation and judgment which still anchor the 
gangster movie are challenged’.410 These traditional models are then explicitly 
paralleled with the legal point of view: 
Seen “objectively,” from the point of view of the law, his or her crime 
seems inexcusable; seen subjectively, we begin to understand the 
unfortunate set of chance events that have led to the violation of the law (or 
the –false –accusation of having violated it) and feel inclined to 
acknowledge that the question of guilt is a much more complicated one than 
the legal system allows.411  
 
Although Fluck could be accused of taking noir’s protagonists at face value 
(they are often still conscious of breaking the law, or are situated as unreliable in 
                                                          
410 Winifried Fluck, ‘Mass Culture Modernism: Guilt and Subjectivity in Film Noir’ in Biegler and 
Voelz (eds.) Romance with America?: essays on culture, literature and American studies 
(Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag, 2009), p. 299.  
411 Ibid, p. 297. 
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their protestations of misfortune412), I concur that noir often complicates standard 
models of explanation and judgment so that criminal acts are rendered less legible 
(in terms of action or intent) and thus less simplistically answerable to the court.413 
This is also achieved through noir narrative’s frequent emphasis on the influence of 
fate and chance upon events, characters who have no awareness of their own 
psychological motivations, or narrative twists of fate that reflect upon the hidden 
desires of our protagonists.414 For example, the confession-via-trial convention is 
typically presented as an emergence of an objective truth,415 whereas any “straight” 
reading of a confession in noir is blurred by the genre’s formal strategies and 
thematic preoccupations.416  
 Another productive manner of comparing the characterisations in noir to 
trial convention is to consider the presence of the trial film’s justice figure. The 
justice figures of the golden age trial films were largely beyond reproach in their 
use of the tenets of natural law to achieve justice via the courts. The melodrama 
                                                          
412 The character of Al (Tom Neal), the protagonist and unreliable narrator of Detour, is emblematic 
in this respect. 
413 This is partly why the ostensible golden age trial film Anatomy of a Murder, in which the case for 
the defence is pivoted around the issue of subconscious intent (described as “irresistible impulse”) 
rather than a denial that the defendant shot the victim, feels anomalous within the golden age 
grouping and has itself been considered to display some of noir’s qualities (see Richard Teleky, 
‘Anatomy of Anatomy of a Murder’, CineAction 94 (2014), p. 68). The traditional models of 
explanation and judgment that anchor the trial narratives of To Kill a Mockingbird, 12 Angry Men, 
etc., are complicated. 
414 Examples include the numerous accidents that befall Al in Detour (1945, Dir: Edgar G. Ulmer) 
and the psychology of the femme fatales Ellen Berent (Gene Tierney) in Leave her to Heaven and 
Nancy (Laraine Day) in The Locket.  
415 The murder confession elicited from witness John Palmer Cass (Ward Bond) on the stand due to 
the accusations of Abraham Lincoln (Henry Fonda) in Young Mr. Lincoln is one classic example. 
416 Indeed, Rosenberg himself discusses this in ‘Hollywood on Trials’ in relation to the law noir They 
Won’t Believe Me. In this film, the framing device of the courtroom confession is employed in order 
to emphasise ‘struggles […] over the questions of closure and translation’ (Rosenberg, ‘Hollywood 
on Trials’, p. 361) raised in earlier law noirs. The conflict between the legal point of view 
(embedded in the depiction of a trial) and the tortured subjectivity of the protagonist (suggested in 
the noir devices of voiceover and flashback and foregrounded throughout) results in the ironic 
subversion of courtroom conventions.   
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case studies of my previous chapter refigured the justice figure as the female 
defendant; this nevertheless made a model of natural justice legible to the spectator. 
Noir often complicates this relation to justice. The seeker heroes (another character 
type identified by Walker) often resort to operating outside of the law to achieve 
justice, and frequently fall prey to the criminal underworld themselves. Justice – 
implicitly defined in terms of punishment deemed appropriate to the transgression 
enacted – is necessitated by the guidelines of the Production Code. Nevertheless, 
noir often subverts the standard model of justice so that it is seen to be enacted by 
fate, chance or death (through suicide or vengeful murder) more often than it is 
located within the deliberate action of the legal or institutional framework.417  
These conventions have several implications for the depiction of the trial. 
The most fundamental is that, as justice is typically enacted outside of the courts 
(and often external to the law entirely), a dominant function of the golden age trial 
film - to affirm the possibility of justice via the courts - is thrown into doubt. 
Another implication is that through a combination of the location of justice 
elsewhere and the genre’s ambivalent characterisations, the court scenes of noir 
often feature no justice figure at all. For example, consider how noir typically treats 
the defence attorney. Frequently situated in the golden age trial films as the justice 
figure par excellence, the noir defence attorney is instead figured as inept (as I will 
demonstrate in Stranger on the Third Floor), or ethically corrupt (i.e. willing to 
defend clients he knows to be guilty and constructing narratives that distort or 
disregard the truth: examples include Fred Barrett [Leon Ames] in Angel Face and 
Arthur Keats [Hume Cronyn] in The Postman Always Rings Twice). Or he is led by 
                                                          
417 Such patterns of resolution are evident in many noir narratives, including The Postman Always 
Rings Twice, Double Indemnity (Dir: Billy Wilder, 1944), Detour (Dir: Edgar G. Ulmer, 1945), The 
Lady from Shanghai, Out of the Past, and Angel Face. 
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ulterior motives into perverting the conventional course of justice (the lawyer 
protagonist of The File on Thelma Jordan who deliberately damages his 
prosecution case due to his romantic involvement with the defendant). Even those 
characters that bear closer relationships to the justice figure are more ambivalently 
rendered.418 The convention of lawyer-as-justice-figure is subverted across 
examples of law noir, and I will return to the means by which this subversion is 
enacted in more detail in my discussion of The Lady from Shanghai. 
Rosenberg’s findings also point to another facet of noir’s trial 
representation, which is the trial’s relative scarcity as a significant narrative event. 
The dominant narratives and narrative strategies I have outlined should make 
evident that courtrooms do not appear with great frequency in noir, and that those 
that do have little interest in adhering to the conventional functions of the trial form. 
Rosenberg’s work demonstrates that the overt critique of the court system he 
identifies in Fury and Stranger on the Third Floor exists alongside more 
ambiguously situated relationships to law. Somewhere between this and the 
complete omission of courtroom material from Force of Evil (Dir: Abraham 
Polonsky, 1947),419 exists another model of noir trial depiction, a truncated model 
that either completely elides or defamiliarises the conventions I outlined in my first 
chapter. This model allows the noir to assert its terms of difference while also 
                                                          
418 For example, the lawyer protagonist of Please Murder Me!, Craig Carlson (Raymond Burr), who 
realises his lover, whom he has successfully defended in court for the murder of her husband, is 
guilty. His subsequent actions to ensure that justice is served involve ensuring she kills him, a 
murder he arranges so that she will be caught and convicted for it. Although Craig maintains that 
these actions are motivated by his belief “in the honesty and integrity of the courts”, this 
protestation is challenged by the other implications that circulate within the noir narrative, 
including the notions of guilt, vengeance, and suicide. With this in mind, he becomes a warped 
justice figure befitting the thematic preoccupations and pessimism of noir. 
419 In a return to the concept of law noir, ‘Looking for Law in all the Right Traces’ (2000), Rosenberg 
discusses the removal of a framing courtroom device from Force of Evil between the pre-
production and release stages as representative of noir’s relationship to law (an ambivalent 
mixture of reliance and mistrust). 
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obscuring any potentially untenable critique of the American institution of the 
courtroom. I wish now to look briefly at two examples of this truncated model, in 
Scarlet Street and Phantom Lady, films that place the trial on the margins of the 
noir narrative. 
Noir’s Peripheral Courts: The Oblique Trials of Scarlet Street and Phantom Lady 
 
Scarlet Street exemplifies some of the ways in which the subjectivised 
‘voice’ of noir is used to defamiliarise courtroom convention.420 The film met 
resistance from certain American censors due primarily to what Bernstein deems 
the ‘issue of crime without punishment [my italics]’.421 The “hero” is driven to 
mental breakdown and homelessness by his guilt, after being warned by a journalist 
that all individuals “have a little courtroom” in their hearts that ensures that the 
guilty “go on punishing” themselves and that “You can’t get away with it – ever.” 
Yet this “courtroom of the heart” was not sufficiently aligned with a legal point of 
view for certain censors. A contemporary review proffers a positive reaction to the 
film’s climactic narrative developments: ‘If you think Robinson pays for his crime 
in the conventional manner with the law catching up to him, you are quite wrong. 
And herein lies the most unusual part of the picture’.422 This quote is telling in its 
                                                          
420 The film concerns cashier Christopher Cross (Edward G. Robinson), unhappily married and 
sexually inexperienced, whose romantic obsession with a younger woman, Kitty March (Joan 
Bennett), leads him into a life of lies and embezzlement. Throughout the narrative, the spectator 
has seen how Kitty and her boyfriend/pimp Johnny (Dan Duryea) have manipulated Chris and 
assumed responsibility for the paintings he has produced. When the return of Chris’ wife’s first 
husband, long presumed dead, annuls his marriage, Christopher proposes to Kitty, and her taunting 
reaction leads him to murder her. The murder is attributed to Johnny, who is then tried, found 
guilty and put to death. Chris - wracked with guilt, jobless and alone - lives out the remainder of his 
days impoverished and tormented by thoughts of Kitty and Johnny.  
421 Bernstein, Matthew. ‘A Tale of Three Cities: The Banning of Scarlet Street’ in Bernstein (ed.) 
Controlling Hollywood: Censorship and Regulation in the Studio Era, p. 175. Bernstein details the 
banning of Scarlet Street by the New York State Censor Board, the Motion Picture Commission for 
the city of Milwaukee, and the censor board of Atlanta. 
422 Ann Marsters of The Chicago-Herald American; quoted in Matthew Bernstein, ‘A Tale of Three 
Cities’, p. 171. 
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inferences regarding the ‘conventional’ treatment of crime in American cinema and 
Scarlet Street’s ‘unusual’ divergence from such convention. The trope of the ‘law 
catching up with the criminal’ is a conventional one because it both ensures 
narrative resolution and imparts a legible moral message (or warning) to the 
audience. The courtroom trial can be used to perform this function.423 Noir, as I 
have outlined, often enacts justice outside of the law through the deaths of its 
transgressive characters late in the narrative. Scarlet Street is ‘most unusual’ 
because neither of these methods are employed. Yet the film still contains a trial 
sequence, one that thus inverts one typical narrative function of the courtroom.  
The trial material is referred to by Osteen as a ‘swift trial scene montage’ 
rather than a sequence,424 and occupies only seventy five seconds of screen time. 
Nevertheless, while ‘swift’, it is striking in its non-naturalistic representational 
framework. An establishing shot presents the familiar triangular configuration of 
judge, lawyer and defendant as Johnny presents his case. Aside from the judge’s 
bench and the chairs on which the judge and Johnny sit, the remainder of the frame 
is sparse, devoid of the usual iconographic signifiers of the courtroom. Low-key 
lighting augments the sparseness, frames Johnny within an interrogative spotlight, 
and establishes the non-naturalism that pervades the rest of the sequence. A series 
of subsequent shots consist of witness testimonies, with individuals presented in 
medium to medium-long shot as they give evidence that constucts Johnny’s “guilt” 
(Figs 70-72). The chiaroscuro spotlight effect remains consistent across shots and 
witnesses, situating this courtroom somewhere in between the naturalistic space of 
                                                          
423 One moment that exemplifies the use of the court scenario to economically depict the 
punishment of guilty characters, and thus provide total narrative closure, is the trial sentencing 
montage that appears in the final moments of The Iron Curtain (Dir: William A. Wellman, 1948).  
424 Mark Osteen, ‘Framed: Forging Identities in Film Noir’, Journal of Film and Video 62:3 (Fall 
2010), p. 29. 
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conventional courtroom depiction and the expressionistic nightmare court I will 
identify in Stranger on the Third Floor.  
 
Fig. 70 
   
Figs. 71 (left) and 72 (right) 
One way of analysing this initial portion of this sequence is to look at the 
irony that pervades the scenario. The spectator knows that Johnny did not kill Kitty, 
but his “guilt” in other ways –his mistreatment of Kitty, his deceptiveness in 
manipulating Chris into giving Kitty credit for the former’s paintings – is now 
being used in the courtroom to condemn him for her murder. The trope of the noir 
criminal being sentenced for the one crime of which he is innocent, present also in 
The Postman Always Rings Twice, is used here, thus ensuring that Johnny too, does 
not “get away with it”. This is in line with noir’s structures of justice, but it also 
demonstrates the ambivalent treatment of the courtroom as a problematic conduit 
for achieving justice. The legal point of view, technically, has it wrong, typical for 
the noir model of representation in which the narratives constructed in the 
courtroom, even when used to inform an outcome that is just in one respect, are 
manipulations of the truth.  
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Another way of approaching this sequence in the light of the literature 
considered earlier is to look at the mise-en-scène as distorting and disrupting the 
respectful form of conventional trial depiction in order to convey a character’s 
subjectivity. The question, then, is whose subjectivity this style is meant to reflect. 
Possibly, the expressionistic representational strategies are meant to reflect 
Johnny’s psyche, the visual mode embodying the starkness with which his fate has 
been sealed in the (spot)light of “irrefutable” evidence.425 Yet, another objective of 
the sequence is to begin to convey the downfall of Chris, the beginning of his guilt, 
and present another round of humiliation to which he is subjected. Thus the style 
may also reflect his subjectivity, an interpretation strengthened by the final three 
shots of the ‘montage’, which comprise the testimony of Chris’s “former wife” 
Adele (Rosalind Ivan) (Fig. 73), Chris (Fig. 74), and the distressed Johnny’s final 
statement (Fig 75). Both of the testimonies bookending Chris’s refer to him 
negatively – with Adele describing him as a “thief” and Johnny leaning forward as 
he shouts “For God’s sake, he’s lying!” in response to Chris’s preceding statements. 
Both of these shots are ambiguously situated as subjective, with Adele and 
                                                          
425 An expressionistic and abbreviated trial depiction is also evident in Alfred Hitchcock’s Dial M for 
Murder (Dir: Alfred Hitchcock, 1954), during a sequence in which Margot Wendice (Grace Kelly) is 
tried and wrongfully found guilty of murder. The trial is primarily visualised through a long take of 
Margot, shot frontally in medium close-up, responding facially – but non-verbally – to questions 
asked by off-screen legal professionals whose voices are made to reverberate with a sinister 
echoing effect. The surrounding area of the frame is occupied only by a background surface that 
appears initially to be a blue wall with areas partially obscured by patches of shadow. However, 
over the course of the take, accompanied by an insistent low-pitched ticking in the non-diegetic 
score that augments the sense of tension, there occur overt shifts in the lighting and colour 
scheme of the shot. The backdrop and Margot’s face alternately appear to be purple, red, and blue 
- frontally lit one second and shrouded in shadow the next. The use of lighting, colour and sound 
here corresponds to a highly stylized, non-naturalistic trial that clearly conveys the subjective 
experience of Margot on the stand. As one of the only sequences in Dial M for Murder set outside 
of the Wendice home (it should be noted that this scene is not present in the play by Frederick 
Knott that Dial M for Murder is adapted from) the truncated trial remains memorable by 
presenting not an authentic space but a non-naturalistic reflection of Margot’s psyche.  
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Johnny’s respective disgust and outrage directed at both Chris and spectator. The 
final shot does not, as we could imagine, place us in the perspective of Johnny 
responding to the guilty verdict, but rather shows a distressed Johnny looking 
directly at us, the viewer, and by implication, Chris. It is this moment, perhaps, 
which initiates the guilt into which Chris will subsequently descend, thus setting 
into motion the film’s final enactment of justice.  
     
Figs. 73 (left) and 74 (right) 
 
Fig. 75 
 
The trial of Scarlet Street is depicted in an oblique manner that challenges 
the classical function of the courtroom scene. The clarity and legibility that is 
expected to accompany the trial form is muddied by the subjectivised trial 
experience that is itself illegible. We cannot confidently discern whose point of 
view the non-naturalistic mode reflects: Johnny’s, Chris’s, a mixture of both, or 
another viewpoint entirely. Embedded in the choices of trial depiction is the critique 
of courtroom justice often presented by Fritz Lang;426 a later Lang noir, Beyond a 
                                                          
426 See Bruzzi (2010), p. 2. 
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Reasonable Doubt, would further interrogate the degree to which the trial process 
could be manipulated by the guilty party. The ambivalences of the trial’s 
representational strategies are augmented by its status on the periphery of the 
narrative. The law is present but its conventional function and representational 
framework are distorted.  
 
 Another way of obscuring the legibility of the courtroom as conventionally 
employed is by not showing the stage. Phantom Lady goes a step further than the 
sparse trial representation of Scarlet Street by refusing to show us what any diegetic 
courtroom spectator would see. Tom Flinn summarises this: 
Siodmak handles Henderson’s trial obliquely. The camera never shows the 
accused, the judge, the jury, or any of the lawyers. Only the voice of the 
prosecutor (Milburn Stone) relates the proceedings as the camera dwells on 
the spectators, singling out Henderson’s secretary, Kansas (Ella Raines) and 
Inspector Burgess (Thomas Gomez).427  
 
Why have these choices been made in depicting a courtroom trial? Flinn argues that 
the trial sequence marks a narrative turning point at which the role of audience 
identification figure shifts from the defendant to Kansas and Burgess.428 The close 
ups and eye-line match edits in the courtroom sequence capture looks between 
Kansas and Burgess, constructing a model of identification that diverges from and 
overrides the legal point of view and instigates what Rosenberg refers to (in relation 
to Stranger on the Third Floor) as the process of seeking ‘private solutions to 
                                                          
427 Tom Flinn, Three Faces of Film Noir’, p. 38. 
428 The trial occurs about twenty minutes into Phantom Lady. The film has opened with the 
unhappily married Scott (Alan Curtis) arriving to a bar alone and meeting the eponymous stranger 
(Fay Helm), whom he picks up and takes to a show. When he arrives home later that evening, his 
wife has been murdered, and he is arrested. Despite the alibi of the lady, finding the anonymous 
woman proves impossible, and several figures that we have seen interact with Scott and the lady 
deny ever having seen her. Scott is tried and sentenced to death in this trial sequence, and thus the 
remainder of the film consists of Carol’s/Kansas’ attempts to exonerate Scott.  
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public problems’.429 Thus in this instance, justice figures are present, but they are 
excluded both narratively and through the mise-en-scène from the trial procedure 
and its model of justice. The trial is a narrative obstruction. Its inclusion early in the 
narrative suggests that its function is not to provide closure but to augment the 
disequilibrium and disorientation of the noir world. It brings neither characters nor 
spectator any closer to comprehending the series of narrative mysteries that have 
been constructed. Although we know that Scott is innocent, we do not know who 
has committed his wife’s murder, the identity of the eponymous lady, and the 
reasons the other characters he encountered on the evening of the crime deny 
having seen him. The trial is shown, as in Scarlet Street, to condemn a man whom 
we know is innocent to death on the basis of circumstantial evidence, but the 
representational strategies do not emphasise the injustice done to this defendant, 
instead creating a new set of emphases by only focusing on the emergent doubt of 
Inspector Burgess and Kansas’ mistrust of the prosecution’s case. In a careful 
negotiation of its representation of the law, the potentially censor-baiting critique of 
the legal process (once again, the trial is almost entirely at cross-purposes with the 
truth) is by no means absent, but is obscured by a deceptive disinterest in the trial 
itself.  
 The scene comprises of moments taken from three days of what we are 
shown is a lengthy trial, with the passages of time conveyed through establishing 
shots of the stenographer’s notes that date each section of the sequence (the 10th, 
16th and 24th day of the trial, respectively). We hear elements of conventional trial 
procedure through the off-screen dialogue that, in keeping with noir’s focus on the 
                                                          
429 In both films it is significant that it is the female civilian who, frustrated with the law’s response 
to the crime, assumes the role of investigator herself. 
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wrong(ed) man, emphasise Scott’s victimisation; only the prosecution’s questions 
and accusations are heard, which undermines the notion of competing narratives 
being measured and judged fairly against each other. Yet the camera restricts itself 
to the spectator’s area of the courtroom. This space is noticeably crowded.430 The 
first day depicted consists of the prosecutor’s opening statement, throughout which 
the camera shows spectators murmuring to each other. The sense of the trial as a 
tawdry spectacle for the spectators is encapsulated in the final shot of this segment. 
We begin with Kansas framed in medium close-up visibly disturbed by the 
prosecutor’s comments (Fig. 76). However, a reframing obscures her from view as 
a woman in the foreground right of the frame leans in to her friend – presumably to 
gossip about the case (Fig. 77).   
   
Fig. 76. 
                                                          
430 An impression of heat is conveyed through the recurrent image of spectators dabbing their 
faces with handkerchiefs and using hats as makeshift fans. This lends a specific atmosphere that 
suggests a stifling, claustrophobic environment (recall the use of similar devices in Pinky).  
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Fig. 77  
A similar, but even more obtrusive disruption of convention occurs at the 
moment when the verdict is read out. Kansas is now viewed in the foreground right 
of a group shot of the spectatorship. Behind her, a woman leans forward 
mesmerised as she chews loudly on an apple. The camera pushes in on Kansas, the 
woman, and another spectator on the left of frame as the verdict is about to be read 
out, but the announcement is drowned out in a sudden coughing fit from the 
woman. This moment is significant for several reasons. It is the most concrete 
alignment with Kansas’ subjectivity we have encountered thus far; the spectator 
hears what she hears, and, more importantly, cannot hear what she does not. The 
presence of the woman – again, an individual who we can assume has no 
relationship to Scott other than as an object of her morbid curiosity – is another 
critique of the wresting of private matters into the public sphere through the trial 
ritual. This treatment also thwarts the catharsis of the verdict as conventionally 
employed, again undermining the straightforward legibility of trial sequences in 
Hollywood cinema. Similarly to Scarlet Street, the treatment of the courtroom trial 
in Phantom Lady refuses to provide us with the image of a working system of law, 
and draws our attention instead to other ways of seeing the law – while evading the 
overt critique that is prohibited by the Production Code. The trial is simultaneously 
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subjectively treated through strategies that align us with Kansas’ experience, and 
defamiliarised through its oblique handling. The trial scenes of Scarlet Street and 
Phantom Lady demonstrate some of the means by which noir’s voice speaks to a 
different model of viewing the courtroom, one that moves away from assumed 
objectivity and asks us to question or problematize the courtroom as an arena for 
eliciting justice and objective truth. I wish now to consider two noirs that devote 
more time to the trial, utilising some of the same strategies but constituting more 
explicit critiques of the trial’s processes. 
 
“Sometimes they do get the wrong man….”: Stranger on the Third Floor and the 
Nightmare Trials of Noir 
 
Stranger on the Third Floor is ‘generally regarded as the first film noir of 
the 1940s’,431 a classification that suggests it is both generically anticipatory and 
atypical.432 Billed as a horror film on its initial release,433 the film is now seen to 
exemplify many of noir’s conventions. It is photographed by key noir figure 
Nicolas Musuraca,434 and exhibits many of noir’s ‘distorted and disrupted’ stylistic 
features, including low key lighting, nocturnal settings and exaggerated camera 
angles. The urban setting of New York City in the early Forties prefigures the 
                                                          
431 Frank Krutnik, In a Lonely Street: film noir, genre, masculinity (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 47. 
432 Henri Focillon’s work The Life of Forms in Art, which has been applied to criticism on film genres 
by John Cawelti (The Six-Gun Mystique, 1984) and Thomas Schatz (Hollywood Genres, 1981) argues 
that art forms progress through a series of different stages. Stranger on the Third Floor could be 
considered an exemplar of the initial ‘experimental’ stage that helps to set up conventions by 
playing with existing forms. 
433 See Blair Davis, ‘Horror Meets Noir: The Evolution of Cinematic Style, 1931-1958’ in Steffen 
Hantke (Ed.) Horror Film: Creating and Marketing Fear (University Press of Missisippi, 2004). 
434 Musuraca was essential to the construction of what came to be seen as noir’s distinctive visual 
style, having shot many films now considered emblematic noirs (Out of the Past, The Locket [Dir: 
John Brahms, 1946], Where Danger Lives [Dir John Farrow, 1950]). 
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inclusion of what has since been viewed as much of the iconography of noir, with 
the film’s depiction predominantly favouring decidedly unglamorous interiors 
(cramped apartments, diners, bars) and shadowy, nocturnally set exteriors. 
Although much of the work on the film has restricted its discussion of the film’s 
style to the overt excesses of the nightmare sequence, Flinn argues that ‘the 
Germanic influence, so important in the creation of the film noir style, is quite 
obvious, and not confined to the dream sequence [my italics]’.435 This distinction is 
important. My analysis will show that many of the stylistic elements typical of noir 
are introduced in a more muted form in the film’s first trial sequence, signalling 
Stranger on the Third Floor’s transition from depicting a recognisable diegetic 
world to the noir world of the later sequences.  
The content of Stranger on the Third Floor also correlates with many of 
noir’s conventions. The film’s crime-centred narrative,436 involving a protagonist 
“railroaded” for a murder he did not commit, and its cynical treatment of several 
urban institutions - police investigation, newspaper journalism and the judicial 
                                                          
435 Tom Flinn, ‘Three Faces of Film Noir’, p. 36. 
436 For purposes of clarity, I include the following plot synopsis: Mike Ward (John McGuire) is a 
young newspaper reporter in New York City, happily engaged to secretary Jane (Margaret 
Tallichet). Mike is called upon to testify in what seems to be an open-and-shut homicide trial, with 
Joe Briggs (Elisha Cook, Jr.) as defendant. Despite Jane’s apprehensions, Mike testifies that he saw 
Briggs standing over the dead body of cafe owner Nick Nanbajan, and Briggs is found guilty.  
Harbouring guilt and uncertainty over the verdict (and his role in it), Mike returns to his apartment, 
where the snoring of his neighbour Meng (Charles Halton) reminds him of his fraught relationships 
with Meng and his landlady, dramatized through a series of flashbacks. Mike then encounters a 
suspicious looking stranger (Peter Lorre) emerging from Meng’s apartment. This occurrence, 
combined with Meng’s sudden silence, induces two fears in Mike: firstly, that Meng has been 
killed, and secondly, that he himself will be blamed for the murder. Further flashbacks detail Mike’s 
public animosity towards Meng. A visibly disturbed Mike falls asleep, but in a nightmare envisions 
his arrest, trial and eventual punishment (by death) for the murder of Meng. Awakening from the 
nightmare, Mike discovers that Meng has indeed been murdered, and after a panicked visit to 
Jane, is arrested by police for Meng’s murder. Jane investigates the crime, searching for the 
stranger Mike saw emerge from Meng’s room on the night of the murder. She eventually 
encounters the Stranger, who on realising her intentions chases her into the street. The Stranger is 
hit by a truck and dies, but not before confessing to the murder of Meng. Reunited, Mike and Jane 
plan their wedding, with the final sequence revealing that a pardoned Briggs has returned to his 
job as a cab driver as he offers to drive the pair to their destination. 
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process – is also generically prototypical. The film’s narrative structure corresponds 
to Walker’s ‘noir world’ model. The first sequence in which Mike and Jane meet at 
a diner that is presented as a familiar place for them, and discuss their plans to live 
together, exists emphatically in the ‘respectable world’, calling upon the 
conventions of a much lighter model of representation in Hollywood cinema (quite 
literally “lighter”; this is one of the only clearly daylight-set sequences in the entire 
film). The film anticipates noirs such as Out of the Past (Dir: Jacques Tourneur, 
1947) in providing us with a glimpse of a normal, recognisable diegetic 
environment at the outset (one aligned with the domestic and romantic) to contrast 
with the noir world that then intrudes upon and disrupts the former. However, as 
with Out of the Past, the respectable world also exhibits an immediate uneasiness 
that attests to the speed with which the noir world’s emergence can rupture 
normality. The diner setting also functions to emphasise the young couple’s 
struggling economic status, symbolising their inability to create a home for 
themselves through marriage.437 A series of anxieties that will feed into the ensuing 
narrative are emergent in the opening sequence. These primarily consist of the 
competing economic and ethical impulses within Mike. We learn that by testifying 
in the murder case and reporting on it, Mike will earn a twelve dollar raise. Yet the 
possibility this entails – namely the legitimate domesticity the money will now 
allow the young couple – is soured by Jane’s stated “funny feeling” about Briggs, 
who she states with concern when scanning the newspaper front page “looks like a 
kid”.  
                                                          
437 The diner takes on this symbolic resonance across classical Hollywood cinema. It appears, to this 
effect, in Dust Be my Destiny. It also frequently appears in noir as a symbol of the rootlessness of 
the protagonists, as in The Postman Always Rings Twice, The Killers (Dir: Robert Siodmak, 1946), 
Detour (Dir: Edgar G. Ulmer, 1945) and His Kind of Woman (Dir: John Farrow, 1951).  
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The film’s later developments exemplify Walker’s ‘noir world’ model, as 
Mike finds himself in an escalating crisis following the ‘chance event’ of 
witnessing a crime scene. The film’s second act focuses on Mike’s psychological 
state, depicting an internal loss of control before his prolonged absence in the final 
act strips him of any masculine agency as Jane, in an atypical development for the 
classical Hollywood cinema, assumes the implicitly masculinised ‘seeker hero’ 
investigative role.438 It is largely through the first trial sequence that the noir world 
begins to overtly intrude upon Mike Ward’s respectable life.  
A difference between this initial trial sequence and other trials I have 
analysed is that it occurs in the first act of the film. Rather than providing the 
resolution and closure that can be sought through a trial sequence, Stranger on the 
Third Floor employs its first trial sequence in order to invoke narrative 
disequilibrium and, in effect induce the presence of the disruptive ‘noir world’. This 
is in keeping with the subversion of the narrative function typically accorded the 
court that I have identified across the law noir. Mike enters the courtroom in the 
role of authoritative but emotionally detached witness rather than the pressured role 
of defendant or emotionally invested witness. However, his encroaching guilt is 
being fed into the sequence through the underlying pressures that are embedded in 
the trial’s status as his “break” and Jane’s concern for the “kid” Briggs439. It is also 
made evident in the scene prior to the trial, in which Mike’s fellow newspapermen 
joke about him being “the star of the show” and ask “how does it feel to hold centre 
stage in this eternal drama of life and death?” The tone amongst the newspapermen 
                                                          
438 A similar narrative structure, thrusting the female lead into the role of amateur detective 
following a key male character’s incarceration, appears in Phantom Lady (1944).  
439 It is worth noting that John McGuire, playing Mike, is resolutely not himself a kid. Mike has 
clearly been waiting for this break for a while, which again implicitly raises the stakes of its 
importance to him. 
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is typical of representations of journalists, particularly with regards to the 
courtroom trial;440 to them, it is spectacle, entertainment, nothing more. The issue 
of Mike’s potential responsibility for sending Briggs to “the chair” is raised, but 
rebuffed by Mike who states with sincerity “It isn’t a question of my story against 
his. It’s what I saw with my own eyes.” On this there is a fade to Mike on the stand.  
Mike’s profession situates him as an individual familiar with court 
processes. This trial sequence differs from those in my other case studies not only 
in the role and relative authority our protagonist has on entering the courtroom, but 
also because the audience have not been witness to the crime that has led to the 
trial. We do not actually know whether Briggs committed the crime he is accused 
of, although at this point paradigms of audience identification lead us to trust the 
journalist protagonist. Part of the project of the sequence is to undermine both 
Mike’s and the spectator’s certainty of Briggs’ guilt. The decision not to present to 
the viewer the action – Mike’s witnessing of the crime scene at Nick’s cafe - that is 
pivotal to setting the film’s plot into motion also contributes to a mildly 
disorienting effect I have identified in noir’s narrative structures.  
I noted in my first chapter that the conventional development of trial 
sequences typically places the more dramatically eventful, emotionally charged 
testimonies later in the sequence. Thus, opening this sequence with Mike’s 
testimony immediately posits his time on the stand as unlikely to yield much 
dramatic action, and undermines expectations that any of its related tropes (such as 
the outburst or witness breakdown) will appear at this point. Rather, it is imperative 
to the development of the sequence that Mike’s testimony runs smoothly. In his 
                                                          
440 Consider the depiction of journalists in the courtroom in Chapter One, pp. 75-76. 
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position as a professional, presumably educated white male and (as described by the 
District Attorney whilst on the stand) “trained observer of men and events”, Mike is 
not significantly challenged while on the stand, to the degree that the District 
Attorney (Charles Waldron) encourages Mike to present his testimony through the 
repeated use of the phrase “go on”. Thus, in contrast to the dominant representation 
of the legal outsider on the witness stand, the film at this point depicts Mike as able 
to present the entirety of his account.441 To recall Telotte’s argument regarding noir 
and discourse, Mike is ‘permitted speech’ due to his presence as a trusted witness. 
He is in a position analogous to the expert witnesses (doctors, police) depicted in 
the early stages of other trial sequences.    
It is instead the reaction shots of Briggs, the defendant, that convey an 
impending (and feminising) hysteria. Briggs is introduced via a reaction shot close-
up during Mike’s initial testimony where his evident concern is registered through 
his highly nervous expression - eyes widened and brow raised as if exhibiting a 
mixture of shock and disbelief (Fig. 78).442 This is the expression of an innocent 
man becoming aware of how easily the narratives constructed by others in the 
courtroom can make him appear guilty. Reaction shots of Briggs throughout Mike’s 
testimony begin to situate the former as another potential identification figure for 
                                                          
441 It is worth reiterating here what Mike’s version of events actually is. Mike testifies to having 
seen Joe Briggs at Nick’s café several days before Nick’s murder. During this initial meeting, Mike 
saw Briggs threaten Nick after it transpired that the latter was unable to pay for the food he has 
ordered, and Mike, in order to pacify the situation, gave Briggs the money himself. Mike then 
testifies that, on returning to the café several days later, he saw Briggs standing over Nick’s body 
and an open cash register before fleeing the scene. 
442 Briggs is played by Elisha Cook, Jr., an actor whose recurrent appearances in the noir genre 
following Stranger on the Third Floor would see him establish a persona as the luckless fall guy,442 
442 Cook was a character actor who would emerge as a key noir presence in the decade following 
Stranger on the Third Floor, typically playing doomed henchmen or petty criminals in films such as 
The Maltese Falcon (Dir: John Huston, 1941), Phantom Lady (1944), The Big Sleep (Dir: Howard 
Hawks, 1946) and Born to Kill (Dir: Robert Wise, 1947).  
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the audience, an empathetic response to him again integral to the sequence’s project 
of undermining the certainty of his guilt.  
 
Fig. 78 
It is during Mike’s testimony that Jane arrives into the courtroom. Her 
presence provides another identification figure for the audience to map their own 
responses to the competing narratives of the trial against. A reaction shot of Jane 
listening intently to Mike’s testimony whilst looking over at the off-screen Briggs 
presents her not simply as a supportive female figure but rather an active interpreter 
of events, creating a space for the spectator’s uncertainty to emerge. Putting Jane in 
the courtroom also allows us to view how relatively empty the courtroom spectator 
area is - the reframing as she takes a seat includes within the shot only a woman 
wearing a hat and veil and a non-descript male in the upper right of the frame. We 
can make several inferences regarding the specificities of the noir courtroom based 
on this seemingly minor detail alone. Firstly, the relative lack of spectators – 
particularly anyone we could interpret to be friends or relatives of Briggs (again 
contrasting him with Mike, who does have a loved one present) – is a sharp contrast 
to the crowded courtroom scenes of the golden age trial films and the public 
spectacle of the melodrama trial sequences (see Figs. 79-80 for a comparison of a 
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reaction shot of Jane during the trial to a similar moment in Peyton Place). In a city 
where crime is rampant and both the public and legal system largely indifferent, it 
follows that trials are not imbued with the status of social spectacle that a crowded 
seating area would suggest. Instead the sparse gallery, like a majority of other 
elements in the trial, reflects an urban environment over-familiar with and under-
invested in the kind of crime on trial, with the exceptions being the morbid interest 
in the sensationalistic details of the case implied by the presence of tabloid 
journalists, and the lone female for whom a murder trial is a day’s entertainment 
(this character will shortly shush Mike and Jane as the couple attempt to talk in the 
spectator’s gallery after his testimony).  
  
 
Figs. 79 (top); 80 (bottom) 
 
Mike’s testimony culminates with the District Attorney’s declaration that 
“on your answer may depend a man’s life” before once again asking Mike if he is 
certain that he saw Briggs in Nick’s café on both occasions. This is the first 
instance of the issue of Mike being responsible for Briggs’ fate being raised during 
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the trial itself. In its repetitions throughout the sequence (coupled with the 
intensification of dramatic action later in the trial) this comes to emerge as its 
central concern, laying the foundations for Mike’s guilt-ridden psychology to 
trigger the series of sequences that follow. Having given his testimony, Mike steps 
down from the stand, but as he walks to seat himself next to Jane a brief moment 
conveys this emergent sense of guilt. There is a near-subjective medium shot of 
Briggs looking up at Mike as the latter passes him. He says sarcastically “Thanks 
for that cup of coffee,” upon which a reaction shot of a visibly perturbed Mike 
captures his response as he continues walking. The inclusion of an explicitly 
personal interaction is pivotal in establishing the emerging responses of doubt and 
guilt in Mike’s mind. Following this, the sequence returns to a more conventional 
(procedural) element of the trial sequence with the expert witness testimonial of Dr. 
Evans (Otto Hoffman), who serves to bridge the testimonies of Mike and Briggs. 
Evans’ function – aside from situating the diegetic trial as a reasonably plausible 
one by adhering to what the audience recognises as trial procedure– is primarily to 
present the grisly details of Nick’s murder, with his assertion that “the head was 
almost severed from the body” followed by a reaction shot of several visibly 
disgusted jurors. From this an ellipsis takes us to a long shot of Briggs on the stand 
in the midst of the District Attorney’s questioning. 
The confident efficiency of the District Attorney (Charles Waldron) is 
contrasted with the glaring inadequacies of judge, jury, and defence attorney, 
particularly as we enter the second major segment of the trial sequence, Briggs’ 
testimony. All of these figures are presented in ways that undermine typical 
depictions of them as symbols of stability, objectivity, and relative invisibility. 
Flinn argues that this trial sequence ‘is a vicious rendering of the American legal 
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system hard at work on an impoverished victim. The film displays a fine sense of 
caricature especially apparent in the figure of the judge’.443 I will look at the judge 
in more detail shortly, but we should mention first the glaring inefficiency of 
Briggs’ defence attorney, conveyed through the single question he asks Mike 
during his cross-examination – “But did you actually see [Briggs] commit the 
murder?” – and the ensuing reaction shot of two journalists in the court, one of 
whom states “I wouldn’t let him defend me if it was for stealing an apple.” This 
pushes to the forefront of our response to the sequence an atypical sense of the 
inequalities of the judicial process. Rarely do trial depictions of the classical era 
raise the issue of the quality of the defence lawyer and the effect this can have on a 
(possibly innocent) defendant so explicitly, although noirs such as The Postman 
Always Rings Twice and Angel Face do posit the selection of a showboating and 
unscrupulous lawyer (who knows how to manipulate a jury) as crucial to getting 
away with murder.  
 The focus on Briggs here also brings out this sense of inequality and 
victimisation as integral to trial procedure. Even the initial phase of Briggs’ 
questioning brings out a series of contrasts between him and Mike. Briggs’ costume 
(an ill-fitting, creased suit) and the dialogue in response to the Prosecutor’s 
questioning, including the double negatives “he didn’t say nothin’” and “I didn’t 
take no money,” create a set of assumptions around the character’s class status and 
social background that begin to construct the image of Briggs as ‘impoverished 
victim’. Once again a character’s use of language demarcates them as an outsider, 
less equipped to deal with the judicial process that theoretically works as a great 
leveller than someone of higher social standing. The testimony presents to the 
                                                          
443 Tom Flinn, ‘Three Faces of Film Noir’, p. 35. 
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spectator Briggs’ version of events: that he had returned to Nick’s cafe in the hope 
of finding Mike and repaying his debt, only to find the owner’s body slumped over 
an open cash register. The attorney’s comments and questions - “So you want this 
jury to believe that you went back to Nick’s just to repay a debt of 30 cents.” “How 
did you know you’d find [Mike] there?” – are accompanied by subtle glances at and 
movements towards the jury, in an unspoken conditioning that unites attorney and 
jury in an assumed shared acknowledgment of the unlikelihood of Briggs’ story. 
Briggs’ response to the latter question, “well I took a chance” chimes with the 
notions of fate or chance working against the unlucky individual in film noir. The 
prevalence of coincidences and ironies that circulate around Nick’s death and the 
trial – Mike, the individual Briggs was hoping to find at the cafe, arriving at a 
moment that incriminates the former in murder, Mike’s responsibility in 
condemning to death a man whom he had on their first encounter helped, the 
murder of a man whom Briggs has threatened only days prior -  will reoccur when 
Mike suspects that Meng has been murdered.  
It is during the key moments of Briggs’ questioning that a brief interlude, 
jarring both tonally in relation to the rest of the sequence and in its departure from 
classical courtroom convention, most overtly depicts the fallibility of judge and 
jury, as it is revealed that one juror is not only sleeping but audibly snoring. The 
following shot captures the judge, tellingly looking away from the witness box and 
jury (who are in the upper right of the frame to his lower left) as the District 
Attorney alerts him to the slumbering juror. In another telling gesture, the 
unengaged judge (Oscar O’Shea) is then viewed putting on his glasses in order to 
ascertain what exactly the Prosecutor has alerted him to, before banging his gavel to 
awaken the individual. The following set of exchanges between the judge and juror, 
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in which the judge hypocritically admonishes the man for failing to “pay strict 
attention to the evidence” before the latter explains that he was “up all night with a 
terrible toothache” is written and performed (particularly by O’Shea as the flustered 
judge) in a comic manner, offering both individuals as figures of ridicule. This 
moment constitutes a startling subversion of the expectations surrounding the 
figures of judge and jury, constructed through their conventionalised rigidity and 
lack of individualising detail. The judge, typically presented as a symbol of the law 
at work, and the jury, typically non-individualised,444 are not only imbued with 
personal characteristics, but ones that create a negative impression. To show a 
judge not listening is an almost complete subversion of how this figure is typically 
presented to us and clearly conveys, through this subversion, the sense of a legal 
process that fails due to the apathy and/or fallibility of the individuals granted 
authority within it. Although this could be argued to place blame for the trial’s 
failing on the individual rather than systemic level, the exclusion of a justice figure 
emphasises (rather than obscures) the precariousness of the trial’s processes.445 The 
overtness of this fallibility, demonstrable in the doubling of gestures that demarcate 
the judge’s inattention, is part of the scene’s objective to subvert the conventional 
affirmative depiction of the court.  
This interlude incurs laughter from the rest of the courtroom as the bashful 
juror sits down. There is a cut to a tight two-shot of Mike and Jane, the latter clearly 
uncomfortable as the judge bangs his gavel to quiet the courtroom. Jane looks 
around, surveying the laughter, and then states to Mike that “all they want is to get 
                                                          
444 It is worth recalling here Carol Clover’s work on the cinematic jury (see my review of literature). 
445 12 Angry Men serves as a useful comparison here; the opening trial scene of that film also 
depicts an inattentive judge. But the subsequent narrative developments, structured around the 
persuasiveness of Juror #8, the film’s justice figure, allow the film to demonstrate that justice is still 
achievable under the adversarial trial system. 
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it over with, go home.” This tonally jarring moment aligns the spectator with Jane, 
in a shared comprehension that the proceedings are more serious than the rest of the 
courtroom’s treatment of it suggests. Here Stranger on the Third Floor anticipates a 
moment in The Wrong Man during which 
the accused man sees how trivial the trial is for everyone but him. As his life 
disintegrates, guards and jurors chat, a woman touches up her lipstick, a 
prosecutor and his assistant share a joke, and a juror polishes his glasses. 
The courtroom proceeding simultaneously appears hellish and mundane.446  
  
This discrepancy between how the trial is viewed by the individuals whose lives 
will be affected by the outcome, and those who will not be affected, is anticipated 
in Stranger on the Third Floor. Both films align the audience with the viewpoints 
of the legal outsiders whose hellish experience contrasts with the attitudes exhibited 
elsewhere (it is no coincidence that The Wrong Man also includes subjective shots 
from the viewpoint of the innocent defendant).  
The questioning of Briggs intensifies, and when he is confronted with the 
details of a previous conviction that he had lied about, there are consecutive close-
ups of (a distressed, visibly sweating) Briggs, Mike, and Jane. This editing pattern 
is repeated moments later when a now horrified Briggs, confronted with the barrage 
of evidence against him, turns to the jurors and shrieks “I didn’t kill him!” He then 
repeats “I didn’t” twice over, with each repetition accompanied by a cut; firstly to a 
close-up of an uncomfortable looking Mike, and secondly to Jane, who looks down 
at the floor and covers her ears in evident distress. The consecutive close-ups of the 
three characters unites them in the enveloping intensity of the sequence and their 
feelings, in a reminder of their roles in the others’ fates. It is also representative of 
                                                          
446 Allen K. Rostron, ‘Lawyers, Law and the Movies: The Hitchcock Cases’, p. 227. 
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the shifts in identification and viewpoint that pervade the sequence. We are allowed 
not only to share in the differing perspectives of all three characters, but also to see 
how all three are united in their divergence from the court’s point of view.  
The defendant’s outburst leads Jane to stand up and rush down the aisle out 
of the courtroom, and the sequence continues by following Mike and Jane out of the 
court. This does not correspond with a recess in the diegetic trial itself, but 
nevertheless functions similarly to the recess convention by puncturing some of the 
dramatic tension built up in the preceding developments. The couple’s conversation 
in a corridor outside of the courtroom, during which Mike tries to pacify a disturbed 
Jane by telling her that she is “just upset - everybody is at their first trial” again 
underlines their opposed perspectives. Mike’s conventionally masculine air of 
rational detachment contrasts with Jane’s involved, intuitive and implicitly 
feminine emotionalism, as the latter argues “suppose, for just one minute, that he’s 
telling the truth” and articulates her concern that Briggs’ likely conviction will be 
due to Mike’s testimony. In a parallel to the melodrama’s trial conventions, the 
conflict between reason and emotion is dramatised and gendered so that it is the 
female whose non-rational emotional knowledge will be proven correct. The arrival 
of Mike’s newspaper colleague Martin (Cliff Clark) and the subsequent moments in 
which, Jane having gone home, Martin takes Mike for a drink at a local bar, allow 
for the interjection of another perspective on the crime that is, in accordance with 
the archetype of the heavy-drinking newspaperman, heavily cynical. Flinn argues 
that Martin personifies ‘the congenital cynicism of the [noir] genre’,447 and his 
protestations that “there’s too many people in the world anyway” before ushering 
Mike back to the court with the line “go in there and earn your raise” presents to 
                                                          
447 Tom Flinn, ‘Three Faces of Film Noir’, p. 35. 
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Mike the image of a possible future self, desensitized by too much interaction with 
the noir world of crime and amorality. Martin also underscores the fact that, even if 
Briggs is guilty, Mike’s raise will still result from the deaths of two individuals. 
Both Jane and Martin function here to underline Mike’s responsibility in 
determining Briggs’ fate, before the return to the courtroom for the verdict.  
This return to the courtroom corresponds to a set of alterations to the mise-
en-scène that foreshadows the expressionistic aesthetic of the later nightmare trial 
sequence. This is signified immediately when the familiar establishing shot of 
figures filing back into the courtroom is viewed through a previously unseen metal 
grid that spans the width of the frame (Fig. 81). There is a cut to a frontally shot 
view of the arrival of the judge (Fig. 82). The camera pans right as he walks to the 
judge’s box, with the lighting casting ominous (and distorting) shadows on the wall 
behind him that dissipates into more naturalistic lighting as he sits down. This is 
accompanied by a previously unseen gravity to the judge’s expression. These are 
our first glimpses of the noir world stylistically intruding into the ordered and 
ordinary, choices that ambiguously reflect the subjectivity of Briggs and/or Mike.448  
                                                          
448 As in Scarlet Street, the style can be said to reflect more than one individual’s experience of the 
courtroom.  
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Figs 81 (top) and 82 (bottom) 
 
The treatment of the reading of the verdict also utilises expressionistic 
stylistic choices. From a medium close-up of the judge there is a cut to the jury 
foreman, stood in the centre of the frame (Fig. 83). The foreman’s direct address to 
the camera posits this shot as a subjective one aligned with Briggs’ point of view 
(especially when considered in relation to the positioning of the characters in the 
previous shots) as he states “Yes your honor. We find the defendant guilty of 
murder in the first degree.” The possible subjective shot again demonstrates the 
play with identification and viewpoint, and in this particular instance creates a sense 
of personal nightmare that will become more forceful later. The shot’s non-
naturalistic strategies (with its unusual composition and staging as the foreman, 
flanked by dimly lit jurors, looms over the viewer) contrasts with the respectful 
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form of the golden age courtroom sequence, as do the aforementioned choices, by 
emphasising subjectivity. 
 
Fig. 83 
The guilty verdict induces another hysterical outburst from Briggs, to the 
extent that he is forcibly removed from the courtroom. This event is depicted 
almost entirely in one tracking shot that follows the detained Briggs along the far 
left of the courtroom but which views him through a gridded partition. The use of 
such imagery – shooting through or cutting up the frame with grids, bars, or other 
vertical or horizontal line effects – is a staple of noir’s visual style, inherently 
suggestive of entrapment and enclosure.449 The shot also functions as another of the 
increasingly more frequent, ambiguously-situated-as-subjective shots in the latter 
part of the sequence, as Briggs holds on to the grid and calls out to Mike “Mr. 
Ward! Mr. Ward! I didn’t do it, you know I didn’t do it!” These combined elements 
demonstrate the intrusion of expressionistic noir stylistics into the film, and it is 
telling that this intrusion, which in turn signals the beginning of Mike’s descent into 
the personal nightmare of the noir world, coincides with the point of the trial at 
                                                          
449 One famed example occurs in the following year’s The Maltese Falcon (Dir: John Huston, 1941), 
in which the horizontal lines of an elevator cage evoke prison bars, a visual parallel made because 
the character taking the lift (the film’s femme fatale, Brigid O’Shaughnessy [Mary Astor]), has just 
been arrested.  
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which the law must be seen at its most objective and infallible. The final shot of the 
sequence begins with Mike in medium close-up, his eyeline following the off-
screen Briggs out of the courtroom as the latter continues to yell out to him. Mike 
then suddenly tilts his head upwards, and the camera cranes up and rapidly tracks in 
on the statue of justice that hovers over the courtroom, the low-key lighting casting 
imposing shadow effects (Fig. 84). The statue of Lady Justice is a symbol of a 
natural ideal of law whose immutable accessories (the blindfold, the scales, the 
double-edged sword) represent the qualities of this ideal: impartiality, reason, and 
blind justice. Despite (or perhaps because of) its overt resonance, Lady Justice is 
often absent from the iconography of the courtroom and, when present, usually 
placed in the courthouse exterior.450 In this instance, the statue’s appearance acts as 
the final emphatic and ironic reminder of the abuses of justice that have occurred in 
the courtroom. For many reasons, including the sombre scoring, this shot 
simultaneously typifies the noir’s social critique, visual style and pessimistic tone 
whilst departing drastically from the golden age representational strategies. This 
includes the mobility of the camera. Place and Peterson note that ‘camera 
movements are used sparingly in most noir films […] What moving shots that were 
made seem to have been carefully considered and often tied very directly to the 
emotions of the characters’.451 Thus one can interpret that this moment is a crucial 
one in the construction of the scene’s meaning. Secondly, an elaborate camera 
movement that is unmotivated by character movement presents another rupture to 
                                                          
450 Perhaps a more conventional usage of the statue (and an inverse of its appearance in Stranger 
on the Third Floor) appears in The Tattered Dress [Dir: Jack Arnold, 1956] when, in the film’s final 
shot, the camera tracks out and pans right to position in the centre of the frame the statue outside 
of the courthouse (another example of the affirmative symmetrical compositions I outlined in my 
first chapter) while the triumphant score introduces the “The End” credit. The statue appears at a 
point in the narrative where justice has finally been enacted. Thus the particular treatment of the 
statue affirms the possibility – indeed, the inevitability - of natural justice. 
451J.A. Place and L.S. Peterson, ‘Some Visual Motifs of Film Noir’, p. 32. 
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the respectful form of conventional trial depiction. With the discourse of the law 
fully (and overtly) undermined, its failings become apparent and Mike is left only 
with his own guilt.  
 
Fig. 84 
 
The narrative function of the initial sequence, eschewing notions of the trial 
as a narrative form that embodies closure and (relative) certainty, serves to invoke 
disequilibrium and steadily undermine affirmative assumptions regarding the legal 
system as it questions Briggs’ guilt and the court’s processes of truth-finding. The 
dispersal of viewpoint focuses on the perspectives of the key legal outsiders – 
Briggs, Mike, and Jane – and in no way is a legal point of view affirmed. The 
sequence’s project involves undermining ideological notions of a legal system 
working in the best interests of all, instead moving away from the symbolic to 
depicting the fallible, apathetic individuals causing the system to fail. Having 
become aware of these failings, Mike begins to question the normal world around 
him, and thus the first trial sequence initiates the heavily psychologised second act 
of the film. 
The sentencing of Briggs constitutes a turning point in the film’s dominant 
representational strategies, culminating in the nightmare sequence that reflects the 
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anxieties governing Mike’s internal state: his guilt over Briggs, his fear of being 
accused of Meng’s murder, and myriad other feelings that Mike may not be 
consciously aware of. In order to ascertain how the film leads to this extended 
nightmare sequence, I will consider the material bridging the initial trial and the 
nightmare. This material is intensely focused on Mike’s state of mind following 
Briggs’ sentencing, and is accompanied with a more overt departure from the 
relatively more classical strategies of the establishing sequences and the (majority 
of the) first trial, transitioning into a noir narrative method that is dominated by the 
subjective strategies Telotte associates with noir’s voice, including voiceover 
narration and multiple flashback sequences. This transition makes apparent the 
subjectivity underlying all acts of verbal communication, observation and 
evaluation, which is important to further undermining the assumed objectivity of 
the legal discourses previously presented.  
From the first trial’s final image of the statue of Lady Justice, there is a fade 
to a shot of Mike alone at his desk in the press room. The cleaning lady arrives, 
establishing that it is late at night. This emphasises Mike’s solitude and the 
domesticity that he lacks but longs for, an association that is bolstered by the 
following deflating phone conversation he has with Jane. Mike leaves the office and 
pauses in the corridor as he passes the open door to the courtroom. The following 
shot of the courtroom elicits a low chime from the score followed by Briggs’ 
protestations of “I didn’t do it!” heard on the soundtrack. The use of sound thus 
aligns us with Mike’s subjectivity, and it is this moment that triggers the voiceover 
narration that dominates the rest of the sequence as we hear Mike attempt to 
reassure himself “Of course he did it.”  
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Mike’s following walk home is presented largely through a tracking shot 
which is accompanied by an uninterrupted, near stream-of-consciousness 
voiceover, a commentary on the memories and feelings that the external world 
evokes in Mike. It is here we realise, as Mike walks past and (via voiceover) 
comments on Nick’s café, that the scene of the crime is located directly across the 
street from his apartment building, presenting a sense of inescapability from the 
crime that augments the feelings of claustrophobia and guilt. The voiceover 
narration is not used in conjunction with flashback at this point. Rather than 
providing a relatively assured act of narrativization that looks back on past events 
with a reasonable (even if deceptive) sense of the protagonist’s objectivity, the 
immediacy of the voiceover narration emphasises Mike’s inability to shake off his 
feelings of guilt and doubt. The voiceover exhibits an almost conversational 
fluctuation between opposing streams of thought within one individual, as when 
Mike thinks “after all, I didn’t see Briggs actually kill Nick. And all the rest of the 
evidence was circumstantial, too. So what? That doesn’t make it less reliable.” 
Issues of reliability (or the lack thereof) are central to noir narration.452 Here 
voiceover and flashback are used not to posit Mike as a knowingly unreliable 
narrator, but to undermine the reliability of, firstly, any human mind, and secondly, 
the court’s methods of determining guilt and innocence, further developing the 
themes that were established in the trial sequence.  
Mike then passes the titular Stranger (unbeknownst to him, Nick’s actual 
murderer) outside his building. The voiceover returns inside Mike’s apartment, 
                                                          
452 See Steven Neale, ‘Film Noir’ in Genre and Hollywood, p. 168 and Imogen Sara Smith, In Lonely 
Places, p. 4. 
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reiterating Mike’s hatred of his “gloomy” apartment building, his affection for the 
“poor kid” Jane and his disgust with the “animal next door” Meng, whose snores 
can be heard on the soundtrack. This incurs the first flashback detailing Mike’s run-
in with the snooping Meng and his landlady (Ethel Griffies). Back in the narrative 
present, Mike encounters the Stranger again as he walks back out into the corridor 
outside of his apartment. This time the Stranger is leaving Meng’s room. Following 
a short chase in which the Stranger rushes out of the building, Mike retreats indoors 
again, but the stream-of-consciousness voiceover now articulates his concern on 
noticing the silence from Meng’s room: (“Is there something wrong with him? That 
man! Maybe he did something to him. Maybe he killed him. What’s the matter with 
me?”) The voiceover narration which has heretofore worked to convey a 
subjectivised uncertainty, now begins relating this uncertainty/subjectivity to 
neurosis (“what’s the matter with me?”). 
Our protagonist’s concern then turns to how the discourse of the courtroom 
could translate the current scenario into one that “proves” he is the guilty party. 
Mike goes to touch the doorknob on Meng’s door before another disembodied 
voice intrudes on the soundtrack to intone “You forgot that fingerprints will always 
give you away.” This moment is pivotal as the first instance of the discourse of the 
courtroom being turned against Mike. He will now be exposed to the full failings of 
the trial’s processes as he begins to realise how easily the murder of Meng – which, 
we should recall, we are not sure has occurred – could be blamed on him. Mike 
explicitly begins to connect his current situation with that of Briggs (“Why should 
they think I had anything to do with it? But why did I think Briggs was guilty?) and 
here he realises that, in a parallel of Briggs’ relationship to Nick, he has motive for 
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killing Meng, a fundamental desire to, and witnesses who could testify to this 
desire, as the two following flashback sequences will prove.  
 The two short flashback segments do not solely demonstrate legal motive 
whilst absolving Mike of all guilt. Instead, the issue of unconscious desire and 
psychological guilt pervade them, implicitly undermining both the “objective” 
methods that are worked through in the courtroom to reach a legal designation of 
innocence or guilt, and the goal-oriented, motivated protagonists of classical 
convention. Krutnik, who roots his discussion of Stranger in the popularisation of 
psychoanalysis during the 1940s and the corresponding focus on the psychology of 
crime in many of the decade’s noir thrillers, details the ‘circuit of conflicting 
desires and motivations which operates far beyond any simple cause and effect 
logic of the plot’.453 Krutnik argues that the flashback structure, content of those 
flashbacks, and mise-en-scène of the nightmare sequence reveal Mike’s 
simultaneous desires to kill Meng (the latter acting as a projection of Mike’s own 
sexual frustration) and to receive punishment for this homicidal desire.454 The film 
invites the psychoanalytic reading that Krutnik provides with its ‘rupturing of the 
boundaries between the subjective and the objective’, the noir conventions 
connecting for Krutnik to notions of the Freudian Uncanny that are borne out by the 
proliferation of doubles and doublings within the film.455 These include the 
parallels between Mike and three other male figures within the film: firstly Meng, 
the projection of Mike’s frustrated sexual desire; secondly, Briggs, who similarly to 
Mike is accused of a crime he did not commit; and finally, the titular Stranger, who 
                                                          
453 Frank Krutnik, In a Lonely Street: film noir, genre, masculinity (London: Routledge, 1991), p. 49. 
454 Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
455 Ibid., p. 49. 
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acts out the murder of Meng that Mike desires.  But it also includes the two 
courtroom trials contained within the diegesis.  
The film also exhibits an awareness of and engagement with the Freudian 
concept of transference, which once again anticipates readings of Hitchcock’s 
films. Rostron, discussing the criticism on Hitchcock by the writers of Cahiers du 
Cinéma, states that:  
the French critics […] argued that each of [Hitchcock’s] movies features a 
transfer of guilt, in which an innocent but weak central character is stained 
by somehow capitulating to a stronger, evil double […] the Hitchcockian 
theme of guilt transfer parallels the Freudian concept of transference by 
which emotions associated with one person unconsciously shift to another. 
The protagonists of Hitchcock’s films, while innocent as to action, are guilty 
as to desire. As Freud wrote, “It is a matter of indifference who actually 
committed the crime; psychology is only concerned to know who desired it 
emotionally and who welcomed it when it was done.456  
 
The undermining of conscious intent and motivation (central to the workings of the 
American criminal justice system) is, as I have discussed, another recurrent feature 
of film noir or noir-inflected films of the 1940s. The short flashback sequences in 
Stranger not only present how Mike’s articulated desire to kill Meng could be used 
evidentially in the courtroom, but also exhibits an awareness that, in an extra-legal 
sense, Mike is guilty, of the charges of ‘emotionally desiring’ Meng’s death and 
‘welcoming it when it was done’. 457  Thus, the material bridging the two trial 
                                                          
456 Allen K. Rostron, ‘Lawyers, Law & the Movies: The Hitchcock Cases,’ pp. 225-233. 
457 This also helps to explain why both flashbacks implicitly link Mike and Meng in a shared sexual 
frustration, particularly in the latter sequence when Meng and landlady interrupt Mike and Jane 
when the young couple have taken shelter from the rain in Mike’s apartment. From one 
perspective the viewer is positioned to see Mike and Jane’s retreat to his apartment as innocent 
and share with Mike an anger at the intrusion of Meng and the landlady - Jane has been reluctant 
to enter the apartment initially, and the couple have not and are not engaged in any sexual activity 
when they are interrupted. But the cat-and-mouse interplay of the moments prior to the 
interruption, with Jane moving around the room, attempting to move the conversation away from 
romance as Mike paces after her, strongly suggests that Mike is guilty of attempting to seduce Jane 
- and that, like his neighbour, who almost gleefully exclaims “look at her legs” upon barging in on 
the young couple, his “mind could use a little laundering”. 
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sequences has emphasised Mike’s subjectivity through the voiceover narration and 
flashbacks. With this explicit focus on subjectivity emerges concerns of the 
impossibility of defining truth and guilt, and the ease with which unjust “truth” 
narratives can be constructed in the courtroom.  
This alignment with Mike’s subjectivity is then intensified by the use of the 
dream device. Whereas the earlier trial is collectively observable, the nightmare 
trial has no existence outside of Mike’s head, meaning that the sequence becomes 
about Mike’s psyche. Although one way of handling this dream could have been 
through inviting a popularised psychoanalytic reading,458 I would argue that, 
despite the highly stylised mise-en-scène, the film invites the spectator to read its 
dream content differently. The dream sequence functions as the externalisation of 
the dreamer’s psyche, but this film encourages the spectator to read the elements of 
the dream in light of the world presented elsewhere in the narrative, as mirrored 
images rather than as abstract symbols.459 Walters, discussing the imagined worlds 
of the filmic dream sequence, notes that ‘a great many present the dream as a stable, 
logical and discrete environment […] they function in the film as ‘worlds’ in their 
own right, contained within the wider fictional world of the film’.460  The stability 
and logic of Mike’s nightmare, particularly in relation to his nightmare trial, stems 
(partly) from its being rooted in the film’s wider fictional world. Thus, the spectator 
                                                          
458 Noir’s emergence coincided with the North American popularisation of Freud’s theories on 
dreams as expressions of the subconscious. Freud was an influence on the dream sequence of 
Spellbound (Dir: Alfred Hitchcock, 1945) for example, where the mise-en-scène of the dream 
appears as clues to the subconscious of the dreamer.  
459 The famous dream sequence that constitutes much of the action of The Wizard of Oz (Dir: Victor 
Fleming, 1939) can be considered similarly with the characters encountered mirroring the 
individuals who surround the dreamer in her waking life (a parallelism exacerbated by the casting 
of a number of the actors in dual roles, playing one character in the dream world and another in 
the real world of the film). 
460 James Walters, Alternative Worlds in Hollywood Cinema (Bristol; Chicago: Intellect Books, 2008), 
p. 46. 
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is invited to see as many connections in the dream to the film’s real world as 
departures from it, a mode of interpretation augmented by the embedded 
conventions of the trial form itself, which roots the dream in an existing logic which 
it can subvert or exaggerate, but not ignore entirely. These choices encourage the 
spectator to interpret the dream sequence as a critique of structures of the everyday 
world, which it heightens in its representational strategies but does not defamiliarise 
entirely.  
 The trial is the lengthiest section of a sequence that presents grotesque 
subversions of the entire judicial process, from questioning through incarceration 
and punishment. Immediate reference points for making sense of the sequence are 
the multitude of ironies that emerge through the variations on situations presented 
earlier in the film, augmenting the sense of the uncanny that Krutnik notes. For 
example, Mike is at the sequence’s start at the mercy of his colleagues, who 
bombard him with questions about Meng’s murder. Mike’s cries of “I didn’t do it” 
echo the earlier courtroom protestations of Briggs. The parallels between Mike and 
Briggs – the former effectively becoming the latter in terms of situation and 
behaviour over the course of the sequence – are increasingly emphasised. Briggs’ 
inept defence attorney returns in exaggerated form as Mike’s legal counsel, who 
laughs at our hero’s protestations of innocence and recommends he make a guilty 
plea.  
The subsequent nightmare trial utilises a series of conventions that are 
doubly familiar to us through both the film’s own earlier trial sequence and the 
intertextually-constructed expectations of the filmic trial. These conventions are 
systematically distorted in order to show the ease with which the supposedly 
infallible workings of the legal system can result in gross injustices, producing what 
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Rosenberg considers ‘a bizarre mix of legal incompetence and faithful adherence to 
“neutral” process’.461 It is through the adherence to the earlier sequence that the 
point is conveyed most clearly: the legal system of reality and that of nightmare 
share as many similarities as they do differences.  
Of course, distinctions between the trials are still made, most forcefully 
through stylization. Throughout the nightmare sequence, the heightened visuals 
recall (as Flinn notes) the strategies of German Expressionism, with the nightmare 
scenario allowing Mike’s mental state to be externalised through the mise-en-scène 
without interrupting the (semi-)naturalistic depiction of a recognisable world 
elsewhere in the film. Recognisable settings are depicted using expressionistic 
techniques that convey Mike’s internal state, including low angles and painted 
backdrops that configure New York’s skyscrapers as symbols of an encompassing 
claustrophobia, and outsized set designs that emphasise Mike’s isolation in his 
darkened jail cell. The expressionistic elements continue into the trial portion of the 
nightmare, emphasising the alignment with Mike’s psyche, and often working in 
direct contrast to the classical impulse of trial depiction.  For example, non-diegetic 
scoring, infrequently employed in many classical trial sequences, is present through 
this sequence, accentuating the delirious excess of Mike’s nightmare. Likewise, the 
pivotal elliptical shot transitions – i.e. transitioning from one witness on the stand to 
the next – are dissolves occasionally overlaid with kaleidoscopic morph effects. 
The style renders the known elements of the mise-en-scène in a distorted and 
disorienting manner. 
                                                          
461 Norman Rosenberg, ‘Hollywood on Trials’, p. 351. 
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The trial portion of the nightmare commences with an establishing shot of 
the courtroom (Fig. 85). One could consider this long shot conventional if solely 
examining its composition, as it adheres to a respectful framing of the key 
figures.462 But the mise-en-scène otherwise offers a radical distortion of what we 
expect from the diegetic space of the courtroom. The statue of Lady Justice, the last 
image presented in the earlier trial, now hovers over the rest of the court in mid-
frame, seemingly suspended by nothing. Its presence emphasises the sense of this 
trial as, simultaneously, a bizarre distortion of what we have seen earlier and the 
logical continuation of how the earlier trial was represented in its final moments. 
The chiaroscuro lighting casts jagged light patterns on the walls, slicing up the 
image in a manner again redolent of prison bars. These shadows cast a large and 
uneven pattern that is overtly non-naturalistic. They could not feasibly be cast by 
any element of the court space, and in their possible suggestion of flames they also 
invoke the iconography of Hell. Throughout the sequence the presence of the 
shadowy background ensures that the mise-en-scène remains unnatural in much the 
same manner as the lighting effects of the trials in Scarlet Street, Dial M for 
Murder and The Night of the Hunter (Dir: Charles Laughton, 1955).  
                                                          
462 This includes placing the defendant and defence attorney on the left of the frame, the jury on 
the far right, the prosecutor stood in the centre of the frame addressing the jury, and the judge in 
the background but on a raised platform that positions him higher in the frame.  
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Fig.85 
The establishing shot is presented during the prosecutor’s opening statement 
(again in line with conventional trial depiction). The following shot draws our 
attention to firstly, the prosecutor, who we now see is the same individual as the 
prosecutor in Briggs’ trial, and secondly, the sleeping jury on the right of the frame, 
their heads bowed down in unison in a paradoxical assertion of both their human 
fallibility (a reminder of the sleeping juror in the earlier trial) and their inhuman 
unresponsiveness to the truth.463 On Mike’s first protestation of his innocence, there 
is a cut to a shot of the judge – again presented as the nightmare double of the judge 
at Briggs’ trial. The low-key lighting and O’Shea’s shift in performance style 
reconfigure the judge from an ineffectual, near-comic individual to a monstrous 
one, as he exclaims forcefully “The defendant will refrain.” The repetition of this 
line and action within the sequence conveys Mike’s powerlessness and the silence 
enforced upon him. Pivotally this is all in line with trial convention, and 
exemplifies Telotte’s argument that noir demonstrates the power ‘of our cultural 
discourse to permit speech and to impose silence’. The device of the nightmare also 
                                                          
463 The sudden inability of the dreamer to be heard or seen by other individuals within the dream is 
a trope of the Hollywood dream sequence that is often employed in the dream ballets of musicals 
of the period, including Oklahoma! (Dir: Fred Zinnemann, 1955) and An American in Paris (Dir: 
Vincente Minnelli, 1951). I wish to thank Helen Palmer for this observation. 
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constructs a relationship between the noir techniques employed and the 
Kafkaesque. The nightmarish aspect of the court with its overt biases and failings 
(including its refusal to allow the defendant an opportunity to present their case) 
protected by their status as part of a ‘neutral process’ recalls Kafka’s The Trial 
(1925).464  
The sequence progresses to its witness testimonies, which present the film’s 
two most prominent female characters, Jane and Mike’s landlady.  The differences 
in how the two are depicted on the witness stand visually signifies their 
relationships to Mike and to the nightmare legal institution. The landlady occupies 
the left of frame with the prosecutor leaning semi-casually on the arm of the 
witness box to her right during her testimony (Fig. 86). Both witness and prosecutor 
are positioned facing outwards towards the off-screen Mike, whom the landlady 
points at as she exclaims “He has a vicious temper, always picking fights. Once he 
almost struck me.” The pace of her speech is so rapid that interjection is impossible, 
and Mike’s repeated attempts to do so only incur the judge’s repeated intonation of 
“the defendant will refrain.” Judge, prosecutor, and witness all appear to be in 
league with a trial system that denies the defendant any right to speak while 
simultaneously granting the witness the opportunity to exaggerate or distort the 
truth. The ambiguous subjective shots of the earlier trial’s closing moments 
reappear as the landlady misquotes Mike’s threat to Meng. Her version “He told 
him ‘You’ll be sorry for this. I’m going to kill you!’” does not correspond to the 
truth seen in the waking flashback but is permitted by the nightmare court.  
                                                          
464 I will return to the relationship between law noir and the Kafkaesque in my discussion of The 
Lady from Shanghai.   
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Figs. 86 (top) and Fig. 87 (bottom)  
 
A kaleidoscopic fade effect transitions to Jane’s testimony. She is presented 
in a high angle shot, her victimisation stylistically rendered through both the angle 
and the oversized design of the witness box, which serve to minimise her presence 
as an individual within the intimidating spatial structures of the court. She looks up 
at the off-screen prosecutor as he states “Do you realise you’re under oath to tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?”, followed by her response (“I 
do.”) A cut retains the menacing high angle, but now also incorporates the 
prosecutor into the frame as he leans forward (Fig. 87), looming over Jane as he 
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questions her on the incident in Mike’s apartment that was depicted in one of the 
prior flashback sequences465:  
 [Pros.] “Did he say ‘before I kill him’?” 
[Jane] “I- I don’t remember!” 
[P.] “Would you swear he didn’t say it? Would you? [Points at Jane, then 
repeats more aggressively] Would you?” 
[J.] “No! No I wouldn’t!” 
At this point Jane crumbles, placing her head in her hands as the District Attorney 
walks out of frame right. There is a cut to a subjective shot of Jane, who looks up at 
Mike/the spectator before stating “I’m sorry Michael. I had to tell the truth.” The 
direct address recalls the latter part of the earlier trial sequence, only with Mike in 
place of Briggs as the eye/I of the subjective shots. This again links the two men, 
and puts the audience in the place of the individual victimised by the law.466 The 
Jane of Mike’s dream remains the good girl, but the irony of this moment is that it 
is her passive, stereotypically feminine quality that condemns Mike as the 
nightmare legal system pressures her into “telling the truth”. 
Mike’s questioning follows, initially presented in a noir mutation of the 
conventional triangular formation of testimonial depiction (Fig. 88). However, 
similarly to the establishing shot, the composition is the sole intertextually familiar 
and conventional component of the mise-en-scéne. The prosecutor’s questions, and 
Mike’s responses, are limited to the following exchanges: 
                                                          
465 This is the earlier scene in which Meng and Mike’s landlady barges in on the young couple and 
the former insinuates that they have met for a sexual tryst. An enraged Mike grabs Meng and 
warns him the landlady to throw him out “before I kill him”.  
466 It is a device which we have seen in the earlier trial, and which also features in the noir-inflected 
trials of Leave Her to Heaven and The Wrong Man.  
326 
 
[Pros.] “You hated Meng, didn’t you?” 
[Mike] “Yes, but I didn’t kill him.” 
[P.] “Did you ever think of killing him?” 
[M.] “I don’t know. I might have.” 
 
 
Fig. 88. 
 
This dialogue demonstrates the degree to which guilt is (for Mike) linked to 
desire. His psyche – the auteur of Mike’s dream - situates the mere thought of 
murder as tantamount to legal guilt. Rosenberg notes that ‘Mike joins other noir 
protagonists in recognizing the possibility that their own speech, when represented 
and translated into legal discourse, may return to haunt them’.467 The issues of 
speech, silence and translation again come into play in the following moments as 
Mike stands up, approaches the jury and attempts to explain himself to them. The 
convention of our protagonist being granted the opportunity to give an impassioned 
speech to the diegetic courtroom audience that induces the empathy and 
understanding required to win them over, is one that appears in more conventional 
contemporaneous trial representations, including Dust Be My Destiny and the trial 
                                                          
467 Norman Rosenberg, ‘Hollywood on Trials’, p. 351 
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scenes in several films directed by Frank Capra.468 Such scenes depict a court 
system in which everyone gets their chance to speak, demonstrating the power of 
legal discourse to democratically permit speech rather than impose silence. 
However, here the jurors continue their collective slumber, unable and unwilling to 
listen or respond to Mike’s appeals. When he realises their condition, Mike asks 
“Why aren’t you listening to me?” before appealing to the judge “Make them hear 
me, they’ve got to!” There is a cut to a medium close-up of the judge, lit from 
below to assert his monstrosity as he shouts his final, and most intimidating, chorus 
of “The defendant will refrain!” (Fig. 89). The imposed silence of the legal outsider 
has been again underlined.  
 
Fig. 89 
                                                          
468 The “Capra picture”, typified by films such as Mr. Deeds Goes to Town (Dir: Frank Capra, 1936) 
and Mr. Smith Goes to Washington (Dir: Frank Capra, 1939), foreground social issues while 
maintaining a primarily comic, populist tone, with films such as the aforementioned Mr Deeds and 
You Can’t Take it With You (Dir: Frank Capra, 1938) featuring significant trial sequences in which 
the courtroom plays a major part in resolving the narrative. One telling  quote regarding the 
perception of Capra’s courtrooms and the antitraditional form of noir comes from Force of Evil’s 
director, Abraham Polonsky, who remarked, on the decision to omit courtroom material from his 
film: ‘Committing to law and order is liberal, is a [Frank] Capra ending. Which is okay, but I didn’t 
write a Capra picture’ (see Interview with Abraham Polonsky in Schulteiss and Schaubert (eds.) 
Force of Evil: The Critical Edition (Northridge: California State University, 1996), p. 180; quoted in 
Norman Rosenberg, ‘Looking for Law in All the Old Traces’, p. 1469.) Here we hint at the meanings 
attached to the use of a classical courtroom sequence – which Polonsky considers ‘committing to 
law and order’ – and the generic basis of different depictions of the law. Polonsky’s reluctance to 
give his film a ‘Capra ending’ demonstrates the dominant implications of a conventional use of the 
courtroom in classical Hollywood and the desire by noir filmmakers such as Polonsky to avoid this.  
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Another comparison between Mike’s nightmare treatment and the trial of 
Briggs becomes evident as guards attempt to hold Mike down in the court. It is here 
that the Stranger himself appears, in medium shots of him clambering over what 
bear a striking similarity to movie theatre seats. The spatial illogic of this moment 
underlines the sequence’s lack of naturalism, while the appearance of the seating 
forms a subtle critique of the trial’s underlying similarity to a theatrical spectacle. 
Mike’s attempts to alert the court to the presence of the actual culprit go unheard, 
and the inclusion of the guards mean that the following verdict and sentencing are 
presented with Mike physically restrained, again underlining his own 
powerlessness. The judge requests the verdict, which is presented in a long shot 
incorporating the judge in foreground left, Mike (being held by the guards) in the 
mid-foreground, and the jury in the background right. The procedure of established 
convention is upturned as, instead of the sole foreman, the jurors stand in unison, 
their faces remaining obscured through the lighting as they, in unison, point at Mike 
and shout their “Guilty!” verdict. There is a cut back to the judge, stood upright just 
off-centre frame with the D.A. positioned in the lower left, as the former presents 
his sentencing (Fig. 90). Framing the two figures together unites them and the 
institution they represent in opposition to Mike. There is a loud sting on the score as 
the judge then morphs into the statue of Justice. The final shot of the nightmare’s 
trial parallels the equivalent moment in the earlier trial sequence, as the camera then 
tracks in on the image of Lady Justice.   
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Fig. 90. 
The nightmare trial thus functions as both a bizarre exaggeration and a 
logical extension of the earlier trial scene, a doubled reading that it invites through 
the nuances of its play with the surrounding “real world” material. Our 
understanding of the scene relies crucially upon its use of the trial scenario, which 
is doubly familiar from both the earlier scene and as a broader cinematic 
convention. The nightmare trial casts Mike in the role he helped to place Briggs in 
in the previous scene, but sustains the expressionistic alignment of the mise-en-
scène with the defendant’s subjectivity that was less consistently displayed in the 
prior trial. Its excesses are narratively justified by its status as a dream. Referring in 
part to this film’s nightmare trial sequence, Krutnik argues that  
such ‘italicised’ moments convey, in a displaced manner, the effects of 
extreme violence, perverse or corrupt sexuality or moments of psychic 
breakdown. During the 1940s, and particularly within the generic space of the 
‘tough’ crime thriller, such sequences represented a standardised means of 
simultaneously signifying and siphoning-off excess. Rather, then, than 
representing an alternative to or transgression of the classical Hollywood 
norms, the ‘noir stylistics’ were very much an integral part of the 
systematisation of Hollywood’s narrative regulation during the 1940s.469   
 
                                                          
469 Frank Krutnik, In a Lonely Street, p. 20. 
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I think that Krutnik’s argument can be complicated when aligned with my analysis. 
I have noted that many of the sequence’s strategies of excess were introduced in the 
earlier sequence, thus allowing the nightmare to be viewed as a logical 
continuation, rather than radical departure from, the film’s representation of the 
legal system. This nightmare also acts as our only window into the real-life 
processes of Mike’s interactions with the law following this sequence, standing in 
for the actual experience in a way that invites the audience to infer that it would not 
be dissimilar to Mike’s actual incarceration. Although ultimately ‘narrative 
regulation’ is achieved through the happy ending, a consistent and transgressive 
treatment of the legal institution as highly fallible is integral to the film’s meaning. 
The two trials, and the material bridging them, problematize the attempts at 
constructing an objective “truth” in the courtroom, question issues of legal language 
and translation, and challenge traditional models of explanation and judgment by 
emphasising a number of themes that would come to be associated with noir 
narratives, including unconscious motives and desires, internal guilt, doubt and 
chance, and the overall prioritisation of subjective devices. Both sequences diverge 
from standard, positive depictions of the law, in the process effectively introducing 
a number of the strategies and related meanings of the noir genre, and articulating 
noir’s essential difference from the convention and tradition exemplified in typical 
uses of the trial sequence.  
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“This trial keeps getting screwier all the time”: The Courtroom’s Place in the World 
(Gone Insane) of The Lady from Shanghai 
 
The Lady from Shanghai was released in 1947, seven years after Stranger 
on the Third Floor. Its trial scene is depicted in a highly stylized, non-naturalistic 
manner without being situated as a dream, thus making possible an even more 
sustained and overt critique of the adversarial trial system. I intend to consider how 
the film enacts this critique by systematically analysing how it subverts each of the 
conventions of courtroom trial depiction I outlined in my first chapter and to 
demonstrate the patterns of violation that are evidenced across noir’s depictions of 
courts and law.  
The Lady from Shanghai has been cited as an essential addition to the noir 
canon.470  This classification owes partly to the involvement of Orson Welles, the 
film’s director, producer, leading actor and co-writer, whose Citizen Kane is 
considered one of the earliest propagators of noir’s expressionistic visual style and 
complex narrative structure,471 and whose filmography contains other films 
frequently classified as noir.472 The film exhibits a variety of noir conventions 
including a convoluted narrative (which contains at its centre the male protagonist’s 
deadly interaction with a woman to whom he is inextricably drawn), first-person 
voiceover narration, a flashback structure, and a visual style that serves to distort 
and disorient. The film exemplifies Walker’s configuration of noir narratives as 
revolving around the protagonist’s interaction with a ‘noir world’ of criminality that 
                                                          
470 See James Damico, ‘Film Noir: A Modest Proposal’, p. 103 in Silver and Ursini (eds.), Film Noir 
Reader. 
471 Biesen (2005, p. 12) and Dimendberg (2004, p. 5) both situate Citizen Kane alongside Stranger 
on the Third Floor as prototypical noir. 
472 The Stranger (Dir: Orson Welles, 1946) and Touch of Evil (Dir: Orson Welles, 1958). 
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moves ‘inside the disturbed protagonist’ as he becomes entangled with it.473 But 
this disturbance is intensified to the degree that the film’s narrative and formal 
strategies appear exaggerated even by the standards of noir. This results in an 
unusual paradox of The Lady from Shanghai both exemplifying and exaggerating 
noir’s qualities, to some degree violating the norms of a form that is defined by its 
violations of previously existing norms. This is a paradox invoked by Arnott’s 
claim that the film displays ‘a deliberate undermining of the classic film noir style 
but it is this very subversiveness that evokes the essential spirit of the genre’.474 I 
would like to consider this paradox in order to begin thinking about how the film 
invites us to read its trial scene.  
                                                          
473 The following is a plot summary of the film: Michael O’Hara (Orson Welles) is an Irish sailor who 
meets Elsa Bannister (Rita Hayworth) by chance in New York’s Central Park. Michael rescues her 
from three attempted attackers and she subsequently offers him the opportunity to work for her 
husband as a seaman aboard the Bannisters’ yacht. Michael denies the request, but is persuaded 
after a visit by Elsa’s husband, Arthur (Everett Sloane), a world-famous criminal lawyer. On board 
the yacht, Michael quickly becomes romantically involved with Elsa despite his awareness that the 
Bannisters and Arthur’s law partner George Grisby (Glenn Anders) are, at the very least, morally 
dubious characters. Grisby privately proposes to Michael that he agree to “murder” him as part of 
a plot to fake his own death, promising him a sum of money and, due to a legal technicality, no 
chance of imprisonment for the crime. Although again dubious, Michael realises he can use the 
money to elope with Elsa, and so agrees to sign a confession for Grisby’s murder. The night of the 
“crime” arrives. While Michael proceeds with his actions as part of the agreed-upon plan, Grisby is 
confronted by Sidney Broome (Ted de Corsia), a private investigator working for Arthur, who has 
become aware that Grisby intends to murder Arthur and frame Michael for his death while faking 
his own. Grisby shoots Broome, who lives long enough to firstly inform Elsa of Grisby’s plot to 
murder her husband and secondly, let Michael know that he is being set up for this murder. 
Michael rushes to Arthur’s office, where it is discovered that it is in fact Grisby who has been killed 
and Arthur who is alive. Michael’s “confession” is found, and he is arrested and placed on trial for 
Grisby’s murder. Arthur acts as his defence attorney in the trial, and attempts to persuade Michael 
to plead justifiable homicide. The truth regarding Michael’s relationship with Elsa is made public 
during the trial, and while awaiting the verdict, Arthur voices the pleasure he will receive in losing 
the case and insinuates that he is aware of the identity of the actual murderer of Grisby. Michael 
feigns an overdose of pills in the courtroom while awaiting the verdict, and in the subsequent 
uproar manages to escape. He is reunited with Elsa in a Chinatown theatre, where Michael realises 
that it is in fact Elsa who killed Grisby, before he is rendered unconscious and brought to a nearby 
carnival funhouse. The various schemes of Elsa and Arthur are revealed as the pair confront one 
another within the funhouse hall of mirrors, before a shootout between the two kills Arthur and 
mortally wounds Elsa. Michael leaves Elsa to die in the funhouse. 
474 Jake Arnott, ‘I Love The Lady from Shanghai’, The Guardian (2nd June 2004), 
<http://www.theguardian.com/film/2004/jun/02/2> accessed 01 September 2015. 
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Walker’s conceptualisation of the noir world is particularly useful to 
considering this exaggeration. Its relevance is marked in both the negative 
references made to a collapsing world in the film’s dialogue (with a protagonist 
who considers it a “bright guilty world” and another character convinced of an 
impending nuclear apocalypse), and in how consistently the literature on the film 
refers back to its “world”. The main divergence from Walker’s conceptualisation is 
that in this instance it could be argued that the entire film exists in the noir world. 
Unlike Stranger on the Third Floor, The Lady from Shanghai exhibits no normality 
upon which noir intrudes. Bessy describes the film as ‘the sumptuous, 
hallucinogenic and baroque re-creation of a world in the process of disintegration’, 
475 a process that is in occurrence from the outset due to, as Telotte argues, the lack 
of a legible framing device from which Michael’s voiceover emerges. The 
voiceover simply accompanies the opening images, so that the entire film, in effect, 
constitutes a flashback. Telotte argues that this means ‘we find ourselves placed not 
in a world within which disturbing events occur, but in a world of disturbance – a 
realm conjured up precisely because a mind is troubled’.476 Bessy’s use of the term 
baroque to describe the film’s world is also telling in that the ‘baroque’ is one of the 
ages in the evolution of genre as posited by Focillon, a stage summarised by Avisar 
as ‘the stage of parody and subversion’ .477 It is on the level of parody and 
subversion that many of the film’s aesthetic and narrational strategies operate. 
                                                          
475 Maurice Bessy, Orson Welles (New York: Crown, 1971), p. 60; quoted in Robert B. Pippin, 
Fatalism in American Film Noir, p. 57. 
476 J.P. Telotte, Voices in the Dark, p. 57. 
477 Ilan Avisar, ‘Time and Representation: Generic Transformations and Historicist Interpretations 
of Holocaust Films’ in Jonathan C. Friedman (ed.), Performing Difference: Representations of ‘The 
Other in Film and Theatre (Plymouth, UK: United Press of America, 2008), p. 220. 
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This world of disturbance is conveyed through a number of means that seize 
upon the exaggeration of the familiar. The film uses a familiar noir narrative (the 
male protagonist’s romantic entanglement with a dangerous female already 
involved with an older love rival478) but exaggerates the characterisations so that 
the desirability of the female and the repulsiveness of her husband are excessively 
treated (I will return to the film’s characterisations in more detail shortly). Another 
effect of the voiceover is to convey the sense of Michael looking back from a 
position of knowledge on past events, which allows the establishment of an early 
awareness of the badness of these characters and the inevitability of their 
subsequent double-crossing. This exaggerated handling of noir’s familiar elements 
paradoxically renders the film’s world instantly legible while working to obscure 
legibility in the extent and specificity of these exaggerations. We know that Elsa is 
bad, but the convolutions of the narrative render the spectator’s comprehension of 
her role in the various developments impossible. The disorienting narrative method 
features recurrent narrative twists, gaps of knowledge between characters within the 
diegesis and between certain characters and the spectator, and methods of 
delivering narrative information that favour speed and density over the spectator’s 
(and characters’) comprehension. The sound design serves as a literal expression of 
the noir voice, featuring post-synchronised dialogue and repeated instances of 
characters talking over each other. This produces a dense soundscape that again 
blocks the spectator’s comprehension. The narrative method serves to disorient the 
spectator in much the same way as Michael. Both protagonist and spectator 
demonstrate an awareness that a noir story is unfolding before him, but are unable 
                                                          
478 A narrative model previously featured in Double Indemnity and The Postman Always Rings 
Twice.  
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to grasp its intricacies.479 This sense of disorientation is augmented by the film’s 
visual style, which again exaggerates the already frequently expressionistic mise-
en-scène of noir. Justice states that ‘[r]arely is the camera where it should be, and 
many shots employ tense angles, claustrophobic or vertiginous vantage points, or 
chaotic compositions’.480  
I have mentioned that the characterisations are also integral to the film’s 
exaggerated world. The (self/)destructiveness of the trio of Elsa, Arthur and George 
is compared, in a monologue given by Michael, to a “crazy pack” of sharks he 
encountered who tore themselves apart in a frenzy, a foreshadowing of their own 
eventual fates (the ensuing inevitability of which, post-Michael’s monologue, 
becomes emblematic of the fatalism often found in noir storytelling). But two of 
these sharks are lawyers, figures of authority and power within the film’s world. It 
is worth considering the characterisations of Arthur and George specifically in more 
detail here as exaggerations of the typical construction of the lawyer figure in noir, 
in order to identify what the implications of this are for the film’s trial scene. Arthur 
Bannister’s professional reputation looms over the film’s narrative developments. 
In the film’s opening sequence (but prior to his introduction proper), Arthur is 
referred to as a “great criminal lawyer,” but this designation is qualified with a 
recognition of the ethical corruption it entails: Michael argues instead that “greatest 
criminal” would be a better descriptor for the lawyer who managed to get a man 
who shot his wife in the head five times acquitted. This attitude is typical of noir 
                                                          
479 The level of Michael’s confusion is demonstrated by an exchange of dialogue between he and 
Elsa after they realise George has been witness to one of their personal interactions. Elsa states 
worriedly “Now he knows about us”, to which Michael replies “I wish I did.”  
480 Chris Justice, ‘The Lady from Shanghai’, Senses of Cinema 36 (July 2005) 
http://sensesofcinema.com/2005/cteq/lady_from_shanghai/, accessed 28th August 2015. 
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characterisations of the lawyer, which features multiple examples of defence 
attorneys whose professional brilliance exists alongside an ethical ambivalence.481 
The union of the lawyers’ characterisation and the convoluted narratives of noir 
results in a number of variations on the dramatization of the manipulation of truth 
and of legal structures. This is exemplified in The Lady from Shanghai by George’s 
plan to fake his death without involving an ensuing criminal trial, which is enabled 
through his knowledge of a legal loophole.482 The lawyers of noir frequently use 
their knowledge of the law to manipulate it rather than serve the normative course 
of justice. Noir reveals the successful trial defence to be rooted in appearance and 
narrative rather than truth and fact.483  
The characterisations of Arthur and George are also rendered negatively due 
to their roles in the narrative outside of the legal material, an added element that 
goes beyond the comparatively flat (if otherwise ambivalent) lawyer 
characterisations of The Postman Always Rings Twice. Arthur’s involvement in the 
narrative’s central love triangle establishes a professional conflict of interest that I 
will further discuss shortly. Asimow, who considers Arthur and Grisby ‘two of the 
                                                          
481 This ethical corruption is demonstrated not only in their lack of concern with the innocence of 
their clients, but in the manner in which their brilliance takes form in strategy and manipulation, 
the ends (an acquittal) justifying the means and often bypassing the factual truth. Films such as 
Angel Face and The Postman Always Rings Twice depict their defence lawyer characters out of the 
courtroom as well as in it, in private spaces where strategy and tactics can be openly discussed and 
presented.  
482 Namely, that the act cannot be deemed homicide if a body is not found, but that he will also be 
considered legally dead as long as Michael “confesses” to his murder. 
483 Examples are numerous. In Angel Face, the defence attorney convinces his two clients, a male 
and female charged with murder, to marry, assuring them that the District Attorney “wouldn’t dare 
stand in the way of love […] with a trial coming up”. The File on Thelma Jordan features a 
prosecuting attorney who secretly wishes to sabotage his own case for the sake of the defendant, 
who happens to be his lover. This sabotage involves deliberately introducing the possibility of the 
“capital punishment” into the trial, which he knows will render a guilty plea less appealing to the 
jury. In both instances, the desired outcome is reliant upon the manipulation of key courtroom 
players: judge, jury, D.A., etc. 
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most disgusting, reptilian lawyer characters ever put on film’,484 demonstrates that 
many of Welles’ divergences from the source material485 in his adaptation portray 
the lawyer characters more negatively.486 One of these is to make Arthur crippled. 
Davidson notes that ‘Welles made him a polio sufferer presumably to link him with 
a virus associated in the public mind with impotence and physical wastage’,487 488  
which would identify him as an unsuitable husband for Elsa and provide a further 
contrast with the sexual potency of Michael/Welles, as well as establishing a 
physical disability that would contrast with his intellectual brilliance.489  
We can begin to understand then, how the film’s world might interact with 
the courtroom trial convention. The trial form, conventionally committed to order, 
legibility and closure, is the point where the spectator could reasonably expect the 
film’s style to calm down or its narrative convolutions to be clarified. Instead the 
baroque representational strategies are continued, clashing with and in effect 
subverting the conventions of trial depiction. Asimow suggests that the scene works 
as a ‘parody’ of ‘traditional courtroom movies’,490 and Justice argues that the film’s 
‘kangaroo court scene […] shatters our expectations of any official courtroom 
decorum […] the entire scene [is] a metaphor for everything the legal system is not 
                                                          
484 Michael Asimow, ‘Embodiment of evil: Law firms in the movies’, UCLA Law Review 48 (2000), 
pp. 1345. 
485 If I Die Before I Wake by Sherwood King (Simon and Schuster, 1938) 
486 Asimow, ‘Embodiment of Evil’, p.1346-7. 
487 Michael Davidson, ‘Phantom Limbs: Film Noir and the Disabled Body’, GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian 
and Gay Studies, 9:1-2 (2003), p. 67. 
488 Davidson also detects a homosexual subtext to Arthur and George’s relationship (see Davidson, 
‘Phantom Limbs’, p. 67-68), a coding that in the 1940s cinema would also function to demarcate 
them as others to the physically, sexually and (relatively) mentally normative couple of Michael and 
Elsa. 
489 Similarly, the bizarre intonations of George’s speech (again part of the film’s use of sound as 
well as image to disturb and disorient) conveys his grotesqueness, and his paranoid fantasies of 
nuclear apocalypse situates him as an integral element of the pervasive madness of the film.  
490 Michael Asimow, ‘Embodiment of Evil’, p. 1346. 
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supposed to represent: chaos, gamesmanship and frivolity’.491 The film represents 
the legal system in a way it is ‘not supposed’ to be represented. A baroque 
representational model is implied that seizes upon the exaggeration or subversion of 
an existing set of conventions.  
I propose that the film’s courtroom sequence employs and exaggerates the 
strategies of film noir in order to subvert the conventions of trial depiction and thus 
enact a critique of the American legal system. The strategies of the sequence 
anticipate Welles’ later adaptation of Kafka’s The Trial, a film Adams discusses in 
terms of its use of noir conventions to film the Kafkaesque (which Adams considers 
alongside noir as a similarly elusive term):  
By emphasising the expressionist look of film noir onto The Trial, and by 
emphasising the sense of disorientation, paranoia, and alienation that the 
noir worldview shares with Kafka’s unique rendering of German 
Expressionism, Welles was able to create the cinematic equivalent of that 
strong blend of nightmare absurdity and theatrical farce that now goes by 
the name of Kafkaesque.492  
 
The parallels drawn between noir and the Kafkaesque, and of course the subject 
matter and tone of The Trial, suggest that Welles recognised that noir techniques 
could be used to critique what he saw as the absurdities of the legal system, and that 
this recognition is also embedded in the courtroom material of The Lady from 
Shanghai. Indeed, ‘nightmare absurdity’ and ‘theatrical farce’ are both terms we 
could use to describe the earlier film’s courtroom trial, and this attitude towards the 
trial is underlined not only by the absurdity of the narrative context, but its 
                                                          
491 Chris Justice, ‘The Lady from Shanghai’. 
492 Jeffrey Adams, ‘Orson Welles’ “The Trial:” Film Noir and the Kafkaesque’, College Literature 29:3 
(2002), p. 141. 
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emphasis in the protagonist’s voiceover narration immediately preceding (and thus 
setting up) the trial sequence:   
The wrong man was arrested. The wrong man was shot.  […] And what 
about Bannister? He was going to defend me, in a trial for my life, and me 
charged with a couple of murders I did not commit. Either me or the rest of 
the whole world is absolutely insane. 
 
Once again the notion of a world of insanity is invoked, immediately prior to a 
sequence that arrives with its own form and set of conventions. Thus we can expect 
the insanity that has thoroughly infected the film to in turn infect its treatment of the 
trial.  
A short scene, filmed in one take, bridges Michael’s narration and the 
beginning of the courtroom scene proper, and I wish to look at it in some detail. In 
the scene, Elsa and Arthur discuss the impending case in one of the courthouse’s 
corridors, their conversation briefly but repeatedly interrupted by moments in which 
Arthur interacts with both the judge and his opposing attorney, Galloway (Carl 
Frank). These interruptions serve two functions: the small talk Arthur makes with 
the other legal professionals (including asking the judge about his child) establishes 
an image of the legal system as an exclusive network of insiders which links 
personal connections to professional success, thus subtly undermining the judicial 
ideals of impartiality and blind justice. It also sets up a contrast between the civil 
chatter of the legal professionals and the personal dramas and strategizing that 
constitutes the content of Arthur’s conversation with Elsa. Arthur’s attempts to 
convince Elsa that his defence of Michael will convince a jury that “I have reason 
to believe he’s innocent”, and that the best tactic for Michael is to plead justifiable 
homicide, relates to the notion that, in the noir trial, everything is a matter of 
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strategizing and manipulation: the truth itself is never enough of a defence. It is 
given another layer of ambivalence due to the murkiness of Arthur’s own 
motivations; his assertion that he wants Michael to be acquitted because otherwise 
“My wife might think he was a martyr” raises the issue of the cuckolded husband’s 
sexual jealousy and plants the suggestion of an ulterior motive for “defending” his 
love rival. Once again, a scene that could clarify character motives as the film 
prepares to enter the courtroom only muddies them further. Part of the film’s 
intensification of noir’s disorienting effects is to render the process of relying upon 
any one character’s words impossible, already an indicator of how the discourse of 
the courtroom will interact with the film’s broader representational strategies. I 
shall now analyse this interaction by comparing the film’s trial sequence to the 
golden age conventions I outlined in my introductory chapter. 
The Space of the Courtroom 
I have outlined how the golden age trial films accord the courtroom a 
respect through its formal strategies, including its representation of the courtroom 
space. The trial sequence of The Lady from Shanghai undermines this respectful 
form through a variety of devices. The design of the courtroom set presents a more 
claustrophobic space, with the jury box placed closer than is usual to the witness 
stand and the judge’s box. The framing and editing of the sequence emphasises this, 
keeping the jurors within the frame so that their intrusions into the trial (which I 
will return to shortly) are also figured through the stylistic choices employed. Low 
and high angles proliferate through the sequence, and the ‘claustrophobic or 
vertiginous vantage points’ and ‘chaotic compositions’ Justice locates throughout 
the film are especially apparent in the conventionally more stylistically muted 
courtroom setting. These angles and compositions defamiliarise the courtroom, 
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distancing the viewer from convention while refusing to orient them to what is 
immediately figured as a chaotic space. 
This is evident from what could loosely be termed the establishing shots of 
the courtroom stage. Although the sequence begins with Elsa’s entrance into the 
courtroom, the off-screen voice of Arthur yelling “I object!” corresponds to a cut 
that transitions into the trial procedure. However, the following shots deny the 
conventional establishing strategies of giving a legible visual introduction to the 
trial stage and prioritising the anthropocentric commitment Bordwell et al. identify 
in the classical style. Arthur’s dialogue occurs not with him framed centrally or 
frontally, but with the camera placed at the back of the courtroom and the figure 
turned away from the camera, framed in the mid-ground on the far left (Fig. 91). 
Spectators fill the foreground, the jurors the mid-ground right, and the judge’s box 
the background on the left of the frame. Key elements of courtroom iconography 
are present, but the composition is messier than conventional trial establishing 
shots, and the venetian blinds on the right of the frame, which cast shadows on the 
adjacent wall that are more evocative of noir iconography than court iconography, 
take up a notable portion of the frame.  
A cut brings the spectator closer to the stage, while continuing to distort our 
perspective on the space and the action. The second shot presents Galloway with 
the current witness, Officer Peters (Phillip Morris), on the stand. Both are captured 
from a low angle that places at the very forefront of the frame a glass of water (Fig. 
92). Both visual planes are in focus. The framing and composition of these shots, 
and the unexpected aspects of the mise-en-scène (namely the glass and the venetian 
blinds) work to distance us from the procedural drama and anthropocentric 
imperatives in order to undermine the typical respect with which the court and its 
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players are treated. The venetian blinds cast shadows over the judge and witness 
box so that two sources of potential authority are undermined; as Schrader notes of 
this particular stylistic noir pattern, ‘[n]o character can speak authoritatively from a 
space which is continually being cut into ribbons of light’. 493 
   
 
Fig. 91 (top); Fig. 92 (bottom) 
 
-  
-  
I argued earlier that the golden age trial films avoided stylistic choices that 
could be considered excessive. The aforementioned distancing devices and the 
proliferation of high and low angles throughout the trial sequence of The Lady from 
Shanghai, however, draws attention to style over naturalistic presentation. An 
                                                          
493 Paul Schrader, ‘Notes on Film Noir’ [1972] in Silver and Ursini (eds.), Film Noir Reader, p. 57.  
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excess of stylistic devices are employed in order to demonstrate the chaos 
underlying and undermining the presumed order of the court. Whereas golden age 
trial films maintained a respectful distance from the action that saw close-ups 
largely restricted to emotional witness testimonies and reaction shots of key 
spectators, this scene features a high number of close-ups from the outset, often of 
minor characters who do not appear elsewhere in the film and whose presence in 
close-up is typically coupled with a low or high angle that amplifies their 
grotesqueness. This extensive use of close-ups develops a claustrophobic feeling in 
which the separation of stage and audience, public and private, order and chaos – 
all distinctions the trial generally attempts to maintain – is blurred. The camera 
frequently pushes in extremely close to characters, or has them walk up to the 
camera (achieving a similar effect) so that spatial boundaries – and their typical 
meanings – are eroded. A sense of (relative) normality is preserved in the reaction 
shots of Michael and Elsa, which provides a structure of identification different to 
the chaotic point of view of the courtroom (as in Phantom Lady and Stranger on the 
Third Floor), but this only serves to make the rest of the courtroom look even more 
grotesquely exaggerated in comparison.  
The Players in the Courtroom 
 I earlier considered how the depictions of the judge and jury in the golden 
age trial films grant them a primarily symbolic function as embodiments of a 
working legal system. The Lady from Shanghai parallels the representational 
strategies of the trials in Stranger on the Third Floor by undermining this symbolic 
presence in order to reassert the fallibility of individuals, nearly all of whom are 
complicit in the madness of the courtroom. Before looking in detail at these 
characterisations, however, I wish again briefly to consider the narrative contexts 
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that again distort the spectator’s expectations or desires for the trial scene. The 
pervasiveness of the film’s noir world extends to its characterisations; the world it 
presents is one in which nobody is innocent, and the murkiness of the case’s 
contexts undermine any attempt to desire acquittal or conviction. Elsa and Michael 
are, considered archetypally, the transgressive couple of noir, but there are no 
“good” characters to be the subject of a happy outcome. The main distinction made 
through the characterisations in the court scene is between the madness of the 
majority and the (relative) sanity of Michael and Elsa.  
The Judge 
The depiction of the judge (Erskine Sanford) parallels the equivalent 
characterisation in Stranger on the Third Floor, with the personal characteristics 
presented constructing a negative impression redolent of the trial system’s flaws.494 
In both films the judge’s fundamental buffoonery does not indicate malice but 
rather ignorance (a marked contrast to the depiction of the lawyer). This is 
exemplified in his coughing fits that consistently intrude upon the trial procedure, 
and the shot of him failing to stifle his laughter at Arthur’s self-examination. The 
latter, conveyed in one brief close-up, is particularly telling. In the golden age trial 
film, it is the judge who admonishes the spectatorship for their laughter, directing 
both diegetic spectators and the film’s audience towards an appropriate attitude on 
proceedings. Here, the judge’s failure to do so undermines his objectivity, instead 
linking him with the spectatorship in a shared susceptibility to what Galloway terms 
Arthur’s “trial tactics”. His action of playing chess in his chambers after the main 
                                                          
494 The casting of Sanford is important here; one of Welles’ staple of character actors, Sanford 
would have been familiar to audiences as the bumbling newspaper editor Herbert Carter in Citizen 
Kane and is cast to type in his role here.  
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body of the trial underlines the ‘gamesmanship’ Justice identifies in the sequence 
and serves as an ironic reminder of the extent to which the absent-minded judge can 
control the fates of those who are made subject to the court.495  
The Jury 
The spatial configuration of the courtroom allows the jury to figure as more 
of a presence than in other films, but one that obstructs rather than aids the trial 
procedure. The sense of the jurors as fallible individuals is emphasised through a 
range of gestures that draw attention to them negatively. This stands in contrast to 
the patterns of representing the jury I outlined in my first chapter, where, in order to 
preserve their affirmative symbolic resonance, the jury was sometimes seen, but 
never heard.  
This is not the case here. The single snoring juror of Stranger on the Third 
Floor becomes a collection of sneezing, laughing and bickering jurors. The 
placement of the jury box and the framing during examinations not only figure the 
jurors in the shot but literally places them in between the witness and the attorney, 
so that even their physical presence appears to obstruct procedure. The sneezing 
juror in the front row who twice interrupts Galloway’s questioning (Fig. 94), or the 
juror in the second row who laughs out loud at one of Galloway’s questions, are 
included within the frame – their intrusion is underlined. Whereas the golden age 
jury is a silent presence figured as an audience to be won over by the lawyer’s 
skilled performance, 496  the noir jury is an inattentive audience at best and an 
                                                          
495 One potential influence on the choice to include chess in this sequence might be Lewis Carroll’s 
novel Through the Looking Glass (1871) which uses a central chess motif to construct a 
deterministic narrative trajectory for the protagonist not dissimilar from the fatalistic narratives of 
noir (and the absurdity of the Kafkaesque). 
496 We can compare the intrusive nature of the jury here with the incorporation of the jury into the 
frame in the witness examination of The Young Philadelphians. See Chapter One, page 108. 
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obstruction to the judicial process at worst. Their refusal to take the process 
seriously is part of the overall impression that the jury is unsuited to making such 
an important judgment.497  
    
 
Fig. 93 (top) and Fig. 94 (bottom)  
 
 
 
                                                          
497 This impression given a final emphasis in a moment following Michael’s climactic escape from 
the courtroom. This is achieved through both the irony of his method of escape (which involves 
himself pretending to be a member of the jury), and the function of a female juror whose opinion 
on a presumably concurrent case, directed at Michael - “That woman is too nice looking to have 
stolen all that jewellery” – demonstrates the superficial treatment of the criminal act by an 
untrained jury. 
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Spectators and Journalists 
The strategies employed in representing the jury overlap with those used to 
represent the courtroom spectators. The treatment of the latter is perhaps the 
primary component of the sequence’s sense of chaos, exaggerating the similar 
strategies of Stranger and Phantom Lady. The use of low angles and close-ups 
during shots of spectators grant them a grotesqueness that exacerbates their 
portrayal as oglers, completely receptive to the trial tactics of Arthur and Galloway. 
The spectatorship’s sole interest in sensationalism and gossip is prioritised, from 
the opening moments of the sequence, when an elderly woman shouts “let me look 
at her” upon Elsa’s entrance to the courtroom, up to the brief montage of gossipers 
when Arthur consents to being examined by Galloway (including the two young 
women speaking Mandarin, whose presence acts as a source of disorientation while 
simultaneously suggesting the wide appeal of the case).498 When the possibility that 
Arthur will cross-examine himself becomes apparent, two non-consecutive shots 
depict jurors leaning forward in their seats in gleeful anticipation (Figs. 95-96). Not 
only is a sense of ghoulish entertainment prioritised, but the extras in these shots are 
dressed and framed in order to look similar to each other, a deliberate lack of 
individualisation which functions to dehumanise the individuals rather than 
construct, as the non-individualisation of jurors in the golden age trials do, an 
affirmative symbolic presence. Issues of class are pertinent to the depictions of both 
jurors and spectators. Their presence, appearance and conduct connotes a lower 
                                                          
498 There are two points to be made that relate to the inclusion of minor Chinese characters 
throughout the film. Firstly, The Lady from Shanghai seizes upon the orientalism evident elsewhere 
in noir, associating East Asia with decadence, degradation, criminality, intrigue and other qualities 
that relate back to the pervasive badness of the noir world (present in the othered settings of The 
Shanghai Gesture (Dir: Josef von Sternberg, 1941) and Macao (Dir: Josef von Sternberg; Nicolas 
Ray, 1952), for example. Secondly, the decision to present the characters’ dialogue without 
subtitles is another disorienting noir device, also evident in The Third Man (Dir: Carol Reed, 1949). 
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class background. The implication is that the spectators are present because the 
courtroom is free and they have nowhere better to go (an implication also present in 
the sparsely attended trial of Stranger on the Third Floor).  
In my first chapter I outlined how noise from the spectatorship, particularly 
laughter, when present in the earlier part of the trial sequences but hushed later on 
(often following a stern warning from the judge) functions to guide the tonal shifts 
of courtroom trial sequences.499 Here, the aural presence of the spectatorship 
exceeds the bounds of this trope.  For example, the laughter of the spectators is 
exacerbated through the use of reaction shots: the spectator does not only hear it, 
but sees it in separate shots. This underlines the notion of legal procedure as a 
show, a frivolous spectacle that only Michael and Elsa seem to treat with any 
gravity. Murmuring and coughing on the soundtrack is also a constant aural 
presence, evocative of an unordered, disrespectful courtroom.  
 
  
Fig. 95 (left) and Fig. 96 (right) 
 
 
 
                                                          
499 See Chapter One, page 81-82. 
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Lawyers 
I have already begin to demonstrate how the presentation of the lawyer in 
The Lady from Shanghai offers an exaggerated portrait of the noir lawyer’s 
qualities of corruption and ethical ambivalence. As in any number of traditional 
courtroom dramas, the trial here places a significant character from the surrounding 
narrative in the defence attorney role against a flatly characterised prosecuting 
attorney. But the qualities that Arthur displays outside of the courtroom are 
resolutely not those associated with the heroic lawyer figure, and thus negatively 
inflect his depiction during the trial. Arthur’s personal involvement in the events 
that have led to the trial – an implausible involvement that nevertheless correlates 
with the film’s disturbed world and the inescapability of the noir world as theorised 
by Walker – adds another layer of illegibility that obscures his intentions and even 
the extent of his involvement in the crime that his client is on trial for. 
Presenting the lawyer both in and out of the courtroom offers other 
possibilities. Depicting the noir lawyer off stage allows the film to dramatize the 
strategy accompanying courtroom performance and demonstrate the divergence 
between such trial tactics and the ethics associated with affirmative portrayals of 
the American legal institution. I have shown that the preceding scene emphasises 
Arthur’s strategizing over any sense of ethics or truth. In this regard, the film 
parallels the representation of the competing lawyers in The Postman Always Rings 
Twice, whose awareness of the guilt of the couple on trial seems of less importance 
than their trial tactics and the bet they run between themselves outside of court over 
which of them will win the case. Similarly, The Lady from Shanghai emphasises (as 
Justice notes) ‘gamesmanship’ in its dramatization of trial tactics, which also 
implies a lack of ethical investment.  
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Arthur’s personal qualities are reflected in his physicality. Arthur/Sloane is 
repeatedly framed in unflattering close-up shots or low angles in the courtroom. 
The crutches he must use to move around the courtroom stage contrast him with the 
elegant movements of other heroic lawyer characters – characters who, as I noted 
earlier, are defined by their greater freedom of movement in the courtroom than any 
of the other individuals within it. However Arthur’s disability also serves the 
exaggerated characterisation in the contrast it constructs between the wracked body 
and keen mind. His physicality co-exists with his status as the “greatest living trial 
lawyer”, a professional who has never lost a case. The lawyer’s unappealing 
personal qualities, including their cynicism and seeming lack of empathy, are 
implicitly bound to their aptitude for the legal profession.500 This constitutes a 
major departure from the conception of the heroic lawyer associated with the 
golden age trial film.501 The flat prosecuting attorney, Galloway, is also imbued 
with suggested sinister qualities, evident in his callous glee at calling Elsa to the 
stand and his treatment of her during the questioning, which uses close-up reverse 
shots of the two to construct a sense of predatory intrusion into Elsa’s space and 
personal life.  
In accordance with Arthur’s status as the “greatest” trial lawyer, we see him 
doing his job skilfully in the courtroom, but primarily as a game-player rather than 
a crusader for justice. This involves some adherence to convention; for example, 
Arthur swiftly undermines the assumptions made by Galloway regarding Officer 
Peters’ marital status.  But the overall sense of the lawyering profession given in the 
                                                          
500 The defence lawyer in Angel Face, who manipulates the jury’s and D.A’s reactions to the 
defendant couple by insisting they get married, is presented as a morally ambivalent character who 
is similarly referred to within the dialogue as “just about the best trial man in the country”. Moral 
ambivalence and lawyering excellence are twinned. 
501 See Chapter One, ‘A Note on the Justice Figure’. 
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trial sequence is evidenced in the squabbling between Arthur and Galloway that 
seems rooted more in personal pride and tactical manoeuvring than the pursuit of 
justice. Throughout the sequence, Galloway and Arthur appear to be engaged more 
in a petty competition of showmanship than in a criminal court case.502 For 
example, at one point Galloway and Arthur begin to argue in long shot as Arthur 
pleads for a mistrial ruling from the judge. A shot in which Arthur approaches the 
camera as he bickers with Galloway (Fig. 97) is followed by a cut to a medium 
subjective shot of Galloway (Fig. 98). In their distance and composition (including 
the distorting effect of the low angles) both shots reconfigure a professional 
disagreement as a personal one. The exaggerated intensity with which the 
attorney’s disagreement is imbued again distorts an existing trope of the trial scene.  
   
Figs. 97 (top) and 98 (bottom) 
 The lawyer’s status as entertainer is also emphasised and negatively 
inflected, particularly during Arthur’s showboating self-examination, which I will 
return to. The fact that Arthur is placed in a position where he can cross-examine 
himself makes evident another inflection of the lawyer characterisation in The Lady 
from Shanghai. Arthur does not only have a personal investment in the case, but an 
                                                          
502 The more conventional and respectful method of depicting the professional rivalry is evidenced 
in the trial scene of The Young Philadelphians: see Chapter One, p. 107, Figs. 20-21.   
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ambiguously situated conflict of interest. Michael’s voiceover narration hints at the 
possibility that Arthur himself may have killed Grisby; likewise, Michael’s 
romantic involvement with Elsa, emerging over the course of the trial sequence, 
leads Arthur to finally admit “This is one case I’ve enjoyed losing.” The conflict of 
interest marks a subversion of courtroom drama that is particularly suited to the 
narrative convolutions of noir (and to a critique of standard depictions of an 
impartial and collectively legible trial proceeding) and is observable in a number of 
other examples of law noir.503   
The Format of the Trial and the Drama of the Courtroom 
I will now examine how these elements inflect the presentation of the trial 
procedure, and the degree to which the progression of the trial sequence 
corresponds to the typical construction of courtroom drama. Before doing so, 
however, I wish to pay a little more attention to an aspect of this trial scene that 
merits further extrapolation here. These are the presence of what Martin refers to as 
‘micro-events’ that command the spectator’s attention to a greater extent than the 
broader dramatic action.504 Although this strategy is apparent across the film, its 
specific function during the trial (evidenced in a number of aforementioned 
elements including the aural interjections of the jurors and the frequent cuts to the 
                                                          
503 Other noirs also play with the conflict of interest convention in a number of variations and to 
different ends, but retaining the crucial element of personal bias and the potentialities for 
individual manipulation of the trial process. In Leave Her to Heaven, the protagonist commits 
suicide but arranges the act to look like a murder planned by her adopted sister and husband. As 
part of this scheme, she orchestrates events so that her former fiancé (and former love rival of her 
husband’s) will act as prosecuting attorney and bring his own personal biases to his case. The File 
on Thelma Jordan features an attorney (Wendell Corey) who deliberately sabotages his 
prosecution of the eponymous Thelma (Barbara Stanwyck), on trial for murder, but with whom he 
is secretly romantically involved. Please Murder Me! features a lawyer who defends his secret lover 
of her husband’s murder in court.  
504 Adrian Martin, Mise En Scène and Film Style: from classical Hollywood to new media art, 
(Houndmills, Basingstoke,  Hampshire; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 111. 
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conversations of spectators during the trial) is to disrupt the conventional 
development of the trial sequence as dictated by the broader format of the trial 
procedure.  
Arrival and Coming to Order  
Rather than opening with court coming to order, the viewer arrives at the 
trial with Elsa, a sense of disorder already conveyed by the noise surrounding her 
and the attention she receives from the spectatorship (which also establishes the 
theme of trial-as-spectacle). We are in the midst of trial proceedings, but the 
witness on the stand, Officer Peters, is a minor character. There is thus an 
adherence to one convention of the golden age trial film, in that the witnesses 
presented on the stand escalate in terms of audience identification and dramatic 
potential.  
Testimonies/Examinations and Cross Examinations 
Following Peters’ testimony, the sequence progresses to its second witness 
and first outright parody of trial procedure as Galloway calls Arthur to the witness 
stand. The trope of the surprise witness is not an uncommon one, but calling one of 
the lawyers in the current case to the stand is a particular – and particularly 
implausible – inflection that reflects the film’s bizarre world. The question of 
whether Arthur can testify against his own client is raised in the dialogue by 
spectators, with one stating “I’ve never seen anything like that before!” This twist 
on courtroom convention not only escalates the dramatic stakes of the sequences, 
but also allows the film to parody representations of courtroom drama.  The 
subsequent questioning of Arthur is a farce that focuses less on the examination 
itself than on the series of obstructions and distractions (the aforementioned micro-
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events) that make the trial process unmanageable. A juror, framed between Arthur 
(sat frame left) and Galloway (stood frame right), laughs at the end of Galloway’s 
first innocuous question, then whispers to the female juror to his right, who shushes 
him (Fig. 93). At the end of their next exchange, another juror sneezes twice, in 
both instances interrupting Galloway’s follow-up question. The questioning turns to 
Michael himself. When Arthur is asked if Michael seemed happy in his work for 
the Bannisters, a series of obstructions occur: Arthur does not hear because 
Galloway’s back is turned, the men talk over each other, and Galloway’s inquiries 
over whether the stenographer has included the preceding interruptions only causes 
further confusion. The issue of characters talking over one another is again a 
subversion of the unquestioned conventions of trial depiction, in which procedural 
and narrative development is predicated upon uninterrupted acts of communication. 
The play with sound, which I have mentioned has been part of the film’s baroque 
strategies, functions here to draw attention to the assumptions regarding 
communication that go unquestioned in the majority of other trial scenes. The 
disruptive noir voice is used to problematize the reliance upon verbal 
communication in the courtroom.   
Thus the examination portion of this witness testimony exists primarily to 
parody courtroom procedure. The film’s tonal qualities do not dictate any viewer 
investment in the trial until Galloway brings up the fact that Michael was intending 
to quit his job for the Bannisters prior to Grisby’s murder, at which point reaction 
shot close-ups of Michael and Elsa suggest an escalation of dramatic tension. 
Galloway mentions that Michael’s bags were packed and asks Arthur if, in his 
experience “as an attorney”, this would suggest premeditation. This leads to a 
shouting match between the two as Arthur pleads for a mistrial, a plea which is 
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overruled by the judge. An even more bizarre and unlikely twist occurs follows this, 
constituting the film’s most overt parody of the absurdities of both actual courtroom 
procedure and films’ representations of trials. Bannister states that, due to the 
position he has been placed in, he should be allowed to examine himself. This again 
raises the interest of the spectators (shown in reaction shots of spectators leaning 
forward in anticipation as murmuring is heard elsewhere). Galloway refers to these 
as “trial tactics”, but the judge allows it. Arthur’s following self-examination is 
scripted to play on our awareness of the conventions of cinematic courtroom 
procedure, as when he impatiently asks himself to simply “answer yes or no” after 
providing a glowing character reference for Michael. His questions and answers 
provokes the laughter of the courtroom, which demonstrates how farcical the 
proceedings are, while reaction shots of Elsa and Michael emphasise an opposing 
gravity. Again the play with courtroom convention has intertwined intents of 
parodying previous cinematic representation and critiquing the actual legal system 
upon which it draws.  
Galloway then presents a subpoena for another surprise witness – Elsa. 
Once again, this moment is depicted as a personal sleight through the use of tight 
framings of Galloway and Arthur that exclude the rest of the courtroom. The 
inclusion of two surprise witnesses constitutes an excess of narrative drama, 
exacerbated by the relationship of the witness to the defence attorney, which can 
again be situated as a parodic exaggeration of courtroom drama convention. With 
Elsa’s placement on the stand, the convention of private lives being wrested into the 
public sphere moves to the fore of the sequence. Elsa is firstly questioned about 
Broome, the Bannisters’ bodyguard whom Galloway “reveals” in the courtroom 
was actually a detective working for Arthur (Elsa has informed Michael of this 
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information in a prior scene). Galloway accuses Elsa of arguing with Arthur over 
her “infatuation with O’Hara.” From this, the sequence moves into series of reverse 
shot close-ups of Elsa and Galloway, with particularly tight, claustrophobic 
framings of Elsa, who eventually cannot deny that she has been seen kissing 
Michael in public. The sordid truth has emerged and a dejected Arthur has no 
further questions.  
The climactic questioning of Elsa thus seems like the most traditionally 
presented portion of the trial with respect to narrative convention and mise-en-
scène. A revelation that represents a breakthrough in the facts of the case is elicited 
on the stand, and the use of tight close-ups demonstrates the trial’s intrusion into 
the personal lives of those involved in the case in a manner that aligns with 
courtroom convention.505 However, it is worth considering the representation of 
Elsa in the courtroom in relation to her representation elsewhere in the film, the 
figure of the femme fatale more generally, and the female witnesses of my 
melodrama case studies. Pippin argues that the representation of Elsa denies her a 
point of view, stating that her ‘face is often a mask, and the close-ups never do what 
close-ups are supposed to do, provide a window to the soul’.506 Although the close-
ups during the climactic portion of her testimony allow some measure of 
identification with Elsa, Hayworth’s performance does not register anything near 
the emotional turmoil of the key female witnesses of my melodrama case studies 
(see Figs. 99-100) and the star is not given a moment of emotional intensity to 
                                                          
505 The depiction of Galloway’s questioning of Elsa on her relationship with Michael in particular 
seems to anticipate the representational strategies of a similar scenario in Anatomy of a Murder. 
Scenes in which District Attorney Claude Dancer (George C. Scott) questions Laura Manion (Lee 
Remick) on her romantic life also use tight framings on both to construct the attorney as a 
somewhat predatory figure, similarly emphasising the murky ethics of invoking a witness’s personal 
life on the stand.  
506 Robert B. Pippin, Fatalism in American Film Noir, p. 65. 
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perform at the level of either of Lana Turner’s trial turns. Elsa’s interiority is kept at 
a distance, in line with the illegibility of law noir, and underlining the film’s 
emphasis on its play with the conventions of trial depiction over the emotional and 
psychological lives of the characters.507 For the same reason, the revelatory quality 
with which this convention is usually imbued is denied, as the information elicited 
regarding both Broome’s identity and the Michael/Elsa relationship is already 
known to not only the spectator, but also to the relevant characters. Elsa’s 
examination is thus treated in a manner that subtly denies the spectator the 
conventional pleasures provided by placing the female witness (and lead female 
star) on the stand.  
    
Figs. 99 (left) and 100 (right) 
Recess 
Following Elsa’s revelation on the stand, which constitutes the climax of the 
testimonial portion of the sequence, there is a fade out, followed by a momentary 
                                                          
507 Interestingly, Elsa Bannister is an uncommon example of the femme fatale archetype who does 
take to the stand in the noir courtroom. The File in Thelma Jordan and Angel Face do not place 
their female defendants on the stand despite the potential for dramatic event, and Leave Her to 
Heaven presents a femme fatale who is deceased by the time of the trial but who nevertheless 
seems to be controlling it from beyond the grave for much of the courtroom sequence. It would 
seem that the conventional function of the female witness, which prioritises the sincere emotional 
breakdown as a central trope, does not fit with the femme fatale archetype, which is characterised 
by ambiguity and inscrutability. In fact, The File on Thelma Jordan seems to present an ironic 
subversion of the silence of the female witness of the melodrama, in that the emotional mysteries 
of “what is in a woman’s heart” is presented as a large part of the defence case that is 
subsequently revealed to be entirely falsified. 
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departure from the courtroom for what we can assume is the jury’s deliberations. 
The recess does not depict any of our leads, but instead stresses the film’s satire of 
the legal institution. Shots of a group of Chinese men listening to a radio news 
report on the trial again evokes the sense of it as spectacle for the masses. The 
following moments in which we glimpse the judge playing chess in his chambers 
before a cut to a high angle shot makes the overt parallel between game-playing and 
legal procedure that I discussed earlier. 
Verdict 
This is followed by another high angle shot of the courtroom, where a deep 
focus triangular configuration frames Elsa between the two men who have been the 
rivals for her attention. Here, in the tense moments before the verdict, Arthur 
admits that he has “enjoyed losing” the case and Michael (in the fatalistic vein of 
many noir heroes) admits that he has known throughout the trial that Arthur wanted 
him convicted. A level of narrative clarity has been achieved, but it is in keeping 
with the project of the sequence that it has occurred outside of the main body of the 
trial. The film’s refutation of the conventional verdict depiction, in which Michael, 
at Elsa’s non-verbal suggestion, downs the bottle of pills on Arthur’s desk and is 
rushed from the courtroom in a final display of chaos, accentuates the film’s 
mistrust in the ability of the courtroom to resolve any issue, and reduces the trial 
sequence to another of the film’s displays of its disturbed, disintegrating world.508  
The narrative continues without the trial having produced any resolution or closure; 
as if to underline its irrelevance and the fatalism with which the narrative is imbued, 
                                                          
508 Another noir violation of the verdict convention appears in the ironic climax of They Won’t 
Believe Me, in which the defendant, convinced that he will be found guilty, attempts to leap from 
the courtroom window before the verdict is read and is shot to death by a guard. The film ends on 
a shot of the subsequent “not guilty” verdict being read out by the foreman. 
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here, the verdict is never even read out. The final developments of the narrative 
bring to fruition the fate suggested by Michael’s shark anecdote as Arthur and Elsa 
end up destroying each other. The film adheres to noir’s structures of resolution, 
which enact justice outside of a legal framework and in the realms of the personal 
and criminal.  
 
To conclude, The Lady from Shanghai clearly plays with the overwhelming 
majority of courtroom conventions, exaggerating the patterns of trial violation 
introduced in earlier noirs. The similarities between the representations and 
functions of the trials in Stranger on the Third Floor, Phantom Lady, Scarlet Street 
and The Lady from Shanghai situate within noir a dominant attitude towards the 
trial sequence that overall constitutes a remarkably critical stance on the legal 
institution within the assumed safety of the classical framework. Noir’s violations 
and essential difference from the majority of classical Hollywood filmmaking is 
evidenced in its use of the trial form. The disturbed subjectivities of noir’s 
protagonists undermine the ordered and respectful golden age depiction of the law 
and emphasises, to varying degrees, the flaws of the legal institution. Within this 
corpus, The Lady from Shanghai constitutes the most sustained attack on the court 
system and the systems of representation used to depict trials in the Hollywood 
cinema. Martin notes that ‘[t]here can be so much cinematic business in a Welles 
scene that it is hard to focus on the basic gestalt, the essential point of what is 
happening. From a dramaturgical point of view, what is this scene essentially 
about?’509 Considering this quote in relation to the trial, I would argue that this 
                                                          
509 Adrian Martin, Mise En Scène and Film Style, p. 113. 
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scene is about the parody and subversion of the trial convention. The use of noir 
strategies is telling with regards to the subversiveness of the genre. The strategies 
used elsewhere to critique, challenge or complicate the typically unquestioned 
belief in American law and justice (in such films as Fury and The Trial) are the 
norms of noir’s trial depiction. Noir is a form in which violation becomes the norm, 
and thus a space is opened up within the classical system in which the courtroom 
convention could be consistently and overtly problematized (albeit with certain 
concessions of obliqueness and non-naturalism made). Noir’s status as an 
antitraditional form is evidenced in its patterns of representing the courtroom trial. 
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Conclusion 
 
Where did the trial sequence go? The courtroom trial’s appearance as a 
dramatic centrepiece in mainstream Hollywood cinema is now limited to occasional 
entries such as Big Eyes (Dir: Tim Burton, 2014). Films that could be classified as 
courtroom dramas are rarer still, the most recent mainstream Hollywood example of 
the genre (as of this writing) being The Judge (Dir: David Dobkin, 2014). The 
traditional model of the courtroom trial sequence seems to have been exhausted for 
Hollywood, with intermittent, often underwhelming, exceptions. Rafter notes that 
the 1970s onwards signalled a ‘period of depletion’ in trial cinema.510 One of the 
reasons for my choice of date range has been that the trial became far less prevalent 
as a convention with imbued narrative significance from the late 1960s onwards. I 
propose that two major contexts are responsible for this. The first is the 
disintegration of the Production Code Administration and the loosening of 
censorship around Hollywood filmmaking. By the end of the 1960s filmmakers 
were no longer bound to the enforced models of justice and punishment and 
affirmative depictions of the American institution that they had been during the 
years of the PCA, and depictions of the trial system (whether critical or affirmative) 
were apparently not considered sufficiently interesting when compared to the 
wealth of other possibilities now available for depiction.  
This leads to the second primary context, which was the contemporaneous 
rise of television in America from the mid-1950s and the subsequent migration of 
the courtroom drama form to this other medium. There is clearly a sense in which 
the traditional elements of the trial form, including its embodied closure, its 
                                                          
510 Nicole Rafter, ‘American Criminal Trial Films’, p. 18. 
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boundedness and its grounding in the procedural and formulaic, were perfectly 
suited to television. The popularity of long-running television courtroom dramas 
such as Perry Mason (1957-1966), Day in Court (1958-1965) and The Defenders 
(1961-1965) anticipated the increasing migration of trial material to television. 
Although the golden age of 1957-62 seemed to incorporate both film and television, 
it was the televisual courtroom drama that proliferated into the following decades 
while inversely, the trial film suffered. This migration, when coupled with the 
aforementioned changes in the Hollywood filmmaking system, signalled a 
depletion both of the courtroom drama as filmic genre and the use of the trial scene 
within broader narrative and genre frameworks in Hollywood cinema.   
 However, although there was a depletion and a migration, forms of trial 
representation have persisted in smaller numbers throughout the Hollywood cinema 
of the subsequent fifty years. One pattern saw the trial form employed but imbued 
with less dramatic and narrative significance than previously, with its central role as 
a narrative climax particularly devalued. Rafter notes of this period of depletion that 
‘seldom did an entire movie build toward a trial scene. Instead, these scenes were 
now enmeshed in a fabric of other, more animated sequences’.511 A more prevalent 
model seemed to be that which highlighted legal proceedings redolent of, but 
adjacent to, the courtroom proper (the deposition that constitutes the narrative 
framing device of The Social Network [Dir: David Fincher, 2010] is one such 
example), a model which supports the view of the general exhaustion of the trial 
form in Hollywood narrative, but which continues to utilise its central elements (the 
adversarial system, the presence of legal professionals as intermediaries of personal 
disputes). Although I hope my analyses have shown that the trial has always been 
                                                          
511 Ibid., p. 20. 
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an intertextually constructed narrative form (and thus ever ripe for parody, as The 
Lady from Shanghai demonstrates) it can be sensed that adherences to the 
conventional trial setting and development in the last several decades are often 
specifically utilised in contexts of postmodern parody (Serial Mom [Dir: John 
Waters, 1994], Wild Things [Dir: John McNaughton, 1998], Intolerable Cruelty 
[Dir: Joel Coen, 2003]).    
Nevertheless, I have been struck by how many of the Hollywood films that 
do feature dramatically significant courtroom trial scenes continue to employ the 
patterns of representation I have identified in this thesis. The women’s melodrama 
may be thought of as a form that was even more severely depleted by the post-
classical Hollywood (or, like the courtroom drama, considered to have migrated to 
television with the ascent of the televisual soap opera), but its emphasis on the clash 
between female emotion and the masculinised structures of law, or its depiction of 
the female whose experience must be translated for the courtroom, is present in 
films such as Kramer vs. Kramer (Dir: Robert Benton, 1979), The Accused (Dir: 
Jonathan Kaplan, 1988) and Nell (Dir: Michael Apted, 1994). Similarly, some of 
the challenges to traditional concepts of American law and justice presented by 
‘law noir’ have persisted in the convoluted narratives and morally ambivalent 
characterisations of films such as Primal Fear (Dir: Gregory Hoblit, 1996) and 
Presumed Innocent (Dir: Alan J. Pakula, 1990). The double-trial structure as 
conceptualised by Clover, and the fit between the courtroom form and the depiction 
of topical social issues has persisted. Certain interesting inflections of these 
underlying patterns have emerged in later depictions. Rafter and Pribram have 
argued that the justice figure also persists, but in contexts that often render this 
figure the sole hope for justice within legal and social systems that are otherwise 
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depicted as broken beyond repair, as in …And Justice for All (Dir: Norman Jewison, 
1979). Tellingly, more traditional recourses to the affirmative model appear in 
comedic fare such as My Cousin Vinny (Dir: Jonathan Lynn, 1992) and Legally 
Blonde (Dir: Robert Luketic, 2001).  
 These consistencies in representation demonstrate that the trial’s 
conventions and their meanings are intertextually constructed and adaptable, and 
thus I believe that analyses could be conducted of these more recent films using the 
patterns of representation I have outlined in this thesis. Similarly, the methodology 
of textual analysis which I have applied to my case studies will doubtless prove 
productive in considering the specificities of trial representation outside of the 
bounds of the date range of this thesis. My studies have hopefully demonstrated that 
paying close attention to a film can demonstrate the nuances and specificities of its 
use of the trial sequence’s form. My research has taught me that, despite the 
necessitated boundedness of this form, no two trial scenes can ever be identical. A 
film’s uses of the trial form and its conventions must be viewed in light of its other 
frameworks and strategies. The most successful uses of the trial convention, 
formally and in terms of their complex relationships to ideologies legal or 
otherwise, are those made by films that subsume it into their own representational 
strategies, generic frameworks, and thematic structures (Madame X, Stranger on the 
Third Floor). In this vein, I also believe that further work on representations of the 
trial using my basic methodology of considering the interaction between two 
generic frameworks in detail would be productive.  
Other further work that could be undertaken on the trial involve examining 
its contextual aspects. Although I have referred to the role of the Production Code 
Administration throughout the thesis, evaluating the exact role of censorship in 
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determining representations of the courtroom during this period would require a 
different, if complementary, approach. I do not find it coincidental that so many of 
the films I discuss (Anatomy of a Murder, Pinky, Peyton Place, Scarlet Street) 
encountered difficulties with censor boards at various stages of production and 
reception. The careful navigation of the trial as a safe space for allowing the 
depiction of sensationalistic or incendiary subject matter in a “respectable” manner 
is an element of the form that I believe would yield a significant amount of 
discussion. 
 My hypothesis, that what we think of as the very limitations of the 
courtroom trial scene are precisely what can yield productive examination of 
specific case studies through textual analysis, has been borne out by my readings. I 
also believe that this thesis has contributed to methods of reading and 
understanding the depiction of public spaces and events in film. I wish to return to 
the concept of ‘social mise-en-scène’, as outlined by Adrian Martin, in order to 
demonstrate this. Martin argues that approaching film analysis through social mise-
en-scène ‘allows us to zero in on something specific: known rituals that are 
recreated, marked, inscribed in the flow of the film, usually in order to be 
transformed’.512 I have noticed that the ritualistic elements of the courtroom are 
often transformed, and accordingly commented upon, by films’ play with point of 
view and identification. The space is made subject to a multiplicity of viewpoints, 
sometimes aligned with certain character’s, other times not. But the consistent 
presence of the legal point of view proffers immediate possibilities for contrast, 
juxtaposition and even conflicts within the text to be displayed. This is reflected in 
the variety of ways with which individual films have dealt with the dialectic of 
                                                          
512 Ibid., p. 134. 
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emotion and reason that acts as a specific structuring element of the trial scene. The 
social mise-en-scène relates to ideas of communication and courtroom discourse 
that have proven especially fruitful in determining how films treat the designation 
of speech, silence and authority in the courtroom. My case studies, even those that 
affirmed and upheld the American justice system, depicted alongside the 
overarching discourses of the law a multiplicity of other voices including (but not 
limited to) the silenced voices of the marginalised defendant, the emotional, female 
voice of melodrama and the critical voice of noir. The balancing of the legal voice 
against these other voices was integral to the specificities of each trial scene, and 
offers a model for reading trial scenes across Hollywood cinema, and beyond, into 
other cinemas. These various avenues of inquiry attest to the central paradox that a 
limited form can offer the critic much in its boundless play between the interaction 
of the individual and the institution.   
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Appendix: Evidence of the Prevalence of the Conventions of Trial 
Depiction in Hollywood Cinema 
 
This appendix consists of three tables, one for each of the main subheadings of 
chapter one. The tables are included to provide examples of the prevalence of the 
conventions I identify in chapter one by demonstrating how many of the golden age 
films include each major convention included. Each table is named for the 
corresponding subheading in that chapter, and conventions are listed in the order in 
which they appear in the main body of the thesis. I identify the presence of each 
convention in up to seven of the golden age trial films discussed in chapter one: 
these films are Witness for the Prosecution, Compulsion, Anatomy of a Murder, The 
Young Philadelphians, Inherit the Wind, Judgment at Nuremberg and To Kill a 
Mockingbird (listed here and hereafter in rough order of release date). Although I 
do discuss 12 Angry Men in chapter one, and continue to consider it an exemplary 
trial narrative, its absence of a conventionally situated trial sequence (bar the brief 
scene depicting the end of the trial at the beginning of the film) has led me to 
exclude it from these tables. Where I have deemed it appropriate, I include specific 
textual detail regarding each film’s use a given convention, but the purpose of the 
appendix has resulted in a primarily quantitative approach. 
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Table 1: The Conventions Used in Depicting the Space of the Courtroom 
Courtroom space conforms to 
basic layout as identified in 
Figure 1 (page 56), with some 
allowance made for limited 
rearrangement (as described). 
Compulsion, Anatomy of a Murder, The Young 
Philadelphians, Inherit the Wind, To Kill a Mockingbird 
[jury box placed on far left rather than far right of the 
courtroom “stage”].  
Framing and composition 
during the main body of the 
trial sequence consistently 
includes one or more of the 
trial’s audiences into the frame 
Witness for the Prosecution, Compulsion, Anatomy of a 
Murder, The Young Philadelphians, Inherit the Wind, 
Judgment at Nuremberg, To Kill a Mockingbird. 
The Judge appears in the same 
frame as the witness during the 
latter’s testimony on at least 
one occasion  
Witness for the Prosecution, Anatomy of a Murder, The 
Young Philadelphians, Inherit the Wind, Judgment at 
Nuremberg, To Kill a Mockingbird. 
The triangular composition 
featuring witness, judge and 
lawyer in the frame is 
employed one at least one 
occasion  
Witness for the Prosecution, Anatomy of a Murder, The 
Young Philadelphians, Inherit the Wind, Judgment at 
Nuremberg, To Kill a Mockingbird. 
The U.S. Flag is visible within  
the courtroom in at least one of 
the trial sequence’s framings 
Anatomy of a Murder, The Young Philadelphians, Inherit 
the Wind, Judgment at Nuremberg, To Kill a 
Mockingbird. 
 
[N/A: Witness for the Prosecution] 
 
At least one stenographer is 
visible within the film’s 
courtroom 
Witness for the Prosecution, Compulsion, Anatomy of a 
Murder, The Young Philadelphians, Judgment at 
Nuremberg, To Kill a Mockingbird. 
Non-diegetic scoring is not 
included in the main body of 
the trial 
Witness for the Prosecution, Compulsion, Anatomy of a 
Murder, The Young Philadelphians, Inherit the Wind, 
Judgment at Nuremberg, To Kill a Mockingbird. 
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Table 2: The Conventions Used in Depicting the ‘Legal Actors’ 
The judge is featured in at least one isolated 
symmetrically framed shot that underlines 
the flat characterisation of this figure 
Witness for the Prosecution, Compulsion, 
The Young Philadelphians, Anatomy of a 
Murder, Inherit the Wind, Judgment at 
Nuremberg, To Kill a Mockingbird. 
 
The jury are relatively invisible, 
characterised through a lack of 
individualising detail, limited dialogue and 
screen time, and an absence of close-ups.  
Witness for the Prosecution, The Young 
Philadelphians, Anatomy of a Murder, 
Inherit the Wind, To Kill a Mockingbird. 
 
[N/A: Compulsion, Judgment at 
Nuremberg] 
 
All lawyer characters (including defence 
and prosecution counsel) are white males 
Witness for the Prosecution, Compulsion, 
The Young Philadelphians, Anatomy of a 
Murder, Inherit the Wind, Judgment at 
Nuremberg, To Kill a Mockingbird. 
 
The courtroom is depicted as physically and 
audibly crowded during the trial 
Witness for the Prosecution, Compulsion, 
The Young Philadelphians, Anatomy of a 
Murder, Inherit the Wind, Judgment at 
Nuremberg, To Kill a Mockingbird. 
 
Laughter from the diegetic spectators 
appears in the trial sequence, but is absent 
from the climactic dramatic moments 
Witness for the Prosecution, Compulsion, 
The Young Philadelphians, Anatomy of a 
Murder, Inherit the Wind. 
 
Murmuring from the courtroom spectators 
in response to events “on-stage” is present 
throughout the trial sequence 
Witness for the Prosecution, Compulsion, 
The Young Philadelphians, Anatomy of a 
Murder, Inherit the Wind, Judgment at 
Nuremberg, To Kill a Mockingbird. 
 
Judge orders silence from the spectators, 
verbally and/or through the use of the gavel, 
at least once during the sequence 
Witness for the Prosecution, Compulsion, 
The Young Philadelphians, Anatomy of a 
Murder, Inherit the Wind, To Kill a 
Mockingbird. 
 
370 
 
Journalists and/or photographers are visibly 
present in the courtroom during the trial 
Compulsion, The Young Philadelphians, 
Anatomy of a Murder, Inherit the Wind. 
At least one character who appears as 
witness in the trial is characterised as 
especially vulnerable to experiencing 
emotional and psychological distress while 
on the stand (due to any one or more of the 
following: an expected divulgence of 
information regarding their private life; an 
emotional attachment to defendant, plaintiff 
or victim; a perceived distance from the 
trial’s code of conduct figured through 
categories of age, race, gender, class or 
education) 
Witness for the Prosecution, Anatomy of a 
Murder, Inherit the Wind, Judgment at 
Nuremberg, To Kill a Mockingbird. 
The sequence is structured so that there is a 
progression from “distanced” witnesses 
(experts, officials, etc.) to witnesses who 
are more intimately involved with the 
events/issues/relationships at stake in the 
trial 
Witness for the Prosecution, Compulsion, 
The Young Philadelphians, Anatomy of a 
Murder, Inherit the Wind, Judgment at 
Nuremberg, To Kill a Mockingbird. 
The “vulnerable” or intimately involved 
witness is asked to speak up and/or repeat 
themselves at a point where they have just 
divulged particularly personal information 
to the court. 
Compulsion, Anatomy of a Murder, 
Judgment at Nuremberg. 
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Table 3: The Conventions of ‘Courtroom/Drama’ 
Film depicts the process of court coming 
to order at the outset of a trial sequence 
(including the arrival of spectators and/or 
judge, and the formal announcement that 
“court is in session”) 
Anatomy of a Murder, Judgment at 
Nuremberg, To Kill a Mockingbird. 
Sequence contains establishing long shots 
and/or camera pans that survey the 
courtroom at the outset 
Witness for the Prosecution, Compulsion, The 
Young Philadelphians, Anatomy of a Murder, 
Inherit the Wind, Judgment at Nuremberg, To 
Kill a Mockingbird. 
A witness being sworn in on the stand is 
depicted in full at least once during the 
trial sequence 
Witness for the Prosecution, The Young 
Philadelphians, Anatomy of a Murder, Inherit 
the Wind, Judgment at Nuremberg, To Kill a 
Mockingbird. 
The sequence contains at least one 
surprise witness (with “surprise” identified 
through the responses of the other 
characters within the diegesis and the 
viewer’s prior unawareness of this 
development) 
Witness for the Prosecution, The Young 
Philadelphians, Anatomy of a Murder, Inherit 
the Wind. 
There is at least one instance of an 
emotional outburst or breakdown from a 
witness on the stand 
Witness for the Prosecution, Inherit the Wind, 
Judgment at Nuremberg, To Kill a 
Mockingbird. 
There is at least one instance of an 
outburst or breakdown that occurs from an 
individual who is not on the witness stand 
but who is acting in response to the action 
taking place in the trial 
Witness for the Prosecution [defendant cries 
out in response to one witnesses’ testimony], 
Compulsion [defendant collapses at the end of 
one witnesses’ testimony], Anatomy of a 
Murder [defendant cries out in response to one 
witnesses’ testimony], Judgment at 
Nuremberg [defendant addresses the defence 
counsel during another witnesses’ testimony in 
protest of the witnesses’ treatment]. 
 
Lawyer’s objections (and the judge’s 
rulings on these objections) are depicted 
on multiple occasions during the 
sequence, acting as a structuring dramatic 
event 
The Young Philadelphians, Anatomy of a 
Murder, Inherit the Wind, Judgment at 
Nuremberg. 
Sequence contains a climactic speech from 
a legal professional character 
Compulsion, Judgment at Nuremberg, To Kill 
a Mockingbird. 
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A jury foreman stands and delivers the 
verdict to the court near the end of the 
sequence. 
Witness for the Prosecution, The Young 
Philadelphians, Anatomy of a Murder, To Kill 
a Mockingbird. 
 
[N/A: Compulsion, Judgment at Nuremberg] 
 
The film ends in or around the courtroom, 
in a manner that situates the court as a site 
of resolution and closure, and implies the 
possibility of justice through the law, 
regardless of the outcome of the case on 
trial. 
Witness for the Prosecution, Compulsion, The 
Young Philadelphians, Inherit the Wind. 
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